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TH~  Author  of  this  book  gladly  welcomes  the 
appearance  of  an  English  translation  of  so satis- 
factory a character.  At the same time it may be well 
to remind  the  English reader  that this is a  history 
of an  English institution written  by  a foreigner and 
intended for the use  of  foreigners.  Difficulties must 
arise  in  any attempt  to  judge  the  institutions  of 
other countries  and to form an opinion  with  regard 
to advisable  refbrms.  The task  is  especially  hard 
in  the case  of  a  country like  England,  where more 
attention is paid  to facts  than  to theories.  Hence 
with  respect  to  various  questions,  especially  some 
arising  towards  the end  of  the work,  when  I  have 
been unable to support my own views by the opinions ' 
of  an  English  authority,  I  have  chosen  rather  to 
confine  myself  to a  statement  of  the facts  than  to 
set  forth  theories  which  might  be  disproved  by 
subsequent events. 
Moreover,  in  writing  for  French  readers,  I  have 
described  various matters and in particular historical 
events,  the  discussion  of  which  may  perhaps  'e 
Su~erfluous  for  English  readers.  I  must then  ask 
the  latter  to  remember  that  the  political  and xx  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE. 
economic  history  of  Great  Britain  is  less  well 
known  to continental readers than  to themselves. 
I  am conscious  of  many  other short-comings  in 
tLis  book,  which  is  a  product  of  youth ; were  it 
not for the pressure of  University  duties and other 
work  I  should  have completed  and revised  it.  In 
its present form it is the result of  the conscientious 
study of  several  years ; and as such  I  hope it will 
obtain  the indulgence of  my new  readers. 
It only remains for me  to express my thanks to 
Mrs.  H. 0.  Meredith,  who has spared no pains  in 
the work  of  translation,  and to Professor  Foxwell, 
whose  instructive  preface  is  sufficient in  itself  to 
give the book a  special value. 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
TO THE SECOND  EDITION 
is  less a preface than a kind of  apology.  I  was from 
first fully aware of  the many  shortcomings of  a work, 
which, though it  took  nearly  four years of  constant work, 
was written when  the author was still very  young.  As a 
matter of fact it was his first large publication. 
In consequence I  looked forward to a second edition with 
the  hope  of  re-moulding  many  chapters,  especially  those 
concerning  the eighteenth  century,  of  adding some tables 
showing the progress of  the Bank  in  the different branches 
of  its activity,  and last,  but  not least  of  devoting a  large 
chapter to the History of  the Bank of  England during The 
Great War. 
But the Greek and the Continental libraries generally ;ire 
insufficiently equipped for a work of  such a description, and 
moreover, while my time in Greece was taken up by sc.vc.ral 
works on  Greek finances and their history, such short stays 
as  I  was  able to  make  in  England  in  recent  years  acrc3 
:thsorbed by a work on the population of  the British Empire 
during and after The Great War.' 
My only chance of carrying out my plans would have been 
a postponement of  this second edition till  1926, which would 
haw allowed me to spend two summers at least in England, 
vk., the minimum of  time which a thorough revision would 
have required.  Rut I have to pay the ransom of  a somehow 
unexpected  success, and the demand of  the public obliges 
the publishers to bring a new edition without delay through 
the press. 
'This being so, it was thought better to leave the book as it 
stands,  and,  while apologising to my new readers, to hope 
'  It  was published  in  193  as  a  Supplrrnent to Metros, the  Intern;~tional 
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that their numbers will be great enough to allow for a third- 
this time enlarged and revised-edition-t  a not too distant 
date. 
I  cannot  bring  these  few  remarks  to  a  close  without 
expressing once more my gratitude to Mrs. Meredith and to 
Prof. Foxwell.  I am aware that the popularity of this book 
-which  in  many  respects  is  a  pechd  de jeunesse-is  due 
to  a  very  large extent  to the  admirable  translation  of  the 
former and the not less admirable preface of  the latter. 
A. ANDR~ADBS,  c.B.E., 
Dean of  the FanJty of  Law 
Athens,Jnne,  1924.  of  Athens. 
PREFACE. 
EN~~1sHMEN  may be pardoned if they regard the Bank 
of England as the greatest financial institution in the 
world.  It is far inferior, no doubt, to many Conti- 
nental banks, in the extent of its metallic reserves and 
of  its  note  circulation ; and  there  are  even  other 
English banks which hold a larger amount of private 
deposits.  It  can hardly be considered so  essentially a 
bank as the Banks of  France and Germany, 
each of which does a larger business in the provinces 
than  in  the  capital : it is not so democratic in  the 
range  of  its operations as  the  Banque de  France, 
perhaps not so  directly associated with general enter- 
prise  as the  Reichsbank.  No  existing  bank  can 
boast a history at  the same time so  long, so  continuous 
and so distinguished ; nor has any played  so large 
and so  worthy a part, not merely  in the fortunes of a 
great nation, but also in the general financial activities 
of the world. 
The history of this famous Bank, here presented in 
an English version  by  Mrs. Meredith, must be held 
to be in many respects a tour de force.  It was written 
by  a  Greek,  in  French : and  notwithstanding  the 
double difficulty with which the author had to contend 
in  describing  an  institution,  so  characteristically 
English, in  a  language not his own, it is  the most 
comprehensive and most readable account of the Bank 
yet  published.  Dr.  AndrCadks,  indeed,  following 
Mr.  Stephens,  goes so far as  to say that nothing 
deserving  to be  called  a  history  of  the  Bank  had 
Previously been written, though the attempt had more 
than  once  been  made.  If  this  be  so,  the  fact is xxiv  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  XXV 
sufficiently remarkable, and suggests reflections, some 
not too pleasant, to those who are concerned for the 
credit  of  English  Economics.  In what sense must 
we accept the statement ? 
We  must  certainly  agree,  with  M.  Lyon-Caen, 
that no complete history  of the  Bank existed before 
the appearance of  this book.  Many valuable contri- 
butions  to such a  history  had  been  published  from 
time to time ; but all  of  them  left  something to be 
desired.  Some were  fragmentary, some were hardly 
scientific ; in  the best  of  them  history  is often  only 
incidental  to the author's main purpose ; nearly  all, 
a characteristically English fault, were unsystematic ; 
none of them covered the whole period, even approxi- 
mately.  We had  no complete, formal and scientific 
account,  such  as would  compare  for  instance  with 
Alphonse Courtois' history of the Banque de France. 
Let us glance at some of  the more important ex- 
isting works.  The account given by Macleod, in his 
Theory and  Practice of  Bnnking, may be said to have 
held the field before the appearance of Dr. Andrbadks' 
history.  It  is  in  many  respects  very  good  within 
its  limits;  the  present  writer,  like  the  late  Henry 
Sidgwick,  found  it  more  suggestive and instructive 
than any other.  But the historical work was merely 
incidental  with  Macleod,  not  his principal  aim ; as 
may be gathered from the fact that the word 'history' 
does not even occur  on the title of his book ; and his 
vigorous sketch deals with  banking rather than with 
the Bank : a  distinction,  I  will  admit, which  counts 
for less in earlier times than it would to-day. 
Tooke and Newmarch  (the former especially) have 
also  contributed  invaluable  material  in  their  well- 
known  Histo~y  of  Prices, notably  for  the period  of 
the  Napoleonic  war,  but  in  hardly  less  degree for 
the whole  period  1793-1857 covered  by  them.  But 
Tooke's  work  might  be  regarded  as a  documented 
argument rather than a reasoned history:  an objection 
apply  to  Macleod  as  well,  though 
perhaps  not quite to the same degree.  The object of 
both writers  was rather to establish a  controversial 
thesis  than  to give a  scientific  explanation  of  the 
course of events.  None the less, each work contains 
abundant  and  trustworthy  historical  material : the 
unconcealed bias of the writers does not seem to have 
interfered  with  their  accurate  record  of  the  facts. 
~\~~~~d  bias, indeed, rarely  misleads ; what is really 
dangerous is the pretence  of  impartiality.  Tooke, 
sometimes puts upon the facts a cbnstruction 
they  cannot fairly  bear ; on  the  other  hand,  he  is 
most careful to give references, the lack of which is a 
principal defect in Macleod.  It is certain that every- 
one who essays to deal  with  the history  of  English 
banking must be deeply indebted to  both these writers. 
There are some excellent authorities, too, upon the 
earlier years of the history of the Bank.  First among 
them in merit, though not in  time, I  would mention 
'I'horold  Rogers, whose First Nine Years of  the Bank 
of  England  has always seemed to me the most brilliant 
of  his  many contributions to econolnic history.  It 
is, of  course, only a  fragment ; but it is a model for 
the  economic  historian.  Among others who  have 
thrown  light  on  the  earlier  history  must  also  be 
mentioned  Mr. Hilton  Price, Mr.  Maberly  Phillips, 
and  the  late  Mr.  J.  B.  Martin  whose  numerous 
works and papers are full  of  valuable information as 
to  early  banking  history,  banking  practice,  and 
banking documents.  Many others might be named, 
did  space  permit,  who have  made similar  valuable 
studies of local banking, and individual banks.  What 
seems to be an admirable sketch, covering a  longer 
period in a more connected way, must be noted here ; 
1  mean  Mr.  W.  R.  Bisschop's  De  Opkomst  der 
Londensche  Geldmarkt :  1640-1826 :  S'Gravenhage, 
'896.  Unfortunately  many  of  us are debarred  by 
linguistic limitations from  profiting as we otherwise xxvi  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  xxvii 
might from  the acute and critical exposition of this 
scholarly writer. 
Returning to the larger works,  Lawson's Hi~r0t.y 
of  Banking  is another  book  of  considerable  merit. 
It wants system, but  has a  great deal of  interesting 
information  about the early  history  of  banking,  is 
throughout  well-informed  on  points  of  banking 
practice, and deserves special mention for the frequent 
references to the relations between  the Bank and the 
Government,  on  which  little  has  been  written  in 
English, though Dr. Philippovich, in his Die  Bank volr 
England im Dicnste dev  Fhnnsvema  ltwg  des Sfnates, 
has treated  it exhaustively  over the whole period up 
to 1884.  Lawson's  book  too has an Appendix full 
of  interesting  matter,  including  a  reprint  of  the 
Charter  and  By-Laws  of  the  Bank.  It has  been 
objected  to Lawson, and it is  still more true of  the 
better-known  History  of  the  Bank  of England  by 
Francis, that his history is too anecdotal and popular 
in  form.  Neither  writer,  however,  appealed  to an 
academic audience, nor would have found one at that 
time if he had.  It may  at any rate be  said of both 
works that they contain matter of value, the result of 
pretty  wide  reading.  Gilbart  again  is  a  writer  of 
whom  we  must  speak  with  respect.  His contri- 
butions  to the history  of  banking  range  wide over 
both time and place.  He  has written of banking not 
merely  in  the  United  Kingdom,  but  in  America  as 
well ;  and has not confined  his studies to the period 
he knew best, the first half  of  the 19th century.  No 
one could accuse him  of  being unduly readable ; his 
writing is always methodical and often didactic to the 
verge of pomposity.  As might be expected from the 
founder and manager of  the first great London Joint 
Stock Bank, his works are full of details of administra- 
tion,  of  which  modern  students  may  be  a  little 
impatient;  but  they  are solid,  well  furnished  with 
statistics, and of  real  value  to the historian.  They 
are not however so directly  concerned with the Bank 
of  England as with  Joint  Stock Banking.  Passing 
over  slighter sketches and papers, of  which there are 
very many, as well  as books  like those of Maclaren, 
really  a  history  of  opinions,  and  of  Doubleday,  a 
..table  criticism  of  the funding system, we come in 
conclusion to  a writer of foremost importance, happily 
still  active,  Mr.  Inglis  Palgrave.  He is our  main 
source  of  information  for  the  history  of  English 
banking  in  the  last  half-century.  His mastery  of 
English banking statistics is unrivalled ;  he has given 
US,  partly in published works,  partly  in the Bankers' 
Magmine and elsewhere, a long series of  studies of 
the discount rate and the changes in English banking 
structure and banking methods ;  and in his last work, 
Bank  Rate  and  the  Money  MavRet,  we  have  a 
collection of comparative statistics from 1844 to rgoo 
which seems to exhaust the available material on the 
subject. 
If, then, we have no adequate history of the Bank, 
it is  evident that very important contributions to such 
a  history  exist.  Moreover,  as Dr. AndrCadks  truly 
says, the records they contain are full of incident and 
attraction, almost of romance.  Why have we had to 
wait so long for a  worthy  formal and fairly complete 
handling  of  such  an  interesting  and  fundamental 
chapter  in  our  economic history 3  Dr.  AndrCadks 
makes a modest reference to the difficulty and magni- 
tude  of  the  task ; but  he does not seem convinced 
that this is quite an adequate explanation.  Probably 
various  reasons  will  occur  to the  reader.  I  will 
venture  to  suggest  two  considerations  which  may 
have  given  pause  to others, as they certainly did to 
myself;  and  I  write  as one  who  for  more  than a 
quarter of  a  century  has felt that special fascination 
ln banking  history to which our author refers. 
The  first  is  the  remarkable  absence  of  official 
records  in  connection  with  the Bank,  especially  for xxviii  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  xxix 
the first  century  of  its activity.  It has  often  been 
observed that the  English  are peculiarly fortunate in 
this matter of records ;  a  result partly of  their habits 
of  publicity,  and  of  the  representative  character of 
their political  life.  Speaking  of  our legal  records, 
Maitland says they form "a  series which for continuity 
and catholicity, minute detail and authoritative value 
has-I  believe  that we  may  safely say it-no  equal, 
no rival, in  the world."  This is  equally true in the 
case of many of our economic and political institutions. 
The Bank  of  England stands out as a striking ex- 
ception to the rule.  It  never seems to have published 
any reports, or even to have preserved its own minutes 
and accounts.  We have mainly to rely for any official 
knowledge of its operations on the occasional returns 
extracted  by  Parliamentary  Committees, and on the 
weekly returns under the Act of 1844, which competent 
judges  have declared  to be  the most valuable result 
secured by  that Act.  But the Committees throw no 
light on the period  before  the French war ; and the 
returns  under the Act of  1844 are very inadequate. 
Neither source gives the mass of valuable information 
contained  in  the  Annual  Reports  of  the  Banks of 
France  and  Germany,  and  indeed  of  most  of  the 
foreign  banks.  Hence there are many questions of 
Bank  policy  which  can  only  be  studied  upon  such 
basis  as is afforded  by  hearsay,  and the articles or 
occasional utterances of individuals. 
This absence of  official  records  greatly  increases 
the labour involved  in  writing a history of the Bank, 
and ,makes  the  result  of  it,  after  all is  done,  less 
complete and authentic than  could  be wished.  But 
we  should probably  have  had our history, authentic 
or not, if this had been  all that stood in the way.  It 
was  not  the absence of  official  records  that  left  so 
many other chapters of  English economic history to 
be first dealt with  by  foreigners.  The main cause is 
to be found in the anti-historical bias of the dominant 
,,hool  of  English  official  economists,  mast of  them 
avowed  disciples  of  that  most  unhistorical  writer, 
*avid  Ricardo.  Their doctrinaire habits of thought, 
their belief  that they  were  in possession of a set 
of  principles " of universal application, led them to  ' 
frown  on historical  research  as at best  mere  waste 
of time.  No  physician,  worthy  of  the name,  will 
prescribe without some knowledge, direct or inferred, 
of the history  of  the case under treatment.  To the 
typical English economist, however, who claimed that 
his  "laws"  were,  would  or should be  (he was not 
clear about the tense) of  world-wide  pertinence, 
historical differences had no interest, and he relegated 
history  to the antiquary.  This,  as we  now  see,  is 
really the attitude of  the quack.  What is curious is, 
that in England, and to some extent in France also, 
the  quack  methods  received  the  sanction  of  the 
professed  practitioner, and it was left to the layman 
to follow  the sounder practice.  Hence for the half- 
century  and  more  during  which  this  "orthodox" 
school  has been  supreme, such economic history  as 
was written in England was written outside academic 
circles, or at  least by  men whose work was under the 
ban of the dominant school.  I  well  remember how 
completely  this  school  ostracised  Macleod.  His 
admirable  historical  work, to which so many writers 
are indebted,  was appreciated  in  every  country but 
his own.  Here,  because  of  certain  eccentricities in 
his  theoretical  position,  his  whole  works were  pro- 
scribed,  Richard Jones  in earlier days met a similar 
fate,  though  Whewell  preserved  him  from  entire 
neglect ; and Cliffe  Leslie  in  later times did not fare 
much better.  There are many living economists who 
are  not  likely  to  forget  the  discouragement  they 
suffered  by  this official  blight  on  historical  studies. 
Fortunately  this  has  all  passed  away,  never,  we 
Inay  confidently  assert,  to  return ; passed  away so 
completely  that  the  younger  men  perhaps  hardly xxx  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  XXX~ 
realise how much  it crippled and narrowed the work 
of the generation  before  them.  Thanks mainly to 
the example of leaders like Archdeacon Cunningham 
and Professor Ashley, and later to the encouragement 
given  to  realistic  studies  at the  London School of 
Economics,  we now  have a  public which  welcomes 
the results of  historical  research,  and there is a large 
and growing  number  of  scholars actively  engaged 
upon it.  The worst reproach  on English economic 
achievement is  now in a fair way to be removed. 
With  these  attempts  to  explain  what  I  cannot 
pretend  to excuse, let me leave the question of  our 
English shortcomings in this matter, and turn to the 
more  agreeable  work  of  considering  the  brilliant 
essay  in  which  Dr.  AndrCadks  has gone so far to 
supply what we  lacked. 
No two  persons,  reviewing  so large  a  mass  of 
situations and incidents, would  be  likely to agree in 
every  estimate of  evidence, or in all their judgments 
upon  the  actors  in  the  drama.  If  I  may  venture 
to express an  opinion, I should say  that Dr. AndrCadks 
seems, on the whole, to have shown a singularly sure 
instinct in  his appreciations.  There are of  course a 
few points of fact, and some minor contentions, which 
might deserve examination,  if  this were  the proper 
place  for it; but  in  general,  and notably  on many 
much disputed issues, his conclusions seem to me, at 
any rate, to be sound and scholarly.  Where I should 
differ most, is in regard  to the period covered by the 
French war, and more particularly as to the conduct 
of the Bank during the Restriction. 
This period  is classical  in the history of banking, 
and has attracted the attention of  every writer on the 
subject.  Never  was  the  fate  of  England  and  her 
Empire more intimately  bound  up with the fortunes 
of her national credit ; and there is no chapter in the 
long story of the Bank of England in regard to which 
her conduct has been so  severely censured.  On both 
grounds  it must always be  of special  interest to an 
historian of our National Bank ;  and we might expect 
that  the  traditional  verdicts  would  receive  a  very 
careful  and  critical  scrutiny at his hands.  It is just 
here  that  our  author,  who  is  not  afraid  to make 
into party politics, and to shower censures 
on pitt which will not commend themselves to every- 
one,  seems  to become  less venturesome  in  dealing 
with the banking history, and follows too faithfully, 
,s  some may think, the generally accepted views.  It 
may  be  worth  while,  then,  to  state  briefly  some 
considerations  which  he has perhaps under-rated. 
Too much can easily be made of the iniquity of the 
Restriction itself, especially as a ground for reflections 
on the Bank.  The  difficulties of the Bank throughout 
were mainly  due to its strong patriotism and loyalty 
to the Government.  Even  the Government,  in  the 
persistent  demands upon  the Bank which  made the 
Restriction  necessary,  was  only following the well- 
established  policy  of  the  titne.  In  the  eighteenth 
century  nations  exploited  their  banks  in  the  same 
ruthless,  impenitent  way  as  they  exploited  their 
colonies and their trade.  The contemporary  Cnisse 
dlEscompte in  France,  otherwise a  very  promising 
and well-managed institution, was completely wrecked 
by the insatiable demands of  the State : and in later 
Years  the Rnnque  de  Frnnce  was  more  than  once 
brought by the same policy to a temporary suspension 
of Payments.  Nor is it so certain, quite apart from 
18th century  notions,  that we  could  even  now get 
through  a  first-rate  war  without  an  inconvertible 
'Urrency.  Gilbart, giving evidence before the Com- 
mittee on Banks of  Issue in  1841, says very frankly 
and emphatically  that  in  the  event of  another war 
as the war with France, '' I would, immediately 
On  the commencement of  the war, issue an order in 
Council  for  the  Bank to stop payment."  He says 
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payments in  1797 "was  not a  matter of  choice, but 
of  necessity-it  has  since  been  confirmed  by  the 
writings  of  McCulloch."  Quite  recently  again,  at 
the discussion of Sir Robert Giffen's important paper 
at the  Royal  United  Service  Institution  in  March, 
I 908,  several  speakers  expressed  their  conviction 
that a  suspension  of  payments would  be  inevitable 
on  the  outbreak of  a  first-rate  war; and Sir Felix 
Schuster said  that we should  certainly prohibit the 
shipment of  gold to the enemy, which would involve 
a  partial suspension.  To  find precedents for such a 
policy  we  need  not go back  to  1797.  We have an 
excellent example to hand  in  the case of  France in 
1870.  Suspension,  then,  must be  considered  as a 
still possible expedient, rather  than as the scandal of 
a less enlightened age. 
It  is admitted by the severest critics of the Bank that 
there is no substantial ground for complaint as to its 
conduct during the Restriction  until 1808-9.  There 
does not seem indeed to have been  any real  deprecia- 
tion  of  its paper until  that date.  The price  of  £4 
per ounce which  figures  monotonously for the years 
1803-9,  was  really  an arbitrary  price,  fixed  by  the 
Bank itself as one at which it would purchase foreign 
gold.lThe Bank, in  fact,  was adopting at its own 
expense  the  policy  so common  on  the  Continent 
to-day  of  strengthening the reserve  by  buying gold 
at a premium.  No doubt it is less easy to  defend the 
action of  the Bank just after  1808.  It might  have 
done more than it actually did to check the speculative 
movement at that time.  But events in South America 
were  opening  up splendid  opportunities,  which  the 
English did  well  to seize, even  at some risks.  We 
must consider too,  how  limited  were  the  means  of 
control then at the disposition of the Bank.  Regula- 
+Cf. the Resolution of  the Committee of  Treasury,  28 Mar.  1804, in Appendix 
to Report of  1819. 
tion by the rate of discount, the method now approved, 
,as  quite out of  the question.  The Usury law pre- 
vented a higher rate than 5%, and the Bank had long 
made  5"/0  its minimum.  It had to work therefore with 
fixed  rate of  discount.  Its policy in  regard to the 
granting of accommodation seems very cautious, even 
in  with modern practice.  Tooke tells us 
(I., p.  159) "The  rule by  which  the Bank directors 
professed  to be,  and were  in  the main  guided,"  was 
"the  demand for discount of  good mercantile  bills, 
not  exceeding 61 days date,  at the rate  of  5%  per 
annum";  and he adds that this rule "did,  with  the 
necessary  policy  of  Government  in  periodically  re- 
ducing  the  floating  debt  within  certain  limits  by 
funding, operate as a principle of  limitation upon the 
total  issues  of  the  Bank."  If  the  Bank wished  to 
contract its circulation, what courses were open to it? 
To refuse accommodation  altogether  is always held 
to be  dangerous.  To make personal  preferences  is 
invidious, especially for a  National  Bank.  It is just 
possible the Bank might have resorted to the expedient 
used  in  1795-6,  I  mean  the  granting  of  pl-o  ratn 
discounts ; but  even  so,  it  must  have  put  severe 
pressure  on  the  market,  and risked  the creation  of 
panic.  Further,  its  power  over  the  market  was 
seriously diminished by  the rapid growth and reckless 
advances of the country banks.  It was to these banks, 
and not  to the  Bank of  England, that most of  the 
troubles of  the Restriction were due.  The Bank was 
practically responsible for the solvency of this crowd of 
Small, ill-managed institutions, but dared not call them 
to account, on peril  of  provoking  a  general collapse 
of credit.  Thus the country banks over-traded with- 
Out  check, and on a  moderate estimate had  afloat  a 
~irculation  of  f;~o,ooo,ooo,  a  figure  never  touched 
the circulation of the Bank itself. 
Still there were  those who held  that, cost what it 
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paper and the exchanges to par.  Tooke seems on 
the whole to have been of this opinion ; but he clearly 
perceives and fairly states the extreme danger of such 
a course.  After noting the difficulties imposed by the 
Usury law, he says, "Under  these circumstances, and 
at such a time of  unprecedented  political difficulties, 
I  am perfectly convinced  that if  the attempt alluded 
to had been  made, there would have been  a  moment 
of  total stoppage of  business, something very like a 
general suspension of all payments except for retail 
purposes, and of  all business excepting retail trade " 
(1  p.  8).  The alternative open to the Bank is 
admirably stated by him in another passage (I., p. 164), 
too long to quote here.  The Bank  had  to choose 
between  '(violent changes in  the state of the money 
market"  and  "extraordinary  fluctuations  in  the 
exchanges."  If  the issues had been  rigorously con- 
tracted so as to keep the exchanges at par, the most 
disastrous pressure would  have  been  caused  in  the 
money market.  In this earlier passage Tooke seems 
to think a financial  crisis the lesser evil  of  the two. 
But there is much to be  said for the opposite view. 
We should remember that it was a main point with 
Napoleon to wreck our national credit.  He  regarded 
the remarkable credit  development in  England as a 
prime source of its military power, so  long as it could 
be maintained ; but he was equally satisfied  that the 
development  had  proceeded  to a  dangerous  extent, 
and that it would be quite possible to bring about its 
collapse.':'  To that  object  he  directed  many of  his 
~neasures.  He permitted the free import of corn to 
England, in  the hope that it would cause a drain of 
gold.  The Berlin and Milan decrees  not oniy aimed 
at injuring our trade, but at destroying the basis of 
our credit,  by  causing drains of  bullion ; and they 
..:;This has been clearly shown by  lliss Cu~lningl~am,  in an interesting paper, 
shortly  to  appear, upon Napo/eoon's Attack  on British Credil, which  I  have 
had the advantage of  reading in hlS. 
undoubtedly helped to bring about the high premium 
on exchange  in  1810.  If  the  Bank,  in  the attempt 
correct  this  premium,  had  caused  an  internal 
stringency,  and thereby provoked a general crisis, it 
have exactly realised  Napoleon's  aims.  Our 
credit,  then (as now),  was our strongest resource  in 
war ; then (as now), it was a vulnerable point, and its 
destruction  was the first  and main  objective of  the 
enemy. 
considerations of  this kind, no doubt, rather than 
arguments, led  Parliament and the Bank in 
 is^ 1 to reject the main recommendation of the Bullion 
Committee.  For my part,  I believe they were right ; 
and  that  if  at a  time  of  such  unprecedented  dis- 
turbance to trade, the Bank had followed the counsels 
of the doctvtnaires, the whole  system of  war finance 
would  have  collapsed.  But  the  rejection  of  the 
Report, together with the passing of Lord Stanhope's 
Act  in  the same year, which  put a check on the not 
too  patriotic  Lord  King,  and  saved  us  from  the 
danger of  "two  prices,"  enabled  the  Bank to pull 
through.  As it  was,  and  without  the forced  con- 
traction of issues which resumption must have caused, 
prices  fell, according to Jevotls'  investigations, from 
164 in  1810  to  I 17 in  1819, or tlearly 29  per cent.  in 
nine  years.  It may be  doubted  whether, at such a 
critical  time,  the  country  could  have  supported  a 
more  rapid  fall. 
The situation, one would think, was so difficult and 
uncertain, that even  if  Parliament and the Bank had 
made  an error  of  judgment,  the  error  might  have 
been  pardoned,  or at least gently handled ; all  the 
more  too,  inasmuch  as many  weighty  authorities, 
merchants, bankers, and writers, inclined against the 
recolnlnendation  of  the Cotnmittee.  But  the  Dank 
hqd  a  consistent  and  uncon~pro~~lising  enemy  in 
R'cardo.  He came  to  the  front  in  the  currency 
Controversies, and was soon  to be the acknowledged xxxvi  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  xxxvii 
head  of  the "  new  school " of  economists ; and his 
hostility is reflected in the unconsidered severity of tra- 
ditional censure.  Ricardo's animus was unconcealed; 
its origin I do not know, and it would be unprofitable 
to speculate upon it.  In a letter to Malthus in  1815, 
he writes, "  I always enjoy an attack upon the Bank, 
and if  I had sufficient courage,  I  would be a party to 
it."  He  seems to have found  his courage later.  In 
1822 he denounced  the  Bank  in  Parliament as "  a 
company of merchants who . . . did not acknowledge 
the true principles of the currency, and who, in fact, in 
his opinion, did not know anything about it."  It was 
precisely because they  were  a company of merchants 
that they saved the trade of the country from the crude 
prescription of  the doctrinaires.  However it is only 
fair to Ricardo to note that though he never tired of 
abusing the Bank, he was far from entirely approving 
the Report of  1810, which  he is  so  often assumed to 
have  inspired.  For in  a  letter  to that able  writer 
Wheatley, dated  18th September, 1821, we  find  him 
writing "  You rather misconceive my opinions on this 
question.  1 never should advise agovernment to  restore 
a currency which was depreciated  30 per cent. to par 
. . .  It  was without any legislation that the currency 
from  1813  to 1819 became  . .  .  within  5  per cent. 
of  the value of  gold,-it  was in this state of things, 
and not with a currency depreciated 30 per cent., that 
I  advised  a  recurrence  to  the old  standard."  The 
policy  he  here  disclaims  was  precisely  the  policy 
recommended by the Bullion Committee.  It is perhaps 
doubtful  whether  Ricardo's  view  was  so  qualified 
in  1810-1  I ;  and we  may  well  be  thankful that men 
of  more  cautious  temper  were  at  the  helm  then. 
Huskisson, who knew  both  the times and the man 
exceptionally  well,  pronounced  a  judgment  on 
Ricardo  in  1826 which  we  may extend to the whole 
party of the docfvinaires.  "  I believe," he said, "  that 
if that gentleman, ingenious as he was,  had been the 
sole director  of  the  Bank of  England,  the country 
would  before  this  have  seen  the  stoppage  of  that 
establishment."  (Speeches, 11. p. 462). 
Other critics have taken a kinder view of the action 
of the Bank.  Baring in  1819, and Adam Smith fifty 
years  before,  both  agree, that, as Smith puts it, the 
duty of the Bank to the public "  may sometimes have 
obliged  it,  any fault of its directors, to over- 
stock the circulation with paper money."  There was 
no  severer  critic  of  the  Restriction  finance  than 
~~~bl~day,  the opponent of  funding in all its forms. 
~~t  Doubleday,  far  from  thinking  that  the  Bank 
should  have  acted  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
Bullion Committee, says that it "seemed  to smack of 
a degree of fatuity that looked like political insanity" 
(p.  184).  Senior, too, even when criticising the Bank 
for the extension  of  its issues, concludes with words 
of  praise.  "Such  conduct,"  he says,  "injurious  as 
it was, is  a  model  of  sobriety and moderation when 
compared with that of any other individual or  commu- 
nity invested with similar powers " : and again, "  The 
Bank  directors  exercised  their  power  with  extra- 
ordinary  moderation."  And  Fullarton,  in  1844, 
speaks of  "the  deep debt which the nation owes the 
Bank for its services throughout that long and trying 
crisis" (p. 68), and adds, "  I  believe  they cannot  be 
too highly  appreciated ; and  I  believe,  further, that 
the same services could  not have been so beneficially 
performed  by  any mere  Bank  of  the  State,  or by 
any body whatever less intimately bound up in all its 
interests  and  relations  with  the  commercial  affairs 
and prosperity  of  the country.'' 
This  impression  certainly  grows  upon  me,  the 
more  I  read  the  history  of  the  period.  I  doubt 
whether  the  crowd  of  critics  who  have  repeated 
Ricardo's  censures  of  the  Bank  have  sufficiently 
distinguished between  the speculative views and the 
Practical  measures of the  Directors.  I  think it will xxxviii  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  xxxix 
appear,  the  more  the  circumstances  are examined, 
that their actual  policy  during the  Restriction  was 
generally guided  by  a  sound instinct.  It would be 
impossible to defend  some of  their arguments ; but 
they were  not there to argue.  As so  often happens 
with men of affairs, their policy was much better than 
the reasons they gave for it.  The fact remains that 
where there was about an even chance of failure, the 
Bank succeeded : we  may well  be grateful to it for 
steering the country safely  through the most critical 
period in the whole history  of its banking and credit 
system.  No doubt the Bank had  the defects of its 
qualities ;  it  may  have  laid  rather too much  stress 
upon  the urgency of  accommodating  the trade and 
commerce of the country : but if  so, its vices leaned 
to virtue's side.  Its principal difficulties were due to 
its  unwavering  loyalty  to  the  State ; and  to  its 
endeavour, so  far as lay  in  its power,  to avert undue 
pressure on the commercial  community.  These are 
the ends for which a National Bank exists. 
If we are to criticise the Bank, its conduct seems 
more open to objection in the twenty years after  than 
.  in  the twenty years before  the  Resumption  of  Cash 
Payments.  As our author's account  clearly  shows, 
its management of  the crises of  1825-6, and 1837-9 
was far from prudent ;  and this after full allowance is 
made for the difficulties caused by the Usury Law and 
the conversion  of  the debt in  the first period.  One 
cannot  help  feeling  too  that  much  grave currency 
trouble  might  have  been  spared  to our own times ir 
the Bank had given  a  more favourable consideration 
to the currency  proposals of  Alexander  Baring and 
Ricardo.  But here again the Directors might plead 
that  they  were  hardly  free  agents ; the  political 
situation was dominated  by Cobbett, whose hostility 
to  these  schemes  is  well-known.  For  the  worst 
blemish  on  the long and  honourable record  of  the 
Bank we must go  back to earlier times, to that fevered 
year IIZa  It  was the wild  competition of  the Bank 
with the South Sea Company which, more than any- 
thing  else,  as was  ably argued  by  a  contemporary 
writer, Was the prime cause of the speculative mania of 
that year,  The  Bank was never nearer ruin than at  that 
time, and only escaped, as Dr.  Andreades neatly puts 
it, by the  of its own proposals.  His caustic 
iudgment upon this episode seems fully warranted. 
Dr. ~~drtiades  apologizes for not having discussed 
,ore  exhaustively  the  question  of  liberty  of  note 
issue,  and the particular system of  issue imposed  by 
the Act  of  1844,  another legacy of the doclvznaires. 
English  readers will hardly complain of this: the Act 
has been  discussed ad nauseam.  The vital question 
for us to-day  is not so much liberty bf  issue, as the 
discovery of some means of regaining the elasticity of 
issue  of  which  the  Act  of  1844 deprived  us.  The 
whole  question  of  note  issue,  in  so  far  as it  is 
separable from the question of reserve, is of much less 
importance for England than for most other countries. 
But there are some omissions in this history which 
strike  one.  It is  hardly  as strong  as might  be 
wished on the documentary and statistical side.  One 
would have welcomed an Appendix  containing some 
fundamental  statistics : for  instance,  statistics  of 
Capital,  Dividends,  Reserves,  Discount  Rates,  and 
Note Circulation.  A history of the Charter renewals 
would  have been convenient :  the original Charter and 
BY-laws, the monopoly and other important Acts, and 
certain Orders and other documents might  well  have 
been printed.  These are the things most useful, and 
generally most  inaccessible, both  to the student and 
the  man  of  affairs.  Again,  some  account  of  the 
various forms of Notes, Cheques, Bills, Tokens, etc., 
issued or handled  by the  Bank, such as might  have 
been gathered from the writings of Maberley Phillips, 
H1lton  Price,  Bisschop  and  Philippovich,  would 
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generally that the development  of  English  banking 
is very closely connected  with  the currency develop- 
ment,  and  neither  can  be  thoroughly  understood 
without  some  reference  to the other.  Some of  the 
incidents connected  with the Recoinages of  1696  and 
1774 have  left  their  mark  not  only on the currency 
history  of  the world,  but  upon  its banking history 
also,  and  certainly  on  the  history  of  the  Bank of 
England.  It  would  be  difficult,  for  instance,  to 
exaggerate  the  importance  of  the  rejection,  in 
deference to Locke's plausible platitudes, of  the very 
well  considered  Report of  the  Parliamentary  Com- 
mittee of 1695.  Much the same may be said in regard 
to outside systems of banking.  The development  of 
banking in  Scotland and  Ireland is  intimately  con- 
nected at many epochs with the history of  the  Bank. 
More information also might  have  been given as to 
the relation of  the  Bank to various  groups of  other 
English  banks.  The growth  of  the country banks 
and the extent to which  they were  able to force the 
hand of the central institution, might have formed  a 
special study, which  would  have  thrown  much  light 
on the period  1793-1 844.  Another might have been 
devoted  to  the  Bank's  relations  with  the group of 
City  bankers,  and with  the Clearing.  More detail 
might  been  given,  too,  in  regard  to Joplin's  move- 
ment,  the  relaxation  of  the  Bank  monopolies,  the 
growth  of  the  great  Joint  Stock  Banks,  and  the 
effects produced by these  changes upon  the position 
of  the  Bank, and its control over the money market. 
After all is said, however, the fact remains that we 
have in  this work  of  Dr. Andrdadits the best general 
survey of the subject which exists.  It is the only one 
that  covers  the  whole  period  of  the Bank's history, 
and takes note of all the most important  passages  in 
it.  Its author shows a  remarkable familiarity  with 
English  methods  and  habits  of  thought,  and  his 
criticism is usually most just and temperate, and full 
suggestion and stimulus.  The earlier part 01  the 
history  has  never  before  been thrown into a form so 
convenient for English students; and they will find in 
the later part some new matter of  interest, especially 
the sketch of the relations between the Bank and the 
Treasury, and a  Memorandum  by  Sir Robert  Peel 
which has not appeared in any previous work  on the 
subject.  The whole  treatment  is always  alert  and 
animated,  the  topics  are vividly  presented  and well 
arranged,  and  above  all,  the  book  is  eminently 
readable and attractive. 
These merits seem to  have been generally recognized. 
Dr. AndrCadks' history has been everywhere  well  re- 
ceived, and by cone more cordially, I think, than by 
those who best appreciate the great difficultyofthe task. 
As I have ventured to touch on one or two matters in 
regard to which our paints of view are not exactly the 
same, it is all the more pleasant to me to be able to 
congratulate  the author upon his remarkable success, 
and  upon  the recognition it has rcceived,  not only in 
other countries, but in  his own, where he now holds 
an important Chair in the University of Athens. 
The work  of  the translator also calls for  grateful 
recognition.  The lucidity and vivacity of the original 
have  been  admirably preserved  in  Mrs.  Meredith's 
effective and idiomatic version.  While the translation 
is accurate, and keeps  closely to the text, it  has the 
unusual  merit  that it bears no trace, except perhaps 
in  its clearness and point,  of  the original  language 
from which it has been rendered.  Perhaps it should 
be mentioned here that the translator did not attempt 
a general revision of  the work, or the completion  of 
the  Bibliography ; though  many obvious slips and 
mis-spellings,  and occasional inaccuracies of quotation 
and  fact have been carefully corrected by reference to 
the original authorities. 
It only remains to note that the appearance of  the 
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and policy of National Banks is in some respects the 
supreme economic question of the day.  The  financier 
is in the ascendant ; his is the dominating influence 
on modern  econornic activities.  We are living in an 
age when financial  fortunes and financial  operations 
are upon a scale never  dreamt of  before ; and when 
price  manipulations  and  gold  movements are con- 
stantly causing wreckage and dislocation  of industry 
in greater or less degree.  If disturbing forces of this 
magnitude are to be  kept within  due control, it can 
only be  by  institutions  wielding national  resources, 
and under the direction of  men  representing general 
public  interests--men  in  touch  with  the  national 
commercial  and  industrial conditions,  and with  the 
general aims of the State. 
National Banks, then, are more necessary than they 
ever were ; though their  r81e  has changed.  If we 
look at their early history, either here or abroad, we 
shall  find  that  the  main  object  of  the  State  in 
establishing  relations with a Bank was to become its 
immediate beneficiary : indeed by the loans it exacted 
it very  frequently  crippled  the  Bank for  its  proper 
function  of  controlling  the  monetary  position  and 
securing due accommodation  to industry and com- 
,  merce.  In  modern  times  the  public  or  national 
character of a Bank is mainly important in so far as  it 
may be a guarantee  that the Bank will safeguard public 
interests: that is to say, will realise that its chief duty 
is  to  the  business  world  rather than  to its share- 
holders,  and  its chief purpose to maintain  financial 
security and stability rather than  to make profit.  It 
is from  this point  of view  that National  Banks will 
now be judged, and that we interest ourselves in their 
history.  So regarded,  the  world's  great  National 
Banks have no cause to be ashamed of  their  record, 
the Bank of England least of all. 
Cambridge,  Xmas,  rqn8.  H. S.  FOXWELL. 
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THE  Bank of  England is the oldest of  the European national 
banks.'  Established  in  1694,  it has seen  the great banks 
which  preceded  it disappear one by one and has witnessed 
the collapse of many later foundations.  At the present day 
it still remains the most famous, and from  many points of 
view, the most original bank in  the world. 
A  very  slight  study  of  English  history  shows  the 
importance  of  this  great  institution  to  the  Government 
and to the  English  nation.  The loans made by  the  Bank 
to William 111. and Queen Anne enabled England to regain 
that  position  among European  nations  which  she  had  to 
all appearances hopelessly  lost.  The English Government 
Sought help from the Bank on the eve of.all the eighteenth 
The  ter~n  national  bank  seems  well-suited  to  those  grcat  establish- 
"lents  for the supply of credit facilities, such as the Banks of  France,  Spain, 
and.Gerlnany,  which are, in  fact, national  institutions,  performing,  as they 
do,  llllportant scrviccs  for the Government  and  for thc public,  and  possess- 
'"I2  more  or less  exclusive  privileges  of  issuc.  Thc expression "  national " 
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with various  eminent  statesmen  of the  past  and  $resent 
times.  This purports to  be  an autobiography,  but  apart 
from its  curious form  the  contents are  wretchedly  poor, 
The author, who is an ardent supporter of  the Bank, thinks 
himself witty when he calls Louis SIV. Louis the Gascon,' 
or describes the Bank as being received by William 111.  in 
his  palace  at Kensington.  When he refers  to the  newly 
opened  branches,  he compares  the Bank  to Sarah giving 
birth to a child in her old age, and he is guilty of  a thousand 
other like absurdities.  The book is one of  the coarsest and 
dullest  I have ever met with.  It was published in  1832. 
In  1848  Francis'  History  of  the  Bank  of  England 
appeared.  Mr.  Stephens'  has accurately  summed  up  its 
good qualities and its defects by describing it as "  popular.'' 
It is certainly not  a scientific work, and the writer lived at 
a  time when  those who  wrote  for  the  mass of  the  public 
were too much  influenced by the author of  the  Trois Mus- 
quetaires.  hlr.  Francis has, however,  the credit of  being 
a  pioneer  in  a  difficult  task.  His  position  at the  Bank 
enabled him to give various interesting details, and I must 
confess to having read  his book carefully and with  advant- 
age. 
The one really scientific work  which  has been  published 
on the history  of  the Bank of  England unfortunately deals 
with  but a  very  small  portion  of  that history.  I  refer  to 
The First Nit~e  Years of  the Bank of  Engl~nd,~by  Thorold 
Rogers.  It is  no small praise to say that this book  is a 
worthy companion to the same author's great work, A His- 
tory of  Agriculture and  Prices.  It  is a matter  for some 
regret  that  in  this book,  which  was  written  but  shortly 
before his death, Mr. Rogers has not  dealt with the period 
leading up to the Act of  1694, and that he begins with  the 
actual  creation  of  the  Bank  of  England.  This,  as  he 
explains in  the  preface,  is  due to the fact  that  the  work 
was  taken  up accidentally.  During  researches  connected 
with his History of  Agricztltz~re  atid  Prices,  he came across 
'  pp.  6 and 13. 
'  Loc.  cit. 
3  Oxford,  1887, 8vo. 
a  weekly  register  of  the  prices  of  Bank  stock  from 
7th  1694,  to  September  17th,  1703;  this 
register  found  in  a  statistical  paper  published  by 
city  called  Houghton.  In  addition  to 
a 
some  short  articles  on  passing  events,  the  paper 
contained a  list  of  the  prices  of  corn  and  other  com- 
modities on the markets of  different English towns, as well  ,,  a  great  variety  of  notices  and  advertisements.  Mr. 
Rogers  applied  to  the  Bank  for  an explanation  of  some 
obscure points, and found to his surprise that they possessed 
no  record of  the prices of the shares before  1705.  He con- 
sequently determined  to  publish  this  register  with  com- 
ments;  this was  the origin  of  the book  in  question,  and 
explains why it is limited to the brief  period of  nine years. 
~f  it  was  true,  as  Mr.  Rogers'  alleges, that  the  political 
and financial history of the Bank of  England had never been 
written,  he  might  congratulate  himself  that  the  gap was 
filled up to 1703, the last date referred to in his work. 
These are, to the best  of my knowledge, .the only works 
especially devoted  to the subject. 
It is a curious fact that for a complete history of  the Bank 
of England we must look, not to a book primarily concerned 
with  the  Bank  itself,  but  to  one dealing with  banking  in 
general,  that is,  to  Macleod's  treatise  on  the  T.heory arrd 
Practice  of  B~nking.~  In this book  the Scotch economist 
gives  the  most  complete existing  account  of  the subject, 
especially with  regard to the question of  currency.  hlore- 
Over, he supplies excellent analyses of  the reports of  Locke, 
Lowndes and Newton  on  the coinage question, and of  the 
Report and the  debates relating  to it.  Unfortun- 
ately, Mr.  Macleod  wrote  history  less  with  the  object  of 
discovering the truth than to supply proof of certain theories 
which he was responsible, and of  which he was for that 
reason  uncritical.  This does not destroy the value of 
his work, but makes some caution necessary on the part of 
the reader, 
general  treatise  deserving  careful  attention  is 
'  Preface, p.  I j. 
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Lawson's History of  Banking.'  This book appears super, 
ficial in form, but a more detailed study will show that, not- 
withstanding  his stories of  eccentric  wills  and celebrated 
frauds, of Quakers and adventurcrs, the author possesses a 
thorough knowledge of business and of  the art of  discussing 
a problem.  Lawson  is I believe the  only  English author 
who refers in  his account  of the  Bank of  England, to the 
close  relations between  this institution  and the Treas~ry.~ 
There are also interesting historical  chapters in  Gilbart's' 
and hlr. Collin~'~  books on  Banking, but there is no refer- 
ence to  the history  of  the  Bank  in  the best  known  of  the 
general works, Bagehot's Lombard  Street. 
In addition to the histories mentioned above, and among 
what  may  be  called  narrative   source^,^  there  are a  large 
number  of  official publications  devoted  to  the  Bank  of 
England,  such  as exist  for  all other  English  institutions, 
and which have greatly facilitated our study.  These publi- 
cations form a very complete series from the early nineteenth 
century, dating from the appearance in  1810 of  the Bullion 
Report and the  account of  the preceding  Inquiry,  Since 
1810 there have been numerous Committees and Reports on 
Banking.  They have followed  almost all  the  great crises 
which  have  shalren  public  credit  to  its  foundations  at 
intervals during the nineteenth century.'  These reports are 
so valuable that the  Bank of  France has thought it  worth 
while to have them translated.' 
The Parliamentary debatese  are no less important than the 
official publications.  Some of  the debates on banking in the 
'  London,  1850. 
On this point  see  the  Appendix  to Vol.  11.  of  the  present  work. 
History,  Principles and  Practice  of  Banking.  The  last edition  of  this 
work  was p;blished  in 1907. 
'  The Nlstory, Law and  Practice  of  Banking (1882). 
Vmong these  may  be  included  La  Banque  d'dngleterre  et  les  Banques 
d'Ecosse  bv  Wolowski.  This  is a  collection  of  studies,  some of  which  are 
historical. 
The correspondence  exchanged from time to time between the  Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer  and  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England  has also  been 
published. 
' Ertraitcs  des  Enquites  anglaises sur  la question  des  banques.  Edited 
by  M;\f  Coul!et and Juglar.  8 vols., 1865. 
Parliainentary  Debates  from  1803  to the present  time.  Edited  by  Han- 
srrrd. 
English  parliament  are unrivalled  in  their  completeness. 
Among  these may be instanced the debates on the Bullion 
Report, On  the resumption of cash payments (1819). on the 
crisis  of  1826, on the Act of  1844, on the crises of  1847 and 
185,;  in  the  course  of  these  discussions,  orators  like 
Thornton, Canning, Lord King, Ricardo, Peel, and Glad- 
,tone,  delivered  some  of  their  finest  speeches,  and  the 
problems raised were examined from an historical as well as 
from a theoretical and a practical point of  view. 
Before  1803 the  Parliamentary  debates were  only  pub- 
lished  in  a  fragmentary  manner.  The  summaries  in 
cobbett'sl  Parliamentary  History  cannot  however  be 
neglected; without them it would be impossible to study the 
~~~th  Sea crisis, or even the Act of  Restriction. 
Another source of  quite a different character, but afford- 
ing valuable information,  is the innumerable mass of  pam- 
phlets, inspired in the first instance by the idea of  a national 
bank,  and  later  by  the  Bank  of  England  itself.  These 
publications began to appear about 1660.'  Since then they 
have never entirely ceased, and have always been especially 
plentiful  at  times  of  crisis,  when  every  quack  has  a 
sovereign  remedy  for  the evils from  which  the  country  is 
suffering. 
The study of  these  pamphlets  is particularly  indispens- 
able for the period from the middle of  the seventeenth to the 
beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century.  During this  long 
interval  owing to  the lack  of  newspapers and of  economic 
treatises, scientific activity of  every kind made itself  known 
by  means  of  pamphlets.  Indeed,  the  economists  of  the 
period wrote in  this form, in  M hich appeared the studies oi 
Child,  and  Locke,  as well  as  those  of  Paterson, 
Godfrey,  Chamberlain  and  everyone  else  who  discussed 
banking questions, from Cradocke to Sir Francis Baring." 
After the beginning of  the nineteenth century it becomes 
Purlian~cntar~  History of Englnnd from  1066 lo 1803.  Edited  by  Cobbelt. 
36 volumes. 
2  r 
rhere were  some even before  this date. 
Many  of the  pamphlets devoted  to  the  Bank  of  England  are  absurd  or 
from an  economic point  of view, but  none the  less they  hove  a  vi\id 
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an impossible and also a less useful task to look through all 
the pamphlets relating to the Bank.  Impossible because of 
the excessive number of  these productions,  less  useful be- 
cause more complete works1 are now  obtainable in  addition 
to these publications.  Nevertheless, this form of  expression 
is so firmly established among English customs that neither 
newspapers  nor  books  have  ousted  pamphlets .and tracts. 
The reform controversy due to the financial crisis of 1890 was 
carried on almost entirely in pamphlets. 
This account of  authorities would be  incomplete without 
a further reference to Stephens' work, A  Contribution to the 
Bibliography of  the Bank  of  England.'  This is, as stated 
in  the title,  merely  a contribution to the bibliography,  not 
a complete list of  books.  The author has  indeed  omitted 
several interesting works, but he has at any rate taken  the 
trouble to read those mentioned, and often to give in addi- 
tion  a short and able analysis of  them.  Mr. Stephens has 
increased  the value of  his  work  by  adding to  the biblio- 
graphy a  chronological  list  of  works  on  the  English 
national debt, and biographical  notices of  the founders of 
the Bank of  England. 
Before concluding this introduction, I should like to reply 
in  anticipation  to  two  criticisms  which  will  probably be 
made with regard to this book, viz. : 
(a) That  too  much  space has  been  devoted  to  general 
history; that while claiming to write a hiftory of  the Bank, 
something  like  a  history  of  England  itself  has  been 
attempted. 
(b) 'That the dispute as to the  respective  merits  of  free 
issues  and  regulated  issues  has  been  treated  rather 
negligently  and with a  certain  lack  of  interest. 
The first  criticism  is perhaps justified  as far as certain 
minor questians are ~oncerned,~  but on the whole we  believe 
it to be undeserved.  The history of  a national bank must be 
'  Among  these  may  be  included  Lord  Overstone's  studies,  which  have 
been  collected into a volume. 
'  London,  1897. 
'  Our excuse for this is the hope that the reader may be as much interested 
to hear about these  questions as the  author has been  to  write  about  them. 
part of  the general history of  the country, and 
this,  the creation  of  the Bank  of  England was  so 
connected with political events, and was, indeed, so 
direct  result  of  some of  these  events  that  it  cannot  be 
described without taking them into account.  Moreover, the 
~~~k of England was distinguished at the outset from other 
Continental banks1 by certain characteristic features intro- 
duced into banking operations by the goldsmiths ;  hence the 
importance of  studying the business methods of  these gold- 
smiths and their causes, which  causes however,  are purely 
historical.  And further, the Bank when established did not 
remain in its original position but secured further privileges, 
and the  explanation  of  this  must  be  sought  in  political 
causes. 
The  Bank  of  England  was  thus  created  for  political 
reasons,  It was preceded by the goldsmiths and their bank- 
ing methods, which again were due to political  events and 
had  received  from  them  their  peculiar  form;  it  has been 
supported and attacked for political purposes.  How then is 
it  possible to  avoid treating of general history  in  writing 
the special  history of  the Bank?  In particular,  no  under- 
standing  of  the  position  and  transactions  of  the  Bank 
during the first thirty years of  its existence can be obtained 
without  a  knowledge  of  the  events  which  preceded  and 
accompanied  its  creation,  and of  the  quarrels and  pre- 
judices,  the Jacobite  opposition,  the  political  corruption, 
the hatred of the landed gentry for  the commercial world, 
in the midst of  which England was then struggling. 
When once this period was passed frequent references to 
general history became less necessary and we have avoided 
making  them.  The  Seven  Years'  War,  the  American 
Revolution, the Crimean War, have been barely mentioned. 
But on  the  other  hand,  we  have  had  to  emphasise  the 
economic revolution which  transformed  England from  an 
agricultural into a commercial and industrial country, and 
the wars with the French Republic and with Napoleon. 
At this  point,  indeed, general history  becomes once again 
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closely  connected  with  that of  the  Bank.  Victimised  by 
William Pitt's imprudence the Bank  had  to suspend cash 
payments in  1797, and was unable to resume them until four 
years after Waterloo.  The transformation  of  England into 
an industrial country, on the other  hand, not only enabled 
Great  Britain to resist  Napoleon,  but also produced an up- 
heaval of  the system of  credit which  had  hitherto existed, 
and thus led to crises which brought the Bank  of  England 
to the verge of  destruction. 
But  the  necessity  for  purely  historical  discussion  has 
proved  a  fruitful  source  of  difficulty.  In  the  first  place, 
it has not been easy to decide  which historical  events must 
be included and which might be neglected.  When this was 
settled fresh difficulties arose with regard to the satisfactory 
combination  of  this  historical  information  with  economic 
discussions;  in some cases it has seemed better to treat the 
history  separately, and this has led to an apparent lack of 
unity in the book. 
As regards the second probable criticism, that of  neglect- 
ing  in  our discussion  of  the  Act  of  1844 the  important 
controversy concerning freedom versus regulation of  issues, 
we  must  acknowledge that  we  have  here  deliberately  in- 
curred the risk of  blame.  We judged  that a  discussion of 
this  question  would  over-burden  without  compensating 
advantage,'  a book  already  long  enough.  If  however  we 
had  to  give  an  opiilion  on  this  unsolved  problem,  this 
opinion  while  favouring  in  theory  the  idea  of  a  certain 
limitation  of  issues,  would  resemble  the  definition  once 
given by  Iimile Augier in an unspolten  ans\ver to a speecli 
of  hl. l?mile Olivier.  'There  is a legend, says the dramati~t,~ 
that  a  Rlinerva  was  discovered  fragment  by  fragment  in 
' Without  compensating  ndvantagr  brcausr  it  u~o11l4  h- had  to  say any- 
thing  new.  This question,  like nlanv  otllers  ot  which  people  are  beginning 
to  Neary,  was  formerly  very  fasl~ionable,  ~speciall: in  Flance.  Reviews. 
newspapers  and economic  societies  gave it  no peace,  and  the  English  crisis 
of  1866 aroused a famous controversy at the expc~lse  of  thr doctrine of  liberty 
between  Wolowski  and  Michael  Chevalier.  (I  hr  whole  of  this  discussion, 
together  with  the  articles and Irttrrs of  the  t\vo  cconomi\ts,  will  be  found  in 
\\'olowski's 1.a  Ru~rque  d'Attgletcrrr). 
a  Emile Augier,  (Euvres  d~zwrscs,  p  289. 
successive excavations over a considerable extent of  country. 
Each of  the fortunate discoverers caused the portion  he had 
found to  be  completed  by  a  local  sculptor, so that  there 
were  ten  indifferent  statues,  each  containing  part  of  the 
masterpiece  which  was  thus  condemned  to  perpetual  dis- 
rnemberment. 
Is not  the history of  truth somewhat of  this nature? 
The case in question may be an instance.  Both systenls 
have  their advantages  and their  disadvantages.  Regula- 
tion  of  issues  may  accentuate  some  crises  by  prevent- 
ing  the  Bank  from  giving  effective  help  to  trade  and 
industry.  Free issues may bring about other crises by en- 
couraging the Bank in an ill-judged excess.  No doubt bank 
directors  who are working  under  the  latter principle  may 
and ought to be guided by the course of  the exchange and 
the  prices  of the  precious  metals.  But experience shows 
that this precaution has not been  always observed.  On the 
other  hand the case of  the Bank of France may  be  noted; 
this institution,  enjoying what is  practically  conlplete free- 
dom  of  issue,  has secured all the advantages of  the system 
without falling into the excesses to which  it might have led. 
We may  in  fact  conclude  that  the  uses  made  of  the 
system for regulating issues is of  more importance than  the 
actual system adopted.  In this as in other cases it may  be 
said that it is a bad workman who finds fault with  his tools. 
Hence we  have attached less importance  to the theoretical 
value of  Robert Peel's Act than to its practical working. ORIGIN  OF  BANKING  IN  ENGLAND.  15 
PART  I. 
ORIGIN  -4ND  DEVELOPMENT OF  BANKING  IN 
ENGLAND. 
Political situation in  England about  1640.  Financial  difficulties  of  Charles  I. 
Seizure  of  Bullion  deposited  by  the  merchants  in  the  Tower.  Serious 
results of  this proceeding.  It encourages the development of banking, but 
delays the establishment of a National Bank. 
Position  and  transactions  of  the  Goldsmiths.  Reasons  for  their  success and 
their unpopularity. 
Extension  of  English  Trade.  Projects for  a  National  Bank.  Pamphlets by 
Gerbier and Lamb.  The return of  the Jews, its influence  upon  banking. 
The Bankers and the Government  of Charles 11.  The King's Foreign Policy. 
Dutch  War.  First  Run  on  the  Banks.  Financial  Relations  between 
Charles  11.  and  Louis  XIV.  Second  Dutch  War.  Suspension  of  EX- 
chequer payments.  Results and criticism of this Policy. 
"  BANKING,  in the modern sense of  the word, had no exist- 
ence  in  England before  the  year  1640,"  writes  Macleod.' 
This state of  things might have gone on for a  long time, 
for the merchants had acquired the habit of  depositing their 
bullion  and coin at the Tower, and there was therefore the 
less need  felt for mere banks of  deposit.  But an incident, 
the  precursor of the approaching internal struggles, hastened 
the appearance of  bankers and of  banking. 
To explain this incident more clearly, the political  situa- 
tion must be briefly recalled.  Charles I., who was then King 
of  England, had ascended the throne not only believing  in 
the political theories of  his father, but firmly determined to 
put them into practice.  To  enforce these ideas, which were 
based on the theory of  divine right and hence of  absolute 
monarchy,  a -standing army was  essential.  And for  the 
maintenance of  this army money  was required.  The King 
hlnclcod,  op.  cit. brd ed.),  Vul.  I.,  p.  364. 
was  resolved  '9  have  this money,  the Commons were  re- 
solved not to vote it.  Things were at a deadlock as Charles 
was  not  long  in  reqlising.  After  dissolving  two  Par!& 
rnents and calling a third, he determined to dismiss this aim 
to summon no more.  Thanks to the remarkable talents 
of  \Ventworth,  better  known  by  his  title  of  Strafford, 
England was  able to live for eleven years under a system 
of  absolute  monarchy.  The great  question  througt,,  st 
these eleven  years was how  to get money.  The solution 
of the problem was not easy.  As Dr. Cunningham points 
out,1 Charles was  more seriously  in  need  than  his father, 
and his  requirements  demanded both  skill and invention. 
During the early years of  his reign, although the Commons 
kept  a  tight hold  on  the  purse-strings  and  only  granted 
concessions  in the form of  tenths and fifteenths,  a  method 
of  taxation  which  disappeared after  this period,  yet they 
did at any rate vote him numerous subsidies according to 
the custom which had originated under the Tudors.  This 
source  of  revenue  naturally  declined  under  the  absolute 
monarchy.  But  the expenses so far from decreasing pro- 
portionately, were increased by the necessity of  keeping up 
the  army  which  was  urgently  needed  to  strengthen  the 
system of absolute monarchy so painfully built up. 
It was thus important  to invent a speedy remedy.  One 
of the  various  methods of  obtaining money  was to  grant 
monopolies under the pretence of  developing  the national 
industry,  on which  monopolies taxes were  levied  to com- 
pensate the Crown for the decrease in Customs duties.'  But 
the device which was the most successful and which had the 
most disastrous consequences, was  the illegal  levying  of  a 
tax intended for use in emergencies, which is known in the 
history of  English taxation as Ship Money. 
This tax  was  levied  as follows :  the  English maritime 
were bound, in  case of  a  naval war,  to provide a 
certain  number  of  ships  for  the  defence  of  the  coasts. 
' The Growth of Ettgglish Industry  and  Commerce (Modern Times), p.  217. 
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Money payments had sometimes been substituted for these 
ships.  The Lord-Keeper Finch was of  the opinion that this 
tax  might  be  levied  in  time  of  peace,  and a  decree  was 
accordingly  issued  under  the  pretext  that  pirates  were 
capturing  English ships in  the Channel, and that it  was 
necessary to provide for "  the defence of  the kingdom,"  and 
"  the safeguard of the sea."  This tax brought in  EIOO,~ 
in  the first year.  Made covetous by  this, the Government 
raised A;200,000 by the tax in the following year, extending 
it to all towns,  indiscriminately,  whether  maritime or not.' 
In  this way  a  tax  which  ought only  to  have  existed  in 
emergencies, and then to have fallen upon a limited number 
of  citizens, was levied in ordinary times, and throughout the 
whole kingdom. 
This was  too  much,  the  two-fold  illegalitv  caused  the 
failure of  the  plan;  a  vigorous  protest  wal  lade.  John 
Hampden, whose  name afterwards became fb,llous,  took  it 
upon  himself  to  dispute the  legality  of  the  tax.  He was 
condemned  by  the  Court of  the  Exchequer,  though  by  a 
very  small  majority.  This  decision  only  increased  the 
general  irritation,  for everyone could see, as Strafford did, 
that  if  taxes intended for the fleet  might legally  be  levied 
without authority,  there was  no reason  why  it  should  not 
be  equally  legal  to  collect  in  a  similar  manner  taxes 
intended  for the army. 
This  was  the  moment  chosen  by  Charles  to  involve 
himself  in  fresh  difficulties by provoking a religious crisis 
in  Scotland.  This affair, the details of which we  need  not 
 discus^,^ ended in civil war, and the maintenance of  an army 
very  soon  exhausted  the  ill-supplied  coffers  of  the  royal 
ex~hequer.~  The Scotch army had  no such anxieties,  for 
it was supported by subsidies from the national government, 
For  the  assessment  of  this  tax,  see  Davenant,  Ways and  Means  of 
Supplying  the  War.  Works, Vol.  I., p. 37. 
'  Dowell,  History of  Taxation in England,  Vol.  I., pp.  234,  263. 
J  For the  Scotch crisis, see Clarendon, History  o!  the  Rebellion  and  Civil 
U'ars  in England,  Book  II.,  Vol.  I., pp.  137-218, in  Macray's  edition  in  6 
volumes ; and John Hill Burton,  History of Scotland, Vol.  VI., Chaps. 68-72 
It  cost ~300,000. 
and above  all,  by  the confiscations  of  its opponents'  pro- 
perty  charles had no resources of this kind;  he had still 
rely  upon  ingenious devices.  He was delighted to find 
an excuse for summoning Parliament in  an intercepted letter 
which contained, as he alleged, the proofs of  an understand- 
ing between the King of  France and the Scotch.'  The said 
letter had actually  been  written.  And in  this conduct  the 
King's enemies had only followed the traditional  policy of 
scotland, which was to apply to France for help in  case of 
any  c-uarrel with  England.'  Charles  reckoned  on  the 
indignation aroused by  this letter to produce a docile and 
generous Parliament. 
Parliament  met  in  the early  spring of  1640.  The new 
assembly  according to  the testimony of  a  famous author, 
was more moderate and showed more respect for the  rights 
of  the Crown  than any of  its predecessors since  the  death 
of  Elizabeth.  But apparently it failed to satisfy  the  King 
who hastily dissolved it after a session lasting three months 
without giving it time to pass a single Act. 
The need  for money  continued  to  be  no  less  urgent. 
Taxation was inadequate  to supply means to  maintain  an 
army  and to repel  an impending invasion  and a loan  was 
suggested.  To raise  this  the  Government  applied  to  the 
King of Spain, the Pope, and the  City of  London.  The 
King of Spain refused the request for ;C;400,ooo.  The Pope 
was not prepared to give effective assistance unless Charles 
would  become  a  Catholic.  The  City,  being  definitely 
opposed to the King, was determined to do nothing to help 
him.3 
The  King  was  more  successful  in  dealing  with 
individuals.  Certain  persons  in  official  positions  agreed 
to make him loans,  which  in all amounted to ~60,000;  the 
This  letter,  which  was  addressed,  but  not  despatched,  to  the  King  of 
France by  the  Scotch, is given in  Mazurc,  Histoire  de  la Rt'volution d'At~gle* 
terre,  Vol.  II.,  o.  roc.  ..  ." 
'  The converse  was  equally  true.  See a  reference  to  an  old  proverb  in 
King  Henry  V., Act  I.,  sc.  2 : 
"  If  that you  will  France  win, 
Then with  Scotland  first begin." 
when  Parliament  was  summoned,  the  city  did  however  grant  a snlall  loanJ  it  was only paid by  instalments. 18  HISTORY OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
Catholics and the  administration of  the  Crown  lands ad- 
vanced large sums.  But  amounts  which  were  large  for 
individuals were  nothing  to a  government in  extremities. 
The relief  was  thus of  but  short  duration,  and new  ex- 
pedients for raising money had to be devised.' 
The first one suggested was not exactly  new,  it had for- 
merly  been  a  usual  practice,  and consisted merely  in  the 
debasement  of  the  coinage.  T:\e  proposal  was  to  coin 
&3m,ooo of  shillings, each containing three pennyworth of 
silver, with the motto, Exsztrgat  Deus,  dissipentur inirni~i.~ 
This proposal  caused  great  indignation.  According  to 
hiacleod it was most u-armly opposed by Sir Thomas Rowe 
in "  a noble argument, which might have been studied with 
advaritage two centuries later."3  But in spite of  this noble 
protest,  the Mint was ordered to coin  the new  money, and 
the Attorney-General  drew up a  proclamation  announcing 
the intention.  The King although he had  declared that 
the debasement  was  inevitable,  now  sent Cottington  and 
Vane to the City to promise  that  if  the merchants would 
grant the  loan  of  iC;zoo,ooo which  had been  demanded so 
long before  there should be  no  more talk of  debasing the 
coinage.  The Common  Council at a  specially summoned 
meeting,  replied  that  it  had  no  power  to  dispose  of  the 
citizens'  money.  Renewed  orders were  sent to  the  Mint. 
When this was known general prices rose  10 per cent.,  and 
Charles gave  way,  having,  as Mr.  GardinerC  points out, 
drawn upon  himself  all  the  unpopularity of  the  measure, 
without  gaining any of  the  immediate advantages which 
might have accompanied it. 
His resources  exhausted,  and apprehensive of  complete 
ruin, the King seized ~130,ooo  in bullion  which  had been 
See Gardiner,  History  of  England,  Vol.  IX.,  p.  169. 
'  These new shillings  were  reserved  for  civilians,  the  soldiers  according 
to  Strafford's  advice, were  always to be  paid  in  good  money. 
'  Macleod (p. 366)  probably refers  to a  remarkable  speech by  Sir Thomas 
Rowe  (A  speech  touching  the  alteration  of  Coin), published  in  1641.  This 
speech is often confused with one made by  Sir Robert  Cotton before the Privy 
Council in  1626, and .published in  1651 in  Cottoni Postlauma. 
'  VO~.  Ix.,  p.  174. 
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deposited  in  the  Tower  by  the  city  merchants.  This 
bullion  had  come  from  Spain,  and  was  to  have  bee51 
despatched to Dunkirk, then a Spanish port. 
The horror  of  the merchants  may  easily  be  imagined. 
*his  seizure-apart  from the immediate loss-meant  the ruin 
of  the  bullion  trade  which  then  flourished  in  London. 
They met at once and drew up  a vigorous protest which they 
sent to Strafford.  He answered that the step had only been 
taken  in  consequence of  their refusal to lend money to the 
Icing.  At  length,  after a  whole  day  spent in  argument, 
Charles agreed to give back  the money  he had seized,  in 
return for a loan of £40,000,  the Customs receipts being the 
security for the payment of  interest and capital. 
Before  pronouncing  judgment  on  the  King's  strange 
proceedings, his position must be remembered.  It has been 
weII  summarised thus : "  The enemy were  proud  and in- 
solent,  the  army  corrupt  and  disheartened,  the  country 
mutinous  and  inclined  to  the rebels,  and the  court . . . 
were all  three."'  The actions of  the King could only be 
explained by the situation in which he found himself.  Like 
a  drowning  man  clutching  at straws  Charles  committed 
folly after folly, each one more fruitless than the last.  This 
interpretation of  his behaviour is  confirmed by the fact that 
in  the case of  the  seizure of  the bullion,  as in  the earlier 
scheme  to  debase  the  coinage,  Charles dared  not  carry 
out his plans, and dishonour was all that he obtained.  The 
seizure  was  nevertheless  an  exceptionally  serious  matter. 
and had  not  even  the excuse of  a  precedent.  As Francis 
remarks :'  I' If  the short-sighted policy of  the earlier kings 
of  England  had  extorted  money  from  the  Jew  and  the 
Lombard,  at least they borrowed from their English sub- 
jects;  it remained for the polished Charles to sully his fair 
fame by  robbing them."  It is  only fair,  however,  to  re- 
mark that as regards "  subjects,"  the "  polished  Charles," 
as Mr.  Francis calls  him  in  his figurative  language, had 
"One  that were less faithful or less devoted than these very 
' hlacleod, p.  365. 
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city  merchants  who,  reasonably  enough,  rcceived  him 
badly, refused to lend him  money, showed no eagerness to 
pay taxes,'  and in the approaching struggle were to be  the 
strongest supporters of  his enemies. 
It would however be beside the point to discuss the policy 
of  the  seizure.  The matter  only concerns  us  through  its 
consequences  in  which  respect  it  is  of  supreme  interest. 
It had two results which are in  appearance contradictory : 
(I)  It led to the rise of  banking. 
(2)  It delayed the foundation of a national bank. 
We will begin  by a few remarks on the second  point, to 
save returning to  it later on.  This seizure so affected  the 
country that  it was  long before  the  people could consider 
the possibility of  an official bank, on account of  the difficulty 
of  protecting the precious metals in it from the depredations 
of  royalty.  The behaviour of  Charles  11.  did not  tend  to 
allay these fears. 
More  needs to  be said about  the first  result,  the rise of 
banking.  In  this respect  the King's action  had such im- 
portant consequences that we  have not scrupled to study the 
question from the beginning, ab ovo.  This explains indeed 
the starting point of  the present work, a starting point which 
might otherwise seem to have but a slender connection with 
the subject. 
We pass  then  to  the  history  of  the  development  of 
banking. 
AFTER  SLIC~  an experience  the merchants could  no  longer 
think of  entrusting their money  to the Tower.  'I'hey  were 
reduced  to keeping it themselves  under the charge of  their 
own clerlcs and employees.  But the Civil War broke out, a 
warlike  spirit  seized  upon  everyone,  and amongst others 
This, at least, was what the  King alleged,  when  he summoned  the  Lord 
Mayor  and  the  Sheriffs  for  their  neglect  to  pay  the  taxes  of  "  Coat  and 
conduct."-Sce  Gardiner,  loc.  cit. 
,pan the cashiers, who went off to join  one or other of the 
opposed  armies,  taking their  masters'  money  with  them. 
~t was a run of ill-luck, especially as even the more peaceful 
clerks were not more scrupulous, and secretly lent out to the 
at the rate of 4d.  a day the sums entrusted to 
them.  The goldsmiths inspired universal confidence.  And 
consequently it  soon occurred  to the merchants  that since 
their cashiers had treated them  no better than their king, it 
be  both  safer and more  profitable  to  deposit  their 
money directly with these goldsmiths.  The country gentle- 
men  very  soon  followed  the  example  of  the  merchants, 
and, seeing their  homes exposed  to all the dangers of civil 
war,  were only too glad to entrust their  rents to  the gold- 
smiths even  without receiving  interest.  Thus rapidly  and 
with  but  little trouble the goldsmiths found  themselves  in 
possession  of  considerable sums.  A  new  field  of  business 
opened  to  them,  and they  anticipated  the  functions of  a 
modern  bank. 
The business carried on by the goldsmiths was varied  in 
character,  but all  of  it  was  exceedingly  profitable,  if  not 
scrupulously honest. 
(a)-In  the  first  place along with  their  former  trade as 
goldsmiths which many of  them did not at once abandon,2 
they  adopted  very  readily,  thanks to  their  knowledge  of 
coins, the extremely lucrative business of  exchaqge.Tharles 
1.  who let slip no opportunity of  making money, had indeed 
See on-this point  a  most valuable  though  very  short  pamphlet  (it con- 
tains  only  8  pages) : The  Mystery  of  the  New-Fashioned  Goldsnaiths  or 
Bankers  discovered (1676).  This booklet,  which is adverse to the Goldsmiths, 
gives  a very  interesting account of  their  transactions. 
See  also  Macpherson,  Annals  of  Commerce,  Vol.  II.,  p.  427,  etc., and 
various other  works  which  we shall  mention  in  the course of  this study. 
a  Maitland  states that  even  in  his time  niany  important  banlters  kept  a 
goldsmith's  shop  in  conlbination  with  their  bank.  Maitland's  History  of 
was  publishcd  in  1739. 
Copcrnicus in his Traitd de  la monnaie,  maintains  that  the  state of  the 
LL~;::~  '~h:ch :xns deplorable  in  his time,  served  only  to bring  profit  to  the 
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debarred them from this occupation by declaring it to be a 
Crown  monopoly,  and  reviving  the  office  of  royal  ex- 
changer.'  But this office  disappeared with the  King, and 
during the revolution the goldsmiths resumed  the business 
of  exchange, which was the more profitable  since the coins 
struck in these disturbed times were very unequal in weight. 
They sometimes  varied  by as much  as 3d.  an ounce and 
many of  them were heavier than the foreign coins of  equi- 
valent  values.  The goldsmiths  did  what  is  always done 
under  such conditions;  they put aside all  the good coins, 
with a  view  to exportation.  When it is  remembered  that 
Parliament about  this  time  ordered  the  coinage  of  half- 
crowns to the value of  seven millions,  it will easily be seen 
what  profits  were  to  be  gained  from  this  business  alone. 
Nor was this the only advantage which the goldsmiths de- 
rived from  their knowledge of  precious metals;  they were 
expressly accused on all sides of  debasing the coinage.  It 
seems likely  that these accusations were  not without truth. 
One of  the founders of  the Bank of  England remarks :  '  "  If 
the bulk of  the money of  the nation which has been  lodged 
with the goldsmiths had been deposited in the Bank four cr 
five years past, it had  prevented  its being so scandalously 
clipped,  which  one day or the other must cost  the nation 
one and a half  millions or two millions to repair it."  And 
the founders of  the Bank of  England were not unsupported 
-  - 
in their accusations.  One of  their opponents says:  "  As 
for  the  goldsmiths, no one expects any reformation  from 
them,  or  that  anything  will  make  them  honest  but  a 
catchpole." 
'  This office was a very  ancient one.  Its holder had  to buy  bullion  with 
gold,  to  exchange coins  of  one  metal  for  those  of  another,  and  also  to  ex- 
change  foreign  and  English  coins.  The  arrangement  appears  to  havr 
hindered  trade,  and  hence  Henry  VIII.  abolished the  ofice  in  1539, on  the 
advice of Sir Thomas Gresham.  Charles I.  revived  it in  1627, on the pretence 
of  preventing  the  shameful debasement of  the  coinage, and  conferred  it  upon 
the  Earl  of  Holland for 21 years.-(Ruding,  op. cit., pp.  383-385). 
'  Godfrey,  A  short account  of  the Bank  of  England. 
'  Remarks  on  the  Proceedings  of  the  Co~nmissioners  for  prttting  i,lfo 
execution an Act  passed  last sessio'r  for  Establishing a Land  Bank.  1696,  pp. 
449  45. 
~~t whatever were the profits made by the goldsmiths out 
of their transactions as exchangers, they carried on another 
business which  brought  in  yet  larger gains, and through 
which they introduced banking into England. 
(b)-We  have  seen  how,  thanks to the  uncertainties  of 
war and the dishonesty of  some of  the cashiers, a consider- 
able capital  had been collected  in  the hands of  the gold- 
smiths.  This capital,  which  they received  at a  very  low 
rate, or even for nothing, they used for the discount of  bills 
and for loans at high rates.  The profitable nature of these 
induced the goldsmiths to encourage the deposit 
spare money with them by offering good interest and by 
allowing the depositors  to  withdraw  their  money  without 
notice.  This policy succeeded beyond all expectations, and 
in  the  course  of  a  few  years  the  citizens  had  generally 
adopted the habit of depositing their savings with the gold- 
smiths.' 
Receipts were given for these deposits, which,  under the 
title  of  goldsmiths'  notes,  soon circulated  better  than  the 
actual coins whose scarcity they often supplied.  Nor was 
this  usage a  temporary one,  for even  in  1696,  during the 
crisis due to the restoration of  the coinageF2  DavenantS tells 
us  that in  the absence of  coins, "  All  great dealings were 
transacted by tallies, bank bills, and goldsmiths' notes." 
Goldsmiths notes must thus be regarded as the earliest 
form of bank-notes issued in England. 
It  is  not  surprising,  in  view  of  these  profitable  trans- 
actions,  that  the  goldsmiths  grew  rich  with  prodigious 
Five  or six of  them,  Clarendon  remarks,  gained 
'  Sir  Dudley  North, on his return to London  in  1680, after several  years' 
absence, was surprised to find everyone depositing their money with the gold- 
Smiths.  He could not reconcile himself to such  new customs, more especially 
as  the  one  occasion  when  he  had  the  misfortune  to  entrust  d50 to a 
banker, he chanced  to select  a bankrupt.  See  the  life  of  Dudley  North, by 
his brother Roger,  in  The Lives of the  hrorths (ed.  by  A. Jessop,  1890), Val. 
11.9 p.  174. 
'  See below,  Part  II., Chap.  V. 
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such a reputation on the London market'  that people would 
have  trusted  them  with  all  the  money  in  the  kingdom. 
"  And they then first  came to be called Bankers." 
This immense prosperity  naturally aroused  some envy. 
And the conduct  of  the new  bankers  furnished excuse  for 
numerous attacks.  They were  not  only accused of  debas- 
ing the c~inage,~  but also of  a succession of  other misdeeds, 
and this esl~ccially  after they began  to lend money to  the 
Government.  These  accusations  are  expressed  in  the 
hlystcry of  the new-fasltioned  Goldsmiths, and, indeed,  in 
most of  the other economic pamphlets of  the period. 
In the first place, it was alleged that they lent money  at 
exorbitant rates, and that  they asked 33  per cent.  or even 
more,  whilst the legal rate was 6 per cent.'  Complaint was 
made also of  the inadequate security which  they offered to 
depositors.  According to  Godfrey,  two or  three  millionss 
'  The celcbratrd  Sir Francis Child  was the greatest of  these goldsmiths. 
Mr.  Collins  supplies  some  details  about  the  early  London  bankers  in  a 
chapter of  some interest, the only one in his History and  Practice  of  Banking 
which can be so described (Chap. IV., pp.  39-59.  Tke Early London Bankers). 
Amongst  othrr things  he gives  a  list  of  people  who had  deposits  with  Sir 
Francis Child.  We find anlong the number Cromwell,  Nell  Gwyne, Churchill 
(afterwards  Duke of  Marlborough), William  III., and so on  (see pp.  49  and 
SO).  The  firm  still  exists.  Mr.  Collins  has  indeed  obtained  most  of  his 
information from a study by one of  its members, Mr. F. G.  Hilton Price, who 
supplies  interesting details abcut his own and other firms bf  goldsmiths.  See 
A  Ilandhoolr  of Laondon  Bankcrs,  with some  account  of  their  predecessors, 
the  early  Goldsmilbs. 
Some  amusing  anecdotes  will  also  be  found  in  an  article  by  Disraeli, 
Usurers of  the  Seve~lteenth  Century (see  Curiosities of  Literature, pp.  228- 
233).  The stories are well  told, and without pretence to scientific  knowledge, 
like all the numerous and varied  studies which  the volume contains. 
More detailed  information  about  the  goldsmiths  and  their  London  estab- 
lishments  are given  in  a  book  by  one of  their descendants, Mr. J.  Biddulph 
Martin, The- Grasshopper in Lo~nbard  Street.  The grasshopper was the sign 
of  a banking house in  Lombard Street (now No.  68).  It also formed  part of 
Sir Thomas Gresham's  cost-of-arms. 
Finally,  for the sake of  con~pleteness,  we  will  mention  a  short pamphlet 
by  Mr.  A.  F.  Rakrr,  Banks  and  Banking, which  gives a  brief  summary of 
the history  of  the principal  London  banks. 
Compare Maclcod, op. cit., p.  367. 
'  See  above,  p.  22. 
4  Bank  of Credit:  or  the  ~tsefulness  and  security  of  the  Bank  of  Credit 
r.mniined it, a dialogue  hrt?wrrtt a country gentlen~an  and a London merchant, 
p.  18.  An  analysis of  this pamphlet is given below  (p.  50, et seq.). 
5  It is not clear  whether Godfrey includes in  this sum the money belongi* 
to thr gnld.itiiiths  nl~ich  was scizcd by  Charles 11. 
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had been  lost  through the bankruptcies of  goldsmiths and 
the disappearance of their clerks.  Finally, the goldsmiths 
paid more attention to their profits than to the safety of  their 
investments, and made  loans to  persons of  no comnlercial 
This accusation at any rate is made by Dr. Lewis. 
speaking of  the Bank of  Venice, he remarks :'  "  It had its 
first rise from the dishonesty of the Bankers.  The Bankers 
at Venice did just as our Rankers have done here,  they got 
nlens' money into their hands at interest, and used it (as was 
necessary) to their best  advantage, that they might make a 
better profit of their money than the interest they paied, they 
lent it out to insolvent persons, or laid out in desperate cases, 
as our Bankers did."  This behaviour obliged the Venetian 
Government to interfere in the matter. 
These  accusations  apparently  contained  elements  of 
truth,'  and  all  this  serves  to  explain  why, although tlie 
goldsmiths introduced banking into England, they did not 
succeed in adequately fulfilling the functions of  a  genuine 
bank and had later on  to give place  to  the Bank of  Eng- 
land;  this institution supported as it was by the State, was 
able to avoid the mistakes of  its predecessors. 
We have now described the introduction of  banking into 
England;  it remains to observe its development under  the 
successive  governments  of  Cromwell  and  of  Charles  11. 
This development  was favoured by  a number of  economic. 
and political events which we  shall proceed to describe, and 
the importance of  the goldsmiths was  increased  by the fact 
that they began to make loans to the Government. 
We shall study in  succession the period of  the Republic 
and that of the Restoration, but in order to give more unity 
A Large  Model  of  a  Bank  (1678),  p.  40.  The author of  the  pamphlct 
"bout  banking called  England's  Glory, which  was  published  in  1Gg4,  and is 
quoted, borrowed  largely from Lewis. 
The goldsmiths published an answer to these attacks, under  the curiot~s 
title of 1s not  the  hand  of ]oob in all  this? or, An  Enquiry into  the grounds 
Of  late  pamphlet,  entitled, "  The  Mystery  of  fhe tww-fashiotled  Gold- 
Smiths."  This second pamphlet  contains  17 pages.  Unfortunately,  it  is not 
so good  as the first.  There is  nothing of  intrrest in  it.  The author 
denies the  accusations  brought  against  the  goldsmiths,  and  in  particular 
(P  4)*  1,  their crimes; 2, their  insecurity. 26  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
to the account  and to  avoid repetition,  we shall defer  the 
question of  State loans until we come to the reign of  Charles 
11.  Moreover,  it  was  only  in  this reign  that  such  loans 
became frequent. 
SECTION  I. 
THE  condition  of  English  trade  and  commerce improved 
greatly under the Republic and under the quasi-monarchical 
rule of  the Protector.  This was due in the first place to the 
natural  progress  of  civilisation,  but  in  the  second  place 
and more especially, to the restoration of  order at home and 
to a varying but successful foreign policy, to the Navigation 
Act and the wars which attacked the Dutch monopoly of  the 
carrying  trade,  and  finally,  to  the  liberal  policy  which 
opened England's gates to a race pre-eminently commercial, 
which  had  been  ignominiously  despoiled  and  ultimately 
banished several centuries earlier. 
This  commercial  prosperity  naturally  favoured  the 
development  of  banking,  and in  1651  we  may  note  the 
appearance of  the first work which recommended the estab- 
lishment of  a bank.  It was called Some considerations of 
the two grand  staple commodities of  England,'  and is only 
nine pages long.  It is written  by  Sir Balthazar  Gerbier, 
the  author  of  several  economic  tracts.  The two  staple 
commodities are  fish  and cloth ;'  the  trade  in  these  is in 
the  hands  of  the  Dutch,  the  problem  is  how  to  attract 
it  to  England.  The  question  of  the  fishing  trade  is 
The complete title is :  Some considerations of  the  two grand  staple com- 
modities of  England,  and  on certain  establishments  wherein  the Public  good 
is very much concerned.  Humbly presented  to the Parliament  by Sir  Balthasar 
Gerbier, Kt.  London, printed by  I. Mab and A.  Coles, 1651.  This pamphlet 
has sometimes  been  referred  to,  but  has not  hitherto been  honoured  by  an 
analysis, though it has at least the merit of  novelty  in  default of  other  good 
qualities. 
P.  3. 
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foreign to our subject.l  IVith  respect  to  the trade in  and 
of  cloth,  Gerbier cites the example of  France, 
which  established  this industry  at Sedan,  and  was  after- 
wards able to  supply  half  Europe.  Moreover  in  order to 
furnish credit  facilities  to  English  business,  a "  bank  of 
" ought to be set  up in  London.  Gerbier points 
out the advantages other  countries  had  gained  from  such 
institutions, and in particular  he believes, for he is frankly 
that the capital of  various foreign traders might 
be attracted in this way, and that a great benefit would result 
therefrom to  the State.' 
Some years later (in 1658), another still more characteristic 
proposal was published by Samuel Lamb, entitled, Season- 
able  observations humbly offered to his highness the Lord 
Protector.  In this case the  author's  principal  object is to 
advocate the establishment of  a bank.  He enumerates the 
advantages  derived  by  the  Dutch  from  theirs.  Of  these 
eight are important, and he considers that similar benefits, 
the  chief  being  the  increase  of  national  capital  and  the 
reduction  of  the  rate  of  interest,  will  be  felt  in  England 
as soon as the bank is founded.  Shortly afterwards Lamb 
issued a proposal in  the form of  a petttion  to Parliament. 
'  For  the question  of the  fishing  trade and the  importance then  attached 
to it, not  only  from  a  commercial  standpoint  but  also as regards the main- 
tenance of  a fleet, see,  among modern  authors, Cunningham,  The Growth of 
English  Industvy  and  Commerce  (Early and  Middle  Ages,  p.  443) ; Motley, 
Dutch  Republic  (Vol.  I.,  p.  43);  and  among  contemporary  writers,  H. 
Robinson,  England's  Safety'in Trade Increased  (1641),  p.  16;  John  Smith, 
England's  Improvement  Revived  (x673), p.  262. 
There was a  series  of laws, dating from  Henry  VIII.'s  time,  to  protect 
the fisheries, and especially the herring fisheries.  The introduction of  bounties 
was also advocated.  See C.  Reynal,  The truk  English Interest  (1674)~  p.  28. 
It 1s  difficult to realise  the importance  attached  to this trade.  Dr.  Cunning- 
ham  remarks  that  it  was  believed  to  be  the  basis  of  Dutch  prosperity. 
It is  with  regret  that  we  limit  our discussion  to  this  note.  We may  add 
that  the  Navigation  Act  was  evidently  directed  against the  naval 
of  Holland.  (The Act  was passed  in  1651.)  And  similarly,  the 
war  of  16.52  was due  rather  to  commercial  rivalry  than  to  the  relationship 
between  the  Stuartr and  the  Prince of  Orange.  See  Morley,  Cromwell,  p. 
3s6* and  Seeley,  The  Growth of British  Policy  (Vol.  II.,  Chap.  I.).  The  :atter  work  is  full of  original opinions and of  interesting, though rather  con- 
Used, detail. 
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A comnlittee was appointed to  consider  it, but there is  no 
record of  the result. 
It  is  unnecessary  to  contrast  the  two  paniphlets  and to 
c.stiniatc the superiority of the second.  There had been an 
interval  of scven  ycars bctweeri  the  t~o  publications,  anti 
clltring  this time an event had occurred w11icl1, to judge by 
otlier countries, must  have cscrciscd consideral~le  influcwcc 
on  tlir developmrnt  of  banlts  in  England.  I  refer  to  the 
rc2turn  of  the Jens. 
The return  of  the ]ezeu  to  Et~glund.  Its  i~ljlueuce  ott 
banking.--?'he  effect  of  the influx  of  Spanish Jews  on the 
development  of  Dutch  conimerce is well  known.  The in- 
fluence of  the Jews at Venice uas no less marked.'  It was 
tuo Jews who  first  (in  1400)  obtained  the  authority of  the 
Senate to found a bank in the strict sense of  the word.  Their 
success was so great that many Venetian nobles established 
rival  institutions.  Abuses followed  which, combined  with 
monetary  difficulties,  determined the  Government to estab- 
li.;ll  tlie Bank of  Venice.% 
'I'lie same influence must have made itself felt in  England. 
Hut  at what  date?  In  other  words,  when  and  for  what 
reason were the Jews authorised to return to England?  We 
will proceed  to consider this question ; it  is not altogetl~er 
easy to answer it. 
It is certain that as soon as Charles I. was dead, the Jews 
attempted to return  to  England.  Public opinion  was  not 
' Macleod,  Dictionary  of  Political  Ecorzori~y, p.  216,  article  Bank  of 
I'ct~ice. This dictionary  which  if  finish'ed,  might  hare been  of  inestimable 
value, stops at .the letter C.  It was publislicd  in  1863. 
'  See above, p.  25, and below, p. 75. 
a  C'ro~nwcll's  best  lcnown  historians  say litlle on this point.  Morlry and 
Carlyle  devote  littlr  more  th:m  n page  to  it, and  confine  themselves  to an 
appreciation  of  the cbvent.  Sctt:  Oliver  Cro~nwcll,  pp.  433-434, and Letters and 
.Yp~,rrlrrs. p.  175,  Vol.  IV.  Goodwin  (Jlistory  of  tlte  Co~i~n~onwealtk,  Vol. 
IV.. Chap.  XVII.),  who  drvotrs  a  r11nptc.r  to  the  subject,  docs  not  tell  us 
nluch  more.  Interesting  information  will  be  found  in  Gardiner,  History  of 
t11ts  Cot~rt~ro~rw~ealtl~  and  Proteciorcltr.  Vol.  II.,  p.  30;  in  Leti,  Storia  et 
~ir~,morir  sopra la  Vita  di 01.  (:roi~~?ru~ll,  Vol.  11. ; and esprcially  in  a  pub- 
lislird  Ircture  by  Mr.  Wolf,  Kcs~-ttleint~~ct  of  ll~r  Jews itr  England.  Guizot 
may  also br consultc~d  wit11  atl\,antagc.,  Ilistoirc  de  la  l~'r'p~rbliqu~~  d'Angle- 
tcrrt., \'ol.  II., pp.  154-157. 
ullfavo~~rah!e  to them, partly on account uf  the biblical spirit 
\,.hi&  then  prevailed,  and partly  because  of  the  services 
by them in  EIolland, a country which the English 
of  this  period  constantly  set  before  them  as  a  model. 
'rhus  Gardincr  mentions'  the  publication  of  a  pamphlet 
about this tinle,  in  which  in order to prove  the importance 
of Dunkirk, it is stated that the Jews were prepared to give 
L60,000  to ,@o,ooo  in  return  for the toleration  of  a syna- 
gogue there, and that such permission  would attract all the 
Portuguese merchants from Amsterdam,  from which  a still 
greater  benefit  would  re~ult.~  The Amsterdam  merchants 
had not expected such demonstrations of  sympathy.  They 
took  the initiative, and tuo of  them  presented a petition  in 
1649 to Fairfax and the  Council, for  the  revocation of  the 
hanishmcnt of  the Jews3 
Another  petition  is  referred  to  by  some  historians. 
Certain  Jews had  asked for  the repeal  of  the  laws passed 
against  them, and on  condition  that the  Rodleian  Library 
was  made over  to  them,  together  with  perntission  to  con- 
vert St. Paul's Cathedral into a synagogue, they undertook 
to pay "six  millions of  livres"  according to some, £5m,ocx, 
according  to  others.  It is  stated  that  negotiations  Mere 
broken off  because the parties could not agree as to the price, 
the English Governtnent asking eight millions or &~w,uM,. 
It is unfortunate as far as concerns the authenticity of  this 
talc, that the  references given by  tllc  historians'  are inade- 
'  Gardiner,  loc.  'it. ;  sce  also Ilistorical Rcvirul,  July,  181~6,  p.  48.5. 
a  For  a  sit)~il:tr opinion,  scc  a  lcttrr  from  Xlnjor  Wliallry  to  Thurlor. 
7'~~1trloL"s  I'npcrs,  Lrol.  IV.,  p.  3'1% 
Srr Clr~rl:c l'crpc~rs,  Val. II., p.  172, notr n.  7'11is {)c,tilion  is  git.1.11  ;tl  the 
end  of  IVolf's  Kcsctllc~~ietat. 
'  The historians  in  question  arc Francis  and  Goodwin.  Francis  (p.  z4) 
rc.fcrs to l'hurloi;.  Arcordi~ig  to his  habit  ht:  nicntions  ncsith(.r volu111c nor 
Page,  in  which  indc,cd he  is  wise, for whc-ncvrr hc departs  from  this custom 
his rc:fc.rcnc(.~  arc f;ll.icb.  (;ood\vin  (Vol IV. p.  246,  riote),  tvllo does not  him- 
S~lf  bclicvc  the  to ';c  nuthcntic,  rcfcrs  to  Saltiionc-t's  Ilistoirc  dcs 
?'roubles rlc  [a  Grclllclt,  I~rc~lrcjinc  (1).  309).  Ilut h1cntc.t  tlc Snlrnont~t  on  1).  301, 
I"  Spr:tkinji of tllc yrwr  164nn~l  the  l<il~g's  stay at Yorlc.  Ucsitlcs,  this work 
Which  was publisllcd  in  ,640, dr:~ls  with  nothing later  th:ln  1646  Cuizot nncl 
Othrr  historians 111aIcc no rrfc,rc,ncc to the ~Nnir. Ncitlirr  have-  1  found any- 
''ling  in  Thttrloi;,  a booli  rcsr;ircllcs  in  which  arc grcatly  facilitntcd  by  thc 
'Xccllent  index. 30  HISTORY  OF  THE  BANI<  OF  ENGLAND. 
quate or erroneous, hence we only refer to it as a curiosity. 
These negotiations came to nathing.  RIr.  TVolf  proves 
however,  that  notwithstanding  this  rebuff  a  number  of 
Jews established themselves  secretly in  London in  the time 
of  the Commonwealth.' 
The situation improved still more during the Protectorate. 
Cromwell's  ideas were in advance of  his times, and as Mr. 
F. Harrison  remark^,^ "  Noble were the efforts of  the Pro- 
tector  to  impress  his own  spirit  of  toleration  on  the  in- 
tolerance  of  his  age; . . .  He  effectively  protected  the 
Quakers;  he admitted the Jews, after an expulsion of  three 
centuries;  and he satisfied  Mazarin  that he  had given  to 
Catholics all the protection that he dared."  Cromwell was 
particularly well-disposed  towards the Jews, with  whom  he 
had,  according  to  M. Guiz~t,~  fairly  frequent  dealings. 
They seem to have done him numerous services.  The Jews 
for their part were  not  unaware  of  the  Protector's  feeling 
towards them, and did their best to profit by it. 
Rabbi  Manasseh  Ben  Israel  took  the  initiative  in  the 
matter.  This Rabbi was a remarkable character.  He was 
born  in  Portugal  about  1604, but  while  still  a  child  he 
emigrated with his family to Holland.  There he became a 
brilliant student, wrote books, and even established the first 
Jewish  printing press at Amsterdam.  But his chief  efforts 
were devoted to improving the lot of  his co-religionists,  and 
to  securing  -heir  admission  into  the  different  European 
countries.  In  particular  he  tried  by  various  means,  such 
as petitions to the Protector, and even the dedication of  his 
book,  Spes  Israelis,  to the  British  Parliament," to  obtain 
permission for the Jews to return to England. 
*  See Tlre  Crypto-Jews under  the  Commonwealth.  A  lccture re-published 
from The Iewish Chronicle, and from the first  pages of  the "  Resettlement " 
by  the sarne  author. 
a  Frederick Harrison, Oliwer  Cro~nwell,  p.  216.  See also Glasson,  Hist. dlr 
droit et  des  Ivzstitutions d'nngleterre, Vol.  V.,  pp.  194-195. 
J  Op.  cit. p.  154.  See  also pp.  154-155 for  the cause of  these  dealings. 
'' Probably the Jews had  more than once  been  useful  to him, either as spies 
or in connection with his need  for money." 
'  The English translation of  this  nvork  was published  in  1650. 
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A commission, presided over by Cromwell, was appointed 
to  consider  the question.  It  was  composed  of  lawyers, 
priests  and merchants.'  The debates  were  long-winded 
and threatened to be interminable.  Cromwell consequently 
dissolved  the  assembly,  remarking  that the matter,  com- 
plicated enough to start with,  now appeared more  intricate 
than ever, and that, "  although he wished no more reason- 
ing, he yet begged an interest in their prayers."a 
The conference  was thus without result  and Manasseh's 
hopes were apparently vain.  As a matter of  fact however, 
the Jews were tacitly allowed to live in England.  Manasseh 
received  a  pension  of  A100  to  console  him  for  his  dis- 
appointment.  And  three  years  later,  on  February  15th 
1658,  at a reception  at Whitehall, Cromwell seems to have 
given an assurance of  his protection to Carvajal and his co- 
religionists. 
Whatever may be the  truth about this fatter point,  it is 
probable that Cromwell took no legislative action with regard 
to the Jews,  but it is certain  that he tolerated  their return, 
and that at the end of  the Protectorate  a  number of  them 
were  living in  England.  They must have taken an active 
part in  trade,  for shortly afterwards a petition  was  signed 
Collier, Ecclesiastical  History, Vol.  VIII., p. 380-382.  Readers must not 
be surprised to find  that this celebrated  discussion  is credited  to the reign of 
Charles 11.  Collier  was an uncompromising royalist,  who never  recognised 
the Revolution,  and refused to take the oath to William 111. 
Francis, p.  26. 
'  Perhaps Cromwell  would havc done more if  it had not been  for Manas- 
sell's  behaviour,  which  Mr.  Wolf  considers  to have  been  most  extravagant. 
According  to the  statement of Sagredo,  the Venetian  ambassador,  he seems 
actually to have adored Cromwell, asking him if  he were  not  a  superhuman 
being.  Moreover  one or more of  his companions,  having obtained leave  to 
"isit  Cambridge,  went  to Huntingdon,  Cromwell's  birthplace.  The rumour 
that they had gone there to study the Protector's  ancestry, to discover 
a Jewish  origin  for him, and to prove  that he  was the Messiah.  (For this 
journey to Huntingdon,  which has been  disputed, see Leti, op.  cit., Vol.  II., 
P  443.)  These rumours were made use of  by  Cromwell's  enemies,  and he, 
to  avoid  ridicule  an.!  sarcasm,  ordered  the Rabbi's  companbns to 
return  to London. 32  HISTORY  OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
by numerous merchants complaining that the Jews were not 
subject  to  the  alien  law, and  that  in  consequence  the 
Treasury suffered a yearly loss of  ~~o,ooo.' 
SECTION  11. 
- 
BANKING  AFTER  THE  RESTORATION. 
THE  distinctive feature of  this period is the transactions of 
the bankers with  the  Government, transactions which  took 
the form of  loans and advances in  anticipation of  the sup- 
plies.  Loans of  this sort had already been  made under the 
Protectorate.  Crornwell had  to maintain  a large army  to 
carry  on  continual  wars,  one  of  which,  that  with  Spain, 
was  very  unpopular,  and he  dared  not  ask Parliament  to 
vote  new  tases,  owing  to his somewhat strained  relations 
with that assembly, which  was jealous of  his power, hence 
lie  \vas hard pressed  for  money,= and was often  forced  to 
rely on the help of  the goldsn~iths. 
Charles II., when he returned to the throne of  his fathers, 
\\.as forced to have recourse to his predecessor's  expedients, 
in this  respect  at least, with still greater frequency.  It is 
true that he had not such a large army as the Protector's to 
keep up; indeed, lie  had  no regular standing army, strictly 
speaking.-either  had he a specially warlike disposition, 
since he entered upon only two European  wars during the 
' Stowe,  A  Survey  of  the citics of  London  and  U'esti~linsfer.  Vol.  I].,  p. 
143.  Others drtllandcd  that strict regulations should be  made  for  the Jews, 
src 'l..  Violct,  Pctition against the ]cws  (1661), and Ettgland's  JVattts (1667). 
1'.  40.  l.hrsc  unfavourable feelings lasted for a  long  tinlc;  tllc  question  of 
11ic n;~turalisation  ol  thc  Jews gave  rise  to long  Parliamentary debates.  111 
1;.;,3  ~~atur:tlis;~tion  \\,:I.;  concrdvd, and thm, in  thc face of  popular oppohition, 
\r.ithdr;~\r.n. Srr Josiah 'I.uclter,  A  1cttt.r to n friend cottrertting Nuturalisatiott 
(tjs.3).  I<vrn  in  this  conlury  hlacaulay  had  to  writc  :In  cssay  protesting 
;~g:~inht  the civil disabi1itic.s of  the Jews. 
It  i.;  intvrc.;ting  to  notr that as soon  as the fcws wrre placed  on  an equal 
footing  with othcsr citizens  these  fcvlings bcgan  rapidly  to disappear.  At  the 
~)r'."'.~it  day 1 hare found no trace of anti-sc~nitisnl  ill England. 
Goodwin,  Vkl.  IV., p.  552. 
V(:h:tl.lrs'  standing  army  was  for a  long  time  litnitcd  to  his  personal 
guard.;.  'l'liis  artily  \V;IS  incrvasf.d I;ttrr on, but  evr,ll at the end  of  his reign, 
;~ftt,r  tli,, rraru:~tion  of l':lngifT,  tlir do\vry of his wifr, Cathrrinc: of  Uraganza, 
tlt,:  King had  no  tilore  than  foot  and  1,700 horsc and dragoons  at his 
disposal. 
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twenty-f~~r  years of  his reign, wars which indeed brought 
neither honour nor  profit  to  England.  The Parliaments, 
too,  were  liberal enough, and voted subsidies with unusual 
zeal,  especially during the years immediately following the 
Restoration.  Charles'  vices  and  courtiers  were  however 
quite able to swallow up more  money in  one year  than all 
cromwell's armies and wars had cost in ten.  And his urgent 
desires could ill  adapt  themselves  to tardiness and delays, 
two  qualities  which  usually  accompany  the  collection  of 
taxes.  He wanted money and that at once,  and  the gold- 
smiths undertook to supply him. 
It is however only fair to acknowledge that Charles was 
obliged to apply to the goldsmiths at the very outset of  his 
reign.  Cromwell's army had then to be disbanded, since it 
was at once an  object of  hatred to  the people, a danger to 
the Crown and a heavy  burden to the Treasury.  But con- 
siderable sums were owing to the troops.  Between two and 
three hundred  thousand pounds had  to be  found in  a few 
days.  The House of  Commons had readily voted this sum, 
but it could not  be  raised all at once by  taxation.  To put 
off  the disbanding of  the troops would  have  increased  the 
nation's  obligation  each  month  in  incredible  proportions. 
"  None could  supply those occasions,"  writes  Ciarendon,' 
"but  the  bankers,  which  brought  the  King's  ministers 
first acquainted with them;  and they  were so well  satisfied 
with  their  proceedings  that  they  did always  declare  ' that 
they were so necessary to  the King's affairs that they knew 
not how  to have conducted them  without that assistance.' " 
This satisfaction was indeed so great that soon the Crow11 
could  not  do without  the  bankers,  and entered  into  the 
closest relations  with  them. 
-According  to  Clarendon's2 account,  these  transactiotls 
were managed  as follows : As soon  as the  subsidies were 
Voted, after discussion  with  his  ministers  as to  the  sums 
. . 
All  that  follo\~s  is  taken  from the Life,  we  hnvc  mercaly  condensed  the 
Ori~inai  to  somr  tsxtcnt.  No  onc could  have  a  better  knowlrdge  than  the  "Ythor.  \vho  wa~  then  Lord  Chancellor, of  the  financial practices devised  by 
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needed  at  once,  the  King sutnmoned  the bankers  to  his 
presence, for no contract was arranged without him.  Each 
banker was asked how much he could  advance, and what 
security  he  would  require.  Each  answered  according  to 
his own  resources,  for there  was  no combination  between 
them.  The bankers asked 8 per cent. for their money, which 
was not unreasonable,  and the  King was ready to pay  it; 
but after mature consideration they decided to leave the rate 
of  interest  to  be determined by the King's bounty,  at the 
same time  remarking that they  were  themselves paying 6 
per cent. to their own creditors, which  was,  in fact, known 
to be true.' 
They then received a transfer of  the credits for the pay- 
ment  of  the first taxes voted by Parliament, and tallies on 
those  parts  of  the  budget  which  were  the  least  heavily 
burdened.  But even this was not sufficient security, for the 
King and the Minister of Finance might devote  the sums 
thus collected  to  other objects.  Hence they had really no 
other security than their firm belief in the justice of  the King 
and in the honour and integrity of his Treasurer;  this was 
the real basis of  the credit which supplied the needs of the 
Crown.  The King, too, always treated  them graciously as 
his very good servants, and the Rlinisters regarded them as 
very worthy people. 
In this way  for many  years,  even  up to the unfortunate 
outbreak  of  the  Dutch  war,  the  public  finances  were, 
Clarendon states, managed with little difficulty, though per- 
haps at some slight additional cost, and no one said a word 
against the bankers, whose credit and reputation  increased 
daily, and who had everyone's money at their disposal. 
Probably at the time of which Clarendon speaks, that is 
before 1665,  the  goldsmiths  did  not  ask more  than  8 per 
cent.,  but this could not long continue,  and their  demands 
increased proportionately with the needs of  the King, all the 
more since they  were advancing money on more and more 
distant revenues,  and had  already anticipated  all the pay- 
ments to the Crown which would fall due in the near future. 
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Soon, according to contemporary  evidence,'  they were ask- 
ing 20 and 30  per cent.  Pepysa tells us that  as early as 
1663 the  Treasury was  paying  15 and sometimes  20 per 
cent., which is, he says, "  a most horrid shame,"  and ought 
not to be allowed, nor, be adds, should the goldsmith May- 
nell be suffered to make an income of  Ero,ooo a year in this 
way. 
possibly  the  contemporary  writers  exaggerated  a  little, 
but  there is no doubt that the goldsmiths got 12  per cent. 
from the  King for their money.'  And when  it  is remem- 
bered that they were paying barely half  this interest to their 
depositors, the indignation of  the public may be understood, 
an indignation which was further increased by the shame of 
seeing the King in the hands of  usurers,  and by the harsh- 
ness, common to all farmers of  taxes, with which the gold- 
smiths collected those taxes which were made over to them. 
But  even  if  the farmers derived  as much  profit  from  the 
King's vices as their enemies alleged, they were shortly to 
pay cruelly for their  gains, thanks to this same royal  im- 
morality. 
At this point the history of  banking becomes once more 
closely connected with the general history of  England.  We 
must now consider in turn Charles' two European wars. 
(a)-The  War  with Holland.  The Dutch fleet  enters the 
Thames.  First "  run "  on  the banks.  Charles had entered 
upon  a war with  Holland.  After several  vicissitudes,  and 
at the  very moment when  people  were expecting  the  con- 
1  (L Charles  being  in  want  of money,  the  bankers  took  10 per  cent.  of 
him  barefacedly,  and  by  private contracts on  many  bills,  orders,  tallies,  and 
debts  of  that  King,  they  got  20,  sometimes 30  per  cent., to the  great  dis- 
honour of  Government.  This  great  gain  induced  the  goldsmiths  to  become 
111Ore  and more  lenders  to  the  King,  to  anticipate  all  the  revenues,  to take 
grant of  Parliament into pawn  as soon as it  was  given ; also  to outvie 
each other in buying and taking to pawn bills,  orders, and tallies, so that,  in 
effect, all  the  revenue, passed  through  their  hands."  See The new-fashtoned 
cf.  Macpherson.  p  4.28. 
P~PY~'  Diary, Vol.  Il., p. 97.  This diary and that of- Evelyn, are most 
for any  study  ot  the  history  and customs  of  the  ~eriod. Pepys  was 
!o  the  Admiralty during the  reigns of  the  two Stuarts. 
a W.  D.  Christie,  Life  of  Shaftesbury,  Vol  [I.. p.  57. 
4  dl  Sir  John  Hebden,  the  Russian  Resident,  cries out against  the  King's 
much  with goldsmiths  and  suffering  himself  to have  his kingdom 
and commanded by  them."-Pepys,  Vol.  II., p.  170. 36  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
clusion  of  peace,  De Ruyter  sailed  up  the  Thames,  took 
Sheerness, burnt such ships as were at Chatham and seemed 
actually to  threaten  London.  A  description  of  this event 
&ill be found in Clarendon.'  Cc)nstcrnation spread through 
London, the inhabitants of  which thought themselves on the 
verge of  destruction.  Parliament,  which  had  voted'  large 
sums for the fleet and for the fortifications of  the river, was 
terrified beyond description3 at hearing  the enemies'  guns 
for the first time.  It was believed that the Dutch had taken 
Greenwich, and had it not been for the presence of  mind of 
the King and the Duke of  York, the Tower would have been 
abandoned. 
Everyone who had any money had  deposited  it with the 
goldsmiths.  This money was known to have been  lent to a 
Government  which  at  the  moment  seemed  to  offer  no 
security; each man then hastened to his banker in the hopes 
of  being in  time to save some remnants of  his fortune,  and  . .  ., 
London  witnessed  for the  first  time a phenomenon,  wlth 
which, alas ! it was destined to become  familiar-a  "  run " 
on the banks.4 
These fears were calmed by a royal proclamation6 declar- 
ing that payments from the  Exchequer would be made as 
usual, "  And that we  will not upon any occasion whalsoevrr 
permit or suffer  any alteration, anticipation, or interruptioll 
to be made to our said subjects." 
It will  now  be  seen  how  Charles kept  his promise,  and 
what he called "  our royal word and declaration." 
(b)-Second  War  with Holland.  Treaty of  Dover.  Sus- 
pension of  Exchequer payments.  A treaty of  peace followed 
De Ruyter's expedition.  During the years succeeding this 
treaty  Charles  seemed  determined  to  enter  upon  friendly 
relations with the Low Countries.  Through the good offices 
PP. 414-419. 
'  See contra, Life  of  King Jan~es  11.. Vol.  I., p.  425. 
For an account of this  panic  and its accompanying incidents, see  Evelyn, 
1)inry. Vol.  II., pp. 24-25 
'  The same phenomenon  occurrvd in  Alnstcrdanl  fivc years  later. 
This  is  published  at  the  end  of  a  very  interesting  pamphlet  by  Th. 
Turnor : 7'he Case of the  Bankers and  their  creditors,  nrore  f~tlfy  stated  and 
~xanlincd  (I  675). 
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of  Sir  William  Temple,'  the  ambassador  to  Holland,  a 
protestant  Triple  Alliance  was  made  between  the  States 
General, England, and Sweden.  Charles hoped by  this to 
give temporary satisfaction to English public opinion, and, 
above all, to make  a definite breach  between  Holland and 
Louis  XIV. who  had  hitherto  been  allies,  at any  rate  in 
name.  Shortly after he  made  with  Louis XIV. a second 
treaty, known  to history as the Treaty of  Do~er,~  at which 
town  the Icing had  personally  carried on  the negotiations. 
This treaty, in which Madame took such an important share, 
Charles was careful not to publish, not even communicating 
it to all his ministers.  He bound himself to join Louis XIV. 
in  a war against  Holland, to be converted  to  Catholicism 
and  to  several  other  undertakings.  In  return  he  was  to 
have  two  million  francs  in  two  instalments,  and  three 
millions a year during the war. 
Charles  II.'s  principal  object  in  signing the  Treaty  of 
Dover  was  neither  foreign  policy  nor  the  conversion  of 
the English  to Catholicism, but to obtain  power to satisfy 
the caprices of  himself and his companions;  in other words, 
to get money. 
He was  undoubtedly attracted  by  Catholicism,  the  faith 
in which  he  died,  and  his  conversion  to  which  seemed 
very  rapid.3  Doubtless,  too,  all his sympathies were  for 
France,  brought up as he had  been  by  a French  mother, 
and subject to the French influence of  his sister and of  his 
For this treaty, see  Macaulay's  essay, "  Sir William Temple," pp.  418- 
468,  in  the  one-volume  edition,  and,  of  course,  Mignet's  Histoire  drs 
Ndgociafions relatives  ti  la  succession  dlEspagne. Vol,  II.,  p.  549,  etc.  An 
account of the  varying  feelings  with  which  this treaty  was  regarded  by  the 
of France  will  be  found  in  the  CEuvres  de  Louis  AIL'.,  Vol.  Ill., pp. 
83-85. 
a  For  the  Treaty of  Dover,  see  Mignet,  Vol.  III.,  and  the  text  itself  in 
the same volume, p.  187.  For contemporary  English  writers,  see An  account 
Of  the  private  league  in  State  Tracts  (1705)~  37-44 ; and  also the  Secret 
'lisf'Jry  of  IVhitehall,  Letter  xix.  This  last  work,  which  was  published  in 
'('971 is  evidently  directed  against  France.  It  possesses  some  intcrcst  as an 
curiosity. 
a  Of this conversion, which must have taken place even before the  Treaty 
Of  Dover,  an account full of romantic and curious details,  which  seem how- 
ever  to  be authentic  is given  by  an  Italian  Jesuit: Storia della Conversione 
''la  Chiesa  ~attolich  de  Carlo  II.,  re  d'ln hilferra,  Cavato  de  Scrilture 
authentiche r3 originoli  per  Gttiseppe Boere  J.c.D.G.  Eslratto  della  Civilta 
Cattolicu. Rome,  1863. 38  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
cousin, Louis XIV., then at the height of  his magnificence, 
and later of  the Duchess of  Portsmouth.  But  the subtle, 
intelligent and sceptical Charles 11. was not the sort of  man 
to  risk  his  crown  for the  Pope and  the  King of  France. 
He knew  well  how  to exploit  the  fears with which  Louis 
XIV. inspired Parliament,  and the anxieties which Parlia- 
ment aroused in Louis XIV., with the sole object of  securing 
a few subsidies. 
We shall  shortly  be  able  to  watch  him  at  his  work. 
The Treaty of  Dover was no sooner signed than the Lord- 
Keeper Bridgeman'  urged Parliament to vote fresh supplies 
in  order that the English navy might  equal the constantly 
increasing navies of  France and Holland.  Parliament voted 
A; I ,soo,ooo to pay off  debts and ~800,000  to equip the fleet, 
adding a long  report in  which  it prayed the King to  take 
measures against the dangers of  Popery.  Charles promised 
all they asked, issued a religious proclamation  of  the char- 
acter desired, prorogued Parliament, spent the A;8oo,ooo on 
anything but the equipment of  the fleet, and at the end of 
the year signed a new  treaty with  Louis XIV. in which he 
secured  even  better  conditions than  those  of  six  months 
earlier. 
Charles  persisted  in  a  policy  which  he  had  found  so 
succes~ful.~ 
After  a  temporary  delay'  however  Louis  XIV.  deter- 
a  This minister,  who acted  as spokesman of  the Government on  the occa- 
sion, was not  aware of  the Treaty of  Dover. 
a  Madame had died in the interval, but this had not caused that loosening 
of  the relations between  the two Kings on  which some people had  counted. 
a  "And  so, in return for the prorogation  of  Parliament for fifteen months, 
which fook place in  November,  1675, Louis pays  A~oo,ooo. Again,  in  1677, 
when  Parliament presents an address '  representing  the danger  from  French 
aggression  and imploring the King to strengthen himself  by  such, alliances as 
may  secure  Flanders and quiet  the fears of  the  English people,  Parliament 
is prorogued  again, but this time  Louis has to pay  ~180,000.  On  the  other 
hand, at tbe beginning  of  1678, when  Charles demands .&6oo,ooo  from Louis 
for a similar  service and meets with a refusal, Charles begins  to decide  upon 
war,  and obtains  a  grant  of  A6oo,ooo  from  Parliament  '  for  enabling  his 
Majesty to  enter  into  actual  war  against  the  French  King.' "-Seelev,  oQ. 
cit.,  Vol.  11..  p.  214. 
'  This delay  was  due  to  the  fact  that  although  Louvois  had  completed 
his reform of  the army, the new  army  had not yet been  tested.  See Camille 
Rousset,  Histoire  de Louvois,  Vol.  I., p.  294.  The affairs of  Lorraine  gave 
an admirable opportunity for  a trial of  the  new  system. 
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mined to begin the war with Holland.  The Cabal  Ministry 
was  in  power.  Charles was as usual  without  money,  he 
dared not summon Parliament, and the French King's sub- 
sidies were no longer adequate.  He determined on an action 
,t  once arbitrary, unjust and foolish, which was inspired by 
clifford,  though it has often been attributed to Shaftesbury, 
who in fact, according to his biographer, Mr. Christie, both 
condemned and opposed it.* 
Clifford's remedy was as follows :  An order was issued on 
January 2nd,  1672, just  two months before the commence- 
ment  of  the  war,  suspending  all  payments  out  of  the 
Exchequer on whatever  warrant,  order  or security,  for  a 
period of twelve months. 
When  this  order  was  issued  the  Government  owed 
cf;1,3oo,ooo to the goldsmiths, of  which ,&16,724  belonged 
Cabal,"  from  the  initials of  the  names  of  Charles'  five  ministers- 
Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley, and Lauderdale. 
a  Lord  Ashley,  afterwards  the  Earl of  Shaftesbury,  even  sent  a  written 
protest to the King against the  suspension  of  payments from the Exchequer. 
See also a  letter from him  to Locke,  and the corroborating evidence of  Sir 
W.  Temple  in  Christie, Vol.  II.,  pp.  58-70.  This account  is  supported  by 
Evelyn, Vol.  II.,  p.  70.  Burnet,  however <History of  his own  time,  Vol.  I., 
pp.  532-j33), formally accuses Shaftesbury of  instigating  the King :  I'  Shaftes- 
bury  was  the chief man  in  this  advice."  He alleges  that he  had  this from 
Shaftesbury  himself,  who  had  moreover  withdrawn  his  money  from  the 
bankers before the seizure.  J.  Lingard (History of  England,  Vol.  IX.,  p.  202. 
note  b)  is inclined to agree with  Burnet.  I  do not  believe that Burnet  was 
right.  But  nevertheless  I  feel  some  doubt  as to Christie's  assertions,  be- 
cause, to say  nothing  of  the morality  of  Shaftesbury-he would  have served 
for  a  model  for  Otway's  Senator  in  Venetia  Preserved-his  biography. 
published  with  the  consent  and  assistance  of  his  family,-the  7th  Earl  of 
Shaftesbury,  to  whom  the  book  is  dedicated,  having  supplied  numerous 
dOcuments,-his  biography,  I  say,  has somewhat  the  tone  of  an  apology. 
Mr.  Christie's  work has however nothing  in common  with  those biographies 
O*  which Macaulay speaks as the result of  an agreement by  which the family 
Provides the documents and  the historian the flattery.  On the contrary the 
book Is one of the best there is on the reign of  Charles 11.  In this connection 
it ia  .egrettable  to have to state that we  possess no good history of  Charles 
'I'  reign, and worse still, that the gap is not unique.  There are hardly more 
than  periods of  modern  history  about which  scientific  works exist,  that 
with by  Gardiner,  and the fifteen yean (1685-1700) to which Macau1a.y'~ 
""o~ 
England is devoted.  It is true that pictures  of Charles 11:s  retgn 
to be found both in  Macaulay's  work and in Fox's  James 11..  but  how-  ever good  these may  be,  they  remain little more  than pictures,  serving as an 
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to Sir Robert Vyner.'  This proceeding, which was nothing 
less than a declaration  of  national bankruptcy, was accom- 
plished so suddenly, and was so entirely unexpected by the 
public, that indescribable confusion at once spread through 
the town  and caused a number of  financial disasters.  This 
confusion  can  be  easily  explained,  since,  although  the 
number of  bankers di iectly injured was comparatively small, 
yet,  as everyone  who  had  any money  had  habitually  en- 
trusted  it  to  these  bankers,  the  total  number  of  people 
brought to ruin was not less than ten  thousand. 
The bankers indeed stopped their payments immediately, 
and those merchants  who  had  deposited capital  with  the 
goldsmiths declared  themselves bankrupt.*  Colbert who, 
in the interests of  the war, approved of  the measure, refers 
to the great opposition  it aroused,  and  remarks that bills 
of  exchange to the value of  %3o,ooo had to be sent back  to 
Italy dishonoured." 
Four days  later  (on  January  6th), an  explanatory  an- 
nouncement  was  made,  promising  the bankers 6 per cent. 
interest  and  declaring  that  the  suspension  of  payments 
should not last more than six months.  The next  day  the 
King  summoned  the  goldsmiths  to  the  Treasury.  He 
pacified  them  and  persuaded  them  to  repay  the  money 
deposited with them by the merchants.  This was done, and 
the evil  was  so far diminished,  but  the  bankers  were  no 
nearer  payment.  The King probably  had some idea  that 
Parliament would provide the means of  repaying them when 
the twelve months were over.  But nothing of  the sort hap- 
pened,  the  House  of  Commons  rejected  the  repeated 
demands made on it to adopt such a course.  All  that was 
'  Collins,  op.  cit., pp.  43-44,  gives  a  list of  bankers and of  the  sums of 
which  they  were  respectively defrauded :- 
Sir  Robert  Vyner  ... L416,724.  J.  Snow  ...  ...  ...  At;S9,780. 
E.  Blackwell  ...  ... A295,994.  J.  Colville  ...  ...  E85,832. 
G. Whitehall  ...  ... E248,866.  Thomas Rowe .  ...  E17,615. 
J.  Horneby  ...  ...  A22,548.  T.  Portman  ...  ...  .&76,7b 
G.  Snell  ...  ...  ...  E10,894.  Divers  ...  ...  ...  E93,505. 
Vivid  details of  this crisis  will  be found in  Turnol's pamphlet  referred 
to above. 
See  Christie,  loc.  cit.,  Letters  of  January 4th  and 8th  (1672)  in  the 
Archives  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Aflairs.  Colbert  too  estimated  the 
number of  those  affected  at ten  thousand. 
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done was to pay  the 6 per cent. interest,  and in  1677 the 
King granted  a yearly rent on his hereditary excise for this 
purpose.  All payment of interest ceased, however, in  1683, 
and was  not  resumed after the  Revolution,  in  spite of  a 
lawsuit of  a unique character which was carried on  by the 
goldsmiths.'  At length (in 1701) an Act was passed charg- 
ing the hereditary excise with a yearly interest of  3 per cent., 
payable from  1705, not  on the actual amount of  the debt, 
but on  the  original capital.  Moreover,  these  3 per  cent. 
annuities were counted  as redemption,  and were  to  cease 
when  half the original capital,  that is, &X4,263, had been 
repaid.  The Act of  I701 was simply a fraud, for six times 
this amount was owing to the bankers.  It was calculated 
that they had lost three millions in the affair, without count- 
ing their legal expenses.  But what  was  most  remarkable 
was  that  this debt,  known  as the "  Bankers'  Debt,"  was 
never  paid,  and  still  forms  part of  the  English  national 
debt, having been consolidated with the South Sea annuity. 
'  Substantially  the same accounts are given  of  this  lawsuit  by  Macleod, 
3rd  Edition,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  373-375,  and  Broom,  Constitutional  Laws  (The 
Bankers'  Case), pp.  128-234:  The latter discusses  the duties of  a  sovereign 
to his subjects : comb~ned  w~th  the right to personal  liberty,  there exists the 
right to private property.  It is in connection with the latter that Broom gives 
a very detailed account of  the whole dispute. 
The ground for quibbling was that the letters patent, in  which  Charles had 
recognised  his debt  to each of  the goldsmiths  and  to  their heirs,  had  been 
ratified  by  the  House of  Lords,  but had  never  been  presented  to  the  House 
of Commons, and had  not passed  into law. 
Thus,  when  the  goldsmiths  brought  an  action  before  the  Court  of  the 
Exchequer  in  1689,  and finally  won  their  case  after  a  delay  of  two years, 
the Government raised  two questions, viz. :- 
~.--Whether  the letters  patent  were good  and valid  to bind  the Crown. 
2.-Whether  the Court  of  Exchequer  was  competent  to decide  the case, 
Or  whether  the petitioners  ought not  to  have applied  directly  to the King. 
The discussion turned chiefly on  the second  point,  since the first was not 
disputed.  Somers,  the  Lord  Chancellor,  in  spite of  the opinion of 
the  majority  of  the  judges,  declared  that  the  Court of  Exchequer  was  not 
in  the case. 
The question  whether Lord  Somers could  give a  decision  contrary  to  the 
'Pinion  of the majority of  the judges  gave rise  to an appeal to the House of 
Lords,  the  Supreme  Court,  which,  on  January  23rd,  1701,  reversed  Lord 
'~~ers'  judgment.  But-and  this is the most surprising part of  this remark- 
B~'?  suit-as  Macleod  aptly  points  out,  although  this Court recognised  the 
lndls~utable  rights  of  the petitioners,  it  made  no  attempt  to  redress  their 
grievances.  And  this  was  the  conclusion  of  a  lawsuit  of  twelve  years' 
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This melancholy  history brings us  to the conclusion  of 
our first part. 
It is not  possible to treat  Charles 11. as we  treated  his 
father in  a similar case, i.e.,  to find excuses for him.  On 
the other hand,  it  is evident  how  well  this suspension of 
Exchequer  payments  accorded with  the general  character 
and with the political ideas of  this prince, a charming per- 
son, but born with tastes in excess of  his resources, and with 
no  idea  of  sacrificing  these tastes to  the interests of his 
country.  An  economist of  well-deserved  reputation,  M. 
Wilfredo Pareto,'  has however defended  him  as follows: 
"  Charles has been  much blamed for a deed  which differs 
but  slightly  from  the actions  which  have  been  done and 
continue to  be  done by  governments who appropriate the 
treasures of  banks."  It  might equally  well  be  said  that 
William  111.'~  Government  treated  the defrauded bankers 
very  little  better than Charles'  had done.  But these after 
all, are meagre excuses. 
'  Cours d'Pconomie Politique, profess4  (t  la Facult4  de  1-ausanne  (Vol.  I., 
P 363). 
PART  11. 
FOUNDATION  OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
CHAPTER  I. 
NECESSITY  FOR  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 
Sketch  of the  commercial  requirements.  The  rate  of  interest.  Importance 
attached to a low  rate.  Theories  of  Sir J.  Child.  The paper  currency. 
In  what  way  this could  be  made less variable  than  a  metallic  currency. 
Account of  the proposed  schemes.  The Bank  of  Credit.  Failure of  the 
schemes.  Reasons for this failure. 
Bad state  of  the  public  finances.  Heavy  expense of  the  War  against  Louis 
XIV.  Inadequate  returns  from  taxation.  Montague's  financial  expedi- 
ents.  The  Tontine  and  the  Lottery  Loan.  Montague  and  Paterson's 
scheme. 
IN  spite of  defeats abroad and disorder at home,  industry 
and commerce  prospered  under  the  Restoration  Govern- 
ment.  The comparative peace enjoyed by England and the 
wars into which Louis XIV.'s  insatiable ambition plunged 
the rest  of  Europe,  largely contributed towards this com- 
mercial expansion.  The natural progress of  civilisation also 
counted  for  something,  and  vigorous  legislation  for  a 
great deal.  Numerous  protectionist  measures were in  fact 
passed  by  Parliament.'  Some of  these  laws,  such as the 
extension and improvement of  the Navigation Act, were of 
great  service to  the country.  Others were  marked  by  the 
absurdity  to  which  extreme  protection  often  leads:  for 
instance, the law quoted by M. Glasson, which ordered that 
corpses should be buried in flannel shrouds so as to encour- 
age +he  growing woollen inciustry. 
This commercial prosperity  required  to be  supplemented 
the foundation  of  a bank,  an  institution  which  would 
Strengthen England's position  in  a  remarkable  degree by 
regulating and  securing  the  paper  currency,  by  redu(.ing 
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the rate  of  interest and by  looking after a  thousand other 
secondary interests.  The goldsmiths had perhaps delayed 
the creation  of  such an institution, but  had  not  succeeded 
in  making it superfluous.  Even  before  they had been  de- 
spoiled by the King, their greed had made them hopelessly 
unpopular.' 
Throughout Charles 11.'~  reign there was accordingly a 
spontaneous  outburst  of  pamphlets  advocating  the  estab- 
lishment  of  every  variety  of  bank,  whose  proposals  were 
very favourably received by the public.  The promoters also 
could  readily  point  to  the  services done  by  the  banks  to 
Venice and to Genoa,  and,  above all,  to Amstetdam;  and 
this latter case had no small weight  in a country and at a 
time when the imitation of  the Dutch and their  institutions 
was exalted into a regular ~ystem.~ 
These  projects  came  to  nothing  for  accidental  reasons 
which we  shall notice presently, but from this time onwards 
the commercial  world  actively  desired  the creation  of  an 
institution  of which  it  felt  in  serious need.  Very  soon  it 
was not alone in this wish. 
The Revolution  of  1688  had occurred,  involving  a  war 
with France.  William 111.'~  Government having engaged in 
an expensive and, for a long time, an unsuccessful struggle, 
and unable to count on a satisfactory payment of  the taxes, 
and having tried all kinds of  financial expedients, at length 
realised  that the  creation  of  a bank  would  be  of  immense 
service to them, for nothing but a national bank could raise 
an  important  loan  and subsequently maintain  the  King's 
financial position. 
Henceforth the interests of  the  Government were  in  ac- 
cordance with  those of  the  country.  A  suitable  proposal, 
easily carried out, was brought forward by Paterson.  The 
Bank was founded. 
Our first chapter,  dealing with  the causes which  led  to 
this foundation, thus falls naturally into two divisions : 
See above, pp. 25 and 35. 
For  the  general  effects of  this  imitation  on  English  industry  and  com- 
merce, see Cunningham,  op. cit., (Modern  Times),  p.  101. 
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I. The commercial necessity for the foundation of  a bank. 
2. The political necessity. 
The  first  part,  besides  describing  the  requirements  of 
commerce,  will deal with  the various systems proposed  for 
satisfying them ; that is, the different projects suggested for 
banks and the reasons for their non-success. 
The second  part will deal with the financial and political 
reasons  which  induced the Government to  found a  bank, 
and these reasons will explain the opposition with which the 
institution met from the beginning. 
SECTION  I.  - 
THE  COMMERCIAL  NECESSITY  FOR  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  A 
BANK. 
A.-Account  of  the requirements of  commerce.  We  have 
already pointed out the chief  reasons which  influenced  the 
commercial world in favour of  the establishment of  a bank; 
they correspond to the three main classes of  business which 
a  bank  undertakes : the receiving of  deposits,  the lending 
of  money, and, in the case in point, the issue of  bank-notes. 
The deposits made with the goldsmiths have been discussed, 
and it has been shown that the system did not always offer 
desirable guarantees of  security.  The chief  remaining ser- 
vices which the public expected from a bank were :-(I)  that 
it  would  reduce  the  rate  of  interest;  (2)  that  it  would 
guarantee a paper currency. 
(I).-The  rate  of  interest.  Interest  was  first  forbidden 
in  England by  two .synods  in  787.  But the codification 
.of the  canon  law  was  only  begun  In  England in  Henry 
111.'~  reign,  under the influence of  researches  into the law 
which  were  initiated  by  Theobald,  bishop of  Canterbury. 
Even  at this period,  however,  we  find  documents against 
usury and bishop's edicts against it, but no royal edict.'  It 
was not until  1364 that Edward 111.  empowered  the city of 
London  to issue  an  Ordinatio contra  Usurarios.  An  Act 
' Dictionary  of  Political  Economy,  English  Early  Economic  History. 
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having  the same object  was passed  in  1390.  The usurers 
evaded these laws by numberless devices and consequently 
a very stringent Act was passed in  1487.  But this pr~ved 
equally vain  and was  repealed  by  a  law  passed  in  1495, 
which,  while condemning usury, allowed the "  poena  con- 
ventionalis, or usura  punitoria."  This in  fact sanctioned 
the very practice it  pretended to forbid.  At length an Act 
of  Henry VIII. (1545) legalised the demand for interest and 
fixed the rate at 10  per cent.  In 1552 there was a fresh pro- 
hibition, which again failed, and the legality of  interest was 
recognised  anew by Elizabeth,l with the former limit of  10 
per cent.  The limit was reduced to 8  per cent. in  1624. 
This reductiona was followed by a second in  1651, which 
made the limit 6 per cent.  And Sir josiah Child,'believing 
that the low rate of  interest had largely  contributed to the 
prosperity of  H~lland,~and  considering the 6 per cent. limit 
too high,  proposed an additional  reduction  to 4 per cent., 
which  he  calculated  would  double  the  national  wealth  in 
twenty years.5 
Very  soon  the controversy as to  the legality  of  interest 
changed into one as to the legal rate.  William Petty, in his 
It has been  alleged  that  this  was  due to Protestant  influence;  and a 
letter from  Calvin  to Oekolampadius  on  the  Aristotelian  theories is  quoted 
in  support  of  this.  Besides  this,  it  is pointed  out that  Holland,  whcre 
interest  was  early  permitted,  was  a  Protestant  country,  whilst  about  the 
same time  Dumoulin's  Tractatus  contractarum  et usurarium  was censured 
in  France.  I  believe,  however,  that it is difficult  to form  a definite  opinion 
on this matter;  the canonists were less  severe than  people  try to make out, 
and objected chiefly  to loans to consumers. 
The reduction of 1624, like that of  1652, was chiefly due to Sir Thomas 
Culpepper,  who thus helped  to put into practice  the theories  which  he had 
set forth as early as 1621 in  his Tract against  the high rate of  usury.  His 
son  also wrote various  works on the same subject. 
'  See the first  edition  of  A  New  Discourse  of  Trade, published  in  1668 
under  the  tit1.e : Some  brief  Observations  concerning  trade  and  interest  of 
money, pp.  7-16. 
'  The legal reduction of  the rate of  interest  was,  as Professor  Edgworth 
justly  remarks,  Child's  panacea,  his  unum  tnagnrtm.  Child  alleged  for 
instance,  that  the  sole  reason  why  Holland  was  able  to  capture  English 
trade in  spite of  the  Navigation  Act,  was  that  the  rate of  interest  was  3 
per  cent.  lower  there  than  in  England.  John  Law  of  Lauriston  shared 
Child's  views  on  this  matter.  See  Premier  MCmoire  sur  les  Banques,  in 
Guillaumin's  edition,  Economistes et financiers  du rviiie. sikcle, p.  550. 
9.  10.  Child declared that a  high rate of  interest encouraged luxury and 
hindered  the development  of  commerce. 
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~~~tulurncunque,~  condemns all  laws regulating  interest. 
Locke's  arguments,  as expressed  in  his  Consideratiorts 
on the  Lo~vsring  of Iltterest  and  Raising  the  Value  of 
Mortey, tend to the same conclusions. 
As  regards  the period  in  question,  it  appears that  the 
had  little ground for complaint,  since the legal 
rate was  no higher than 6  per cent. which  was in  no  way 
immoderate  considering  the  financial  condition  of  the 
country.a  Unfortunately  this  limit  was  theoretical  and 
nothing but theoretical.  The goldsmiths were not the kind 
of people to be satisfied with so little.*  We have seen the 
interest  which  they  asked from  the  King; and they were 
even  more  exacting  in  dealing  with  ordinary  merchants, 
especially with  the poor ones,  from  whom  they demanded 
exorbitant rates.'  Hence there was urgent need to remedy 
a situation which was most irksome to the commercial world, 
and a  national bank was the only institution  which  would 
be sufficiently influential to improve matters, and to secure 
for trade  that credit which  is "  one of  the essential condi- 
tions of its expansion."'  Such a bank would also do good 
service in another matter,  that of  the paper currency. 
(n).-The  paper  currency.  The future bank  must  also 
issue notes.  Contemporary  thinkers had clearly  analysed 
the  advantages  which  might  follow  from  the  use  of  the 
metallic coin thus made available.  Sir Williani Petty,  for 
instance, in his pamphlet, Quantulumct~nque,~  to which we 
'  Question  23.  For  Petty's  theories  on  interest  see  a  reccnt  work  by 
A!.  Maurice  Pasquier,  Sir  William Petty,  pp.  186-192. 
This  is  pointed  out  by  the  author  of  the  pamphlet,  The  Intercst  of 
nfottey  naistaketr,  who  attanpts  to  refute  Child,  and  renlarlcs  very  justly 
that the latter  throughout his  argument  is  mistaking cause  for effect. 
a  This  was,  besides,  the  rate  which  they  themselves  were  paying  to 
their own depositors, see ahove, p.  34. 
This is an undoubted  fact, and is proved  hy  a  number  of  authorities to 
whom  reference  has already  been  made.  The author  of  Bank  of Credit, p. 
18,  states that although the rate of  interest had been  reduced  to 6 per cent., 
Private  enquiry  showed that  poor  men  could not  obtain  loans  for  less  than 
33 Per  cent.,  and  were  lucky  not  to be  asked  60,  jo,  or even  80  per  cent., 
as had  been  known  to happen.  (See also above,  pp.  25 and 35). 
Lyon-Caen  and  Renault,  Manuel  de .Droit  Commercial,  p.  510.  We 
ilnaf&ne that the loans were  not  to take the form of  discounts, but  were  to 
be  tdvanced  on the security of  goods held  in  deposit. 
Question  26, p.  165  of  McCulloch's  reprint in  Select  Tracts  on  Money. 48  HISTORY OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
have already referred,  answers  the question : "  If  there is 
any way  to  know  how  much  money  is sufficient  for  any 
nation,"  by saying, "  I think it may be pretty well guessed 
at."  A nation, like "  a particular merchant, may have too 
much money,  I mean coined money."  If  there is too little 
money,  the best  remedy is the erection of  a  bank "  which 
well  computed doth almost  double the effect of  our coined 
money. "'  Again, if  there is too much coin, "  we may . . . 
turn it into . . . vessels or utensils of  gold and silver,  or 
send it  out as a  conlmodity where the same is wanting or 
desired, or let it out at interest, where interest is high." 
These opinions  had  been  originally  stated  by  Francis 
Cradocke,'  a  merchant who  in  1660  wrote  to  Charles  11. 
concerning  the  advantages  which  would  follow  from  the 
establishment of  a bank.  He believed that the profits would 
be so great that it would be possible to abolish all taxation, 
and hence he called his pamphlet : "  An expedient for taking 
away  all  impositions, and for  raising  a  revenue  without 
taxes by creating banks for  the  encouragement of  trade." 
This pamphlet is seven  pages long, but the  theories  in  it 
are  not  demonstrated  scientifically,  and the  author  exag- 
gerates the effects of  his device. 
Petty's pamphlet dates from 1682.  Hence it is a mistake 
to credit Adam Smith with having discovered how the issue 
of paper money might increase the riches of  a given country. 
In  this case as elsewhere,  the father of  political  economy 
discovered  nothing,  he  merely  worked  out  the  idea,  and 
above all, was able to  render it  tangible by a  most happy 
simile, that of the "  waggon-way through the air." 
The second  advantage which  the  public  hoped  to gain 
from paper money is more unexpected.  Whenever a com- 
parison  has been  made  between  a  paper  currency  and a 
metallic  coinage,  economists have  always  been  careful  to 
note  among the drawbacks of  the former that  it  is much 
' See Question  26.  He rezarks also that  a country  is not  always  "the 
Poorer  for  having less Money.  "  For, as the  most thriving Men  keep little 
or  no  hloney  by  them,  but  turn  and  wind  it  into  various  commodities,  to 
their  great  Profit, so may  the  whole  Nation." 
"or  Fr.  Cradocke,  see  the  Quarterly  lournal  of  Economics,  published 
at Boston  by  Harvard  University,  Vol.  II.,  p. 485. 
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more variable  in value than the latter.  But at the time of 
which we write the metallic currency was in such confusion 
and the  English coins were  so debased, clipped and falsi- 
fied,  that  people  could  not  recognise  them,  and  they 
preferred to take a bank-note which  they might reasonably 
hope to pass the next day at the same price as  that for which 
it had been received. 
In  addition  to  these  two  principal  advantages  the 
public  anticipated  certain  secondary  benefits  from  the 
bank, on which it is superfluous to dwell, but which helped 
in  the production of  a  number  of  projects on  the subject. 
This brings us to our second point, the description of  these 
suggested projects. 
B.-DescriPtion  of  the projects  suggested.  This descrip- 
tion  seems to us necessary.  It  is  true  that  none  of  the 
projects in question was fully carried out, but they prepared 
public opinion,  which was  thus ripe  to  receive  Paterson's 
scheme.  On  this  account  alone,  apart  from  the  interest 
possessed by some of  them for their own sake, they deserve 
not to be neglected. 
For  reasons  already stated,  the schemes  proposed  were 
exceedingly numerous.  Their publication  was  encouraged 
by the policy of  the city of London.  This city had had for a 
long time the charge of children of  deceased freemen.  The 
property  of  these  children  was  administered by  the  Court 
of Orphans.  In this way a large sum of  money  had been 
accumulated which was known  as the Orphans' Fund, and 
this,  being  rashly  lent  to  the  King,  had  been  much 
diminished.  The corporation tried to fulfil their obligations 
by means of  the profits which might result from the creation 
of a bank, and the Lord Rlayor appointed a  committee  to 
examine  all such propositions as should be made by any 
Persons for the improvement of  the Chamber of  London." 
Amongst  the suggestions made was  one which  the  com- 
mittee accepted,  and which  it only remained to carry out. 
To assist in this was the object of a very compact little work 
Co~poration  Credit or a Bank of  Credit made current 
common consent  in London more useful and  safe than 
This pamphlet, which appeared in  1682, was four 
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to would-be  supporters of  the scheme to sign their  names 
as  such  in  various  specified  taverns.  This appeal  was 
apparently unheard.' 
Apart from these municipal schemes there was the project 
for a land bank, which  was put forward by Dr. Chamber- 
lain, a project  which  nearly  ruined  the  Bank  of  England, 
and of  which we  shall have to speak more at length.'  The 
propositions  contained  in  a  pamphlet  by  M.  Lewis,  P70- 
fosals for  a large model of a Bank, published in 1678, must 
also be referred  to, and we  may  then  pause  to  consider a 
bank of credit which was actually established and carried on 
business for a certain time. 
The functions and the utility  of  this bank of  credit are 
stated in the form of  a dialogue between  a country gentle- 
man and a London  merchant in  a  lucid and most amusing 
pamphlet  called,  Bank  of  Credit,  or  the  usefulness  and 
security of  the Bank  of  Credit examined  in a dialogue be- 
tween a Country Gentleman and a London Merchant.  The 
scheme however referred only to a bank of  credit, there was 
no question of  a deposit bank. 
The somewhat curious reason  for this omission is  given 
in the merchant's answer to the country gentleman, who was 
inclined to think highly of  the advantages of  such a com- 
bination.'  The directors, he says, "are  unwilling to meddle 
with Money,  . . .  because  . . .  the scarcity thereof  (on any 
occasion) would perhaps, by ignorant or malicious men, be 
A  more complete account  of  this scheme  will  be  found  in  England's 
Interest, or  the great  benefit  to the  trade by  the  Banks and  offices  of  credit 
in London,  as it  hath  been  considered  and  agreed  upon  by  a Committee of 
Aldermen  and  Commons appointed by  the Right  Honourable  the  Lord  Mayor 
(1682).  This pamphlet contains 8 pages. 
'  See  below,  p.  103.  Before  proposing  a  land  bank,  Dr.  Chamberlain 
had  apparently had a  share in  Mr.  Murray's  schenle to establish shops where 
merchants could  deposit  goods  which they  did not  imnlediately  require,  and 
receive in return loans to enable them to carry on their business successfully. 
See Murray, Proposals for  advancement  of  Trade (1676)-4  pages. 
The gentleman  had  said  (p.  16):  'I Let  me ask  you  for  what  reason 
the  Bank  will  not  meddle with  money;  for in  my opinion,  considering  the 
great  security and  safety  of  their  constitution,  they  might  very  well,  and 
without  any dama e  to themselves,  have  secured  the  running  cash  of  the 
Nobility,  Gentry,  temhants and  Traders of  this  City  and  Kingdom  from 
all  hazard  of  loss.  That would  have  been  a  reat ease and  benefit  to all  7,  concerned, who know not now where to deposit t  eir cash securely ; especially 
if  runnin5,cash  should  prove,  as some  imagine,  to be  within  the  state of 
bankrupt. 
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imputed to them ;  and as that can never be their Crime, they 
would also avoid the Imputation."' 
What then was the business which the directors proposed 
to  undertake  ? 
Their first objecta was thus described : "  that Tradesmen, 
when they have a considerable quantity of  goods or wares 
made, . . .  they know not what to do therewith . . .  whereas 
by the help of  this Bank they may deposit their Goods, and 
by  raising a  credit  on  their  own  dead  stock  imploy  their 
Servants, and increase their Trades, until1 they get a good 
Market,  without spending their time . . . to look out Chap- 
men, who usually take advantage of such men's necessities  . . .  they being many times forced to sell their Goods and 
Wares to loss." 
Traders might offer as security not only merchandise but 
any other kind of  unproductive goods, such as silks, ribbons, 
jewellery,  toys, linen,'  which  they could  thus make use  of 
in  case of emergency.  The bank  also made  loans on  real 
property  and  even  on  long  leases,  "  without  hazard  or 
trouble of  their Friends." 
The interest on the loans was 6 per cent. 
Should the goods deposited be lost, the bank forfeited the 
sums advanced on them.  These sums might not exceed two- 
thirds or three-thirds  of  their  value.  But as regards  the 
surplus  value,  the  risk  might  be  avoided  by  insurance 
through a monthly payment of  two shillings per £100.~ 
The directors also intended to encourage any "  ingenious 
invention tending to the Increase of  and Promoting of  any 
Linnen,  Woolen,  Silk,  Lace,  Paper,  Salt; or  any  other 
useful Manufacture. . . ."" 
Notes  were  to  be  issued:  but  the  merchant  was  quite 
undisturbed  by  the  dangers of  forgery.'  "  I  am  well  as- 
' P  17.  The directors' fears were not ill-founded,  for this very accusation 
afterwards brought  against the Bank of England. 
See pp.  5,  6, 7.  In  short,  this bank  was to  be  especially  useful  in 
cases of over-production,  but it was dangerous on that very account,  for by 
saving;  the  merchants  from  the dangers of  a  glut, it  would  en- 
Cou:age  them to speculate by  excessive  production  or by  ill-judged purchases. 
The Bank of  Hmburg, established  in  1619  on  the model  of  the Bank 
Of  fmsterdam,  made advances on jewellery  as readily as on bullion. 
a  k. Is.  % 16. 
Promoters  6f the bank of  credit were  moreover  not  alone  in  their 
that the solution  of  this  problem  was  a  simple matter.  In England's 
G1Or~,  a  Work  published  in  1694,  the  author  remarks  incidentally  that the 
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sured," he asserts, "  that the bills are so contrived that it is 
morally impossible that they should be counterfeited."  He 
enumerates the precautions'  taken, and the list  is so long 
that  his  questioner  remarks, "  I cannot  but  admire and 
applaud the care and caution of  the bank in this particular." 
The London  merchant  was  no  more  disturbed  by  the 
dangers which might arise from the note issue.  The bearers 
would  he  considered,  have  sufficient  guarantee  in  the 
honour of  the directors,  who would besides be liable up to 
the full value of  their pr~perty.~  This satisfied the country 
gentleman,  who-like  a  wise  man-was  content with  very 
little. 
The arguments used  by the  London merchant  were  not 
stated here for the first time.'  They might have been  read 
seventeen years earlier in a pamphlet called :  A  description 
of  the ofice of  credit.'  The first part of  this, consisting of 
I I  pages, is devoted to an explanation of  the working of  the 
system, and the second, consisting of  15 pages, answers the 
objections which  may  be  raised.  The pamphlet,  Several 
objections sometimes made against the ofice of  credit fully 
answered15 is  merely  a  later,  slightly  revised  edition  of 
this second  part.  Finally,  An account  of  the  constitution 
and security of  the general Bank of  Credi16 contains nothing 
which  has not already been  noti~ed.~ 
thing  is that  these optimistic  views  were  actually justified  by  facts for a long 
time.  The  first conviction  for  counterfeiting  was not  until  1758,  sixty-four 
years  after the  foundation  of  the  Bank  of  England.  The guilty  person  was 
a  Stratford draper called Richard  Vaughan. 
pp.  12-13. 
It  must  be  remembered  that,  owing  to the  narrow  limits of  the  conl- 
mercial  world  at  that  time,  the  personality  of  the,  directors  would  play  a 
much more  important  part  than  at  present,  and  that  the  Bank  of  England 
itself  offered little  more  security  to  the  bearers  of  its notes. 
Sce Murray's  palnphlet  referred  to above,  p.  50. 
:  The full title is : A  description of  the office of  credit by the use  of  which 
none  can  possibly  sustain  loss,  but  every  man  may  certainly  receive  great 
gain  and  wealth.-Printed  by  the  order  of. the  Society,  1665. 
Wndated, Mr.  Stephens,  in  his  Contribution  to  the  Bibliography  of  the 
Bank  of  England,  refers  it to the  year  1682.  Two circulars  announcing  the 
establishment of  the  Bank  of  Credit for  the  City of  London  will  be  found  in 
the  British  Museum  bound  up  with  the  pamphlet  in  question. 
1683,  14  pages. 
' The same  may  be  said  of  the  arguments  in  Englat~d's  Interest.  See 
above, p.  59. 
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This  bank  of  credit  was  at  length  established  after 
numerous  vicissitudes ;  its offices were in  Devonshire House, 
~i~hopsgate  Street.  1  ts transactions suggest those of  some 
of the Italian Monti.  Advances were made of  three-quarters 
of the value of the goods deposited and notes for  this sum 
were given  to the depositor.  To ensure the circulation  of 
these  notes  a  company  had  been  formed  of  persons  en- 
gaged  in  various branches of commerce, who  undertook to 
accept  the  notes  in  payment.  Anyone  possessihg  notes 
might purchase goods from this company as easily as if  he 
offered coin.  The bank does not seem  to have been  a suc- 
cess.  Its organisation was  too complicated and the risk  of 
depreciation in the value of the goods was too great. 
Failure of  the projects.-Reasons  for  this failure.  To be 
brief, none of these schemes, to which must be added a pro- 
ject for mortgage on land, the Land Bank, could be realised 
successfully. 
The cause of  these failures must be sought not only in the 
intrinsic  weakness  of  the  schemes,  in  the  very  genuine 
dread of  royal confiscation,'  and in the distaste felt by some 
nations  for  novelty,  but above all  in  a  speculative  mania 
which had suddenly spread and was diverting public atten- 
tion from serious schemes which would take time to mature, 
to the advantage of  charlatans who offered rapid profits to be 
made in  lotteries, by the exploitation of unknown mines and 
pearl  fisheries,  or from  treasures  hidden  at the bottom  of 
the sea. 
Anderson draws a vivid picture of  what was truly a raging 
fever, which  we shall find reappearing in  Engla~~d  with the 
South Sea scheme, and in  France with the Compagnie des 
I?ldes.  The promoters of  these enterprises made much stir 
in  the town,  says Anderson, in  order to induce the public 
to  support them, and employed  a  variety  of  devices  and 
Stratagems.  They  stated  that  a  vein  of  gold,  silver or 
f  See  in  Pepys'  Diary  (Aug.  17th. 1666) a  discussion  which  took  place 
durrn%  an excursion  which  Pepys  made  with  several  friends.  The  fear  of  co?fiscation  was  not peculiar  to England.  Compare  Law's  remarks  on  this 
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bronze, had been  found in a piece of  land which they knew, 
that they had made a contract with the owner of  this land, 
and that he, in return for a small life- annuity or for a share 
in  the profits, had leased  the mine to them for  21 years, it 
remaining for  them  to exploit it and to extract its wealth. 
Then they  formed  a  company, generally with  400  shares, 
and declared their intenton of  dividing the resulting profits 
between all the shareholders.  The shares were at first sold 
at very  little, perhaps  for  ten  or twenty shillings.  Then, 
suddenly, the price  was  raised to £3,  A5, £10,  and even 
drg.  At this stage the promoters hastily sold out and the 
company shortly co1lapsed.l 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that  a 
serious scheme for a  bank  should come to  nothing.  The 
speculators who were in the majority in  these days, did not 
care to invest capital  in  lengthy undertakings which  could 
not  yield  more than  from  ro  to  15  per  cent.,  when  they 
might triple their fortune from one day to another.  Prudent 
people  for their part, only noticed  the failures, which were 
of  daily occurrence,* and to be on the safe side, refused to 
involve  themselves in  any project whatever. 
It  must  not  be  concluded  from  this  however  that  the 
fundamental reasons for creating a bank no longer existed. 
On the contrary the economic necessities which have been 
described  were  now  strengthened  by  political  necessities 
which  we  must next consider. 
SECTION 11. 
WE  have  attempted  to  describe  in  a  few  words  the 
embarrassment  of  the  Government ;  it  was  excessive. 
William  when he came to  the  English  throne,  found that 
' For a  similar account  see  De  Foe.  Essay  on Projects,  pp.  11-13 (1697), 
published  in 1698; one of  the very  numerous economic writings by  the author 
of  Robinson Crusoe. 
a  An  echo of the  failures due  in  these  days to  speculation  will  be  found 
in  the anxieties of  the country  gentleman  so often  quoted.  Bank  of  Credit, 
p.  20. 
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the financial situation was as follows :-The  total  revenue 
of the Kingdom, after he  had abolished the hearth  tax1 in 
the hope of  gaining popularity, was between &1,60o,m and 
E1,7oo,ooo,  of  which k1,101,83g had to be  devoted  to the 
of  an insignificant army and a  fleet in very bad con- 
dition. 
These supplies were small  enough in  time of  peace;  in 
time of  war  they were absurdly inadequate.  But  William 
was  soon  successful  in  his policy  of  joining  England to 
the  European coalition.  And  a  civil  war  in  Ireland and 
Scotland was shortly added to the war with France. 
Attempts were made to supply these needs by a series of 
taxes.  The  poll-tax,  both  burdensome  and  unpopular, 
was introduced from Holland.  From thence also came the 
stamp  tax;  tlie  customs  and  excise  were  considerably 
increased;  even  hearth-money  was revived  in  the form  of 
a  window  tax,'  and a  large number  of  direct  taxes  were 
levied. ' 
The administration  was  however  so  corrupt  that  the 
revenue did not increase in  proportion  to the taxes voted." 
The  tax known  as hearth-money  or chimney-money  was  imposed  in 
1662  on  all dwellings  excepting cottages.  The tax was  2s.  on every hearth 
or  stove in every dwelling-house.  It was extremely unpopular on account of 
its  inquisitional  character,  and  was  at first  collected  with  much  difficulty 
(Davenant,  Vol.  I.,  p.  208).  This  tax  was  profitable,  being  farmed  at 
.&170,000.  It was abolished  by  an Act of  William and Mary (I and a, c.  lo) 
when  it was  yielding Azoo,ooo  (see Sir Robert  Howard's  report, Commons' 
lournals, Vol.  I I.). 
It is  interesting  to  note  that a  similar  tax,  the  Kapnikon,  existed  at 
Byzantium,  and  was  also abolished  for  political  reasons  by  the  Emperor 
'rheophilus. 
'  For  these  taxes see  the  section  ir)  Dowell's  Taxation  and  Taxes  in 
England  referring to William  111.'~  reign,  Vol.  II., pp.  37-63. 
'  In 1694.  :  ln 1696. 
1 here were  besides  the  land tax and the window  tax, taxes on pedlars 
(1697)~  on hackney  coaches (1694), on births,  marriages,  and  burials  (1695)~ 
and  finally  on bachelors  (1695).  Recent  proposals  have invested  the  latter 
tax  with  some importance:  it  was not  8  succession tax,  but really a  direct 
tax, each  paying  according to his rank.  Dukes paid A12  11s. a  year,  per- 
sons at the other extremity of  the social ladder  IS. on1  gentlemen paid 6s.. 
esquires and  Doctors of  Divinity,  Law,  or  Physic d;  6s.  See the list  in 
Dowell,  Vol.  II., p..  544.  This tax was abolished  in 1706.  .  Another  suggestion  which  Macaulay  qualifies  as  confiscation,  was  to 
l.mPose a  tax of  Eloo,ooo on the Jews.  The Jews, however, prevented this 
lnlPosition  by  threatening  to  leave  England  if  it  was  voted  Macaulay, 
Ilistory of  Englattd,  Chap. xv.,  p.  125 of  the popular  edition  in two volumes. 
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The poll  tax only produced half  of  what it ought to  have 
done and the other taxes succeeded little better. 
Even  had  the  finances  been  honestly  administered  the 
revenue would not have covered the war expenses, not only 
because  these were enormous,  but  because  the army com- 
missariat and the army contractors were such that the taxes 
collected  never  reached  their  destination.  The King was 
left without his carriage, and the soldiers went shoeless.' 
The administrative machinery,  both  civil  and military, 
was  rotten  throughout.  When  not  in  use  and looked  at 
from a distance it might perhaps still have imposed on the 
ignorant.'  But  when  after the fall of the  Stuarts, people 
wished  to  set  it  going, the  structure  crumbled  to  dust. 
William did much to improve matters,  but his throne was 
insecure  and he  recognised  his  unpopularity,  and  hence 
dared not introduce changes except with the utmost caution. 
His ministers  too could not  resort  to  the plan  so much 
used by their predecessors of  mortgaging the taxes voted by 
Parliament,  for  the  policy  had  been  adopted of  granting 
subsidies for short periods only, and soon Parliament voted 
taxes only for the service of  the current year.  This limita- 
tion was due to want of  confidence in William III., and was 
regarded  as the best guarantee that the nation  could have 
that Parliament would be summoned regularly. 
Taxation then was insufficient to meet the expenses of  the 
war.  Nowadays this is  the usual  state of  things,  and we 
find Governments raising a  loan  on the  outbreak  of  war. 
Then matters were different, the public were  unaccustomed 
Macaulay,  Chap. xiv.,  Vol.  II., p.  89 of  the edition  referred  to above. 
He says with  regard  to the  Irish campaign, and more especially  with  regard 
to the Commissioner General,  Henry Shales: "  The bcef  and brandy  which 
he furnished were  so bad that the soldiers turned  from them  with  loathing : 
the tents were rotten : the clothing  was scanty : the muskets  broke  in  the 
handling:  great  numbers  of  shoes  were  set  down  to  the  account  of  the 
Government, but  two months  after the Treasury  had paid  the bill  the shoes 
had  not  arrived  in  Ireland.  . . .  An  ample  number  of  horses  had  been 
purchased . . .  But Shales had let them out for harvest  work to the farmers 
of  Cheshire, had  pocketed  the hire,  and  had  left  the troops  in  Ulster  to get 
on as thc:y  bcst might." 
The fleet  fared little  better,  see Macaulay,  Chap.  xi..,  Vol.  II.,  p.  127. 
I  say  the ignorant,"  for men  like  Bonrcpaux.  who had been  sent by 
1,ouis  XIV. in  1686  to investigate  the  state of  the  Engl~sh  navy,  were  not 
deceived as to the real condition of  things. 
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to State loans.  It nlay  have  been  that Iliillintn  could not 
readily  have procured  money, for he had no credit;  not  to 
mention the bankers' recollections of  Charles I I .,I the public 
had  no confidence in  the  stability of  this Government, the 
Jacobites were numerous, and 1,ouis  XIV. continued to be 
victorious.'  \Villiam  was forced to beg a loan of  k~oo,ooo 
from the city of  London.  Patersonhays  that  tcl  get  the 
money the ~ninisters  and aldermen had to  go from  shop to 
shop and from office to office.  In  the end they could only 
raise the whole amount by allowing commissions and giving 
premiums, which reduced the total by  nearly 30 per cent. 
The mar expenses had however to be met, and hIontague 
took  upon  himself  to attract  the  public  by  ingenious de- 
vices.' 
The first  of  these  devices,  ~hich  strict-minded  people 
might be inclined to call  shifty, was a loan  raised  in  1692 
in the form of  a t~ntine.~  "  The subscribers mere to receive 
10 per cent. until 1700, and after that k7,ooo per annum was 
to  be  divided among the  survivors till  their  number  was 
reduced  to seven,  when, on  the death of  each, his annuity 
was to lapse to the Crown."  The ingenuity of  the scheme 
was  greater than  the credit of the  Government  and only 
'  The lawsuit of  the goldsmiths was then  in  full swing.  It was suggested 
that  they  should  be  offered  6  per  cent.  for  thcir  money  on  condition  that 
they  would  advance, at the  same rate,  a  sum equal  to the debt,  which  was 
estimated at ~1,340.000. But  these  proposals  niet  with  little  success. 
'  At  the  time  of  which  I  write  Irelahd  was  not  yet  completely  re-con- 
quered  and  rebellion  was  raging in  Scotland.  Tourville  had  control  of  the 
Channel, and Luxembourg was fighting Willia~n  in  Flanders.  And  this, apart 
from the personal  exploits  of  Louis,  thc  capture  of  Mons,  and  thc  taking 
of Namur,  which  last event  inspired  such  terror  in  Europe  and  such  bad 
verses  in  France. 
'  See  Wednesday  Club  iit  Friday  Street. 
One of  these  had  important  results,  though  in  itself  a  small  ma.. 
A  tax  was put  on  the  shares of  the East  India  and  of  the  Hudson's  Bay 
Companies.  "  This  tax,"  says  Mr.  Dowell  (p.  51),  "  had  thc iffrct  of  a 
Caution  to the public creditor.  No  one  is  more easily  alarmed  than the man 
about  to lend  his money."  Even  after the repcal of  the tar '(  it  was  found 
expedient, if  not  necessary,  to  introduce  into  the  Loan Acts  a  proviso  that 
Government  annuities  should  be  clear  of  all  taxes  and duties  whatsoever." 
As regards  the loan  demanded  from  the City,  the Council  refused  to hclp 
the  King except on  receipt  of  a  conimission.  See on  this point  Renlarks  ova 
the  jwoceedings  of  the  Con~missio~~ers  for ptcttitlg  into  execution  tile  Act 
Passed  last session  for establishing  a Land Bank (1696). 
~laaclod,  op.  tit. (3rd  Edition),  p.  376.  The interr-t on  the Ion11 \\.as  to 
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jC;108,ooo was collected.  Better  results were obtained after 
the addition  of  a clause by  which  subscribers could get 14 
per cent. during the life of  any person they liked to indicate.' 
This loan,  which  in  the end brought  in  E881,493, and 
the money from  the land tax,%  which  was raised in  1692 to 
4s. in  the  and produced  E1,g22,ooo,'  joined  to a relative 
improvement  in  the  political  situation,  enabled  things  to 
go-on until  1694.  But at this date political affairs were as 
bad as they  had  been two years earlier.  Th'e estimates for 
the year were enormous, over five millions;  more than half 
this was needed for the army alone.'  In order to meet them 
all  possible  taxes  were  imposed  and a  lottery  loan  was 
agreed to;  the latter was a new  invention  of  the indefatig- 
able Montague. 
This  lottery  had  nothing  in  common  with  modern 
lotteries except the name.    he sum to be raised was divided 
into  ~o,ooo  ~IO  shares.  The yearly  interest payable  on 
each of  these shares was ~os.,  that  is,  10  per cent.  for  16 
years.  But  as this was  not enough  to attract the  public, 
prizes were  added.  L40,ooo  was  to  be  divided  each  year 
among the fortunate winners.'  This sum, and also the  10 
per cent. interest, was to be raised  by means of  a new  tax 
on salt. 
A  million  was secured by  this  means,  and another  was 
needed to make up the required  sum of  A;5,0301000; there 
was  only  one  way  of  obtaining  it,  which  was  to  adopt 
' Many  people  received  incomes  throughout  the  18th  century  in  return 
for a  few pounds lent  to William  111.  in  their youth.  For  instance, &roo 
was enteced  in  the name  of  Charles puncombe,  then  three  years  old,  who 
afterwards translated Horace.  This author received 77 annual payments under 
the Act  of  16yz.-Macaulay,  Chap. xix.,  Vol.  II., p.  398. 
'  A  tax imposed on the rental value of  land. 
In  1693  the land tax did  not,  as Macaulay  (Chap.  xix.)  states, bring 
in  two millions, but E~oo,ooo  less than the year  before.  The total  rent  was 
stated this year by  the taxpayer on oath.  Davenant (Essay upon  Ways and 
Means,  Works, Vol.  I.,  p.  33)  attributes  the  decrease  to  this  method  of 
assessment. 
4  The King wished  to  increase  the army to 94,000 men; he was  in  the 
end allowed  83,000.  Things had  advanced  a  long  way  since Charles'  8,700 
men,  and since his budgets of  f;~,.po,ooo. 
a  The largest  prize,  a  .&loo  annuity,  was  won  by  four  Huguenots  who 
had given up their country to keep their religion.  The English  public thought 
that  th~  hand of  God  w:ts  rrcognisable in  this  rrsult. 
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paterson's plan.'  Montague, who had known of  this sclleme 
for several years,  now  turned  his  attention  to  it,  and  the 
Bank  of England was founded. 
It  is  now  time to  learn  something of  Paterson  and his 
scheme.  We shall first give a biographical  sketch of this 
remarkable  man  and rhen  proceed  to examine his scheme, 
or rather schemes, and point out their main  features. 
1  See the reports of F. Bonnet to Frederick  IIl., Elector  of Brnndrnburg, 
which  were  found among  the  Secret  Archives  at  Berlin  by  1,eopold  Van 
~~~k~,  and  were  published  by  him  at the  end  of  his  llistory  of  England 
principally  in  the Seventeenth  Century. Vol.  II.,  pp.  144-278  These letters 
of  great  interest, the  writer describes  vividly  the financial  difficulties  in 
,,,hi&  William  111.'~  Government  were continuallv  involved.  See  especially 
the letter  of  January  12-22,  in  which  the future  Bank  is  discussed,  and pp. 
23e.  239, 240. 
The letter of April  20-30,  1694,  (p.  246),  is  the  most  interesting  of  all. 
Bonnet  explains the organisation of  the Bank and the reasons  for  its  founda- 
tion.  He concludes by  stating that  the paper  tax  has  been  passed  and  that 
possibly  a  tax on hackney  coaches  will  be  passed ; but,  he adds, "  this  last 
contribution is rt.  arded as an extra one, because the House has only agreed  to 
raise a sum of 2~,030,00o  this year, which  is to be produced as follows "  :- 
Land  Tax, estimated  at ............................... ~I,~OO,OOO 
Poll  Tax,  ~~0,7~,000  ................................. 




.................................  &1,200,000 
Annuities,  .................................  Ao,3w,ooo 
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CHAPTER  11. 
PATERSON,  141s  LIFE  AND WORI<.-THE 
FOUNDATION  OF THE BANI<  OF 
ENGLAND. 
Birth and youthful  adventures.  Return to England  after 168% Active  share 
in  public affairs.  Exp!anation  of  his leaving the Banlc of  England .;liortl!. 
aftrr he  had  founded  ~t.  The Daricn  Expedition.  Last ycars of  his life. 
His claims on public gratitude. 
Paterson's  first  scheme,  1691.  His Pamphlet  in  1694, "  A  Brief  Account  of 
the  Intended  Rank  of  Ellgland."  Principles  on  which  the  new  Bank 
shoi~ld  be  based. 
Political opponents; Jacobites and Tories ;  Commercial rivals ;  the Goldsmiths. 
Hostility  of  the  1and1,d  gentry ;  its  causes.  The  dissentient  M'higs. 
Arguments  used  by  the  Bank's  opponents.  Opposition  in  Parliament. 
Bill  only  passed  because  the  Government  wanted  money  and  could  not 
obtain it  otherwise. 
SECTION I. 
WILLIAM  PATERSON  was  born  at Trailflat,'  in  the  county 
of  Dumfries, probably in 1658.~ He came to England when 
very young ;nd  afteiwards spent a long time in travelling, 
as is shown by one of  his letters to George I  .3  In particular 
he visited  the West Indies, and was able to point out  the 
importance  which  would  be acquired  by  a colony  on  the 
isthmus of  Panama,  or of  Darien,  as it  was  then  called. 
Rut the tale4 according to which  he joined  some American 
buccaneers,  after  having  started from  England as a  mis- 
sionary,  while  it  is  possible,  yet  rests  on  no  sufficient 
foundation. 
' See Pagan, The Birthplace  and  Parentage  of  1V.  Paterson. 
a  This date may be  deduced  from  his  will,  made in  July,  1718, in  which 
hr says  that he  is  60  years  old.  The farm  where  he  was  born  was Only 
pulled  down in  1864. 
'  Paterson,  Memorial  to George I. (March 8th, 1714). 
Francis,  pp.  45-46.  The profession  of  buccaneer was not  then  accounted 
dishonourable  and  it  was  alleged  that  Bldckburn,  Archbishop  of  York 
It-otn  1724-1743, had  followed  it  in  his  youth.  See  Thorold  Rogers,  The 
l,~tl~rslrial  and  Comnrercial  History of  England, p.  la. 
*bout  ,685 Paterson went to Amsterdam-then  the head- 
quarters of the English IVhigs;  he apparently took part in 
the revolutionary  movement  of  1688, and must  have been 
deeply involved in  the Liberal agitation which preceded the 
campaign in  England.  At any rate  like many politicians, 
he diligently frequented the coffee-houses. 
After the revolution  he  settled in  London  where  he  be- 
came rich and influential.  In  1691 he, in  association with 
hlichael  Godfrey  and  other  London  merchants,  proposed 
the foundation of  the Uank  of  England, at the same time 
pointing  out  the  need  for  a  restoration  of  the  coinage. 
Paterson was the chief promoter of  this scheme, but in spitc 
of his repeated efforts,  nothing came  of  it  for three years. 
During this time Paterson, who was by  no means the mere 
adventurer  people  have  tried  to  make  out,  took  part  in 
various  important  undertakings,  helped  to  supply  North 
London  with  drinking water,  and  in  1692  was  the  chief 
witness  before the  Parliamentary  Committee  appointed  to 
receive proposals for  raising supplies. 
It was  during these  negotiations  that  he  had  the good 
fortune  to become acquainted with  ,Ilontague, then  one of 
the  Commissioners  of  the  Treasury,  who  recognised  the 
advantages to the State which  might follow the realisation 
of Paterson's  scheme,  and whose  influence  proved  invalu- 
able  two  years  later, when  the proposal  came to  be  voted 
upon. 
When the Bank was founded  Paterson became a director, 
with  a salary of  k2,ooo, but  the Uank  did not  completely 
fulfil his expectations, and a year later he resigned, after a 
disagreement with  his colleagues. 
As a matter of  fact  the exact cause of  Paterson's  retire- 
ment  is not  known.  In his Enquiry3e expresses himsclf 
Purposely  in  vague terms.  Sir W. Scott and  Chambers 
both  incline to the belief  that his colleagues  having made 
"se  of his experience, wished  now  to make use of  his post. 
Stephens3 considers this view quite mistaken;  he  be- 
lieves it to be inlpossible that a body of people having such 
An  Enquiry  by the  1Vedtiesday's Club in Friday Strcct (1717)~  p. 68. 
'  See Enquiry, lor. cit. 
. '  See the notice of Paterson  by  hIr.  Stephens at the end  of  his  Cotltribu- 
t'O'l  to  the  Uibliograplry of the  Baitk  of  Englaild,  p.  160. 62  IilSTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
high reputations should act so meanly and should be blind 
enough to  get rid  of  so experienced  a colleague. 
The explariat~on  of  these disagreements seems to me easy 
enough to find  when  we  remember the differences of  char- 
acter and financial  training  which  distingilished  Paterson 
from his colleagues.'  Paterson was a genius, bold even  to 
rashness, quick to undertake  difficult enterprises and to ac- 
cept the risks of  untried experiments, experiments which, as 
\\ e shall see, \tlere not always successful.  His colleagues were 
of  quite a different type ; they were merchants, the heads of 
important firms, not having like him  made a rapid fortune, 
but  on the contrary, having amassed their  wealth by  pro- 
longed effort,  and on  this very  account not caring  to  risk 
in  a  day what  had cost  them  so much  labour  to  acquire. 
The long praccice which  they had had  in business inclined 
them to excessive prudence.  Paterson  in spite of  his many 
good  qualities,  nad  the  adventurer's  temperament,  which 
must have frightened not a little the good citizens who were 
his  colleagues.  As long  as Godfrey  lived  he  was  able 
to keep  the peace  between  these two inharmonious factors. 
After his death  the differences of  opinion came to the sur- 
face, and Paterson  realised  that  there was  nothing  for  it 
but to retire, which  he did in  a perfectly dignified manner.' 
However  he was soon  to be  involved  in  fresh adventures. 
He took  up  once more  a scheme with  which  he  had  pre- 
viously dailied, and to promote which  he had applied to the 
Elector of  Brandenburg, and had even gone lo Prussia, but 
without success.  I refer to the famous project of the Dar~en 
or Panama expedition. 
This is not the place to give an account of  this disastrous 
See also the pamphlet:  Observations  upon the  Constifution of  the  Cotn- 
Pony  of  the  Bank  oj  England,  with a  t~arrative  of  tlreir  late  proceedings. 
'I'he  author  complains  amongst other  things  of  a  director,  who  espected an 
"  unreasonable reward,"  and  was  inclined  to  express  his  opinions  on  the 
nlatter  in  the  coffee-houscs.  It  is  possible  that  Paterson  is  the  person 
referred  to,  and this would  give a new explanation of  his resignation. 
'  Apparently  however  he  continued  to  feel  a  certain  resentment  at  the 
incident,  for some years afterwards,  in  a  petition  to  Godolphin,  the  Lord 
'I'rcasurcr,  dated thc 4th of  April,  1709, he  refers  to  the services he  rendered 
and states that he received  no reward  for  his cflorts and for the  expense  to 
which  he was  put. 
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adventure,' into which the whole Scotch nation threw itself 
blindly  and  with  unexpected  fervour.  The  result  w-as 
deplorable, but Paterson's share in the matter was absolutely 
honourable.'  Indeed  on  his  return  to  LondonJ  he  was 
most graciously received by William III., who accorded him 
numerous  interviews and requested  him  to  formulate  his 
schemes  in  writing.  These  schemes  related  to  various 
financial  questions and occasionally  to  political  matters : 
such  as the  real  union  between  England and Scotland.' 
hiany of  these proposals subsequently formed the basis of 
important  financial  reforms,  such  as Walpole's  Sinking 
Fund, and the consolidation of  the  national debt in  1717." 
William Paterson died in London in  1719.  According to 
some writers he passed the concluding years of  his life  in 
want."  He certainly lost LIO,~  in the Darien expedition, 
and he complained of poverty unceasingly  until the end of 
his life.'  It seems  however,  that  in  17x5 he  was  recom- 
pensed for his losses in the Scotch expedition, for not only 
did Parliament, at the request of  the King, vote him a sum 
of A18,241 at this time,  but it is probable  that he actually 
received  the  money  since  in  his will  he  left  considerable 
bequests to different people. 
Details as to  the  Darien  Expedition  will  be found  in  Macaulay,  Chap. 
xxiv.,  and in John Hill Burton, History of  Scotland, Vol.  VIII., chap.  Ixxxiv. 
The Scotch numbered ~,zm  and the expedition  went in  five large ships. 
'  Paterson  nearly  lost  his  life  in  this  expedition,  during  the  whole  oi 
which  he  displayed  great  courage  and  energy.  His  fellow-countrymen 
never  blamed  him  for their  common  failure,  disastrous  though  it  was  for 
Scotland.  Dumfries elected  him  a  Member  of  the  first  United  Parliament. 
The last Scotch  Parliament  had  already  recommended  him  to  Queen Anne 
on account of  his good  services.-Dc  Foe,  History of  the  Union, p.  525. 
'  April,  1701. 
'  Enquiry, p.  84. 
'  I  have  olrlitted  to  sav  that  Paterson,  who  certainly  took  a  part  in 
everything,  was concerned  I%  the question  of  the  Orphans'  Fund.  There  is 
in the British Museum  a  pamphlet  ca!led  : Some occount  of  the  Transactions 
of Mr.  JV.  Paterson in relation  to the  Orphans'  Fund  (1695).  l'he  catalogue 
Stales  however  that  this document  is "  wanting all but  title  page,"  and  it 
adds for our more definite  information, and out of  respect  to the memory of 
M.  de la Palice,  that the work is itlcomplets. 
DalrympIe,  Memoirs  on Great Britain  and  Ireland,  Vol.  II., Part Ill., 
PP 89-123. 
'  The last  petition  which  he  made to  the Government is  in  a  letter  sent 
a nlonth beforc his death, in  L)eceniber,  1718, to  Lord Stanhope. 
'  He le[t  A6,oou to diflercnt  relatives,  ;C;~,ooo  to Paul Daranda, his legal 
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Such was  in outline the  life of  the  founder of  the  Bank 
of  England.'  There have been  none more  eventful and, it 
must be acknowledged, none more fruitful or more honour- 
able.  On all the occasions when  he was the promoter of an 
enterprise,  Paterson showed  much  talent and energy,  and 
whatever mistakes he may have made, he never spared either 
himself or his fortune.  His courage and the nobility  of  his 
character were  proved  during  the  Panama expedition,  an 
undertaking which  was happy in  its conception and which 
deserved to succeed.  Me gave evidence of  diplomatic skill in 
the  negotiations  with  Scotland  with  which  the  Queen  en- 
trusted him about 1706, and of  statesmanship in the various 
measures which  he  brought forward between  I701 and his 
death,  and which  others had  the  honour  of  carrying out. 
In addition  he not only possessed great facility, which was 
a sufficiently common gift at that time,  but also exceptional 
gifts as a political  ~riter.~  Nevertheless,  his name will be 
chiefly  remembered  in  history  on  account of  his share in 
founding the Bank of  England. 
I-Ie had the honour of  proposing the first really  workable 
and matured scheme; and possessed talent and perseverance 
tu carry it out in  the face of  innumerable obstacles, as much 
political  as financial.  I-Ie 'n.as it  is  true  but  ill-retvarded 
for his labours.  IIe never held any of  the official posts to 
\\-hich he might have aspired; and though  I  do not think it 
accurate to say that he died in  poverty, he at any rate passed 
' l.hosc  who  are intcrrhlrd  to  learn  more details  of  Paterson's  remark- 
;tble  lifts  may  consult  in  addition  to  thr  works  alrrady  tncntioncd,  a 
biographical  notice  at the beginning of  S.  Bannister's  edition  of  his  works; 
1,itiiig's .IIis~or~  01 SCOI~UII~,  Vol.  V..  1).  209;  Cllan~b~~r~'  I.)oI)IcsLI'c Att~~als 
of  Sioll~c,rd.  \?ol.  111..  pp.  121.  124,  131 ; and,  finally,  a  French  work  by 
I'aul  Coq  on  the  Jlorttiaie  dc  llntrque,  dedicated  to  Patersoll,  and  preceded 
by  an essay on  the ingc.nious  Scot.  Patrrson was also the hero of an historical 
novrl publislicd  in  1852,  I)nriet~,  by  Eliot  Worburton,  which  had  its  day  of 
cclcbrity. 
L):tl~it*I  11,.  1:01.'4  \\.~rli  i\  the  111ost f:~~nou~  i-,tai,\c  oi inr prolific  and 
divrrsr  character of  thcr  writings  of  the  authors of  the  period.  M.  'I'aine 
says of Ilini : "  Zlc  Ivrotc* in  verse,  in  prose,  on  every  subject, political  and 
rc4igious,  ephcn~eral and  fundanlcntal, satires and  romances,  travels  and 
pamphlets,  busincss  treatises  and  statistical  studies,  in  all  ZIO  wor1ts."- 
llis~oire  de In  Littc'rature nnglaise,  Hk.  Ill.,  Chap. vi.,  p.  264. 
' Bannister's  edition,  The  H'ritings  of  W'illiarn  Pate-rson,  with  a  bio- 
graplrical  tlotice,  is  not  complete.  A  full  list  of  Paterson's  works  will  be 
foulid  at the end of  Stephens'  notice of  him. 
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a  large portion  of his concluding years  in  this condition. 
posterity will do him more justice  than his contemporaries, 
and his  name will  always be  connected  with  the  famous 
institution which  owes its origin to him. 
SECTION  11.  - 
WILLIAM PATERSON  AND  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
The scheme which  was  accepted  by  Montague and was 
destined to be realised in the form of  the  Bank of  England 
was not Paterson's only project;  there were two others. 
AS early as 1691,  he proposed, in  company with  various 
=ity notables, to lend a million to the Government, in return 
for a yearly payment of  ~65,000,  of  which cf;5,000 were for 
the  expenses of  management,  on  condition  that  the  notes 
of the  bank  to be  founded should  be  legal  tender.  The 
committee to whom  these proposals were  submitted  refused 
to make the notes legal tender,  but were ready to authorize 
their  issue.  Paterson  was  willing to  accept  this,  but  his 
colleagues would not support him.' 
The second scheme, which offered to provide two millions 
for the Government, also came to  nothing.  And it was to 
compensate for this failure that Montague devised the lottery 
loan ; but  as we  have  seen, the sums yielded by this were 
inadequate,  and application was made to Paterson,  who in 
the interval, had drawn up his final scheme. 
The plan  now  was to  raise ~1,zoo,~  to be  lent to  the 
Government  in  return  for a  yearly  interest  of  EIOO,~. 
The subscribers to the loan were to form a corporation with 
the right to issue notes up to  the value of  its total capital. 
The corporation  was  to  be  called, "  The  Governor  and 
Company of  the Bank of  England."= 
Paterson  wrote  a pamphlet  demonstrating  the  economic 
principles  on  which  the  future  Bank  of  England  was  to 
rest. 
' See  Macleod,  5th edition,  Vol.  I., p.  47.  Bannister,  Paterson's  Works, 
"~l;  1.9 pp. xxviii., xxix. (2nd edition). 
-  See  Bonnet,  letter  referred  to  above, p.  246.  '' The high  profit of  8 
per cent. paid  to those who lend the sum of  ~1,2oo,ooo,  only affects a  small 
of  persons  and  the  majority  of  the  Lower  House,  who  are  in  a 
Position  to advance  ten,  twenty,  or  thirty  thousand  pounds.  For the  whole 66  HISTORY  OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
He notes the old mistake "  that the stamp or  denomina- 
tion  gives or  adds to  the  value  of  money."  The fallacy 
contained  in  this was pointed  out by  those who  had  sug- 
gested the foundation  of  the Bank some years earlier.  Its 
promoters had seen that the  institution  ought to be  based 
on the following principles :  ' 
"  I.  That  all  money  or  credit  not  having  an  intrinsic 
value,  to answer  the contents or denomination  thereof,  is 
false and counterfeit, and the  loss must  fall one  where or 
other. 
"  2.  That the species of  gold and silver  being  accepted, 
and chosen by  the commercial world  for  the standard,  or 
measure, of  other effects, everything else is only accounted 
valuable as compared with these. 
"  3. Wherefore  all  credit  nc  founded on  the  universal 
species of  gold and silver  is  ir  acticable, and can  never 
subsist  neither  safely  nor  long,  at  least  till  some  other 
species of  credit  be  found  out  and  chosen  by the  trading 
part of  mankind over and above or in lieu thereof." 
After describing the strong position  of  the Rank and its 
prospects  of  success, and stating  that  no  dividend  would 
be paid without several months' notice, in  order to give the 
shareholders the choice of  selling or retaining their shares, 
Paterson  remarks  that  "  The politicians  . . .  distinguish 
between the interest  of  laild  and  trade, as they have  lately 
done between that of  a king and his people,""ut  "  if  the 
proprietors of  the Bank can circulate their own lundalion of 
t~elve  hundred thousand pounds without having more than 
two or three  hundred  thousand pounds  lying  dead  at one 
ti~r~c  with another, this Bank will be in effect as nine hundred 
aniount is  divided  into sharcs of  L.IO,OOO  cach, of  which  not  less than  one 
nor  more  than  three may  be  taken.  . . .  The  subscribers  are  to  form  a 
company, here called a  corporation, . . . which  will  pay  thcm at the rate of 
.+a  per  cent.,  and from  which  they  can  withdraw  their  nioney  at any titne 
and  in  any quantity that they  wish,  hence  the proprietors  will  make 8 per 
cent.  on the money  they have lent, and 31  per  cent.  on  what is lent to them. 
. . . But  Parliarnent  makes  the  corporation  responsible  for  all  the  sums 
which  it receives  above .&~,zoo,ooo,  and makes  the  proprietors  jointly  and 
severally  liable. " 
'  A  brief accottnt of  the it~tc,nded  Cank of  England (1694)~  p.  3.  Bannister, 
op. cit., Vol.  III., p.  80. 
'  pp.  9,  10.  Bannister, pp.  83 and 84. 
p.  12, an allubion to the Land  Barik.  Bar~nister,  p.  Sj. 
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thousand pounds or a million of  fresh money brought into 
the nation."  The Bank, far from being a source of  danger 
to borrowers, traders or  landowners,'  will  benefit  them  by 
reducing the rate of interest, as has been done by the Banks 
in Amsterdam and Genoa. 
Paterson concludes that the enemies of  the Bank are only 
"  Jacobites who apprehend it may contribute to lessen their 
monarch of France, with  some few usurers and brokers of 
money; and the third  sort are commody such as have not 
wherewith  to  trade,  unless  it  be  like  Haman  of  old,  for 
whole nations or peoples at once."' 
This conclusion leads us  to  refer to the objections which 
greeted  the  announcement  that  the  Government" had  ac- 
cepted Paterson's  scheme, and the i:  lusion of  the plan of 
the new  Bank in  the Tonnage Bill.  These objections came 
from  all  sides,  and  though  the  Bank  opponents  may  if 
necessary, be  classified in  Paterson's  tl- .ee categories, such 
a division requires  to be  explained and defined.  This will 
be  the aim  of the third  part  of our  second chapter.  We 
shall also explain why  their opposition  was ineffectual. 
SECTION  111.  - 
THE  OPPONENTS  OF  THE  QANK. 
These opponents were both  political and commercial. 
In the first  place, the Tory party  and the Jacobites were 
afraid that  the  Government  would  be  strengthened  by  a 
' Paterson  is  trying  to pacify  the mercharlts  and  above  all  the  landed 
proprietors,  who had  been  led  to believe  that the bank would  absorb all the 
money  in  the  country,  and  would  only  make  loans  at  abnormal  rates. 
Godfrey, the second  founder of  the  Bank,  also did  what he could  to dispel 
such fears.  He writes (p.  7 of  the pamphlet alreadv referred  to,  Francis,  op. 
Cat..  Vol.  II.,  p.  247) : "  The Bank  will  reduce  the  interest  of  rnoney  in 
England to 3 per cent. per annum in  a few years, without any law to enforce 
it, in  like manner  as it is in  all other countries  where banks are establisht, 
. . . the  lessening  the  interest  of  money  will  infallibly  raise  the  value  of 
land . . . for the falling the interest of  money  . . . will unavoidably  advance 
price  of  land  to  above  thirty  years'  purchase,  which  will  raise the value 
01.  the  lands  of  England  at  least  loo  millions,  and  thereby  abundantly 
the nation  all the charges of  the war."  Codfrey does not however 
on  what  ground he  promises  this remarkable  rise,  and appears mainly 
Concerned to disarm the opposition  of  the landed proprietors. 
a  Bannister, p.  87. 
The  statute  establishing  the  Bank  had  received  the  royal  assent  on 
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successful  bank,  while  if  the  scheme  failed  it  would  be 
powerless from lack of  funds. 
Then  there were  all  the country  gentry,  whose  opposi- 
tion was due not only to their political opinions, but also to 
the  horror  which  merchants  and  financiers,  such  as 
were  the promoters of  the  Bank,  have always inspired  in 
small landowners, condemned  to lead a miserable existence 
on their estates.  Moreover,  these landowners had been  in- 
duced to believe that the Bank would attract all the money 
in  the  country  and that  borrowing  would  no  longer  be 
possible  except at exorbitant rates.' 
The new Bank had also to meet the opposition of  the gold- 
smiths and money-lenders  who were deprived of  their most 
obvious profits  by  the new  undertaking;  and of  the  pro- 
moters of  rival schemes, chiefly that of  Chamberlain and the 
other supporters of  the Land Bank. 
Finally,  these  various opponents were  joined  by  a  few 
dissentient  Whigs,  whose  opposition  was  not  altogether 
without effect. 
This union between  all  the enemies of  the Government 
served to rouse its partisans.? 
But nevertheless  the arguments of  the opponents did not 
appear  valueless  to  contemporaries  The principal  ones 
were as follows :' 
(I) It was alleged  that the Bank, which  was  nicknamed 
the Tonnage Bank, would absorb all the money in the king- 
dom and would subject commerce to usurious exactions.  A 
remarkable objection this to come from the goldsmiths, who 
had  never  enjoyed  the  reputation  of  lending  their  money 
for nothing ; none the less they  talked of  'the risk of  honest 
merchants "  il  they got  into the clutches  of  this harpy  of 
Grocers' Hall."" 
(2)  It was alleged that the Bank would  attract to itself all 
the  money  in  the country by its high rate of  interest,  and 
' We have seen that Paterson and  Godfrey tried to allay these  forebodings. 
The  latter  even  went  to  the  length  of  making  rash  promises.  See  above, 
p. 67  note. 
'  Burnet,  oh. cit.,  Vol.  IV., p.  246. 
'  l'horold Rogers, pp.  9. 10. 
'  From  the  namc  of the  hcadquartcrs  of  thc  colnpany. 
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that no capital would  be available for  trade and industry. 
 hi^ is the objection made by Davenant,' who writes :  "  The 
funds . . . are so inviting and of such infinite  profit  that 
few now are willing to let out their money to traders at 6 per 
cent.  as formerly;  so  that  all  merchants  who  subsist by 
credit, must  in time give over." 
(J)  It was alleged that the Bank would grow too powerful, 
and would  become  the  keystone of  the commercial  world, 
and that if it failed, it would drag down with it the whole of 
English trade. 
(4)  It  was  alleged  that  the  Bank  could  only  favour  a 
limited  number of merchants,  and that  these,  thanks to a 
very low rate of discount and to facilities of  all kinds, would 
soon be able to ruin their  competitor^.^ 
(5)  From  a  political  point  of  view  the  Tories declared 
that a State  Bank  would  be one step towards a  republic, 
because  such  institutions are not  compatible  with  a  mon- 
arch~.~  Indeed the facts seemed to give some plausibility to 
this theory,  since the three great banks  then  existing were 
established in three republics. 
(6)  Starting from  a  similar  standpoint  but  arriving  at 
totally  different conclusions,  the dissentient  Whigs feared 
lest the foundation of  a bank should lead  to absolute mon- 
archy,  since  the  King  would  be  supplied  with  means of 
procuring  money  through this institution  and  might  thus 
escape the financial control of  Parliament. 
To meet  this criticism, a clause was  introduced  into the 
law  prohibiting  the  Bank  from  lending  money  to  tile 
Government  without  the express authority  of  Parliament. 
The full wisdom of this prohibition was not realised until  it 
Essay  upon  Ways  and  Means  (2nd  edition,  1695,  p.  44). 
[H'orks.  whitworth's  Edition,  ,771,  Vol.  I., p.  24.1 
This  objection  was  not,  to  be  strictly  accurate,  brought  forward  until 
I707.  It  is  the  only  original  objection  contained  in  a  work  opposing  the 
of  the  Bank's charter : Reasons  offered  against  the  continuation  of 
the  Bank.  h  a letter  to a Member  of Parliament.  Perhaps  it  is partly due 
lo  Considerations of  this  kind  that  the  Bank  of  France  is  obliged  by  its 
charter (0 allow the  same rate  of  discount  to  evrryone  alike. 
'  Paterson,  Intended  Bank,  p.  8.  "Another  tells  us  that  in  all  his 
he  never  met  banks  but  only  in  Republics.  And  if  we  let  Ihem  get  footing in  England,  wr  shall  certainly  be  in  danger of  a  common- 
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was  disregarded  by  William  Pitt,  from  which  neglect  a 
crisis resulted  whose description will occupy  the whole  of 
the IVth Part of  this volume. 
All  these  criticisms, contradictory  though  they  appear, 
greatly  excited  public  opinion,  and  aroused  many  fears 
among the  landed  proprietors  who  formed  the  House  of 
Lords.  The project  was only passed because  the  Govern- 
ment needed  money and could not obtain  it otherwise. 
Bonnet1 thus describes the debate in  the  House of  Com- 
mons:  "  People think that this institution has its good and 
its bad points,  but had it  not been  that time pressed,  they 
do not believe that it would have been  passed by the Lower 
IIouse, for there was strong opposition at the last moment, 
one of  the chief  objections being that this will  be a  Rank 
in  the State without being under the control of  the Govern- 
ment."  The Bill however passed without a division.  "  No 
question,"  writes  our author, "  has been  more vigorously 
debated in this Parliament than that of  the establishment of 
a Bank in the hands of  a corporation.  It came before the 
Upper  House  yesterday,  and  the  assistance  of  all  the 
Lords of  the  Court  party  was  needed  to  get  it  through. 
The  Marquess  of  Halifax,  and the  Earls  of  Rochester, 
Nottingham  and Monmouth,  spoke  several  times  against 
this institution,  and  brought  forward a  number  of  argu- 
ments  to  show  that  it  would  be  injurious  to  the  King, 
since it was not to his interest that the management of such 
large funds should  be  in  other  hands  than  those  of  the 
Government.  That it  would  be still more injurious to the 
public,  since  instead  of  money  beiqg  invested  in  trade, 
it would be deposited in this bank; and that it would be no 
less injurious to individuals, since it was obvious that they 
would  no longer be able to sell or to mortgage lands with- 
out great loss.  The Marquess of  Caermarthen and the Earl 
of  Mulgrave were  the chief  among those who maintained 
that the Bill must be passed without alteration; not because 
the arguments agai,.st the  Bank were  not  good ones,  but 
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because the difficulties which  would follow from a  refusal, 
and the departure of the King, which would at least be de- 
layed ten or twelve days by a consent, seemed more real than 
those with which they were threatened.  But the number of 
votes, not the number of arguments, carried the day, for in 
the  division  which  they  were  forced to  take  there was  a 
majority of twelve in  favour of passing the Bill  unaltered, 
and it has been read to-day for the last time."' 
'  Letter  of  April  24th  to  May  4th,  p.  248. 
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THUS  notwithstanding  the  violent  opposition,  the  project 
was finally passed,  and the Tonnage Bill became the Ton- 
nage Act.  We  shall proceed to study its provisions.  Then 
we  shall compare the  Bank  of  England with  the principal 
Continental  banks of  the  period,  and shall point  out  the 
original character of  the new  institution,  and in  what  way 
it marked a definite advance.  This comparison will lead us 
to examine the business which  the  youthful bank proposed 
to transact. 
SECTION I.  - 
CHIEF PROVISIONS  OF  THE  "  TONNAGE  ACT."] 
The Act of  Parliament by which the Bank was established 
is called "  An  Act  for  granting to their  Majesties  several 
Rates and Duties upon Tunnages of  Ships and Vessels, and 
' Gilbart,  History,  Principles  and  Practice  of  Batlking,  Vol.  I.,  p.  31 
(edition  of 1907),  gives  a  good  analysis of  this  Act.  It is  almost  the only 
thing in which this book  has proved of  se~vice. 
upon  Beer,  Ale,  and other  Liquors;  for  securing  certain 
~~~~mpenses  and Advantages,  in  the said Act mentioned, 
to  such persons  as shall voluntarily  advance the  Sum of 
Fifteen hundred thousand Pounds towards carrying on the 
war  France." 
After various articles referring to the imposition of  taxes, 
the  Act authorised the raising of  ~1,200,000  by subscrip- 
tion,  the  subscribers forming  a  corporation  to  be  called, 
The  Governor  and  Company  of  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land."'  No  person  might  subscribe more  than  £~o,ooo 
before the  1st of  July following, and even  after this date 
no  individual  subscription  might  exceed  E20,ooo.  The 
corporation  was  to  lend  the  whole  of  its capital  to  the 
Government, and in  return it was to be paid interest at the 
rate of  8 per cent., and £4,000  for expenses of  management, 
in all A;~oo,ooo  per annum.  The corporation  was  to have 
the privileges of a bank for twelve years,  then the Govern- 
ment reserved the right of annulling the charter after giving 
one year's  notice  to the  company.  The corporation were 
not authorised to borrow or owe more than their capital ; if 
they did so, the members became  personally liable in  pro- 
portion  to the amount of  their stock.  The corporation were 
forbidden to trade in any merchandise whatever, but  'I they 
were allowed  to  deal  in  bills  of  exchange, gold  or  silver 
bullion,  and to sell any wares or merchandise upon  which 
they  had  advanced  money,  and which  had  not  been  re- 
deemed within three months after the time agreed upon.'-'= 
The subscription list was opened at the Mercers'  Cha~el,~ 
then  the  headquarters  of  the  corporation,  on  Thursday, 
June PI,  1694.  According to Luttrell, A3oo,ooo was sub- 
scribed on the  opening day alone, the Queen having con- 
tributed LIO,~.  "  To encourage capitalists,  £2  10s. per 
cent. rebate on  the amount subscribed was allowed on  the 
first three days,  and £2  on the subscriptions of  Monday, 
'  This  is  the  official title  still  in  use.  The word  "  company " is even 
Preserved in  the Italian form then  fashionable; the Bank  notes are issued  in 
the name of the Governor and Compania  of  the Bank of  England. 
Gilbart, Vol.  I., p.  72. 
'  The Bank  continuti at the Mercers'  Chapel  until  September  28, when 
it  moved  to  Grocers'  Hall,  which  had  been  taken  for  II years, and  where 
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June 25;  after  which  the  advantage was  reduced  by  five 
shillings  per  cent.'  for each  of  the  successive  days."' 
This reduction  was  justified,  since Egoo,ooo had  already 
been  subscribed,  and the Lh,ooo  which  came in  during 
the first three days sufficed  to make  the subscribers into a 
corporation. 
After this great success the Charter of  Incorporation was  ---.-  D 
granted  on  July  27,  1694.  Its main  provisions  were  as 
iollows :=  - 
"  That the management and government of  the corpora- 
tion  be committed to  the governor,  deputy-governor, and 
twenty-four  directors, who shall be elected between the 25th 
day of  March and the  25th  day of  April each  year,  from 
among the members of  the company duly qualified. 
"  That no dividend  shall  at any  time  be  made by  the 
said governor and compatty save only out of  the interest, 
profit  or produce  arising  out of  the  said capital  stock  or 
fund. 
"  They  must  be  natural  born  subjects of  England,  or 
naturalised subjects; they shall have in their own name and 
for  their  own  use,  severally,  viz.,  the  governor  at  least 
A4,0oo,  the  deputy-governor  A3,ooo,  and each  director 
&2,ooo of  the capital stock of  the said corporation. 
"  That thirteen or more of  the said governors or directors 
(of  which the governor or deputy-governor  shall be always 
one) shall constitute a court of  directors for the management 
of  the affairs of  the company." 
It may be noted also that  according to the terms of  the 
Charter, each  director  must  have  at  least  A5oo  capital 
stock; "  four  general  courts"  must be  held  in  each year, 
conditions  are  specified  under  which  additional  meetings 
may be summoned, and finally,  the  general  courts are to 
issue "  by-laws and ordinances  for the  government of  the 
corporation ."' 
l'  These  premiums  were  defrayed  from  the  civil  list,"--Postlethwayt, 
History of  the English Revenue, p.  lo. 
This fact,  joined  to that of  the  Queen's  subscription,  shows the intense 
interest  which  the Orangist party had  in the success of  the  Bank. 
a  Thorold  Rogers,  First  Nine  Years of  the  Butrk  cj England,  p.  2. 
See GilbartiVol.  I.,  pp.  32,  33. 
'  The laws nnd  ordinancrs of  the Bank, "  not  repugnant  to the  laws of 
the Kingdom."  were drafted  according  to the  advice. of  Scrgeant  Levir~z,  :t 
celebrat&  bairister  of  the period. 
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The new  institution was started on a sufficiently  modest 
scale.  "  The secretaries  and clerks altogether  numbered 
but fifty-four,  while  their  united  salaries did  not  exceed 
~;~,~50.')~  Business was carried on in a single room  with 
primitive  simplicity.  Even sixteen  years later Addison' 
writes: "  I looked  into the great  hall  where  the Bank  is 
kept,  and  was  not  a  little  pleased  to  see  the  directors, 
secretaries and clerks . . .  ranged in  their several stations 
according to  the parts they hold  in  that  just  and regular 
economy ." 
SECTION  -  11. 
COMPARISON  BETWEEN  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND  AND  THE 
BANKS  OF  VENICE, GENOA,  AMSTERDAM,  AND SWEDEN. 
At the tine of  the foundation of  the Bank of  England, at 
least  three  important  banks  existed  in  Europe,  those  of 
Venice,  Genoa, and Amsterdam.  . An examination  of  the 
constitution of these banks, and a comparison between them 
and the Bank of  England,  will prove  both  interesting and 
important.' 
A.-The  Banks of  Venice, Genoa, and  Amsterdam. 
I .-The  Bank  of  Venice.  A  persistent  error dates the 
Bank of Venice from the 12th century, from  I 156  or  I 171. 
' Francis, p.  65. 
Specrator No. 3 (March, 3, 1701).  This essay will  be found in Chalmers' 
collection,  The British  Essayists,  with prefaces  historical  and  biographical, 
Vol.  VI., p.  13.  I  was surprised  not to find it in  the edition  of  Addison's 
Essays  brought out by  Sir John  Lubbock  in  !894.  See Sir  ]ohn  Lubbock's 
hundred  Books.  The essay  in  question  contams an allegory  illustrating the 
close  union  between  the  Bank  and  the  Whig  party;  we  shall  refer to  it 
again below,  see p.  I 19. 
'  For this two-fold  purpose  the following  works may be  consulted :  Law, 
Memoires  sur les  Banques;  Guillaumin's  edition,  Economistes  et Financiers 
d74  XVIIIe  siicle;  and  Rota  (P.), Storia  delle  Banche.  For the  Bank  of 
Venice  in  particular :  Lattes  La  Liberta delle  Banche  a  Venezia do1  Secolo 
xzII.  a1  X171Z;  and  C. F. Dunbar,  The Bank  of  Venice (Quarterly ]ourno1 
Of  Economics,  April,  1892).  For  the  Bank  of  Cenoa : Carlo  Cunco, 
Mentofie sopra l'antico debito puhlico  ntutui, compere, e banche di San Giargio 
"' Genoua; and Adam lviszniewski,  La  Mkthode  Historique  appliquCe  d  la 
"forl~le  des banques; Ifistoire de la Banque  Saint-Georges  de  la RCPublique 
de Cbnes.  Finally,  for the Bank of  Amsterdam : Mr.  Pierson.  Principles 4 
f~O"i~s,  English translation, p.  488, mentions a Dutch work by  Dr.  W.  C. 
cPF~  Pr~ev~cn<*r  gcschiede~~is  VII~  ltet  Hanl(weten in Nrderlund.  The various 
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As a matter of  fact,  this  Bank  was  not  created until  four 
centuries later.  Probably however,  private banks  existed 
in  Venice from an early date, doubtless as a supplement to 
the business  of  the  exchangers.  These exchangers,  the 
campsores,l soon began to accept deposits, and in a law of 
September qth, 1318,  some security  was given to the de- 
positors.  But it should be noted that an earlier law, passed 
in  1270, which  regulates the transactions of  the campsores, 
makes  no  mention  of  deposits.  From this it  seems likely 
that this new  business developed between  I270  and 1318. 
At all events, the laws following that of  1318 frequently use 
the terms bancherius and bancus. 
The new banks grew and multiplied.  Their business was 
very similar to that of  modern banks.  They were banks of 
deposit and of  discount.  Moreover  payments by means of 
transfers on the banker's  book existed from  the early  15th 
century.  These transfers  were  simplified  by  the issue of 
certificates  of  deposit,  the  contadi  di Banco,  to  which  re- 
ference  is  made  as early  as  1421, and which  were used, 
according to Rota,l like coin;  in this way these primitive 
Venetian banks resembled our banks of  issue. 
Some of  these private banks became  very  powerful,  but 
many of  them  ultimately  failed.  Thomas Contarini,  in  a 
speech that well repays reading,%tates  that out of  103 banks 
which had been established only 9 had succeeded.' 
The series of  failures in  1489~  and 1523, and in  1504 the 
failure  of  the  Pisani  and the Tiepolo,  with  liabilities  of 
' For the campsores see Rota, pp. 35  and 36. 
p.  104. 
'  Contarini's  speech  in  favour of  the establishment  of  a public  bank, and 
that of  a  senator opposing this policy,  both  delivered during the great debate 
of  1584, were published  by  Lattes in  1869 at the end of  his book. 
One of  the causes of  the failure of  the private  banks was the perpetual 
loans  made  to  the Government-loans  which  were  indeed  enforced by  law, 
for it  was decreed  that the banks might  not  employ  in  trade  more than  one 
and a half  times the amount of  the money lent  to the Government.  Another 
cause  of  these  failures  may  have  been  the  greed  of  the  bankers,  who, 
tempted by  high  interest, lent  money to persons  of  no co~nmercial  solidity. 
"he  failures wrre in  some cases due  to "  runs."  A  description of  the 
most  important of  these,  which  occurred  in  1489,  is  given  by  Malpiero  in 
the  Archivio  Storico, Series I., Vol.  VII., p.  71j. 
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5@=,  ooo ducats, apparently convinced  the  Venetian  Senate 
that the system of  private banks must be abandoned,'  and 
a fresh one  introduced,  for  it did not  even  occur to  them 
that banks might be dispensed with altogether;  without  a 
bank, contarini remarked, Venice could not exist. 
After some remarkable debates, it was decided to establish 
a public  bank,  and the Banco  della Piazza  del  Rialto was 
founded  by the laws passed in  1584 and 1587.  Another law 
in 1593 decreed  that  all bills  of  exchange should be  paid 
only through bank transfers." 
Unlike the private banks which  it  replaced, the Bank of 
Rialto was  not  a  bank  in  the  modern  sense of  the  term. 
The new bank  had not  been  created for any fiscal purpose 
but solely  to ensure security in  trade.  Hence the republic 
very wisely refused to undertake the investment of  the funds 
entrusted to it, and did not attempt to make any profit out of 
the credit of  the bank.  In theory  at any rate,  it restricted 
itself  to keeping the depositors'  money  in  security, and to 
paying it out or transferring it according to the wish  of  its 
owners. 
The private banks had been  suppressed in  1587, but  the 
need  for a second bank soon  made itself  felt, and in  1619 
the famous Banco del Giro was founded, which is often made 
to date from the 12th century.' 
Hardly  was  this bank  established  than  it  made  a  tem- 
porary  loan to the republic of  500,m ducats;' this incident 
accounts  for  the  tradition  according  to  which  the  Bank 
of  Venice  owed  its  origin  to  a  national  debt.  In  other 
respects the  Banco  del  Giro transacted  business in  exactly 
the same way as the Banco della Piazza del Rialto, which it 
ultimately (in 1637) absorbed. 
The republic was not, however, able to pay its debt to the 
Lewis, op.  cit.,  p.  qo ; compare above,  p.  25. 
See Lattes, pp.  170-171, for the reason  of this. 
a  Dunbar, p.  321.  See also below,  p. 81, for some remarks on the trans- 
actions of continental banks in  general. 
Dunbar gives  numerous  instances  of  this  mistake, he  noted  it  in  most 
Of  the  Dictionaries  of  Political  Econonly,  and  en  in  the  Dictiotznaire  des 
Finances,  Vol.  I.,  p.  291. 
Rezasco's  Dizionario di  L-ittguaggio Itolid,zo  Storico e  A~,rtninistrativo, 
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Banco  del  Giro, and after many struggles,  the latter was 
obliged to suspend cash payments from 1717  to 1739.'  This 
suspension had the effect of  reducing almost to nothing the 
premium  on bank money,  which  had  sometimes amounted 
to  20 per  cent.,  and  had existed  throughout  the  17th and 
18th centuries.¶ 
In 1739 the Bank of  Venice resumed cash payments, and 
continued them until the French occupation of  Venice.  At 
this  time,  that  is  in  1797,  the  Bank  had  a  reserve  of 
522,000  ducats against liabilities of  1,500,ooo ducats.  Tlie 
Banco  del Giro  nevertheless  survived  the  French  occupa- 
tion, and was  not suppressed until  1806, after the peace ~f 
Presbourg . 
2.-The  Bank of  Genoa.  Perhaps the Middle Ages pro- 
duced  no  institution  more  unique  than  the  Compania  or 
Casa  di  San Giorgio  of  Genoa;  an  association  of  State 
creditors who managed the revenues of  the republic, owned 
colonies  and  possessions,  maintained  armies  and  fleets, 
made war and  concluded  treaties,  and combined  with  all 
these various functions the duties of  a bank of  deposit. 
This  institution  was  founded  under  the  following  cir- 
cumstances : 
In  1148, the  republic,  which  had  previously  had  no 
public  debt, was obliged to  raise a  loan,  and its creditors 
were formed  into a company  to  which  was entrusted  the 
administration  of  certain  taxes,  whose  returns  were  to  be 
devoted  to  paying  the  interest  and  capital  of  the  loan. 
This system was extended, and gradually there came to be 
as many distinct companies as there had been loans.  These 
companies  were  called  compere,  and  this organisation  of 
compere recalls that of  the monti of  Venice, Florence, and 
Sienna.  Complications resulted from the increasing number 
of  compere,  and  they  were  united  about  I250  into  one 
institution called the Compera del Capito10.~ 
In  1407, Jean  le  Maingre,  marshal  of  France,  changed 
Apparently  there  had been  previous  suspensions  between  1631 and 1669 
during the war  in  Crete.  Compare what Savary writes  i~:  1679 in Le  Parfait 
Nkgociant, Part  II., p.  128. 
'  Dunbar,  p. 330. 
Rota, p.  185. 
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this compera into the  Uficio  di Sun Giorgio,  a  company 
intended to advance to the Government  the money  needed 
for the conversion of the numerous existing debts.  In  this 
the  Uficio  never  changed its character, and from 
1441  to  1736 it  supplied  the  Government  with  frequent  . . 
loans.' 
Soon the Uficio di Sun Giorgio became a State within a 
State, and  much  surpassed in  importance the most power- 
ful of  chartered  companies.  The  East  India  Company 
never held  in  England a position  one-quarter  so great as 
that which the Uficio occupied at Genoa. 
The republic began  by  ceding to it  in  1453 PCra and its 
Black Sea colonies.  In the same year Corsica, in which the 
republic, torn  by  internal  discussions,  could  not  maintain 
its authority, was made over to it.  Many  other such con- 
cessions were  made.  "  The citizens,"  says Machiavelli,' 
"  preferred the authority of  the company to that of  the State, 
on  account of  the  tyranny of  the latter and the  excellent 
administration of  the former." 
It has often been  stated that  the  Bank of  Genoa did not 
begin to carry on banking business  until  1675.  This view, 
as has now  been  proved,  is a  mistake.Vhe error can  be 
explained as due  to  a confusion.  It was,  in  fact, at this 
date that  it  was  decreed  that  bills of  exchange should be 
paid in biglietti di cartulari di Sun Giorgio.'  Amongst the 
instruments of  credit of these early banks the cartulary notes 
of St. George are those  which  most  resemble  bank-notes. 
They were certificates of  deposits, deposits which the Bank 
of  Saint  George  used  in  whatever  way  it  considered  ex- 
pedient. 
The  crisis  of  1797  ruined  the  Bank  of  Saint  George, 
and between  1799 and 1804 the Ligurian Senate tried vainly 
to Jestore it.  In  1816  Genoa was annexed to Sardinia and 
the debt of the Bank of  Saint George was consolidated with 
the  Sardinian national debt. 
For the amounts and dates of  these loans see Wiszniewski, p. 106, et seq. 
a  Le  Istorie  Fiorentitre,  Hk.  V.,  111.  Giraudet's  French  Translation, 
"'I;  IV.3  p.  389,  et seq. 
Rota, p.  141.  The name Ba~ik  of  Saint George  was  in  use before  1675. 
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3.-The  Bank  of  Amsterdam.  This bank  was  at the 
height  of  its  glory  when  the  Bank  of  England  was 
founded.  Established  at the  time  when  the  Netherlands 
were  about  to  conclude  their  first  truce  with  Spain, the 
Bank of  Amsterdam was continuously prosperous.  In 1608 
and 16og  a monopoly was granted to it by the decrees which 
abolished  the offices of  the exchangers, and a  subsequent 
law still further increased its power by enforcing the use of 
its receipts for all payments exceeding a certain amount, an 
arrangement which obliged every merchant of  importance to 
have a deposit account at the Bank.  And its credit became 
boundless after Louis XIV.'s  invasion of  Holland and the 
consequent run on  the  Bank  resulted  in  proving  that its 
treasure was  absolutely  intact.' 
The prosperity  of  the Bank of  Amsterdam  was so con- 
tinuous  and it  was so  generally  looked  upon  as a  model 
bank, even in the time of Steuart and of  Adam Smith, that 
these economists felt it necessary  to study the organisation 
of the Bank of  the Netherlands in preference to that of  the 
Bank of  their own co~ntry.~ 
Unfortunately, at the time of  the invasion of  the revolu- 
tionary armies  it was discovered that all the Bank's treasure 
had been  lent  to the  East India Company.  This was the 
end of the Bank of  Amsterdam. 
B.-Contrast  between the  Bank  of  England and the three 
Continental  Banks. 
Without pausing  over certain  points  of  resemblance  to 
the  Bank  of  Genoa,  such as a  similar  origin  (both banks 
came into existence through the organisation of a loan, and 
found their  privileges  increasing in  return  for  successive 
advances made to the State),s and without pausing either to 
'  The marks on  those  coins  which  had been  injured  in  the  fire  at the 
Stadthauss could  be  easily  seen. 
An  Enquiry  into the  Principles  of Political  Economy,  Chap.  36-39,  and 
Wealth  of  Nations,  Vol.  IV.,  Chap.  iii.  Adam  Smith  was  helped  in  his 
study by  his friend  Hope. 
'  Other banks  owed  their existence  to a  loan, e.g., those established  at 
Florence  in  1336 and  1357,  at Chieri  (Piedmont),  in  1415,  at Barcelona  in 
1349.  (See  W.  Pareto,  p.  356).  In  modern  times  the  National  Bank of 
Austria  was founded  in 1817 in order to withdraw from circulation  the paper 
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notice  that the Bank of  England never possessed the political 
powers of the Italian Bank, we  must bring out at once the 
ways  in  which  the  Bank  of  England  was  original  and 
differed essentially from its Continental rivals. 
(,)  The chief  distinction was  that the Continental banks 
were merely banks of deposit while the Bank of  England 
something more and something better. 
We must  explain.  The  Continental  banks,  with  the 
indeed of  the Bank of  St. George, accepted from 
merchants coins of  all  countries of  repute and held  them 
11 as the equivalents of  the bills  issued against  them.  In 
theory the notes of  these earlier banks were of  the nature of 
dock warrants, entitling the holder to claim not only the sum 
which  they  expressed,  but,  theoretically  at least, the  very 
coins which were deposited against them.'" 
The Bank of  Amsterdam  guaranteed that  its depositors 
should always receive  the same weight of  money,  that  is 
a value equal to what they had deposited.  Accounts were 
kept in terms of  an ideal money, bank rn0ney.l  In this way 
the paper issued by the banks was much superior to metallic 
money which was liable to all kinds of  depreciation.  Hence 
it was at a premium.' 
The Bank of  England from the outset adopted a different 
money  issued  by  the Government.  The Ranks of  Genoa and Turin  also lent 
20 millions  to the Piedmontese Government,  which  authorised  their  amalga- 
mation  into  a  singlc  bank;  this  bank  continued  to  ~nake  loans  to  the 
(;overnnlent  and becaliie  the national  bank  of  Sardinia  and then  the  Bank 
of  Italy.  The Bank  of  Spain  was founded in  1874 to  raise  a  loan  of  125 
millions of pesetas  for the  State.  Since  then  it:,  advances  have  continued 
under various forms. 
Ac  exa~nples  of  a  different origin  the Bank of  Amsterdalil   nay  bc  noticed 
and  more  recently  the  Scotch  banks.  The Banks  of  France  and  Belgium 
were  created  by  private  enterprise  but  th~y  received  a  more  or less  direct 
asststance from the Government. 
For  further  details  on  the  above  points  see  du  Hays du  Gassart,  Des 
Prets consentis aux Etats  par  les Banques  de Circulation, Chap.  I. 
Thorold Rogers, p.  8. 
Gidc, p.  336.  The incid<*nt  of 1672 showed that the obligation  of keep- 
ing the  dcposlts  was  not  at  first  an  illusory  guarantee.  According  to 
Davcnant, the  Bank  of  Amvtcrdam  held  regulariy  ,436,000,000. 
For  a  long  time the public believed  that this policy  was always followed. 
but  Law  (Mdmoire  st:?  les  Banques,  edition  already  quoted,  p.  553).  and 
Galliani (Della  Moneta, Vol.  II.,  p.  21;.  edition  of  the  Economisti  classici 
Ita!ani), wrre sceptical, and  future events showed  that they  were justified. 
I'icrson,  p.  480.  'I'he  s:111lc  thing  hap1)cnt.d  at Venire.  See above,  1). 
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policy, that already followed by the goldsmiths and by the 
Bank of  Sweden.'  "  It  purported  to give in  its bills the 
equivalent of  what it had received, but it never pretended to 
take the deposit for any other purpose than that of  trading 
with it.  It never professed to make its issues square exactly 
with  its coin  and bullion,  though,  of  course,  it  made  its 
liabilities square with  its assets, plus the capital of  its share- 
holders,  and in  time, plus  its  rest or  reserve also,  i.e.,  its 
accumulated  and undivided  profits.  At  first,  these  profits 
were  derived  from  the dividends it  received  from  Govern- 
ment, and from the gains it made out of  the notes which  it 
put into circulation  in  exchange for; or  in  addition  to,  the 
cash which  it took.  It coined, in  short, its own credit  into 
11"  paper money. 
(b) Another  important  distinction  between  the  Bank  of 
England and the other Continental banks consisted  in  the 
fact that its notes were not legal tender, whereas in  the case 
of  the three banks described above, debtors were obliged to 
offer and creditors to receive the paper money issued by the 
banks.*  The Republic of  Venice, for instance,  forbade the 
use  of  metallic money for sums exceeding 300 ducats, and 
ordered such payments to be made by  bank transfers.  At 
Amsterdam  payments of  sums exceeding,  at first 600 and 
later 300 ducats, had to be made in bank receipts.  Finally, 
at Genoa, an ordinance of  1675 ordered all payments, how- 
ever small, of  bills of  exchange or other remittances,  to be 
made through the Bank of  St. George. 
There was nothing of  this sort in the case of  the Bank of 
England.  The  English  Government  did  not  make  the 
Bank's  notes legal tender,  and moreover  the Bank had  no 
'  The  Bank  of Stockholm,  established  in  1656, had  already  issued  batik- 
notes  (Law,  of. cit., p.  556).  Voltaire  writes  that  the  Bank  of  Sweden, 
which  is the  oldest  bank  in  Europe,  had  to  be  created  because  the  currency 
was  copper  and  iron,  the  transport  of  which  was  too  difficult  (Histoire de 
Charles  XII., Bk. I., p.  I).  On this point  we also Palgrave, Notes on Bonk- 
ing in Great  Britain, Sweden,  and  Hotnburg, p. 87. 
On  the  Bank  of  Palnlstruch  an  Anlerican  worlc : History  of  Banking in 
all  Nations, Vol.  IV., pp.  393-395,  and the  Economiste Fran~ais  for Feb. nnd, 
1901,  may be  consulted. 
'  Thorold  Rogers, oh. cit., p. 9. 
On  this point  see  Wilfredo Pareto,  op. cit., Vol.  I., p. 360,  ct  scq. 
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thought of as~ing  that they should do so, for the directors 
\f.ere not  in  favour  of  such  a  measure.  One of  them  re- 
It's  nothing makes bank bills currant, but only 
because that all those who desire it, can go when they will, 
and fetch their money for them." 
(,)  A third important  distinction  is that the Continental 
banks enjoyed a mocopoly  while the Bank of  England was 
granted no soch privilege at the time of  its foundation.  The 
Government even threatened it with  a formidable rival by 
the  creation  of  the  Land  Bank.  It  wasonly  after  the 
collapse of  this instittltion,  which nearly  ruined  the  Bank 
of England, that the Government (in 1697) conceded to the 
latter a partial monopoly ; twelve years later a genuine one 
was granted. 
The distinction  between  the Bank  of  England  and the 
Banks of  the late Renaissance will  be  better  understood  if 
we  study the business which the new  English bank  under- 
took  from  the outset of  its career.  But before doing this, 
we  must point  out that the important  differences which we 
have tried to describe exist no longer. 
At  the  present  time  the  Bank  of  England  enjoys  a 
monopoly, which, originally limiied  to  London,  has been 
extended throughout the country ;  its notes are legal tender, 
and have been so since 1833 ;  and in addition to this,  it has 
shown for some time a tendency to return to the position of 
the  primitive banks,  whose  chief  function  was  to manage 
the exchanges,  to supply good money, and to take charge 
of the capital of   individual^.^ 
The Act  of  1844 obliges the  Bank  to  buy  all  the  gold 
offered to it at a fixed price.  And besides it can be shown 
that  for some time-more  than ten years-the  value of  the 
Bank of England notes in circulation  has always been  less 
than that of its metallic reserve.  The-character of  the bank- 
has thus completely changed ;  like the old certificates 
deposit, they are to-day approximately warrants.  In fact 
the Bank of England to-day  is less a credit institution than a 
:  Godfre~,  op. cit., pp. 7-8.  [Francis,  op. cit., Vol.  II., p.  248.1 
III.,  Lero~-~eaulieu,  Trait6 thCorique  et Pratique  dlEconotnie politigue,  Vol. 
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repository of  cash.  It is  the guardian of  the cash  reserves 
for  the  whole  of  English  commerce,  i.e.,  almost  for  the 
world's  commerce.' 
SECTION  111. 
- 
TIIE TRANSACTIONS  OP  THE  BANK.% 
These transactions were various, but they were not under- 
taken  according to  the  principles  which  seem  to  regulate 
the business of  modern banks. 
In the  first place  all the capital  up to  the last shilling 
had been  lent to the Government.  The only  security  the 
shareholders had  was  the good faith of  the  debtor.  But 
only  two years had  passed  since the system of  a  national 
debt had been  first introduced by the Government through 
the annuities.  The lottery  loan  of  a  million  was  under- 
taken at the same time as the foundation of  the bank.  It 
was speedily successful, but this debt also was  temporary, 
and was  to be liquidated in  sixteen  years.  Thus the loan 
from the Bank was the first permanent loan, if  not in theory, 
since the Government reserved the right to pay it off  in 1705, 
at any rate in fact, since everyone foresaw that the Govern- 
ment would  never want to  destroy an institution  so useful 
to itself and to the public. 
The capital of the  Bank  was  thus in  the  hands of  the 
Government. 
In what way, then, could it make any profit? 
1st.-Besides  the income of  ~100,ooo  paid to it yearly by 
the Government, the Bank had the power to issue notes. 
It issued  these to an amount equal to  the sum advanced 
to the  Government.  These notes,  as we  have  seen,  were 
'  We shall  see at the  end  of  the  present  work  (Vol.  II.,  appendix)  that 
the  English  Government  has avoided the  inconvenience  of  keeping the  public 
money by  entrusting this to the  Bank.  It  is interesting  to note  that  as early 
as the  eighteenth  century  the  Republic  of  Venice  proposed to  hand over  the 
duties of the  Treasury to the  Banco del  Giro-see  Besta,  Leeioni  sulla  Con- 
tabilita di Stato, Bk.  VII., Chap. iii. 
For  an  account  of  these  transactions  see  Godfrey,  A  short  account  of 
the  Bank  of  England  (1695).  This pamphlet  also describes  the  ilnmediatc 
results  of  the  Bank's  foundation.  It  is most  useful  and  we  have  already 
referred  to  it.  All  references  are  to  the  reprint  which  Francis  gives at  thc 
end  of  his own  lxr~k. 
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not legal  tender;  an interest of  2d.  a  day was allowed  on 
them,  which cost the Bank L36,ooo a year, but attracted to 
it  the  patronage  of  the  goldsmiths.  This  policy  made 
people use these notes less often in making payments ; but 
it also deprived them of  that fixity of  value which is one of 
the  characteristics of  a well-managed currency. 
~t seems incredible that the Bank took  no precaution  to 
ensure the convertibility of  its notes, and during the restora- 
tion  of  the coinage  it  was  reduced  to  the most  desperate 
to maintain its credit.  It would  not  have suc- 
ceeded in doing so had it not  been  for the sacrifices made 
by  its directors and shareholders. 
2nd.-Nominally  the Bank discounted at 44 per cent. in 
the case of  foreign bills of exchange, and at 6 per cent. in the 
case of English bills and notes for debts.  But considerable 
reductions were made to such of  its customers as kept their 
money deposited with  it. 
3rd.-This  was not the only favour shown  to depositors. 
In order  to  increase  the profits which  could  be  made on 
deposits the Bank endeavoured to attract them by paying q 
per cent. interest to depositors.'  This  practice aroused great 
indignation among the Bank's opponents who declared that 
it would cause the withdrawal of  capital from commerce and 
indu~try.~ 
4th.-Its  first charter authorised the Bank to lend money 
on  pawned  articles.  According to Godfrey  it  lent  money 
on "  pawns of  commodities " and "  real  securities " at 5 
per cent. per annum.  If  the titles to land had  been  more 
certain,  advances would  have been  made on  mortgages at 
4  per  cent.,  and  in  time  of  peace,  at 3 per  cent.  The 
Bank does not seem to have made much use of  its power  to 
lend on pawned goods, and it never bore any resemblance to 
a Paw n-dealer. 
Another  feature  distinguishing  it  from  the  primitive  banks,  whose 
so  far  from  making  any  profit  on  their  deposits,  were  obliged 
to Pay  for  them. 
Davenant,  Discourses  on  the  Public  Revenues  and  Trade  of  England 
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CHAPTER  IV. 
RESULTS OF THE  FOUNDATION OF  THE BANK. 
Political  and  econo~nic  condition  of England  at the  time  of  its  foundation. 
Success  of the  Bank.  Causes  of  this  success.  Michael  Codfrey,  his 
salutary  influence  on  the  commercial  world,  his  pamphlet,  "  A  Short 
Account of  the  Bank of  England."  Services of  the Bank to the  Govern- 
ment and the public. 
THE  Bank was created under gloomy auspices.  The political 
outlook was bad,l the March equinoxes had been extremely 
severea and the financial situation was deplorable;  not only 
was the  market  constantly  upset  by  the gambling  fever,3 
' Marlborough had disclosed to james  11.  the plan  for an assault on Brest, 
and had  thus converted into a disaster an attack which  it had been  believed 
must  ruin  the  French  navy.  (This  letter  from  Marlborough  is  published 
among the Stuart PaQers.  See also Henri  Martin,  Vol.  XIV., pp.  196-197). 
At  home  the Government  was  not  strengthened,  an attack on  the coasts 
of  Britain  was  feared,  and  it  was  rumoured  that  the  Pope  was  going  to 
advance considerable sums to James 11.  to support this expedition. 
*  One  of  these  alone  seems  to  have  done  damage  to  the  amount  of 
&OO,OW,  a  considerable  sum when  the  English  navy  according  to  Rogers' 
estrmate,  hardly  exceeded  200,oao  tons  burden.  In I702  the  total  tonnage 
according  to  Macpherson,  did  not  exceed  212,222  tons.  At  present  it  is 
9,164,342, as compared with  1,639,552  for  Germany,  and  957,756  for  France 
(these figures  arc taken from  very  detailed statistics published  in  the  Timer 
for  February  5,  1901).  In  18~8,  761  merchant  vessels  wvre  constructed  in 
England  whose  total  tonnage amounted  to  1,367,250  tons,  without  counting 
33 warships  of  a  total tonnage of  120,560  (see Victor  Bhrard,  L'Angleterre 
et 1'ImQtrialistr.e contemporain).  In  other  words,  the  annual  construction 
is  now  seven  times  the  total  tonnage  of  the  English  merchant  navy  two 
centuries ago. 
'  We have already referred  to this (p.  53), and to the  companies  formed, 
often  entirely  without  foundation,  and  whose  shares  fluctuated  incessantly. 
These fluctuations  were the more numerous  owing to the  ease with  which  a 
panic  regarding the  shares of  such-and-such  a  company  could be  spread  or 
an  artificial  rise  in  the  shares  of  others  produced,  The  public  was 
unaccustomed  to manipulations of this kind  and  was easily deceived.  The 
speculators  used  to meet  at the  coffee-houses, especially  at Garraway's  and 
Jonathan's,  which  in  London  history  are the  equivalents  of  the  Rue  Quin- 
campoix;  they  had  no  qualms  about  producing  fluctuations  to  an  extent 
of  which  a  few  figures will  give  an idea.  The stock  of  the  Hudson's  Ray 
Company  fell from  A250  to E8o  in  three years.  That of  the  East  India 
Company,  which  had  stood  at A146 at the  beginning  of  1693,  fell  to  A37 
in  May,  1697,  to  rise  again  to A142 by  the  beginning of  1700.  'The  stock 
of  the  English  East  India  Company,  the  young  rival  of  the  former,  with 
which  it  ultimately  combined,  suffered  a  like  fate;  from  A46  in  March, 
but the  lack  of  sound metallic coinage1 on which  to  base 
the credit currency  might at any moment  have forced  the 
Bank to the verge  of  ruin.  However,  in  spite of  all,  the 
Bank  prospered  at  the  outset.'  This  was  due  to  the 
prudence  and  ability  of  its  directors  and  shareholders. 
Michael Godfrey,  who  had  done  for the Bank  in  all that 
related to the City what Montague had done for it in matters 
concerning  the Government,  not  only gave  it  the support 
of his personal  influence,  which  was great, but  also took 
pains to surround it with wealthy financiers of  high reputa- 
tion.  There  was Sir John  Houblon,  the first  governor, 
afterwards  Lord  Mayor  of  London,  Gilbert  Heathcote, 
and several other merchants of  excellent commercial stand- 
ing.  The personality of the directors had  more  influence 
then than to-day and that of Godfrey's colleagues was such 
that even his death,' followed by Paterson's resignation, did 
not  appreciably  diminish  the  credit  of  the new  establish- 
ment.' 
The success of  the  Bank  had  also  a  political  side and 
political causes.  Its promoters were all active Whigs, and 
although  this exposed  it  to  attacks as we  know,  it  also 
ensured to it the support of  the  Government and the sym- 
pathy of the commercial world, who  rallied  round  the new 
institution when they saw it attacked. 
Whatever  the  exact  causes,  the  success  was  brilliant. 
1%  it rose to A219 in  March.  1703.  And  these were  well-established  com- 
panles  of  good  repute.  I  have  chosrn  them  on  that  very  account.  The 
enormous  fluctuations  in  the  stock  of  other  companies  now  long  forgotten 
may  easily be  imagined. 
'  The condition of  the coinage will  form the subject of  the next chapter. 
On all these points  see Thorold  Rogers'  excellent  work : The First  Nine 
Years of  the  Bank  of  England. 
a  These Houblons, for Sir John had four brothers,  were of  Flemish origin. 
Their  father had  taken  refuge  in  England  on  account  of  religious persecu- 
tions.  He made  a  good  deal  of  money  in  I.ondon,  but  always continued  a 
member of the French colony, of which  he  was for a long time the president. 
'  Godfrey was  killed  qt  the  siege  of  Namur  on  July  15,  16gj.  He had 
'Ome  to bring  subsidies to William,  who  was besieging  the town,  and  like 
a  good  courtier  accompanied  his  sovereign  into  the  trenches,  where  he  was 
Shot.  His enemies  alleged  that  he  ventured  into such  an  exposed  position 
O?'y  Out  of excess  of  prudence,  b'elieving  that  the  on'.  placr  of  safe-ty  was 
with  the King.  - 
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Godfrey  lived  long enough  to witness  it  and some little 
time before his death  he published  his famous  pamphlet, 
in which he expressed his delight with some complaisancy. 
The primary advantage which followed from the establish- 
ment of  the Bank was, according to him,'  that a loan was 
granted to the Government at an exceptional rate.  This is 
quite true  and it was this that enabled William to take the 
offensive in  Flanders  and  to  secure  his  first  successes. 
Moreover, the Bank helped the Government by making the 
voting of  taxes  more effective, as well  as by  actual loans. 
It accepted  the tallies at par  so that  fhey soon  rose  to a 
premium, whereas  until 1694, even the most secure of  these 
tallies  which had but a short time to run,  such as those on 
the land tax, had been at a discount of  from 13  to 2 per cent., 
while tallies which  offered less security were discounted at 
a loss of  15  to 30 per cent. over and above the interest." 
The advantages which  the Bank  afforded  to  the public 
were  no less great.  The citizens  now  had  a  place  where 
their deposits would be in security,'  and would bear interest 
although the money could be withdrawn at will. 
The Bank also had  a  beneficial  influence on the  rate of 
discount.  Godfrey remarks as a thing both surprising and 
unexampled  that  after six years of  war  and after  an ex- 
penditure of thirty millions,'  there had been  a great fall in 
the rate of  interest instead of  the rise usual in  such cases. 
The author prophesied that in  a few  years,  thanks to the 
Bank, the rate of  interest would be reduced permanently to 
3 per cent., and the value of  the lands of  England increased 
by nearly  IOO millions.' 
The Bank was  undoubtedly an immense benefit  to both 
Government  and  public;  Godfrey's  statements are  con- 
firmed  on  all sides.  And  what is more,  the benefit  was 
mutual, since the Bank  lost nothing. 
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This is evident  from  the  price  of its stock,  which  soon 
rose to par and on October  25th,  1694, was at 105.  After 
some  fluctuations, of which  Rogers gives a  most  detailed 
account,1 it rose again to 99  on  March 25th of  the follow- 
ing year,  fell  slightly,  then  rose  once  more,  so  that  in 
January,  1696,  it  reached  the  unprecedented  height  of 
108.'  All seemed to be going well when two dangers made 
their  appearance,  which  proved  to  be  among  the  most 
serious of those with which  the new institution  was threat- 
ened : these  dangers were  the  reform, now  become  un- 
avoidable, of  the  coinage  and  the  project  for  the  Land 
Bank.  They  will  form  the  subjects  of  the  two  next 
chapters. 
1 See his  Table I.,  giving  the  "Weekly  Prices  of  Bank  Stock." 
These  fluctuations  were  due  either  to  the  political  events,  favourable 
and otherwise,  whkh  occurred  during  these  years,  such  as  the  taking  of 
Namur,  the death of  the Queen, etc.,  or  to events  ~articularly  affecting  the 
Bank,  such  as  Godfrey's  death,  or  the  announcement  of  a  dividend,  or, 
finally,  to  the  scandals  and  political  intrigues  which  marked  the  period. 
Macaulay  (Chap.  xxi.)  describes  the  scandals connected  with  the  East  India 
Company and with the City of  London Orphans' Fund.  On this occasion  the 
Speaker  was accused  of  corruption,  and  had  himself  to put the  question  to 
the House over  which  he was presiding.  The vote  was against him,  and he 
was  expelled  from  the  House.  Seymour  and  Leeds  were  also  implicated, 
and  their  accusers  were no  better  than they. 
These  scandals threw  discredit  upon  the  stock  of  all  the great financial 
companies, and  that  of  the Bank  was further  affected  by  the manipulations 
of Lord Godolphin  and Charles  Duncombe,  who sold  all  their stock in  order 
fo produce  a  fictitious  fall.  The effects  of  this  sudden  and  combined  sale 
may be  imagined  when  it is remembered  that  Duncombe alone had L80,ooo 
of stock.  This same Duncombe, a man of  the worst character, who  had been 
convicted of  forgery  but  released  in default of  a  legal  penalty  for  his crime, 
ended by  becoming  Lord Mayor of London  by  means of unrestrained corrup- 
tion.  He had made his  fortune in all  ways imaginable.  The account of  his 
life would form  a curious chapter in the history  of  the social behaviour,  and 
in  particular, of  the electioneering habits  of  his time.  Bribery in every  form 
rife at elections without concealment or needless  beatin  about the bush. 
It is  one  of  the things  not  least  to  the  credit  of  modern  %ngland  that  she 
has freed herself  from these scandalous methods,  which,  with the connivance 
of the  Hanoverian  monarchy,  persisted  down  to  the end  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 
'P 3 
.P  3. 
Godfrey  takes  tne  opportunity of  making  various  accusations  against 
the goldsmiths.  See above, pp.  22 and as. 
p.  6. 
'  p.  7, and see above, p.  67 for reference to the result thus anticipated. RESTORATION  OF  THE  COINAGE.  gr 
CHAPTER  V. 
THE  RESTORATION  OF  TI-IE  COINAGE. 
Scandalous  condition  of  the  English  coinage.  I.aws  powerless  to  prevent 
clipping.  The  He-Coinage  Act  of  1696.  lixamination  of  this  Law. 
Montague's  difficulties, (a) Great expense involvcd  in  the successful con>- 
pletion  of  the operation, (h) The standard of  the new coins.  Controversy 
brtween Lowndes and Coclce.  Decision  of  the House of  Commons. 
IN  William  111.'~  time the coins were  struck at the Tower 
by a mill  worked by horses.  But until the introduction of 
a machine for stamping the coins,  this had  been  done by 
a  hammer;  the  metal  was first  cut into  pieces  and then 
stamped.  These two sorts of  coins circulated together,  in 
theory at least,  in  actual  fact  the  bad  money  soon  drove 
out the good.  Folkes,'  indeed,  states that during the  re- 
coinage in  1696 the coins brought to the Mint had all been 
struck between the 6th year of  Edward VI.'s  reign and 1662, 
the year in which milling had been  introduced. 
At the time of  which we  write  at all events, the state of 
the currency had become scandalous; coins dating from the 
Plantagenets were  still  in  circulation,  as well  as debased 
coins of  Henry VIII. and Edward  VI., which  had escaped 
the recoinage'  in Elizabeth's reign  and which were valued 
accurately by  the dealers in  money,  for coins were  found 
offered for  sale and valued as half  alloy.  "  The English 
Mint levied  on the bullion  coined a pretty  heavy  seignor- 
age  to  cover   charge^,^  for  the  coin  had  to  carry,  not 
only the fourteen pence per pound charged for manufacture, 
but the cost of melting and refining.  Now such a seignorage 
Martin Folkes,  A  Table of  Silver Coitas,  p.  42. 
Some details as  to this re-coina  e will  be found in  our fourth part, chap.  f  vi.,  in  connection  with  Robert  Peel s  speech.  It was  this  re-coinage  which 
gave Gresham the opportunity of  stating the law called by  his name. 
'  At the present day all the expenses of  minting are met by  the taxes, and 
the English sovereign is the only coin which  really  possesses  its face value. 
charge  must  have  led  to  a  considerable  importation  of 
foreign  coinl which  in  the exchanges was estimated at its 
bullion, as opposed to its Mint value." ' The disadvantages 
of  such  a  situation  were  continually  making  themselves 
felt, and had been  the subject of  petitions to  the House of 
Commons  and of  various  Bills.  But  in  1694 the  matter 
became insupportable.  The silver currency was depreciat- 
ing daily,  and at the end of  the year,  the guineas which 
were nominally equivalent to 20 shillings, rose gradually to 
30  The exchange on  Holland  fell  25  per cent. 
glthough the balance of  trade was favourable to England. 
This state of  things could not fail to attract the attention 
of  Parliament.!?  The difficulties were  so great that  trade 
was at a standstill  and the taxes were  no longer collected. 
The silver money had been getting clipped for a long time 
and the damage was done so secretly and was so well  con- 
cealed by all who were interested in dealing in the currency, 
that all the coins had greatly decreased in value, five pounds 
in  cash  being  hardly  worth  forty  shillings.  There  were 
also  in  circulation  a  quantity  of  coins  of  iron  or copper 
silvered over.8 
The committee  requested  that  the  money  should be  re- 
coined  and calculated  that this would  cost  a  million.  It 
also recommended  that  the  new  money  should  be  of  the 
same weight and fineness as the old ; that the crown should 
be valued at 5s. 6d. ;  and that numerous penalties should be 
imposed on those who debased the coins. 
An  Act  was  passed  in  1695,'  the  preamble  of  which 
states that it was notorious that the currency had been  greatly 
debased by various devices, that many false coins had been 
to  make them  like the  good ones,  and that  these 
'  Thorold  Rogers, op.  cit., p.  31. 
'  A committee was appointed as early as 1689, hut it   resented  no report. 
References to the  monetary crisis are found  in many of  the literary  writings 
Of  the  period,  in  Dryden's  correspondence,  for  example ;  in  Blackmore's 
against  U'it,  and even  in  Cibber's  comedy,  The  Fool of  Fashion.  the 
?.of  which,  in  language reflecting the licence  which then prevailed  in  the 
"gllsh  drama, declares that "  Virtue is as much  debased as our money, and 
faith, Dei  gratia, is  as hard  to bc found in  a  girl  of  sixteen  as round  the 
of an old shilling."  . -  -  Parlia,nr,ltary  History, Val. V., p. 955 
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practices had been carried on by persons who made a trade 
of  exchanging good  money for bad,  or other  like devices. 
The law  therefore  forbade anyone to exchange, lend, sell, 
buy, or receive any coins, clipped or unclipped,  of  gold or 
silver, for more than their  nominal value, under a penalty 
of  10s. for every 20s. so traded in.  The law added (art. 4) 
that anyone who bought, sold or knowingly possessed, any 
of  the clippings of  the coins, should forfeit them, and should 
be liable  to a fine of  ,4500 and to be branded on the  right 
cheek with  a capital R.  Moreover  everyone, except those 
who were goldsmiths  by profession,  was forbidden, under 
penalty of  imprisonment, to buy or sell bullion, and various 
penalties  were  imposed  on  those who  exported coin.'  In 
addition, this law,  which  Rogers describes as "  a striking 
illustration  of  that  unwisdom  and ignorance of  monetary 
laws  which  pervaded  the  legislature,"  contains  two  even 
more  characteristic sections. 
Section 8 allowed the Warden, with two assistants of  the 
Goldsmiths' Company, or two justices of  the peace, to enter 
any house suspected of  containing bullion,  and if  any was 
found, it rested with the owner of  the house to prove that it 
was not the product of  melted coin or of  clippings.  The law 
went even further in ordering the sheriffs of  counties, on and 
after May  rst,  1695, to  pay  ,440  to anyone who  procures 
the conviction of  a clipper; and the informant may sue the 
sheriff  if the latter neglects to pay him his reward. 
This was  sufficient  to  put  a  premium  on  denunciation. 
But the law went still further in this direction.  Any clipper 
who could prove the guilt of  two others was pardoned-and 
an apprentice who informed successfully against his master 
was at once made a freeman of  the City.  His denunciation 
served him instead of a "  masterpiece." 
We have thought  it necessary  to dwell upon  these  pro- 
'  See  sections  5,  6,  and  7.  The  provisions  are  as follows :-Section  5 
disables  every  person  from  exporting  bullion  unless  it  be  stamped  at  Gold- 
smiths'  Hall  and  oath  be  made  that  it  is  not  the  produce  of  English  coin. 
Bullion thus "sworn  off " was  worth  about  lid. an  ounce  more  than  other 
bullion.  As  Mr.  Rogers  witily  remarks,  "  this  meant  that  three  halfpence 
an ounce  in  gold was the  price  of  perjury." 
Section  6  permits  unstamped  bullion  to  be  seized  and  confiscated  by  the 
Custorns'  Housr.  Section 7 authorises goldsmiths  alone  to deal  in  bullion. 
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visions, because  they are not  peculiar  to the law  of  1695. 
They recur in  all similar legislative attempts, and it is  not 
too  to  say  that  the  prohibition  of  keeping  money 
coined or  in  bullion,  and the encouragement of  informing, 
are the necessary outcome of measures by which statesmen 
have  hoped  to  restrain  the free action  of  monetary  laws. 
T~ refer only to  France, we  find  similar provisions  under 
the Regency, when sons denounced their fathers, and in the 
laws  of the  revolutionists  with  regard  to  assignats.  The 
French laws only served to bring trouble and disorder and 
fulfilled none  of  the  hopes with  which  they  were  passed. 
The effects of  the  English  laws may  be deduced  from  the 
facts which follow. 
During  the  months of  May, June, and July,  1695, 572 
bags of  silver coin,  of  LIOO  each, were  brought into  the 
exchequer.  They should have  weighed  18,451-lbs.; they 
did, in fact, weigh g,48~lbs.,  that is, there was a difference 
of  nearly  50 per cent. 
A contemporary writer'  says : "  Upon trial I  have found 
that 5s. of  milled money  weighed 8s. of  the present current 
money,  and  3s.  of  the  8s.  was  not  clipped,  only  worn. 
Again,  I have found 10s. in milled money  to weigh 21s. of 
the clipped money.  Again, 20s.  of  milled  money to weigh 
43s. of our now current money." 
The oficers of  the  Exchequer, according  to  Lo~ndes,~ 
weighed  £f;57,200 of  hammered money.  Its weight  ought 
to  have  exceeded  221,418 ounces,  it  \\as actually  I 1~3,771 
ounces.  The weight per bag was as follows : 
1st bag, correct weight  15,483 ounces  -  actual  weight 8,095 
2nd  ,,  9  28,645  9,  0 I  14,375 
3rd  t$  st  51,483  $9  $9  27,318 
4th  ,,  9,  46,451  1,  IS  23,469 
5th  ,,  ,  ,  40,645  ,,  ,,  ao,899 
6th  ,,  9,  38,709  11  19,588 
221,418  113,771 
I  An  Essay for the Regulation of  the  Coitt, By  A. V.  (Sept. ~nd,  1695). 
Seine  Ren~arlrs  on  a Rcport  cotttaitring an Essay  for  the Amcndinent  of 
the  Silver  Coins  (169j),  p.  159 of  the  original  edition,  and  p.  2j3 of Mac- 
Cul'och's reprint in  A  Collection of  scarce  Tracts on hioney. 
See  also  Martin  Folltes,  op.  cit..  p.  "7,  note.  L'Hermitage  also  says 
(Dee.  9th  1695) that  three  \veil-known  London  goldsmiths  were  asked  to 
Supply A100  of  current  silver  coin;  the  A300 ought  to have  weighed  1,200 
OUnces~  they  actually  weighed  only 624. c)q  HISTORY  OF  TIiE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
The  anonymous author  quoted  above  gives  a  similar 
calculation.'  He went  to  several  London  goldsmiths and 
asked them to take out of  their strong-boxes a bag of  £100; 
lie found that these bags weighed as follows : 
The whole  ,4600  weighed  I 7,198 ounces,  which  would 
have been the weight of  £310 of  milled money.  The author 
adds that he is informed that the money  paid into the Ex- 
chequer  weighs from  13 to  20-lbs.  per £100  sterling  and 
that  it  is  worth  less  than  two-thirds  of  its nominal value. 
"  ButYBsince  it was thought that the money  in  the country 
is generally  not one-half  as bad as it is  in  and near Lon- 
don,"  he  obtained  an  account  from  various  cities  as 
foill,ws : 
At  Bristol  -  1st bag of  &roo  weighed  240 ounces 
2nd  ,,  ,,  ir  227  ,, 
AtCambridgc  -  1st  ,,  ,,  91  203  9, 
2nd  ,,  ,,  ,,  211  .. 
At  Exeter  -  -  1st  ,,  ,,  r,  180  ,, 
2nd  ,,  ,,  ,,  192  ,, 
At  Oxford  -  1st  ,,  ,,  ,,  216  ,, 
2nd  ,,  ,,  198  ,,  - 
1,668 ounces 
The ,4800  weighed  no  more  than  L43~  15s. of  milled 
money, so that the  difference from  the London figures was 
very small. 
Our author exaggerates slightly,  for  some parts of  the 
North  escaped  the  infection.  Macaulay  relates  with  his 
usual wit, the tale of  the 1-ancashire Quaker, who during a 
Essay for  Rcgulotioir,  p.  8, Chap.  iv. 
T onlit  fractions,  so that the totals  givcn  are slightly  higher  than  those 
of  the  figures  actually  quoted.  The same remarlc  applies  to  the  preceding 
tnblc. 
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journey to London, found to his amazement that the value 
of his money  changcd and increased  as he drew  nearer to 
tile capital,  When Ile got there his wealth was half  as great 
again  as when he started.' 
VThat  was  the reason  for  this incessant clipping  of  the 
It could not  be explained by the negligence of  the 
law.  The laws were only  too  severe,  and were actually 
enforced : instances of condemnation to death  followed by 
exccuti~n  occur  by  dozens.'  Godfrey  accuses  the  gold- 
smiths.  Rogers considers that the  crime was fashionable, 
and  that  the  morals  of  the  Court  after  the  Restoration 
afforded  a bad example to the public. 
It is certain, at any rate, that these  practices were extra- 
ordinarily  pr~fitable;~  the  bullion  had  become  so  much 
dearer than  the coined money that peopie  were irresistibly 
tempted  to  clip  the  coins14  more especially  since  the con- 
nivance of the boatmen on the south coast made the exporta- 
tion of  bullion extremely easy. 
Another equally certain fact is that people were so tolerant 
of  these crimes that the clergy tliought it  incumbent  upon 
Chap.  sxi., p.  544,  Vol.  It.,  in  the  two-volume  edition.  Vol.  IV., p. 
627  in  thc  first  cdition. 
Sevctl  mrn  were  hanged and a  wolnar  burnt in a single morning  for a 
critnc of  this  kind.-hlacnulay,  p.  543,  1'01.  Il., or p.  625,  Vol.  IV. 
Luttrell  says that many pcwplc made fortunes in  tllis way, and instances 
Mour  of  Wc~strnitister,  who,  w111:n his  critnc  was  discovered,  oRercd  a  con- 
sidrrablc sun1 in ordcr to savc his life.  Sce l'horcld  Rogers,  op. crt., p.  32. 
'  The tradc of  clipping  coin,  says L'licrntitage (Oct.  ]st),  was  so profit- 
able  and  sectncd  so easy  that,  no  matter  what  was  done  to  suppress the 
clippers,  othc1.s  wcre  always  rcady  to take their  places.  The author of  the 
Essay for  rcg~tlation  of  the  coin (p.  3) in his  second  chapter,  headed, Setting 
forth what is becoine  of  the grccrt  quairlities of  money coined in  the rcigrr  of 
King  Charles II. and  the precediilg  IZcigiis,  points out that 4d.,  6d., or cven 
Id. may  be  gaincd  by  niclting  an unclipped  5s.  piece.  He adds, "  And  zo 
Per  cent.  advantage  is  a  good  allay  for  any scruple  of  conscience  that may 
 ha\^  those  that  prncticc  it,  and  those  that  rcceive  and  pay  one  thousand 
Pounds a day, and mcct  with but one hundrcd pounds atnongst it of  unclippcd 
silver  may  in  a  yrar  (accounting but threc  hundrcd  days) get  six  hundred 
Stetline." 
~ngthcr  reason  given  by  the same  writer  (p.  4)  for  the disappcarance of 
the coin  was  the fashion for gold  and silver platr,  and  for  chains,  buttons, 
and  buckles  of thc precious  metals,  a  fashiotl  which  must  have  C:IUSC~ the 
m"lting of more than 7 million  sterling, involving an annual loss of  interest  of 
rt'420,000.  The author suggests  tll;ct  the  usc  of  such  plate  should  be  for- 
bidden 0'  that it  should be  licensed  and  a  Ins of  5 per  cent.  imposed.  Such 
'Omplaints  of  the  inconvenicnccs  of fashion  rccall  those  made  by  Bodin  in 
his answer to the paradox of  M.  dc hlalcstroit. c$  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
them  to  protest and to recall the faithful to a truer view  of 
the matter.' 
The Re-coinage  Act  of  Ianuary  2 I, 1696.'  Meanwhile, 
the sermons did little to alter the situation, which grew worse 
daily,  and  the price  of  gold  and the  foreign  exchanges' 
were continually  disturbed by it. 
During 1694 the price of  gold varied from 80s. to 81s. 6d. 
That of  guineas from 21s. ~od.  to 22s. 6d., and that of the 
ounce of  silver from 5s. 2d. to 5s. gd.  In 1695 the prices of 
the precious metals began to rise.'  On January  ~~th,  the 
price of  an ounce of  gold was 80s. 6d., and that of  guineas 
22s. gd.  These prices rose steadily, and on June 14th, were 
'  Two  sermons  on  this  subject  are  particularly  remarkable.  The  first 
and  most  striking was preached  by  Fleetwood,  afterwards  Bishop  of  Ely, 
then  chaplain  to the  King, before  the Lord  Mayor  and  Aldermen,  and  was 
printed  by  order of  the court  (Ruding,  p.  36,  note  2).  Fleetwood  was one 
of  the  most  interesting  characters  amongst  the  English  clergy,  he  was  an 
ardent Whig and continually introduced  politics  into his sermons.  (We have 
of  his  a  Chronicon  Pretiosutn,  or  an  account  of  English  gold  and  silver 
Money,  published  anonymously  in  1707,  and  various  sermons  on  passive 
obedience and in opposition to the peace of  Utrecht).  In this case he showed 
considerable knowledge of  economic questions.  He took for his text  Genesis 
xxiii.,  16, and in  reference to the grave of  Sarah found opportunity (p.  19) to 
point  out the evils  of  debasing the coinage, especially in  regard  to payments 
to foreigners  which  could  not  be  made  in  clipped  money.  "For  it  is  not 
Casar's  face  and  titles,  but  weight  and  goodness  that  procure  credit." 
"Now,"  he  concludes,  "if  the  exportation  of  our  weighty  money  be  a 
Inischief  to the nation,  we see it is occasioned chiefly by the clipping." 
The  other  sermon  was  preached  by  G.  Halley  at York  Castle,  before 
some "clippers"  who were to be hanged the next day. 
'  For  this  Act,  its causes,  and  some  interesting  details,  see  Shaw,  The 
History  of  the  Currency, pp.  222-227. 
Rogers gives five  tables which  are of  great value for the study of  this 
question.  I.-The  Weekly  Prices  of  Bank  Stock  from  Aug.  17,  1694,  to 
Sept.  17,  1703.  11.-The  Rates of  Exchange  on  Amsterdam.  111.-The 
Discount or premium  on bills of  exchange,  London  and Amsterdam.  1V.- 
Discount  of  Bank  Bills.  V.-Changes  in  the  value  of  gold,  silver,  and 
guineas.  Rogers  made  considerable  use  of  a  book  by  Alexander  Justice, 
General  Treatise oft hfotteys and  Exchanges  (1707).  I have not been  able to 
consult this work, for the only copy is in the Oxford Library.  The Director 
of  the British  hfuseum,  to whom  I  applied,  promised  to procure  the book  if 
possible; but apparently the attempt has not hitherto been  successful.  [There 
is now a copy  in  the (;oldsmiths'  Library.] 
The price of  silver fluctuated less, hecause silver was in  fact the standard 
coin  of  the  country,  and  during  this  crisis  the  Government,  so  far  as a 
C;overnment  can  exercise  influence  in  such  a  matter,  was  able  to  control 
partially  the  price  of this  metal  through  the quantity of  coin  issued.  Gold 
did  not  become  the  English  standard  until  1816,  and  the  single  standard 
\\.;IS adopted  less  for  theoretical  reasons  than  on  the  grounds  of  cconorny. 
Silver was then  at a premium.  For the present  monetary system in  England 
sce Crtuwhs'  Cours d'Econonlie Politique,  Vnl.  II.,  p.  54a. 
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109s.  and 30s. respectively, which were the maximum prices 
fo;  the year.' 
 he rate of  exchange fell in a corresponding manner.  In  - --- 
June, I@~,  the exchange on Amsterdam, which is important 
both on account of  the prominent position held by this town 
and also because the sums necessary  to support the English 
troops in Flanders were sent through it, was at 22.2 per cent. 
below  par,  and  in  August  English  bills  of  exchange  on 
~~~t~~dam  were at a discount of  30 per cent. 
This latter fact hastened the decision  arrived at by Mon- 
tape  and Somers  that the currency must be reformed at all 
costs  and that  this could only be done on condition  that 
the debts to individual creditors and to the public remained 
unaltered in  value. 
It  was,  in  fact,  out of  all  the  numerous results of  the 
deplorable state of  the currency, its effect upon  the rate of 
exchange which  most disturbed  England at that  moment. 
Whatever might be the state of home trade, the sufferings of 
those who were dependent on their salaries, the disturbance 
produced  in  credit, the immense profits  of  the goldsmiths 
and exchangers, all these evils seemed small compared with 
the fact that the subsidies voted for a war upon whose result, 
as was commonly thought, the very  existence of  England 
depended, were always reduced by 20 or 30 per cent. owing 
to  the  expenses  incurred in  conveying the sums voted  to 
their destination. 
The  new  Parliament  met  in  November,  1695, and the 
reform of  the currency was its first subject  of  discussion. 
The law  which  decreed  the reform  of  the currency was 7 
William III., ~.i.~  The remedy came almost too late, for the 
continued to be extreme during the first year after 
its application.  The currency  reform  under William  III., 
like that  under  Elizabeth,  was  an undertaking of  funda- 
mental importance and extreme delicacy, and it was  unlike 
I  In April,  1696,  after the  new coins  had been  issued,  guineas fell  again 
22S.*  and the price of  gold,  on  July  10, to 82s. ;  silver  at the same date 
ss. ad.--See  Rogers,  p.  36. 
'  The Statutes  at Large, Vol.  IX.,  pp.  380-386. 98  HISTORY OF TI-IE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
Elizabeth's  re-coinage  in  that so far from yielding a profit 
it was a great expense.' 
The re-coinage RudingZ  states, was  not  completed  until 
1699, having occupied the greater part of  this and the three 
preceding years.  According to the reports of  the directors 
of  the hlint, the new currency amounted to £6,882,908,  of 
which As,og~,  121 were struck at the Tower, and £1,791,787 
at various miIls established in the pr~vinces.~  The expenses 
were met by a tax on houses and windows, and amounted in 
all to £2,702,164,  which  was far in  excess of  the original 
estimates.' 
Criticisms  of  the  Act  of  1@6.--Dificulties  which Mon- 
tague had to  e~tcoullter..Vt  is well  known  that the Act of 
1696 was due to  Montague and a difficult enough task  he 
had had. 
Montague received much help from his colleague Somers, 
and above all, from  two men  of  genius for whom  political 
economy  had  not been  a  primary object of  skudy-I  refer 
to  Newton  and Locke.  The latter was  not content  merely 
to advise, he also wrote a  masterly pamphlet,  of  which  we 
shall presently give an analysis.  These four men, each  so 
distinguished in his own province,  had many difficulties to 
solve,  of  which  the  two  chief  were-(I)  the  question  of 
the expense which  must necessarily  be incurred by  the re- 
coinage, (2)  the question whether, when  the re-coinage  was 
accomplished,  the coins should keep their old  standard or 
be issued at a lower one. 
First difficulty.  The £2,703,164  required for the under- 
taking had to be covered ; a considerable sum at any time, 
and for that period enormous.  Most  likely  if  this expense 
Elizabeth's  re-coinage  left  a  net  profit  of  A14,079  13s.  gd.  See below, 
P. 2.40. 
-  '.VOI.  II.,  p.  57. 
'  These  rnills  for  minting  were  at  Bristoi,  Exeter,  Chester,  Norwich,  - 
and York. 
'  On this point  see  Lord  Liverpool,  draft  of an intended  report  on the 
statc of  coinage.  Mr.  Leakc  (An Ifistorical  Account  of  English Money,  p. 
3bg) points  out that all the expenses  rnight  have been  avoided  if  the matter 
had been  taken up in  time.  Sorne details  interesting from a  technical point 
of  view,  on  this reform and on the statutes relating  to it, will  be  found in  a 
work by  Edward  Hawkins, curator of  the antiquities at the British Museurn, 
1  he  silver  Coins  of  Enxiand, pp.  391-39z. 
'  Sre Thorold Rogers, p.  qq et suq. 
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had  been  clearly  instead  of  vaguely  foreseen,  Montague 
have  argued  in  vain.  Possibly  too,  if  the  Bank 
had  realised  the  difficulties  it  would  have  to  face-the 
depreciation of its stock and notes,  the suspension of  pay- 
ments  and  of  dividends-its  directors,  in  spite of  their 
courage and intelligence, would  have refused to enter upon 
such a formidable adventure, more especially since they were 
already threatened  by the Land Bank.  Godfrey estimated 
the cost of  the re-coinage at from one to two millions.  To 
spend three  million  pounds, a  sum equal  to more than a 
year's revenue in time of peace,  was as serious a matter at 
the end of  the 17th century as the loss of  a hundred million 
pounds to-day . 
Second difficulty.  The second difficulty encountered by 
Montague  was a more delicate  matter.  The harvest had 
been  bad,  prices  had  risen,  and the  distress  was  great. 
"  Would it not be better  to keep  the same  names  for the 
crown, the half-crown, the shilling, and the sixpence, but 
to coin an ounce of  silver into seven shillings instead of  five? 
There are people  who even  now  believe  that the Govern- 
ment can give an intrinsic value to a coin which it does not 
possess In  bullion.'  But many more people believed in this 
theory in  1695."'  Parliament had fixed and was to go on 
fixing for some time  the prices of  crowns and guineas, of 
beef and salt, of  labour and of  money (by deciding the rate 
of interest); why might it not evade the expense of  the re- 
'  At  all events this opinion  had  not  entirely disappeared some Years ago. 
In  England, in  1819, when cash  payments were  to be  resumed  after a  sus- 
pension  lasting 22 years,  Lord Laudcrdale proposed  that the standard should 
bc  lowered,  and  maintained  that gold  ought  to  be valued  at A4 1s.  an 
Ounce.  It was also suggested  that it should be valued  at A4  10s.  Or  at ASP 
since  these  prices,  reckoned  in  Bank  notes,  had  prevailed  some time  before 
the resulription  of  cash  payments.  People  also  said  that  as a  great Part of 
tile  national  debt  had  been  incurred  during a  period  of  forced  CurrcnCY:  it 
Was fair to pay the interest on  it in  depreciated coin.  Rut wisdom  prcvall~d 
and the old  standard  of the coins was re-established.  l.l,is  was  not  accoln- 
p'lshrd  without  opposition, and Robert  Peel  who  advocated  the  policy,  was 
trcntcd  as a  lunatic by his  own  father, the  statesman  who  had  taken  such 
a  large share  in  drawing  up  the  first  labour  laws.  Mnntague's  example 
"Ikht  1lave  been  in  the minds of those  wl~o  were  managing  the  business  of 
<'bumption. 
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coinage by lowering  the standard of  fineness of  the  coins 
and continuing to call the coins by their former names?' 
These opinions were developed  in  a report  by  William 
Lowndes,  the Secretary of  the Treasury, published  under 
the title :  A Re#ort containing an essay for  the amendment 
of  the silver  coins (London,  1695).  This work  which  con- 
tains much  interesting  historical  information,  called  forth 
a reply from Locke.=  The latter took Lowndes' arguments 
in turn, and after stating them very impartially,  proceeded 
to  refute  them  or rather to  crush  them  to  powder,  in  a 
masterly manner.a  Locke's opinions had been stated before, 
but  never  with  so much  authority and skill.'  That cele- 
brated  philosopher  had  written  the  pamphlet  in  question 
for the private use of  Somers.  Somers was delighted with it, 
and ordered  it to be  printed.  The little treatise concludes 
as follows : 
"  The increase of  denomination does or can do nothing 
'  The King, and afterwards Somers,  proposed  that the money  should be 
weighed  and  not  counted,  but  these  suggestions  were  negatived  by  the 
council. 
a  Fttrther  considerations  concerning  raising  the  value  of  money.  This 
pamphlet and  two other economic  essays by  Locke,  Some  considerations  on 
the lowering  of  interest and rarsing  the value of  money, and On the Coining 
of  Silver  Money, have been  reprinted at the end of  McCulloch's  Principles  of 
Political  Economy.  See Macleod,  5th edition, Vol.  I.,  p.  468. 
a  See note,  pp.  322-349  of  McCulloch's  reprint. 
4  We may  mention  among  works  whose  authors agree with  Lowndes: 
A  Discourse  of  Coin and  of  Coinage, by  Rice Vaughan,  a  book  In  which the 
author in  spite of  his talent,  has been  unable  to escape  the idea  that  the 
stamp affects the real value of  the coin.  The book,  which  is worth  reading, 
was printed in  1675, but must have been written some time earlier, at any  rate 
before  1643, when Louis XIII. died, for (p.  29) reference  is made to an edict 
of the present  King of  France,  in  1614.  In connection  with  Locke's  work, 
I  cannot resist  giving  some extracts  from  Quantulumcunque  which  refer  to 
the question.  William Petty seems to me to be far in advance of  the ordinary 
thought of  his time on all  the points with  which he deals,  both  in  the bold- 
ness and in  the decision  of  his  answers,  and  his short pamphlet-it  is  only 
ten  pages long-deserves to be  remembered.  See Question  8  (p.  65, Selert 
Tracts)-"  If  the  new  shilling  were  but  three-quarters  of  the  weight  as 
formerly . . .  the Merchant would  export them, lust as before,  only  he will 
give but three-quarters  so much  Pepper or other  Indian Goods  for the new 
retrenched shilling as he did for the old. . . .  And  consequently  there would 
be  no  difference,  but among a  few  such  Fools  as take  money by  its name 
and not by its weight  and fineness." 
Question 9.-"  If a shilling was by  new Coinage reduced  to three-quartcrs 
of  its present  weight,  should we  not thereby have one-third  more money  than 
we now have, and consequently be so much the richer?  Answer-You  would 
indeed have one-third  part more of  the  new  christened shillings,  but not  an 
RESTORATION  OF TI-IE  COINAGE.  lor 
in the case, for it is silver by its quantity and not denomina- 
tion that is the price of things and the measure of  commerce ; 
and it is the weight of silver  in  it, and not  the name of  the 
pieces,  that  men  estimate  conlmodities by  and exchange 
them for. 
~f  this  be  not  so,  when  the  necessity  of  our affairs 
abroad, or ill-husbandry at home, has carried away half our 
treasure,  . . . it is but to issue a proclamation that a penny 
shall go for two pence, sixpence for a shilling, half a crown 
for a crown, etc., and immediately,  without any more ado, 
\re are as rich as before.  And, when  half the remainder is 
gone, it is but doing the same thing again, and raising the 
denomination  anew.  And so on, and  if  the denomination 
were raised  15 or 16 times, everyone would  find  his wealth 
in  silver turned  into gold. 
"  If this be not so, I desire anyone to show me xhy the 
same way of raising the denomination, which  can raise the 
value of  money  in  respect  to other commodities  one-fifth, 
cannot, when you please, raise it another fifth, and so on." 
The name,  Loclte goes on, is an arbitrary matter;  the shill- 
ing might be called a penny, and vice versa; similarly, the 
existing proportion between the two coins might be changed. 
"  But this, however ordered, alters not one jot  the value 
of the ounce of  silver, in  respect of  other things,  any more 
than  it  does its weight,  this  raising  being but  giving of 
names at pleasure to aliquot parts of  any piece."  No human 
power can "  raise the value of  our money their  double in 
respect of other commodities, and make that same piece or 
quantity  of  silver,  under  a.  double  denomination,  pur- 
chase double the quantity of pepper, wine, or lead, an instant 
after such  proclamation,  to  what  it  would  do an instant 
before." 
Ounce  more  of  Silver  . . . of  Foreign  Comnlodities . . . Nor  even  of any 
DOnlesti~  C~nimoditie~.  . . .  Suppose  you  buy  a  Silver  Vessel  from  a 
Goldsnlith  weighing  20  ounces  at 6s.  pcr  ounca,  making 6  pounds  or 24 
Ounces of Coined  Silver;  now  suppose  that  the said  6  pounds were reduced 
from weighing  24  ouncrs to \veigh  but  18  ounces upon  the new  Coinage. but 
be  still crl1.d  6 pounds enbn  by  the King's  Proclarnation  Can it be imagined 
lhat the Goldsmith  rill give  his \ressel  weighing  20 ounces of  wrought  for 
ounces of unwrought Silver5 . . .  Now  this Absurdity  is the sarnc in  all  Commodities. " 102  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
Locke's conclusions seem  unanswerable,'  and nowadays 
no  one  would  seriously  deny  that  Lowndes'  suggestion 
would have given a severe blow to the credit of  the Govern- 
ment,  and would  have  involved the spoliation  of  creditors 
for  the benefit of  debtors.  Many  interests  were  opposed 
to an alteration of  the standard.  Creditors would have lost a 
part of  their incomes,  landlords a part of  their  rents,  and 
everyone who  had  a contract not  yet fulfilled would  have 
suffered in  like manner.  But the notion  that the name of 
shilling carried the thing with it was powerful and Lowndes' 
reasoning answered well  to  the prevailing  frame of  mind. 
The resolution  to  preserve  the  old  standard of  the coins, 
vigorously supported by  Montague,  was,  however, passed 
by a majority of  I I I .' 
His premises were no less important.  He began by stating as a principle 
that  there is  only  one difference  between  the  Government  which  debases the 
coins and the criminal  who  clips them, viz.,  that the Government can  oblige 
people to accept  the debased coin.  He then  points out that such conduct will 
cost  the  State dear.  The debasement  of  the  coin in  fact "  will  defraud the 
King, the Church, and the universities and hospitals,  and of  so much  of  their 
settled  revenue  as the  money  is raised. . .  It will  weaken,  if  not  totally 
destroy  the public faith,  when  all  that have  trusted  the public and  assisted 
our present necessities  upon  Acts  of  Parliament,  in  the million lottery,  Bank 
Act,  and other loans, should  be deprived  of  twenty pr  cent."  Later on,  p 
338,  Locke  adds  that  it is  alleged  that  the lowering  of  the  standard  w~ll 
enable  more debts  to be  paid,  which  shows evidently  that  there  is a  fraud 
involved which it  would  be  impossible  to sanction. 
'  Macaulay,  Vol.  lI., p.  552. 
CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  LAND  BANK.-RENEWAL  OF  THE 
BANK  CHARTER. 
(a)  Dr.  Chamberlain.  His economic theories  and scheme for a  Land  Banlr. 
Bill  for the  Land  Bank  passed  by  the  House of  Cotnmons.  Collapse of 
the  Land  Rank.  (b) Position  of  the  Bank  of  England  after  the  re- 
coinage and the foundation of  the Land Bank.  Partial suspension  of  the 
Rank's  payments.  First  Exchequrr  Bills  issucd.  (c)  Grievances  and 
demands of  the Bank of  England.  Renewal and extension of  the Charter. 
Chief provisions  of  the Act of  Fcbruary  3, 1697.  Question of  a monopoly. 
THE  price of  Bank stock, which on February   st, 1696, stood 
at £107,  had fallen to ,483 on the 14th of  the same month. 
It was at this time that the House of Commons sanctioned 
the scheme for a Land Bank, best known by the name of  its 
promoter Dr. Chamberlain. 
Chamberlain was an accoucheur who  had written two or 
three medical books, and who had  for some time been  en- 
deavouring  to  found  a  Land  Bank,  or indeed, a  bank  of 
any kind.'  Four  years after  the failure of  his scheme in 
England he made another attempt at Edinburgh,  but with 
no better success than on the former occasi~n.~ 
'  As  early  as  1693  Chat~~berlain  had  submitted  his  scheme  for  a  Land 
Bank  to the  House of Comnlons,  who considered  it and pronounced  it  to be 
useful  and practicable.  Before this  a  formal allusion  to  Dr.  Chamberlain's 
schemes occurs in  the  pamphlet  so  often  referred  to,  Bank  of  Credit.  The 
CI~Y  merchant  remarks  that  Mr.  Murray  and  the  Doctor  have drawn  up  a 
very  ingenious  scheme  for a  bank of credit,  but since they  have received  no 
from 'the City,  they  have  made  a  proposal  for  a  bank  of a 
more general character,  including  not  only  London and  its suburbs, but the 
wh?lc kingdom.  This pamphlrt  is dated  1683.  Possibly  this opposition  ex- 
plains  Chamberlain's  hatred of  the City commercial  men. 
'  Rogers  is  uncertain  whether  Hugh  Chamberlain,  the  author  of  the 
Manuale Medicurn,  is  to  be  identified  with  the  promoter  of  these  schemes. 
If he is, the  latter  was physician  in  ordinary to  Charles  11.  and  a  member 
Of  the  Royal  Society.  It is  certain  that  Hugh  Chamberlain  of  the  Land 
Bank was summoned to attend  the  confinement of  Queen  Mary  of  Modena  in  168Xv  Was  at Gravesend and arrived  too  late.  He wrote a  Narrative  Of  Birth of  the Prince  of  Wales. 104  HISTORY OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND.  1'IIE  LAND  BANK.  10.5 
John Briscoe was another promoter  of  the new  scheme.' 
He was supported by Harley, afterwards Lord Oxford, and 
by  Foley,  the Speaker  of  the  House of  Commons.  Both 
were political opponents of  the Bank of  England and very 
jealous of Montague. 
Chamberlain maintained that he could raise a public loan 
double of  that subscribed by the Bank, upon the security of 
landed property, could make the loan the guarantee for the 
interest which would be paid on the notes issued, and lend 
the capital  directly to the  Government,  and subsequently 
to landowners on mortgage security at3a per cent. 
The projectors regarded it as axiomatic that everyone who 
owned real property ought to have in addition paper money 
equivalent  in  value  to  that  property.  For  instance  the 
owner of  an estate worth £2,000  ought also to have £2,000 
in  paper  money.  Briscoe  and Chamberlain  alleged  that 
over-issue was impossible so long as corresponding to every 
LIO  note there was a piece of  land in the country of equi- 
valent value.  No one, they said, will accuse a goldsmith of 
over-issue  so long as there are guineas and crowns in  his 
vaults equal in value to the notes in circulation  which bear 
his signature.  Why should not an acre of  fertile land have 
the same virtue as a bag of  gold or silver ?  The promoters 
did not deny that the public preferred the precious metals, 
and that in consequence if  the Land Bank were forced to pay 
in gold, it would soon have to suspend its payments.  But 
they  proposed  to  overcome  this  difficulty  by  making  the 
notes inconvertible and legal  tender. 
"  The speculations of  Chamberlain on the subject of  the 
currency,"writes  Ma~aulay,~  "  may possibly find admirers 
even in our own time.  But to his other errors he added an 
See two pamphlets by  the two promoters.  I.-A  proposal  by  Dr. Hu h 
Chamberlayne, i  Esser  Street, for  a  Bank  of  Secure  Current  CrIdit, to %e 
founded  upon Land,  in order  to  the  general  Good  of  Landed  men.  to  the 
increase of  the value  of  Land, and  the  no less  benefit  of  trade and  commerce 
(1695). 
2.-Proposals  for  the  . supplying  their  Majesties  with  money  on  easy 
terms,  exempting  the  Nobility.  Gentry,  etc.,  from  taxes,  enlarging  their 
yearly  estates and  enriching  all  the  subjects  of  the  Kingdom  by  a  National 
Land Bank.  By John Briscoe.  With the motto : 0  fortunatos  nimium bona 
ti sua  norint  Anglicanos.  3rd  edition,  1696. 
Op.  cit..  p. 481,  Vol.  II., of  edition in  two volumes. 
error  which  began  and  ended  with  him.  Iie was  fool 
to take it for granted, in all his reasonings,  that the 
value  of an estate varied directly as the duration.  He main- 
tained that, if the annual income derived from a manor were 
a thousand pounds, a grant of that manor for twenty  years 
must be  worth  twenty  thousand  pounds,  and a  grant  for 
a hundred years  ~vorth  a  hundred  thousand  pounds.  If, 
therefore, the  lord of  such a  nianor would pledge  it  for a 
hundred years to the Land Bank, the Land Bank might on 
that security  instantly  issue  notes  for a hundred  thousand 
pounds." 
On  this  point  Chamberlain  was  proof  against  ridicule, 
arguments  and  even  arithmetical  demonstration.  "  He 
was reminded that the fee simple of land would  not sell for 
more than  twenty years' purcllase.  To say, therefore,  that 
a term of  a hundred years tvas worth  five times as much as 
a term of  twenty years, was to say that a term  of  a hundred 
years was worth  five times the fee simple;  in other words, 
that a hundred was five times infinity.  'I'hose who reasoned 
thus were refuted by being told that they were usurers ; and 
it should seem  that a  large  number of  country gentlemen 
thought the refutation complete."' 
On hlonday, 1:ebruary  loth, the Commons mct  in  Com- 
mittee  to find a means of procuring two  millions.  It was 
decided  that this sum should not  be raised by  the Bank of 
England.  Mr. Neale  then proposed  to "  raise  it upon  the 
Exchequer " (i.c., by Exchequer bills), but, this being also 
rejected,  it was ultimately  agreed that a Land Uank should 
be founded and should provide the capital required by sub- 
scription.  Rloreover  anyone  concerned  in  the  Bank  of 
England was forbidden  to take  a part  in  the  management 
of the new  institution. 
This law received the royal  asscnt on the 27th of  April. 
How  the  King  and  his  Dutch  advisers,  who  were  the 
leaders  of  financial  science  in  Europe,  could  have 
risked the campaign of 160(, on such a scheme, is inexplic- 
able.  As to the success of  the enterprise in  Parliament, this 
' For n reply  to ihcsc doctri~ics  scc  A  Iln~cL  Dinlogctc bctwcen  Dr. If.  C. 
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must be put down to the hatred felt by  the  landowners for 
the financiers and the comniercial world.  This hatred was so 
keen that tlley were ready to believe anything that appealed 
to their passions, and no scheme could have done this better 
than  Dr.  Chamberlain's,  promising  them,  as it  did, loans 
at an unhoped-for rate, and the ruin of  the Puritan usurers 
of  Grocers'  Hall.' 
As in  the case of  the Bank itself  the measure relating to 
the Land Bank was included in what is known  in England 
as a  Fl'ays  and Meails Bill.  The object of  the law was to 
raise  a  loan  of  A2,564,ooo over  and above  the  ordinary 
revenue.  Harley,  Foley and Chamberlain  undertook  this 
task.  The interest on  this loan,  kc., A179,480," was  to be 
sccured by a salt tax imposed for the purpose. 
RIost  of  the  other provisions are  also copied  from  the 
Tonnage Act. 
The Icing was to  appoint a  certain  number of  commis- 
sioners to receive subscriptions before August   st, 1696.  It 
nas intended to issue letters-patent recognising the conipany 
under the title of  the Governor and Company of  the National 
1,and  Bank, on condition however, that  half  the loan were 
subscribed before August   st, and the remainder by the New 
Year.  In order to avoid speculation, each subscriber, as in 
the case of  tile hank of  I'ngland,  must pay a quarter of  his 
subscription at once. 
The batik might  not negotiate bills of  exchange or  issue 
notes in excess of the sum paid to the  Eschequer.  It must 
lend at least A5tm,otm on  land sccurities at an interest  not 
escecding $j  or 4 per cent., according to whether the interest 
was  paid  quarterly  or  half-yearly.  The  company  was 
authorised to sell lands on \\hicl~  it hat1 received no interest 
for two years. 
'sllese  are the  chief provisions  of  this  famous scheme, 
\vhicl~  was not  llowevcr  dcstined  to  come into force.  Its 
collapse was absolute. 
Evidcncc of this two-fold appcal  will  lw  found  in  the  Doctor's  pamphlets 
and in  his three  si~ccrssivc  advcrtist-mcnts.  Analogous  rc-asons had  influenced 
the  Commons  to  declarc  thrcc  years  carlier  t11:lt  Chamberlain's  project  was 
useful  and  practicnblc. 
Thr rntc  \\,as ;  prr  cent. 
The subscription list was to be opened at ?vie:cers'  Hail 
before May  25th.  The preceding weeks were not passed in 
silence by  Dr. Chamberlain.  But  his advertisements  had  ,,  little effect that on June 11th the promoters were reduced 
to  and announced that they were ready to accept 
ds old clippeci  money  that cannot be  passed  away  without 
loss."  On  August  1st the Land Bank, in accordance with 
the Act cofistituting it, ceased to exist.  The total subscrip- 
tion amourrted to £2,100,  t~ which  must be  added £5,000 
by the King. 
This collapse put the  Government into a very awkward 
position  and the  Ianded  interest  was  disappointed  in  its 
dearest hopes, but the country was saved from bankruptcy, 
the real victim of Dr. chamberlain's scheine being the Bank 
of England,  which was threatened  in  the  first instance by 
the project itself, and was subsequentIy obliged to  grapple 
with a most perilous situation.' 
Posiliol~  of  the Bank of E~rgla~td  ajter the creation of  the 
"  Laad  Bank " attd  the reform of the  currency.-Pnrtial 
srupertsio~t  of  payments.  The Bank  suffered, in  the first 
instance, from the project itself, and its stock fell from A107 
to £83.2 
Besides  this,  the  currency  refor:n  vent on  too  slo\\Iy. 
The o!d  coins ceased to be current on May 4, bu:  there were 
no new ones to take their place.  Hence on May 6, when the 
goldsmiths organised a run  on  the  3ank of  England, the 
'  A  clever  dcfence of  the  :.and  13ank  \vas  sc:  iorth  sonlc  tinlc  aiter  tilc 
failure of  the  conlpany  in  a littlc  \\.or];  already  rncntioned :  Krt~tarks  018  the 
Proceedings  of  the  comtnissiotrers for putting  in cxcruiio~r  atr  Act  passed  last 
Jession for  cstahlisltit~g  a Land  Ilrtrtli  (16r)o).  This postlli~mous  pnmphlct  was 
not  the  last  appcnrancc  of the  Land  Rank.  Pa~nphlrts  corntncnding  Dr. 
Chambcrllrin's  systcm continued  to rppcnr  from timc  to  time.  'rhc  two  Inst 
\wrc  published  nftcr  thr South  Sea disaster;  thcy  arc  called,  Prop.osals  lor 
vl'~foring  crcdit, for  ntakjtig  tltp  Ilanb  of Englat~d  911orc ttrcfirl  atrd  profifablc.. 
for relicwing  the sufferevs of tltc  Sorttlr  Sm Cot,rpairy (I;  I).-An  hotlcst 
schpl?lr 101  improving tjrc  !rode 0713  credit of thc ,1alio18 (li27f 
'  The creation of a rival rstablish~ylcnt  ryrn to-day causcs some dis:urbancc 
in  the prices of  the  stocl< of the  0ripin:ll  institution ;  it1 tlirsc  days  thrsc  dis- 
tU.'bancrs  were  mt~ch  Ii,orc. violrnt,  for  thc  public  instantly  brca~nc  a!armrd 
\'lthout  lroubling  to  consider  \\rhetl~c.r both  institutions could  rlot  exist  side 
without  serious  muit~al  dan!ngc.  l.j~us,  n.hcn  hiontaguc r:~iscd up  :I 
pollticnl  economic rival  to  the  old  E:lst  India  Company  by  crcatily:  the 
East India  Company,  the  st0.1;  of  the  old  Tory  cacnpany  fell  fy0111 
"s8  to d33.  Five ycars lntcr the shares of  the old  co~ilpany  stood at A134 
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latter had  not enough coin  to meet  the suddenly increased 
demand.  Sir John Houblon, who was at once Lord Mayor, 
Governor  of  the  Bank,  and  one  of  the  Lords  of  the 
Admiralty, endeavoured to reassure the claimants by offer- 
ing  to  pay  a  tenth  of  their  demands  in  cash,  and  by 
promising on behalf of  the Bank, to pay  the remainder as 
soon as the  RIint could supply the coins. 
"  On Wednesday,  May  13, the directors  held a  general 
court of  the proprietors, who agreed to put off  their dividend 
and to offer to such persons as distrusted  the notes of  the 
Bank the tallies which they themselves held of  the Govern- 
ment as security for  their loans.  Meanwhile the Lords of 
the Treasury  pledged  themselves  to  pay  £6o,ooo  a  week 
in  the new  money into the Bank till  their  whole stock was 
re-coined."' 
By  about June  I I  the  failure of  Chamberlain's  scheme 
had become evident to all, and the Treasury had to apply 
to the very  institution  which the Land Bank  had expected 
to ruin.  The Bank of  England did not open a subscription, 
it borrowed  20 per cent. of  their capital from its subscribers 
for six months at 6 per cent.  only, and paid  this into the 
Treasury, while  it applied  to the  Bank of Amsterdam  for 
an additional sum of  E~oo,ooo. 'The total amount advanced 
to the Government was kf;34o,ooo. 
The issue of  the new coins was meanwhile going on fairly 
rapidly  but  the  Treasury continually put off  paying  the 
sums promised to the Bank.  The Bank was obliged to limit 
its cash  payments to 3 per cent. of  the amounts payable. 
It was at this point that the Lords of  the Treasury at length 
determined to come to the rescue of  public credit by  issuing 
an order on July 13th "  that no public notary  should enter 
a protest upon any bill of  the Bank of  England for fourteen 
days."'  This was not without effect, for three days later the 
discount on bank bills fell from  16  to 8 per cent." 
a  Thorold  Rogers,  op. cit..  p.  63. 
a  Rogers,  p.  66.  "  In  those  days  the  protrsting  of  a  commcrcial  bill 
could only  be  effective  whcn  drawn  up by  one of  thcsc  functionaries." 
'  Rogers,  loc. cif. The notcs  did not rise  to par  until  September  17, 1697, 
when  a  dividend  was  declared  to  the  sharcholdcrs,  who  had  receivcd  none 
for  two  years. 
Issue of the first  Exchequer Bills.'  At this same time the 
~~~~~nment  opened an office at the Exchequer for the issue 
,,f  ~~chequer  bills to supply the want of  currency.  This 
done at Rlontague's desire  and as a result of  a clause 
inserted  into the Ways and Means Act  of  the last session. 
hleanurhile,  nearly  a  million  of the  new  money  had  been 
coined.a  The new  Exchequer bills,  for LIO  each, bearing 
interest at the rate of  3d. a  day and payable  on  demand, 
were issued on  July 23rd. 
The Bank bills were at a discount of  10 per cent. on July 
28th,  and  the  King  secured  the  promise  of  a  loan  of 
.&~,ooo from the  Dutch  Government,  on  condition  that 
security  was  provided.  Several persons  of  high standing 
in  the City, almost all  of  them  Tories,  undertook  to guar- 
antee the money.  On August 15th~  the Bank made a further 
advance to the Icing of  k2oo,ooo at the urgent request of 
Portland,  one of  its principal  shareholders. 
The Bank's grievances and demands.-The  second  Bank 
Act.-Renewal  and  extension of  the  Cha~ter  of  the Bank 
of  England.  The situation forced upon  the Bank of  Eng- 
land  in  1696  was  scandalous.  The  Government  had 
borrowed its last shilling, had forced it to incur liabilities in 
Holland, to forgo its dividends, and even, by  not  keeping 
its own  promises with  regard  to  the  delivery of  the  new 
coins,  to suspend its payments.  To crown  all  it  had sup- 
ported  the  Land  Bank,  and then  as soon  as this  absurd 
scheme had collapsed, it had had recourse once more to the 
assistance of  the  Bank.  Finally,  it  wanted  to  oblige  the 
Bank to increase its capital and to accept depreciated tallies 
in  payment  of  the  new  subscription;  this proceeding,  by 
largely  diminishing  the  number  of  tallies,  would  have 
helped  to raise their value and so to restore the credit of  the 
Paper currency which was then in confusion, but, of  course, 
at the Bank's e~pense.~ 
f  Hamilton,  Inquirv  Concernint the National  Debt. o. 122.  .  '  Altogether  &.g~5,55~  of  money  and  A7,014,047  of  silver  were 
~~incd.  'he  amounts coined since Elizabeth's  re-coinage had been  .&14,669,949 
In  gold  and .&20,355,6<1 in  silver.  -..  - 
'  See  The  arguments  and  reasons  for  and  against  engrafting upon  fie 
Bank  of England  wit18  Tallies, as  tltey  have  been  debated  at  a  late  general IIO  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  directors,  urged  by  the 
shareho!ders,  thought  it  their  duty  to  demand  guarantees 
which would enable them to carry on their business success- 
fully and  to strengthen  their  _wsition.  This position  had 
not improved since the col!apse  of  the Land Bank.  In 1697 
the price of  stock was even  lower than  in  the midst of  the 
crisis.  The Bank notes too, had met with dangerous rivals 
in  the new  Exchequer bi!ls,  which were  ezsily  negotiated, 
and  were  less  liable  to depreciation  than  the  old  tallies, 
hence the notes did not rise to par until after the announce- 
ment of  the peace of  Ryswick and of  a heavy dividend.  The 
grievances and demands  of  ihe Bank  are set forth  in  the 
two pamphlets  to which  we  have just  referred  in  the note. 
The three principal demands are as follows : 
I.-The  co~rcessko~t  of  a  monopoly.  This had  become 
essential for  the  fol!owing  reason.  The notes,  according 
to the author of  A  letter to a friezd,  will only circc!ate  if the 
funds  on  which  they  are  issued  are  szfe,  secured  and 
sufficient.  No  compu!sory  expedient  can supply the place 
of  public confidence.  Hence  the Bank nawt  be  the  only 
institution of  its kind,  for competition  causes distrust and 
contracts  credit instead of  enlarging it.  The Bank,  to be 
useful to the State, must  be the general  repository  of cash 
for all the inhabitants of London.  This is the policy which 
court  of  the  said  Bank.  Not  dated,  but no doubt  written  at the beginning 
of 1697.  The chief  argument brought  forward against the proceeding  is that 
it would  cause  such  an  increase  of capital  that  the  corresponding  interest 
would  be out of proportion  to  the profits.  The author, nevertheless,  thinks 
that the scheme would  be  practicable  if  additional privileges  were  conccdcd 
to the Bank, amongst others that of  a  monopoly.  These privileges might be 
granted  in  return  for  the great scrviccs rendercd  to commerce by  the Bank, 
in  particular  the  reduction  of  the  rate of  discount,  which  was  now  3  per 
cent.  instead of  12 per  cent.  as in  the days of  the goldsmiths.. 
The author of  A  lcttcr to a friend  concerning  tlte credit of  the Nation, and 
with  relation  to  the  Bank  of  England,  li'rittcn  by  a  Member  of  the  said 
Corporation Jor  the  public  good  of  tlte  Kingdoin  (1697)~  gives similar  argu- 
ments  against  the procecding,  which  he  consldcrs  both  unjust  and  stupid. 
Stupid because the credit  of  the Govcrnni~~nt  depends on the good  faith  with 
which it carries out its promises; unjust bcc;~usc  the shareholders of  the Bank 
have  a  right  to  the profits  due to  their  foresight  and  their  efforts,  not  to 
nwntion  the reward due  to  them  for  all  the  sacrifices,  including  even  that 
of their  dividends,  made  to  help the  Governnicnt  in  its  times  of  difficulty. 
In addition to all these good reasons,  the anonymous author suggests another 
which  must  in  his opinion  have sec~ned  cxrellrnt, viz..  that  he had  invested 
a large part of his fortune in the Bank, and had already suffered considerable 
loss.  This explains the elocjucnce  of his remarks  about justice. 
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has caused the strengtil and utility of  the Banks of Venice, 
Amsterdam and Hamburg. 
11.-The  payment  through the Ba~rk  of- sums d.us to the 
This would be a great advantage to the Bank 
and would inconveniellce no One. 
11 I .-A  certairz ?zzrmber of  secondary  rcforms.  Amongst 
others,  a  renewal  of  the  Bank's  privileges  and a  more 
eficieni  protection  against  the  possible  counterfeiting  of 
notes. 
Parliament and the Dank were agreed upon the two main 
points,  viz. : 1st-That  the privileges of  the  Bank  should 
be  renewed  and extended.  2nd-That  in  return  the  Bank 
should  make  a  loan  to  the  Government.  It remained  to 
determine  the  amount of  this loan.  The I-louse  of  Com- 
mans asked for 24 millions,  guaranteed by  a  tax  on  salt.' 
On January 5th the  Bank declared  that,  having regard to 
the scarcity of  coin, it could not agree to such a large loan,' 
but that it  was ready  to increase  its capital  under  certain 
conditions which were uitimatcly accepted by the Commons, 
and which were sanceionkd by the Act of  1697. 
Chief  provisiorzs  of  the  Act  of  February  3rd  (8 and g 
William  111. c. zo).-The  monopoly and its results. 
(I) The  Bank  was  to  add  cf;r,oor,171  to  its  original 
capital. 
(2)  Anyone might subscribe, and the subscriptions might 
be  paid  four-fifths  in  Exchequer  tallies  and one-fifth  in 
Bank notes. 
(3) All the subscribers were to be incorporated in the com- 
pany. 
In return  for  these  sacrifices, the  Act  conferred  on  the 
Rank  a  number  of privileges  with  which  we  are already 
familiar through  the  claims made  in  the  two  pamphlets 
referred  to. 
(1)  The time when  the  Crown  might  put  an end to the 
corporation  by  repaying  the  sums owing  to  it  was  pro- 
%  The tar in question  was that void on account  of  the idand Bank. 
'  The directors must have ma&  this decision  in  order to please  the share- 
holders,  who objected  strongly  to  the policy  of  making loans to the Govrrn- 
'nC"t.  See  A  second  part  of a  I)~SCOU~SB  conccr,titlg  Banks  (undated,  but 
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longed,  and was  fixed  at  twelve  months  after  the  1st of 
ilugust, 1710. 
(2)  During this period a genuine monopoly  was granted 
to the Bank of  England, since no other corporation  of  the 
nature of  a bank was to be established by Act of  Parliament. 
(3)  An interest of  8 per cent.,  guaranteed by a tax on salt, 
was allowed on the tallies accepted  in  payment by the Bank 
of  England. 
(4)  Before  opening the subscription  the  original capital 
was to be estimated and made up to  loo per cent. for each 
proprietor. 
(5) The Bank was authorised to issue notes to the amount 
of  its original capital of  A;1,200,000, and to  the amount of 
the sums to be subscribed, on condition that they were pay- 
able on demand ;' in case such payment was not made, these 
notes might be  presented at the  Exchequer, and would  be 
payable  out of  the  funds constituting  the annuity  due  to 
the Bank. 
(6)  All the property of  the Bank was exempt from  taxa- 
tion. 
(7)  Finally  it  was  made  a  felony,  without  benefit  of 
clergy, to forge or tamper with  Bank notes. 
These privileges  were  important, and the  consequences 
of  the Act  were no less so.  Bank  notes to the amount of 
cf;200,000  and  tallies  to  the  amount  of  ~800,ooo  were 
drawn  out of  circulation,  and hence  the  value of  the  re- 
mainder rose so that by the end of  the year the notes were at 
par and the  interest-bearing  tallies at a  premium.l  Soon 
Godfrey's wish was realised, and banli-notes could circulate 
as nowadays we  are accustomed  to  see them, i.e., without 
bearing interest. 
The 13ank was the chief gainer by this .kt.  The benefits 
it  secured were extensive.  hIacleod3 thinks them excessive 
and attributes a large proportion of  the subsequent crises to 
the monopoly granted to the Bank.  There is no doubt that 
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this  had a very  bad effect on  the organisation of 
provincial credit,l but possibly most of  the crises which we 
shall describe below might have been avoided if  the advice 
of a ,-ontemporary  author  * had been followed, and the Bank 
of  England had  established branches  in  every commercial 
town in the kingdom. 
Be this as it may, it must be acknowledged that the im- 
mediate  effects of  the  Act  were  highly  satisfactory.  The 
Bank notes -ose to par, the stock did the same, and a second 
dividend of  7 per cent. was paid on September zrst, 1698.~ 
~t  this time the Rank undertook a transaction of a more 
prolonged character  which  it  was  able to  bring to  a  suc- 
cessful conclusion.  This was the repayment of  the new debt 
of £1  ,001,171 subscribed  in  January,  1697.  The first  in- 
stalment was paid on September 10, 1698, and for the next 
ten  years  the  Bank  paid  both  a  dividend  and a  bonus. 
But although the debt was finally paid off  in  March,  1707, 
the Bank continued to reckon it as part of  its capital. 
A  fortiori it  seems probable  that the Bank repaid  to  its 
shareholders the loans of ~240,000  and A;~OO,OOO  of  June I I 
and August 15, 1696, respectively.  One writer4 even alleges 
that the Bank offered to advance a million to the Government 
without  interest  for 21 years, on  condition  that its charter 
was prolonged for the same period.  This statement may be 
correct, but it does not seem to be confirmed by oiher writers, 
and in any case, the transaction  referred to was not carried 
out. 
See  below,  Part  IV., Chap.  i., pp.  170-173,  dcaling  with  the  country 
banks. 
a  Sce Some  Thoughts in  the  Interest  of  England. 
'  I.ater on  the profits were  grratcr, and  it  is  said  that  Sir Gilbert  Heath- 
Cote* one of  the directors  of  the  Bank, made  more  than  ,&Q,ooo  for  himself 
alone.  See Francis. D. 80. 
'  A  letter concer,ting the Bank  artd  the CrcRit  of  the  Nation. 
' But  the debts of  thc corporation  might not  escced its capital,  otherwise 
the shnrrholders  became  personally  liable. 
'  1;t.om  50 pcr  cent. hrlow  par  they  row to  112. 
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CHAPTER  VII. 
TI-IE  BANK OF  ENCIAAND  AND  TI-IT: WAR 01: 
SUCCESSION. 
(a) Economic condition of  England in  1700.  Problem  of  the  Spanish Succes- 
sion.  Political  position  of Willianl  111.  Unpopularity  of  a  War  with 
France.  War declared.  (b)  Policy of  the  Bank during the War.  Brink's 
close alliance with the  Protestant Monarchy.  Attacked by  the enetnles of 
the Government, but secures thc continuation and extension of  its Chartcr. 
Run  of  1707.  Act  of  1709.  Criticism  of  this  Act : (I) Bank  sccurcs  a 
genuine  monopoly.  Results  of  this,  (2)  Bank  undr.rta1cc.s  to  rirculato 
Exchequer  Bills.  Is autl-orised to double  its  Capital.  Tho  Sacheverell 
affair.  Attack  on the  Bank. 
THE  year  1699 passed  uneventfully.  The situation  con- 
tinued to improve and the year  1700 opened under the most 
favourable auspices.  The stock, which  had been  quoted at 
lt; I I 74 at the beginning of  the previous year, rose  towards 
the  middle  of  March  to  the  hitherto  unheard-of  price  of 
E148.  This happy state of  things was not confined to the 
Bank.  The prosperity  -was general;  the  harvest  of 
had been very good  and that of  I joo promised to be excel- 
lent ; industry flourished  and trade had expanded rapidly, 
having no longer anything to  fear from  the French priva- 
teers.  Proof of  this is to be found in the noticeable rise in 
the prices of  the stock of  the two East India Companies and 
in the Customs returns, of  which the average for  1700-1701 
exceeded that for the period  1700-1714,' although the duties 
were considerably increased during these later years. 
The rate  of  interest  too,  had  fallen  enormously.  The 
extent of  this fall and the abundance  of  capital available 
may  be  estimated  from  a  project  which  is attributed  by 
Rogersz to  the  Bank's old enemy,  Duncomhe.  This was 
nothing less ihan the formation  of  a company for  the pur- 
pose of advancing four millions to tlle Government at 5 per 
The average  for  those  fifteen  years was  L1,05~,764.-Macphrrson,  Vol. 
III., p.  45. 
a  Rogers,  p.  lor, and  Davcnant,  Vol.  III., p.  320. 
cent.,  with the ultimate object  of  paying off  the  Bank  of 
England and the new  East India Company,  to which  the 
Government  had  granted  extensive  privileges  two  years 
earlier  En  return for a loan at 7 per Cent. 
This scheme,  which was never carried out, was published 
on  October 5.  Bank stock fell LIZ  at once.  The fall may 
also  be explained as due to another cause, i.e., to the news 
of  an  event  which  attracted  the  attention  of  the  whole 
civilised  world,  which  everyone  had  long been  expecting 
and  fearing, and  which  when  it  took  place,  inevitably 
destroyed all the good results of  the peace of  Ryswick  and 
involved Europe in a crisis which  she will  never forget : I 
refer to the death of  Charles II.,  King of  Spain. 
The news  of  his death  when  first announced  was false, 
but the actual event was not  long delayed. 
The Icing of  Spain died  on  November  I,  and shortly 
afterwards the Duke of  Anjou was proclaimed his heir. 
If  William  111.  had  had  absolute  power,  the  doubt 
whether it was not better to keep quiet and to acquiesce  in 
the fact that the Spaniards had acknowledged the Dulre of 
Anjou,  would  never  even  have  been  hinted  at.  William 
hated  Louis  XIV.,  and  his  great  political  ambition  was 
always to humiliate France.  Ile was naturally eager to join 
the European coalition.  It was however difficult for him as 
a constitutional monarch to carry out his wishes and enter 
upon a war, which was likely to prove both long and costly, 
~vithout  the good wishes and the suppor4 of  his people.  But 
he had  neither the one nor the other.  The idea of  a fresh 
war was as unpopular as  he was himself.  He was disliked as 
a foreigner, and for  his cold  manners, his accent, and his 
advisers, ~ho  were foreigners like himself.  As he had hirn- 
self  foreseen,  the  great  services  which  he  had  done  for 
England were forgotten.  Ilis high intelligence, his military 
and indeed all  the other talents which  made him, 
with  the exception of  Cromwell,  the greatest  man who has 
ever ruled England, were overlooked, and instead, his stern 
perst-)nality was contrasted with  the charm and elegance of 
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merry times of  the Stuarts.  Nine-tenths of  the clergy and 
all  the country  squires  were  still  Jacobites.  Even  those 
who would have been most vigorously opposed to the return 
of  James 11. and his family only looked upon William as the 
lesser of  two evils, and so long as there was  no immediate 
danger of  a counter-revolution, were quite ready to oppose 
and thwart their sovereign.  And although in case of need 
they were prepared to support him at the risk of  their lives 
and fortunes, they continued  meanwhile to  be gloomy and 
dissatisfied.  As Somers pointed out in a remarkable letter 
to the Icing : "  There is a deadness and want of  spirit in 
the nation  universally." 
This state of  mind is  easily explained.  William's reign 
had  been  one  long series  of  wars and commercial  crises, 
which  had  so disturbed  the country  that  even after three 
years of  peace,  it had  not entirely recovered.  It had been 
necessary to raise loans at high rates, and heavy  taxes had 
to  be  levied  to  pay  the  interest on  the  borrowed  money. 
Besides this, and what  was more important,  the executive 
power  was  extremely  weak,  notwithstanding  William's 
genius and the high ability of  the men whom  he had placed 
in  ofice.  At  that  time  the  parliamentary  customs which 
now  prevail  were  not  yet  established  in  England.  The 
Government  did not  require  the support of  a  majority  in 
Parliament; and indeed,  during William's reign,  it hardly 
ever had this.  The Opposition  could therefore reject with- 
out scruple the financial measures brought forward by the 
Government,  since  this  rejection  did  not  oblige  them  to 
assume the  reins of  government themselves  and devise an 
alternative policy.  Taine'  most justly  remarks in reference 
to  an  analogous  situation : "  Generally  in  a  supreme 
assembly,  when  one  party  is in  the  ascendant  and has a 
majority,  it  appoints  the ministry,  and this  is enough to 
give it or to restore to  it some glimnlerings of  good sense. 
Its leaders,  having  the  control  of  the  Government,  feel 
themselves responsible for it, and are forced to take account 
of  the effects  of  such laws as they  may  either  propose or 
Les  Origincs  de  la  Franre  coi~tenigoraine.  Val.  Ill., p.  205  (Val.  I. of 
I.o  Rc'i~oltttiotl).  Iinclirttc's cdition,  1899. 
agree to accept.  It is  rare for a  Minister of  Finance to 
advise  whicli  his  revenue  will  not  cover,  or a 
system of collection which will hinder the payment of  taxes. 
Ijut,y9  continues the author,' "  this source of  instruction and 
good sen*  had been cut off  from the outset.  On November 
6, 17g9,  influenced by principle and by the fear of  corrup- 
t;,,,  the  assembly had declared  that none of  its members 
,,,ight  llold office as a minister.  Henceforth it was deprived 
of  all  the  lessons  supplied  by  the  direct  management  of 
affairs.  \.Verse  still,  and what  was  another result  of  the 
same nlistalce,  it was a victim  to continual terrors.  It had 
in lukewarm or suspected hands the powers it would 
not  take  upon  itself, and hence it was  perpetually  uneasy, 
and  all  its decrees  are not  only  marked  by  the voluntary 
ignorance  in  which  it  persisted, but by the  exaggerated or 
illusory  fears from which it suffered."  Taine concludes := 
"  For want of  having the control of  the driving-wheel which 
would have enabled it to guide the engine, it was suspicious 
of all the machinery,  both old and new." 
'I'aine's  words are as true of  the English  Pariiament  of 
our period  as of  the  Constituent Assembly.  The English 
Opposition, very  suspicious of all new  machinery,  rejected 
without consideration all proposals for financial reform, and 
William's Government found itself  without weapons in  face 
of a corrupt  Parliament.  It is  not  surprising  under  the 
circumstances,  that  an  unpopular  king,  who  had  no pre- 
rogative allowing  him  to  dispense wit11  his subjects'  con- 
sent, could  not  undertake  a  war  against which  so  many 
excellent  arguments,  both  political  and  financial,  were 
brought  forward. 
'To  take the financial point of  view only :  in the first place 
the expenses of  the war would  have to be met, and for this 
recourse must be had to  a loan or to taxation, and in  par- 
ticular to taxation,  a method of  raising  money  for wI~i~ll 
the public  always  feels  the  strongest  distaste;  a  distaste 
which  was the more natural when we remember the irksome 
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corruption of  the officials who collected  them, only a small 
part of  the money raised ever reached the Exchequer.' 
The merchants for their part,  feared that a new privateer 
war u-ould ruin  their trade, which  was beginning to revive 
since  the peace,  and were  particularly  anxious about  the 
trade  with  India,  to  which  the  new  company had given  a 
great stin~ulus,  and which  had already  much  difficulty  in 
defending itself  against piracy. 
Public opinion, also (except in  Kent), was opposed to the 
Mar, and the IIouse of  Lords, in its reply to a warlike King's 
speech, stated that its members were prepared  to "  support 
his R'Iajesty and his Government,  and take  such effectual 
measures as nlay bcst  conduce to the interest and safety of 
England,  the  preservation  of  the  Protestant  religion,  and 
the peace  of  Europe."  The House of  Commons,  by its 
behaviour nit11 regard to  various matters,  such as the im- 
peachment of  the four lords and the petition of  Kent, showed 
an even greater dislike for the war and a very characteristic 
suspicion of  the Icing. 
England's neutrality  thus seemed to be certain, when an 
act,  either  of  thoughtless sentimentalism  or  of  malicious 
provocation,  changed  the  whole  situation,  strengthened 
William on his throne  and caused the outbreak of  one of 
the longest and most espcnsive of  modern  wars.  James 11. 
died at Saint-Germain  on September  16, and Louis XIV., 
affected as some think  by  the dignity of  his death and by 
the grief of  the excited queen, or believing, as others allege, 
that William's throne was so unstable that this prlnce might 
be  insulted with  impunity, acknonledged  James  II.'s  son 
as King of  England. 
The indignation of  tlie  English  people  at this nevrs, the 
break in diplonlatic relations u  it11 France, the dissolution of 
Parliament, the crushing defeat of  the Tories in the electiolls 
u  hich  follo~ed,  the beginning  of  the IVar  of  Succession, 
the  European  coalition  and  the  speedy  abandonment  of 
Louis  XIV. by  his  last  allies,  belong  to  the  province  of 
In  Scotland, csprrinlly, througho~ll  nlrnnst  thc \vholc of thc  18th century 
111r co\t  of  collt.ctil,g  the  custolns cxcccdcd  the alnount collectcd. 
'  1:~b.  15,  1701. 
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general history.  We  must content ourselves with examining 
the influence of  this war on the  Bank, the  part  played  by 
institution,  and the  way  in  which  its fortunes became 
permanently bound up with those of  England. 
Policy of the Bank during the war.-Run  of  I 707.-The 
Bank's  Charter renewed  and  extended.-The  Sacheverell 
allair.  The policy followed by the Bank at this period was 
marlced by the same characteristics as its policy during the 
preceding war. 
The  Bank  supported  the  quarrels  of  the  Protestant 
dynasty,  and it  supplied the Government  with  the  means 
of carrying on the war ;I on this account it had to suffer from 
the calumnies and the attacks of  the enemies of  the Govern- 
ment;  but, on the other hand,  it secured  the renewal  and 
the extension  of  its pr~vileges. 
In  substance  the changes made  were  merely  in  name. 
William 111. died at the beginning of  the struggle, but his 
sister-in-law  made no hlteration in his policy, and even did 
more than he for the Bank  since she avoided encouraging 
such  rivals  as the Land  Bank.  The Bank  for its  part, 
supported to the best of  its ability the Protestant succession 
with  which  its  own  interests  were  henceforth  bound  up.' 
Addison has described the position excellently in an allegory 
in  which he  relates  how : In Grocers'  Hall he saw Public 
Credit "  on a throne of  gold.  At the upper end of  the hall 
was the hlagna Charta.  At the lower end of  the hall was the 
Act of Settlement, which  was placed full in  the eye of the 
'  l'his \v:tr  was very cspctisivr.  See thc list given by  Dowrll (2nd  edition. 
1XRS,  Val. .lI., Apprndict.~  V. and  VI.) of  the rost of cacll  of  tlic  wars carri~d 
011 by  Engla~ld  bct\vcrn  1088 and  1815, and the  alnount  of  thc  llational  debt 
which accrued in cac11 case. 
Cost of  each war.  Debt accrued. 
1688-1697  ......  .&32,643,;6.4  ......  ,L;14$5229925 
1702-1713  ......  .&50,684,956  ......  .&z  I ,483,098 
1739-1748  ......  ;C,'43,655,  "2  ...  ..  .  ,4:20,173~771 
?7j6-1763  ......  .&82,6z3,73X  ......  ~550,633~ooo 
1776-17Xg  ......  i;07,50q.~t)h  ......  ~;II  j.zXg,ooo 
1793-1815  ......  .6831,446,449  ......  iG504,889,452  '  T1lc i1llportancc  of  tlir  Bank  niay  be  judgcd  from  thc  following  fact 
rc'ported by  Burnet  (Vol.  VI., p.  8).  Solnc  ycnrs  aftcr thc  oi~tbrraI( of  hostilities,  the  Qucrll  obligcd  Sundrrland  to  rc.sign  and  govc  thc  seals  to 
Dartlnouth.  This caust-d alztrrn  both  at homtr  and  abroad  which  was  Only  when  the  Qurcn  dcclarcd  to somc  of  hrr  subjrcts,  and  notably  "  &!overnors  of  thc  Bank  of  England,"  that shc \votrld  rnakc  no othcr 
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virgin that sat upon the throne. . . . The floor on her right 
hand, and on her left, was covered with vast sums of  gold, 
that rose  up in  pyramids on either side of  her.  But this I 
did not so muchwonder at when I heard . . .  that she could 
convert whatever she pleased into that precious metal."  All 
at once  the  door opened,  and  the  Pretender  hastened  in, 
carrying in one hand a sponge and in  the  other  a sword, 
which  "  he  often  brandished  at the  Act  of  Settlement." 
Credit, "  the beautiful virgin, fainted and died away at the 
sight."  The charm by which she changed all about her into 
gold  was  broken.  The money  bags burst  like  bladders 
pricked with  a pin.  "  The great  heaps of  gold  . . . now 
appeared to be only heaps of  paper or little piles of  notched 
sticks."  This allegory is  to be  found in  the third number 
of  the Spectator,  in  the same essay  in  which  Addison  de- 
scribes the simple way  in which  tlle work of  the  Bank was 
carried  on.' 
Crisis of  1707.-Rutt  on tlts Baitk.  On several occasions, 
after  the  first  outbreak  of  war  the  Bank  found  itself 
involved  in  clifliculties,  but  it  was  not  until  1707  that 
it ran  any serious risk.  At this date tlie agitation of  the 
Jacobite party, stimulated by the announcement of  a 1:rench 
invasion, spread panic  through the  country.  'I'lie  price of 
the public stocks fell  14 or. 15 per  cent.=  The enemies of 
the reigning  dynasty combined with  those  of  the  Bank to 
organise a run  upon  the 1atter.YThe private bankers tried 
to  ruin  their great rival  and Sir Francis  Child refused  to 
accept  Bank  notes;  he  explained  afterwards that  he  was 
only applying the law of  retaliation to the Bank. 
This panic served to show  that  altliough the  Bank  had 
enemies,  it  had  not  lost  its powerful  and devoted  friends. 
See above, p. 75. 
a  Scc a paniphlct cntitlcd,  Tire  anatoniy of  Excliangc  Alley.  hiany details 
arc hrrr givcn about  this alfair and the part pl;ryrd  by  two lmding goldsmiths 
-  "  Knights  also  and  ont  of  thctrt  Mcmber  of  Parliament,  too,"-Sir  R. 
Hoarc and Sir  Francis Child. 
The  IIanlc had  alrcady  sufierrd  from a ritn  organised  by  Duncornbe and 
some  of  hi:< collcagucs  altcr  the  elections  of  January  23,  1701.  On  this 
point  all  thc  drtails  that  can  bc  dcsircd  will  he  found  in  a pamphlet  written 
directly  aftt,~.wards.  and  which  is  wt4l  worth  reading  notwithstanding  its 
eccentric  titlc : ?'lie  villainy  of  Stock-jobbers  dctcctcd  and  the  causes  of  the 
late rrtn  upota  tlie  Uattl;  of  Etlglt~trd  discovered  attd  cotisidered. 
Help  came  from all  sides.  The Dukes of  Rlarlborough, 
Newcastle  and  Somerset, as well  as other  nobles  and  a 
number  of merchants, offered to advance considerable surns 
one  individual,  whose  whole  fortune amounted to  A~oo, 
brought this sum to the Bank.  The Queen, when she heard 
of this,  sent him AIOO,  with a bill  on the Treasury for  the 
of  the A5oo.  The Lord Treasurer,  Godolphin, 
who recognised that the credit of  the country was bound up 
with that of  the Bank, told  the directors "  that tlie  Queen 
would  for six months,  an interest of  6 per cent.  on 
their sealed bills."'  Finally, the Banli itself  made a call of 
2"  per cent. on  its shareholders, and the danger was over- 
come by the combination of  all these efforts. 
Act  of  179.-The  Bank's  Charter  renewed  and  ex- 
tettded.  In  1708 the Government was  once more  involved 
in  financial difficulties.  The receipts from the taxes hardly 
covered half the expenditure.  In this dilemma the Ministry 
applied to the Bank of England for help, offering it in return 
a  continuation  of  its  privileges.  This proposal  roused 
violent  opposition;  the old  enemies of  the Bank were un- 
conquered, and they  proceeded  to  set forth  their  opinions 
in  numerous pamphlets.  The author of one of  these2 was 
not content to propose the abolition of  the Bank, \vhicli  he 
regarded  as beyond all doubt a harmful institution, but, in 
addition, he suggested a remedy for the financial necessities 
of the moment.  This remedy, cleverly set forth, was  that 
adequate  revenues  should  be  collected  by  improving  the 
Excise,  and  in  particular  by  authorising  the  officials  to 
taste the liquors and to tax them according to quality instead 
of quantity.  But this iyriter and liis companions could  not 
'  Francis, Vol.  I., p.  87.  Such  a thing  has never happened  again. 
a  Argumoits  against  prolonging  the  Bank,, with proposals  for  advuncic~g 
the  Revenue  of the excise  and  making  more  useful  to the  Nation  than  ever 
the Bank con be, without any danger to the Publick.  In a letter to a hfember 
Parliament  (1708).  For  other protests against the continuance of  the  Bank 
See also,  Remarks on the  Uanl;  of  England  with rcgard  more  especially  to 
Our  trade,  By  a  Merchant of  I-ondon  and  a  true  lover  of  our  Constitution. 
"short  view of  the apparent daitgcrs atid  mischief  from  the Bank  of  Engln~td. 
Particulurly addressed  to the  Country  Gentlemen.  Ileasons  against  the 
of  the  Bank  of  England.  I  give  the  titles  of  those  parnphlets 
without an  analysis,  which  would  tell  us  nothing  new,  for  they  merely 
reproduce the  arguments  already  brought  forward  against  the  Bank  at  thc 
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hinder the Government  from malting the following agree- 
ment with  the I3ank : 
I .-It  was  agreed  that  the  interest  upon  the  original 
capital  of  &1,200,000 sllould  be  reduced  from  8 to  6 per 
cent., with  an allowance of  L4,ooo a year for expenses of 
management. 
2.-It  was  also agreed  that the Bank  should advance a 
fresh loan of  E400,ooo at 6 per cent. 
3.-Since  the Government wished  to circulate Exchequer 
hills on the security of  the  house  duties,  the Bank  under- 
took to put them into circulation and to pay If;1,775,027 for 
tliesc  at once.  The Bank was to receive G per cent. of  this 
sum, 3 per cent. as interest, and 3 per cent. as repayment of 
the capital. 
In return for these concessions the Bank secured : 
I .---The  continuation of  its privileges  for  21  years from 
August  I, 1711. 
2.-Permission  to  double  its  esisting  capital  of 
,4.2,201  ,I  71, the new shares of  &IOO  being issued at LI  15. 
Anderson  states'  that  in  spite of  these son~ewhat  severe 
conditions,  the  subscription  list,  which  was  opened  on 
1:chruory  22,  1709, was entirely filled between  nine o'clock 
and mid-day : "  Near one nlillion more,"  he says, "  would 
have braen  on the same day subscribed, had there been  room 
fur it, so great was the crowd of  people coming with  their 
money  to  the books."  After these  transactions the total 
capital of  the Bank amounted to £6,577,370,  viz. : 
Capital of the Bank  -  -  -  -  -  ~2,201,171  10s. 
-- 
This Capital doubled  -  -  -  -  -  4,4021343 
And increased by the .&4oo,ooo  now advanced  -  4,802,343 
To which must be added for the Exchequer Bills  1,775,027 
Finally, and this was the most important of  all, the Bank's 
monopoly was strengthened. 
=  Vol.  III.,  p.  33. 
The  Act  of  16g7  had  decreed  that  no  other  bank 
should be  allolred  by  Act  of  Parliament;  but  it  did  not 
forbid the formation of  other joint-stock  companies, nor of 
any  cc)mpany ~vhicb  undertoolt  banking  business.  One 
conlpany,  called  the  Company  of  Mine  Adventurers  of 
England, had constituted itself into a bank of  issue and cir- 
culated notes,  a  po\ter allowed  it  under  the Act  of  1697.' 
T~ put a stop to this it nas now enacted :  I'  That during the 
of  the  said  corporation  of  the  Governor  and 
Company of the I3ank of  England, it shall not be lawful for 
any body politic. or corporate whatsoever, erected  or to be 
erected, . . . or for any other  persons whatsoever,  united 
or to be united  in covenants or partnerships,  exceeding the 
number of  six persons,  in that part of  Great Britain called 
England, to  borrow,  OTVC, or take up any sum or sums of 
money on their bills or notes payable at demand, or at any 
less time than six months from  the borrowing thereof." 
At this time the pouer to issue notes was looked upon as 
so essential a part of  the business of  banking that its pro- 
Ilibition  mas  coilsidered  to  prevent  the  formation  of  any 
bank  hose shares were held by more than six persons, and 
thus  to  prevent  any private  company  from  esercising an 
influence dangerous to  the Bank.  This seemed so evident 
at the time that the clause did prevent the formation of  any 
joint-stock  bank.  It was  not  until  much  later that  it  was 
realised  that the consequences of  the prohibition  need  not 
be  nearly so stringent.' 
The Bank's monopoly  of  issue was only limited  by the 
formal order not  to  issue notes to an amount exceeding its 
capital. 
r. 
Ihese  pro\~isions  with  regard  to  note-issue  have  been 
' Sir  Hurnphrcy  Macliworth  was  at  the  hrad  of  this  colnpany,  and  he 
showed  an  ability  worthy  of  a  better  causc.  He deccived  the  shareholders 
for  five  years  by  the  payment  of  fictitious  dividends  and  othcr  frauds ;  he 
the products of other wincs, and caused thew  to be coinrd  at the hlint 
"S  Produced  by  the  silver  mines  of the  company,  etc.  But,  in  spite  of  all 
this, he could not succccd  for long.  Everything came out, and  the  Company 
Of  the Mine Adventurers  was pronounced a bubble by  the House of Comll~ong 
Sir Humphrey Mackworth  was declared guilty of scandalous frauds. 
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severely  criticised  by  Macleod.'  In the opinion  of  this 
eminent economist,  they amounted tc this :  that every loan 
made  to  the  Government  was attended by an equivalent 
increase in  the paper currency.  " Now, to a certain extent, 
this plan might be attended with  no evil consequences, but 
it is perfectly clear that its principle is utterly vicious.  There 
is nothing so wild or absurd in John Law's Theory of  Money 
as this.  His scheme of  basing a paper currency upon land 
is sober sense compared to it.  If for every debt the Govern- 
ments incurs an  equal amount of  money  is to  be created, 
why,  here we  have the philosopher's  stone at once.  What 
is the iong-sought  Eldorado compared to this ?  Even there 
the gold required  to be picked up and fashioned into coin. 
. . .  But let us coolly consider the principle involved in this 
plan of  issuing notes upon the security of  the public debts. 
Stated  in  simple  language,  it  is  this:  That  the  way  to 
CREATE money  is for  the  Government to  BORROW  money. 
That is to say, -4 lends B money on mortgage, and, on the 
security  of  the  mortgage,  A  is allowed  to  create  an equal 
amount of  money to what  he  has  already lent!!  Granting 
that to a small extent this may  be done without any prac- 
tical  mischief, yet, as a general principle, what can be more 
palpably absurd  T  The ravings of  Chamberlain himself  are 
not  more wild." 
In 1713, the last year of the war, the Bank made another 
loan to the Government, and secured the continuation of  its 
charter until  1743. 
In  the  following  year  Queen  Anne died.  The fear  of 
civil war  roused  by the  question of  the succession  caused 
some anxiety in the City, but all was soon as quiet as usual. 
The Hanoverian dynasty now  established on  the  English 
thmnc, could hardly be ill-disposed  towards the Bank, and 
in 1716  a new agreement was made with the Bank in respect 
to the  Government  debt.  The Act of  1716 was passed  in 
return  for  the  redemption  of  the  previous  debts and for 
further advances at 5 per cent.  This Act also exempted the 
Bank from the usury laws,'  which  were becoming a heavy 
burden on  the commercial world. 
'  pp.  416 and 417 (5th edition, pp. 487, 488). 
a  hlacleod, Vol.  I.,  p.  488 (5th edition). 
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The ~~cheverell  Affair.'  The history of  this period would 
be  incomplete without a reference to the dangers incurred 
by  the  Bank  of  England  in  1709  owing  to  a  sermon 
preached  at St. Paul's by Dr. Sacheverell. 
ri A sermon at St. Paul's,"  says Mr. M~rley,~  "  was like 
a modern  demonstration  in  Hyde Park. . . .  Dr. Price's 
discourse at the dissenting meeting-house in the Old Jewry 
on 4th  November,  1789, laid the train for  Burke's  HefZec- 
tions on the French Revolution.  It was Dr.  Sacheverell's 
sermon  on  November  sth,  1709,  that  provoked  the  most 
violent Tory explosion  of  the century." 
This sermon was violent  in  tone and apparently directed 
.gainst  the  dissenters;  in  particular,  it  declared  the 
principle of  passive obedience and non-resistance to Govern- 
ment,  with  allusions to  the opposite  views  which  had  in- 
spired the revolution  of  1688.  The Lord Mayor  who was 
present  and who was a Tory M.P., asked the preacher to 
dinner,  thanked him for his sermon, urged him  to publish 
it and allowed  it  to be dedicated to  him. 
This publication made a scandal.  The sermon  referred 
to the First Lord of  the Treasury as Volpone.  The author 
was arrested  on account of  the liberties he had taken  with 
the Government.  The populace supported his cause which 
was that of  the Church of  England, and the  preacher  was 
escorted to Westminster, where his trial  was  honoured by 
the  presence of  the  Queen,'  by  a guard of  butcher  boys. 
The  crowd  pressed  round  the  doctor,  struggling  to  kiss 
his  hand,  and  money  was  thrown  to  it  by  the  gentry, 
' References  to this affair are numerous.  The best  authorities  to  consult 
are  Morlcy,  Il'alpolc, pp.  13-17;  Smollctt, Vol.  VIII., pp.  72-79;  Stanhope, 
Ifistory of Queen  A,lne's  Reign,  Chap.  xii., p.  4.  See  also  as curiosities, 
White  Kenett,  Il'isdot,,  of  lool;ing  Backward  with  an  account  of  Dr. 
~~c)~cv~rell's  procrpding,  and  the  opinion  of  the  famous  Duchess  of  Marl- 
borough in  Account  of  my Conduct, p. 247. 
a  P.  '4. 
'  People  cried  out  as  the  Queen  procccdcd to  Westminster-"  God  bless 
your Majesty  and the  Church, we  hope your  Majesty  is for  Dr.  Sacheverell." 
-Morle~, p.  16. 
The English Church regarded the  nccuscd  as a hero and a martyr, prayers 
said  in  all  the churches for  his acquittal,  his  behaviour  was  praised  in 
and  the  royal  rliaplain  himsrlf  csprrssrd  his  adtniration  and 
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who  followed  the  procession  in  hackney  coaches.  The 
people could not rest contented with  these peaceful demon- 
strations,  they  plundered  the  dissenting  chapels  and 
burnt  the  books  and  other  spoils collected from  them,  in 
Lincoln's  Inn Fields.  They even pillaged accidentally one 
of  the orthodox churches whose appearance was  not  suffi- 
ciently distinctive.  The riot  very  soon  acquired  a purely 
political character and the Bank, always an object of  attack, 
was  warned  that  it  was  to  be  assaulted.  The assembled 
directors appealed to the Secretary of  State for a  guard to 
defend their establishment.  No troops were available,  but 
~i:c  Queen sent her own  foot and horse guards, preferring 
to  be  left  unprotected  rather than  risk  the capture of  the 
Bank.  "  Am  I to preach  or  fight 3"  Captain  Horsey  in- 
quired, when  he received  the royal commands.  There was 
no  need  to do either,  the  mere  appearance  of  the troops 
sufficed to put the rioters to Right. 
The Banlc was thus saved from plunder  by the Queen's 
devotion.  As to the Sacheverell affair-it  ended as follows : 
Sacheverell,  not~vithstanding  the  excellent  defence  which 
he read  before  the  I-Iouse of  1-ords  and which  was  prob- 
ably the work of  Atterbury, was condemned by 69 votes  to 
52.'  But the light penalty  imposedZ  caused the sentence to 
be  looked  upon  as a  victory  for  him  and  his  supporters. 
Shortly afterwards Godolphin resigned  and the Tories were 
conspicuously victorious  in  the elections which  followed. 
To  gain  a  better  understanding of  these continual  riots 
and scandals  and of  the state of  I:ng-land  during the period, 
the  third  chapter  of  'Taine's  Ziistoire  de  la  IditlC7ature 
~lrlgluise,  Vol.  I I I ., should be read. 
I1 '  rhere was nothing to he seen,"  writes the great critic, 
11 1)ilt  corruptii~n  in  high  places  and  brutality  among  the 
common  people-a  group of  intriguers leading a populace 
of brutes.  'I'he  iiurnan  animal, drunlt  with  political  pas- 
sions, expressed itst.lf  in cries and violence, and swaying to 
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and fro under the hand of  each party by turn, seemed ready 
to destroy society by its blind outbursts. 
$1 Every political  event  was  the signal  for  riot,  for  dis- 
order,  for blows and broken heads.  When Dr. Sacheverell 
was  tried,  butcher  boys,  chimney  sweeps,  fruit  sellers, 
prostitutes  and the dregs of  the population,  believing  the 
church to be  in  danger,  accompanied  him  with  howls  of 
rage and  and in the evening devoted themsel\res 
to the burning and pillaging of  dissenting chapels." 
Taine goes on to describe the burning of  Admiral Byng's 
effigy, the stoning of  Lord Bute, Pitt's unpopular successor, 
was obliged to surround his carriage with  a guard of 
boxers,  the judges  not  daring to  condemn  drunkards,  the 
I-louse of  Commons afraid to pass  IValpole's Excise Bill, 
and the Gordon  Riots.  He might easily havc  lengthened 
the  list,  for  Royalty  was  no  more  respected  tlian  the 
Ministers,  atid  the  Duke  of  Bedford's  house  underwent 
actual sieges and assaults. 
n .land  The gulf  between  this state of  things and  the  I: 
of  thc 19th century is imniense.  Indeed I know of  nothing 
which  is more to England's credit than  the transformation 
this  produced  in  less  tlian  a  hundred  years.  It  shows 
how much can be accomplished by the persevering work and 
devotion of  all  ranks of  citizens for the public welfare.  It 
shows  also, wltat could he done by tlic active and intelligent 
interference of the nliddle classes, who, not subnlittitlg to be 
set on one side or submerged, were al~le  to take thc lvad in 
public affairs arid to revolutionise the country.  Thcy afford 
an excellent csample of  that patriotism which  refuses to hc 
Put off with  mere words.  ISnglish  iiistory  is accordingly a 
splendid study for ndtions u~hic.11,  like the English nation of 
the  I 7th  and  18th centuric.~, are  numerically  small,  un- 
organised, and the victims  of  demagogues.  It provchs  tliat 
these evils are not such as need I)e sufiercd involuntarily, and 
Offers encouragenient, combined with n good example. 
' Out of the  13  bishops  who \.otcd,  ci~ily  7  were  itgainst  him. 
11~  was forbidden  10  pr~'a(,ll  for  11irt.e )anars nlid  Iris  sctrlnon war  0rdrrc.d 
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PART  111. 
THE BANK OF  ENGLAND  UNDER  THE  HANOVERIAN 
DYNASTY. 
CHAPTER  I. 
THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND  AND  THE SOUTH 
SEA COMPANY. 
Thc South Sea Company.  OKcrs to taltc over all  the Public Debts.  Proposals 
of  tllc  Bank  in  this mottcr.  Government  accepts  the  proposals  of  the 
South  Sra  Col1,pany.  Sprculative  mania.  Multiplication  of  schrmes  of 
evcry  Itind.  The South  Sea  Company's  lawsuit  against  thc  new  Conl- 
panics.  Results of  this lawsuit: Ruin of  the  South Sra Company.  rrial 
of  the  Company's  Directors.  End  of  the  crisis.  Part  played  and  risks 
run  by  the  U:~nk  during  the  crisis. 
WHII.ST France  was  in  the  throes  of  the  financial  crisis 
which  marlted  the  period  of  the  Regency,  England  was 
passing through a similar crisis.  Although she had not her 
man of  genius like T,aw,  she had her Compagnie des Indes 
Occidelttnles in the South Sea Company.  The results of  this 
crisis were  less severe in  England than in  France,  but the 
crisis itself was no less alarming.  For more than a year the 
history of  England is bound up with  that of  the South Sea 
Company. 
The South Sea Company was formed  in  1.71  I  by  Lord 
Oxford  with  the  object  of  strengthening  public  credit 
~vliich  had been  severely shalten by the fall  of  the Whigs. 
I.iIie  all such contcmpnrary institutions  it  originated  in  a 
State loan.  Thc company undertook to provide the money 
due to the army and navy, as well as for other parts of  the 
unfunded debt.  This was to be done ill return  for a 6 per 
cent. interest  on  the  security  of  various  duties  and the 
nlonopoly  of  trading  in  the  South  Seas (i.e., the Pacific 
Ocean), from which  the conlpany took  its name. 
It carricd  on  its trading business  quietly until  1720  at 
\\ liich date. it 11 on  its melancholy notoriety. 
The  year  1720  was,  according  to  Anderson,'  "  a  year 
remarkable beyond any other which  can  be  pitched  upon 
by  historians  for  extraordinary  and  romantic  projects." 
The public rage for Speculation  approached insanity.  But 
the  rulers too were  partly  responsible  for the misfortunes 
which followed.  The crisis originated,  if  Smollett is to be 
believed, from the King's recommendation to the Commons 
to  consider  the "  proper  means for lessening the nationat 
debt." 
The South Sea project was  then brought forward by Sir 
John  Blount,  who  had  the coolness and audacity  required 
for  such  an  enterprise.  I-Ie  submitted  his  scheme  to 
Aislabie, the Chancellor of  the Exchequer, and to one of  the 
Secretaries of  State, both of  whom were already prejudiced 
in  its favour for self-interested reasons.  Hence he  was able 
to meet their objections without much difficulty. 
The scheme was adopted by the Government ; its primary 
object  was  to  lighten  the burden  of  the  national  debt by 
reducing all the public debts into one. 
On  January  22,  1720,  the  House  of  Commons met  in 
committee to consider the project.  The South Sea Company 
offered  to take over all the debts of  the State, which  were 
estimated at ~30,981,712,  in return for an interest of  5  per 
cent. until  1727, and of  4 per cent.  after that date.  In ex- 
change for this it was to pay 34 millions.  These proposals 
were  brought  forward  unexpectedly  by  the  Government, 
hoped  thus to  secure a  favourable vote.  The House 
hornever received them somewhat coldly, and the friends of 
the  Bank  of  England, by  pointing  out the great  services 
relldered by this institution to the State, and the harm which 
the passing of this scheme would do to  it,  secured a delay 
of five days.8 
Bank  took  advantage of  this interval, and before  it 
Ilistoricnl o~td  Cltro~ro~ogirnl  Dcciuctiot8  of  the Origin of  Comfllcrcc- 
Val.  p. 01. .I.his  work, dating from  113 years  ado, gives 1110st valuable 
ilfornlation about  tllc  of this  ~ff;~ir.  Sce ;dso  Macphcrson,  Annals  of 
( i),tc,ilcrre (180;)  \'~l. III., ,,.  76,  to  1764  this  wor~c  is  howcver  nlcr(+ 
a  rc'vis('d  c5ditio;l of Andc,rson's. 
'lislory  of  Scotlatrd, Vol. VIII., p.  238. 
Brodriclt  was  the  chief  supporter  of  the  Bank  during  a  vcry  storm). 
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was over  offered to  undertake  the same  responsibilities as 
the South Sea Company and to pay five  n~illions  in return 
with  less  delay1 than  the  rival  company  had  required  to 
raise the smaller amount tendered by it. 
The proposals of  the Bank were no sooner announced than 
the directors of  the  South Sea Company  called  a general 
meeting of  their shareholders  and received  instructions to 
secure the preference at all costs.  They accordingly offered 
to increase the sum granted to  the  Government from 3$  to 
74 millions.  The Bank however  threw all its strength into 
the desperate struggle, and began  in  its turn  to make the 
most insane proposals.  It offered to give lf;1,700 Bank stoclr 
for every annuity of  d1oo for  96  or 99 years.  "  Let any- 
one,"  writes Anderson, "  consider  how  this was  possible." 
Luckily for the Bank these proposals were rejected.  At one 
time there was  some  idea of  dividing the  undertaking  be- 
tween the two establishments.  But Sir Johri Blount is said 
to  have refused  to  agree  to  this Solomon's  proposal,  ex- 
claiming "  No, sir !  we  will never divide the child." 
The proposals  of  the  South  Sea  Company  were  only 
.accepted after prolonged and violent  debates in  Parliament. 
In the House of  Commons, where, after a discussion  lasting 
two days, the scheme was passed by  172 votes to 55, Robert 
Walpole was the principal speaker for  the Opposition.  In 
the  House of  Lords, where  the debate was very short  and 
where  there was  no division,  the most  notable  speech  was 
that of  Lord  North  and Grey.  Earl  Cowper  also spoke 
against the Bill, saying that, "  like the Trojan horse,  it was 
ushered in and received  with  great pomp and acclamations 
of  joy;  but was contrived for treachery and destruction."' 
The royal  assent  was  given  on  the  7th  of  April.  On 
June  I ~th  when  he  dissolved  Parliament,  the  King con- 
'  These proposals arc to bc  found in  two or thrrc contemporary pamphlrts. 
such  as The schemes of  the  South  Sea  Contpany  and  the  Bank  of  England 
as proposed  in  Parliantent  for  the  reduritrg  of  the  ~Votional  1)ebt; and  A 
comparison  between  the  proposaJs  of  the  Bank  and  the  S.S.  Company. 
1Vherein is shown that  the proposals  of  the first  arc  much more advantageous 
than  that of  the latlcr. 
'  See  Parliatnctrtary  Ilistory, Vol.  VII..  pp.  644-646,  for  the dcbatcs  in 
thc Iiouge  of Commons,  and  pp.  646-648  for  those  in  the  House  of  Lords. 
The principal  supporters of  thc scheme  wcrc  Aislabic  and Lord  Suthcrland. 
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gratUlated the tuo Houses on  having set the liquidation of 
the national  debt on  a firm basis  without violation  of the 
public faith. 
The mere  report  that the South Sea Company intended 
t,,  take  over  the consolidated  debt made  its  shares rise  in  ,  719  to &I 26.  When the law was passed they were at £3  10. 
After the success of the first subscriptions, due to more or 
less correct rumours, the shares rose to lf;~~,'  then (June 2, 
1720),  to ,@go;'  they did not even stop there  for a wave of 
madness had turned everyone's heads.  At the end 
of June their price had reached ~2,000.s 
iiecourse was had to devices and promises of  all kinds in 
order to maintain this artificial level ; promises were made of 
~rofits  of  50  per cent., and of the acquisition of  distant and 
invaluable markets;  it was whispered that mitles and hidden 
treasures  had been  discovered.  A11  these debices had  been 
employed before, and ue have already had to describe them 
at sufficient length ; but this mas no reason why they should 
not be  successfully used once again. 
The great majority of the public was caught in  the snare. 
7'hfx same  thing happened  in Change Alley  in  London as 
had happcned  in  the  liue Quincampoix in  Paris;  nobles 
and citizens,  merchants and country  squires,  judges  and 
bishops, \\omen belonging to all classes of  society, 'crowded 
May  23. 
'  One:  of  tlic  rcports  which  contributed  most  to  tlris  risc  was  that  a 
trcaty  of prace had  just  bccn  signrd  bctwrcn  Spain .and  EngI:~nd, as a con- 
srqucnce of  which  I'ot  t Mollon  and  Gibr;~it:~r  wrrc to bc  cxchangcd  for part 
of  Peru.  'l'his  exchange  was  excocdil~gly  profitable  to  thc  company ;  it 
strrnjithcncd  its  position  in  thc  Pacific  and  sccurcd  to  it  thc  tradc  of  a 
collnLr)  uf Ic-p.t>d:~ry  w(.alth (Stllollc~t,  p.  244). 
In  the  intcrval  the  cotnpanv  had  opcncd  a  third  subscription  list  at 
L1snoo per  sharc; four millions  &re  subscribcd.  Sotnc of  the directors also 
wrrc nlatlc baronrts for thcir  great scrviccs. 
'  Set Pope's  drscription  in  his  Epistle  to Allcn,  Lord  Malhurst. 
"  At  lrnfitll corruption,  liltc a gcnrral flood 
Did  drlugr all,  and zvaricc creeping  on 
Sprrad  lilcc a  low-born  mist and  hid  thc sun. 
Statrstnen  and patriots plied  alilte the stoclcs, 
Prcrrsv  :and  butler  shard aliitr  the box, 
And  judge.'.  job0c.d  :rncl  bi\hops  bit  the town, 
And  u~ighty  dultrs p:rcl<c~I  c:~rds for half-a-rrown- 
I3ritni11  \Y:IS  s~~tll;  ill  lucre's  sordid charms." 
scc . 1  - 
" "0 Swift's pocnl : Tltc Sotith Sea I'rojcct.  in  Complete Works (cdition 
1'824)1  VOi.  XIV.,  pp.  146-155,  and  thc satirical poem,  South  Sea  Ballad,  or 132  HISTORY  OF THE BANK  OF ENGL.4h:D. 
together there.  The King himself did not escape the infec- 
tion'  and his mistress  is accused  of  malting  considerable 
profits  from the affair,  which  gains she hastened  to  send 
to Hanover. 
Fashion  even  was  affected.  South Sea carriages, coats, 
and neckties  made their  appearance;  the  ladies  wore  no 
jewellery  except  that  bearing  this  name,  and  there  were 
South Sea servants. 
The artificial  rise  in  the  shares produced  an  artificial 
increase of  wealth,  and an unprecedented  luxury appeared 
in  the country.  Speculators and adventurers, says a  con- 
temporary  author,  drunk  with  their  imaginary  riches, 
bought the  rarest food  and the  finest  wines  that could  be 
imported;  with neither taste nor judgment  they purchased 
the most gorgeous furniture and carriages; they  gave way 
freely to the most shameful excesses  and their speech was 
characterised by pride,  insolence  and a ridiculous ostenta- 
tion.% 
The result  of  all  this was  an  immense  rise  in  general 
prices.  If  the  level  of  prices  reached  in  France  was  not 
attained  and if  no one gave ,4200  for a chi~ken,~  this was 
only because the Bank was not  involved  in  the  South Sea 
Company, so that  there were  no over-issues;  nevertheless 
the  prices  were  such  that  people  with  moderate  incomes 
were forced either to speculate or to live  in  poverty. 
The clerks of  the company were  among the  few people 
who made genuine profits.  Since the passing of  a single 
Merry  Remarks  upon Exchange  Alley  Bubbles.  We  give  these  numerous 
literary  references not  to display  a  vain  erudition,  but  because in  actual  fact 
it  is  from  such  sources as these that  the  best  descriptions  are obtained,  in 
default of  a history  of  the crisis.  Finally,  see  Smollett, p.  244,  and conipare 
Thicrs  Histoire  de  Law, p.  93.  The two crises are so much  alike that a 
description of  the one might  easily  be  read as applying to the other. 
'  It is  certain  that  the  King  vigorously  supported  the project,  if  he  did 
not  actually make money  by  it,  The Duchess of  Ormond  wrote  to  Swift: 
"  You remember, and so do I, when  the South Sea. was  said  to be my  Lord 
Oxford's  brat,  and must  be  starved  at nurse.  Now  the King  has  adopted 
it and calls  it his beloved  child : though  perhaps  you may  say, if  he loves  it 
I:O  better than  his son,  it  nlay  not  be  saying cnurh ; but he  loves  it as well 
as he does the Duchess of  Kendal, and that is saying a good  dcal.  1 wish  it 
may thrive, for so~ne  of  my  friends are deep in  it; I  wish  you  were so too." 
This letter will  be  found in  Swift's works, Vol. XVI., p.  335. 
Cotnpare Thiers,  op. cit., p.  103. 
a  Thiers, p.  lo;. 
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day might  mean  a  difference of k~m,  people often  gave 
them  a  £20  note  to  hasten  the  transaction.  The profits 
which they made in this way were so great that they used 
to wear clothes trimmed with lace, and replied to those who 
criticised  them  that "  if  they did not  put gold upon  their 
clothes,  they  would  not  make away  with  half  their  earn- 
ings." 
~t would have been  fortunate  if the evil had ended here. 
~~t  the success of the South Sea Scheme gave rise  to  all 
kinds of other  projects.  Some of  these were  serious and 
deserved to succeed,'  but  the absurdity of  the others was 
such that according 60  Francis, their popularity "  stamped 
the minds of  those who entertained them with what may be 
truly termed a commercial lunacy."'  A  few examples will 
illustrate  this.'  One  project  was  for  'the  "  discovery 
of  perpetual  motion,"  another  to  found  a  company 
"  for importing a number of  large jack-asses  from Spain," 
a  third "  for  building  of  hospitals for bastard  children," 
a  fourth  "  for  extracting  silver from  lead,"  and,  finally, 
the  most  remarkable  of  all  was  a  project  to  found  a 
company "  for carrying on an undertaking of  great advant- 
age,  which  shall  in  due  time  be  revealed."  Each  sub- 
scriber was to deposit two  guineas, in  return for which  he 
would subsequently  receive a  100-guinea share, and would 
at the same time  hear the nature of  the scheme !  It is diffi- 
cult to believe that in five hours the ingenious promoter had 
collected  1,000  subscriptions,  i.e.,  &2,ooo,  with  which  he 
decamped  in the course of  the evening. 
Any subscription was accepted  for projects of  this kind, 
even a shilling for  £5,  i.e., I  per cent."  And since no one 
ever asked  for the remainder of  the subscription,  the  poor 
man with  his few pence could build the same castles in the 
air as the rich man with his millions of  pounds. 
Anlong  the schemes which  succeeded  were the  Royal Exchange  and the 
London Assurance Company,  which  still  exist. 
a  Francis,  p.  127. 
'  Still more extravagant projects are given  by Mahon, pp.  16 and  17, and 
by  Anderson, p.  108. 
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Anotlier  fraud  of  the  period1 was  [lint  of  tlie  "  Globc 
permits,"  small  squares of  playing cards, on  which  were 
printed pictures of  the Globe tavern  with  the words, "  Sail 
cloth  permits."  These cards were  merely  permits  to  sul)- 
scribe  to  a  future  Sail  cloth  company,  and  were  sc)lii 
currently for Go  guineas apiece.  The crush and confusion 
were  so great  that  the same shares  \yere  sometimes sold 
simultaneously for ,410 more at one place in Change Alley 
than at another.' 
The new companies enjoyed the patronage of  tlie highest 
nobility.  The Prince of  Wales, afterwards George II., con- 
sented  to  be  governor  of  the  Welsh  Copper  Conlpany. 
According to Lord Mah~n,~  the Spealter and Walpole tried 
in vain to dissuade him ; it was not until the company was 
threatened with an action that His Royal IIighness had the 
prudence to retire with  a profit of  ,&4o,ooo. 
The Duke  of  Bridgewater  founded a company to  build 
houses  in  London  and  Westminster  and  the  Duke  of 
Chandos was  the  head  of  the  York  Buildings Company. 
Practically  all  the other  nobles  followed  these  examples. 
The Dukes of  Argyll and of  Roxburgll and Lord Stanhope 
were apparently the only persons  among tlie  nobility  and 
ministers who escaped the infection. 
This state of  things afforded  excellent  opportunities  for 
satire.  Announcement  was  made  of  3  company  for 
"  making butter from beech'trees,"  and of  various analogous 
projects.  But the most brilliant  satires and the most biting 
'  Mackay, ,Popular Dellrsions,  p.  54.  This work  also contains  an  essay 
on Law, and one on the "  Tulipolriania " in  liolland. 
'  The way  in  which  business  was carried  on  may  be  gathered  fro111 the 
nccount of  a  contemporary.  The London  journal  for June 11,  says: "  'l'he 
hurry of  our stock-jobbing bubblers has been  so great this  wrek, that it  has 
cxcceded  all  that  was ever  known.  There  has  bccn  nothing  but  ruliniilg 
about from  one coffee-house  to another, and  from  one tavcrn  to  anothcr, to 
subscribe  without  examining what the proposals  wrre.  l'he  gencsral  cry  has 
been, '  For G-'s  sake Ict  us but subscribe  to something,  we  don't  care what 
it is I'  So that, in  short, many have taken them  at tlit:ir  words, and c.ntcr<.d 
them  adventurers  in  some  of  the grossest  cheats  and inlproballe  undcrtak- 
ings that ever  the world  heard of;  and yet  by  all these  the projectors  h.~\.e 
got  money,  and  have had  their  subscl-iption  full  as xouli  as desired." 
See p.  15, and hlurlcy,  Il'ulpul~~,  p. 04. 
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epigrams are to he found in  the conten~porary  verse.'  "  The 
print shops teemed  with  caricatures,"  says Mackay, "  and 
the newspapers with epigrams and satires upon the prevalent 
folly.  An ingenious card-maker published a pack of  South 
Sea playing cards, . . .  each  card containing,  besides the 
usual figures, . . .  a caricature of  a bubble company,  with 
.ppropriate  verses  beneath.  One  of  the  most  famous 
bubbles was ' Puckles'  Machine Company ' for discharging 
round and square cannon-balls  and bullets, and making a 
total revolution in  the art of  war.  Its pretensions to public 
favour were thus summed up in the eight of  spades : 
"  A  rare  invention to destroy the crowd 
Of  fools at homc,  instead  of  fools abroad. 
Fear not  my  friends,  this terrible  machine, 
They're only wounded  who have shares within." 
Each company of  the same kind  was ridiculed  in  turn. 
Mackay  gives most of  the verses, and a reproduction of  the 
very curious cards. 
Unfortunately  so  long  as  the  speculator  was  putting 
money into his pocket,  he paid  no heed to  the satires, and 
laughed at those who ridiculed him.  It was estimated that 
the  total  amount  subscribed  to  the  different  projects  ex- 
ceeded  ~300,ooo,ooo,  and  the price  of  their  sharesC  rose 
continually.  Things reached such a pitch that sensible men 
could  nQ  longer hide  from  themselves the dangers of  the 
situation.  Walpole,  the  Jeremiah  of  this  period  of  in- 
sanity,'  was  continually  prophesying  the  most  terrible 
Amongst  the best known the following may be  quoted :- 
"  A wise man laughed to see an ass 
Eat thistles  and neglect good  grass, 
But had  the sage beheld  the folly 
Of  late  transacted  in  Change  Alley, 
He might have seen  worse a4ses there 
Give  solid gold  for empty air." 
pp 60-62. 
'  Tindal,  Iiistory  qf  England  from  the  Revoluiion  to  George  11.  Val. 
"'I.,  P.  357,  and Smollett, p.  245.  Anderson gives  (pp.  104-107) the amounts 
aCt~all~  subscribed  for each project. 
For the  prices  of  shares during  this period  see  Anderson,  pp.  103-104, 
of England  stock itself  was quoted  at ,&260. 
wal~olc's gloonly  prophrcies  did  not prevent  him,  with  characteristic 
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misfortunes.  The  King,  roused  to  anxiety,  issued  a 
proclamation  on June I I, against "  Such mischievous  and 
dangerous undertakings, especially the presuming to act as 
a corporate body, or raising stocks or shares without legal 
authority."  But this proclamation had no more effect than 
the satires and epigrams, and it remained for the South Sea 
Company itself, jealous  of  its rivals,  to put  an end to  the 
folly and to bring about its own ruin. 
Alarmed  by  the success of  all  tfiese projects,  the South 
Sea Company obtained a writ from the Lord Justices reject- 
ing all petitions and dissolving all the bubble companies.' 
This writ, issued on July  12, was followed by a list of  those 
companies which were considered to be of  this kind.  There 
were  no fewer than 86 and this list is still amusing to read, 
both for the number and the absurdity of  the inventions.' 
The company was apparently triumphant  but the burst- 
ing  of  the  bubbles  caused  general  uneasiness;  everyone 
wished  to realise his gains.  People quickly found out the 
difference between the prices in  Change Alley and the real 
value of  the shares of  the different companies, and the South 
Sea  Company  found  itself  involved  in  the  ruin  it  had 
caused. 
When the legal proceedings began  the company's stock 
stood at L850.  It kept  up to A7m until September 2,  but 
on the  13th it  was only A400  and on the 2gth, after a con- 
tinuous fall, it was selling at A175.  The anxious directors 
promised a dividend of  30 per cent., and guaranteed one of 
50 per cent. for the following years,  but their promises had 
no  influence  on  the  now  incredulous  public  which  was 
very soon in a state of  absolute panic.  Everything collapsed, 
thousands  of  families  were  reduced  to  beggary,  many 
people were unable to survive the disaster and the fortunes 
Stock;  he managed  to  choose  a  good  moment  for  selling  out,  see  Coxe, 
Memoirs, Vol.  I., p.  730.  Mr. Morley remarks  (p. 134)~  "  His firm  and wise 
conviction  of  the  folly  of the  South  Sea schemes  did  not  prevent  him  from 
turning his wisdom  to account  by  dealing in South Sea stock." 
'  These  companies  collapsed  after  June 20,  1720,  in  conscquence  of  the 
Bubble Act. 
This  list  is  given  by  Anderson,  pp.  104-112.  But  the  author  only 
mentions  80 companies. 
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secured by a handful of  individuals only served to aggravate 
the prevailing  ruin. 
The directors of  the company vainly sought to delay the 
catastrophe  by the help of  credit.  Several goldsmiths and 
private bankers who had advanced money on the shares were 
obliged  to stop payment owing to the depreciation of  these, 
and the Sword Blade  Association which  had been  the com- 
pany's chief  cashiers, now shared its disgrace. 
In vain they even  applied to  the Bank itself.  Urged by 
\,alpole  the  directors had  indeed  undertaken  to  circulate 
./3,500,000  of  the company's bonds at &4oo, but this agree- 
ment,  which  was  made  on  September  13,  was  no  longer 
tenable, and the directors  took  advantage of  the  fact  that 
the  contract  drawings had  not  been  legally  ratified,  and 
refused to execute  it.'  Indeed,  had  they  been  forced  to 
carry  it  out, they  would only have  shared the  South Sea 
Company's ruin.  The Bank had difficulty enough to main- 
tain  its own  credit  and it  was only able to  meet  the  run 
made upon  it  by  devices which  hlacleod2 thus debcribes. 
"  It  employed  a  number  of  clerks  to  tell  out  the  money 
which  was  demanded,  as well  as what  was  brought  in. 
Payments were made  in  light  sixpences and shillings, and 
large sums  were  paid  to  particular  friends,  who  went  out 
with  their  bags of  money  at one  door,  to deliver  them  to 
people  placed  at another, who were  let  in  to  pay  the same 
money  to  tellers,  who  took  time  to  count  it over.  These 
persons Rere, of  course, always served first.  By this means 
time was gained, the friends of  the  Bank rallied  round  it, 
and made large subscriptions to support the company.  The 
festival of Michaelmas, at which it Mas  usual at that time tc, 
shut up  the  Bank, came, and, when  it  was opened  again, 
the public alarm had passed off  ." 
The directors of  the South Sea Company thought at one 
time of taking legal measures to force the Bank to  execute 
Its  contract,  but  they  soon  remembered  that  the  la\\suit 
For  the  part  played  by  Wnlpole  on this  occn<ion, see "  The rase  of  the 
Corltract,"  173j,  a  rpply  to  the  attack.:  printed  by  Aislabie  in  the 
~~~1ft~~Pl',P,. 
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must throw light on their own  proceedings  and would  do 
them more harm than good.  Besides, they had triumphed 
so insolently  in  their days of  prosperity,  and had  so op- 
pressed well-meaning people by their ill-judged luxury, that 
they could  not  find a single supporter  in  the day of  mis- 
fortune, and during the Parliamentary inquiry they suffered 
more on account of  their gorgeous past than on account of 
their frauds.' 
The  crisis,  however,  continued,  and  George  I.,  who 
according  to  habit,  was  never  in  England,  had  to  leave 
Hanover and return  to his new  kingdom at the beginning 
of  November.  Several remedies were suggested.  The most 
important  of  these  was  that  nine  millions of  the  capital 
should be made over to the Bank of  England  and an equal 
amount to the East India Company; this would leave twenty 
millions to the South Sea Company.  This measure  which 
was ably drafted by Walpole, was  passed,  in  spite of  the 
abjections of  the Bank and of  the two other companies con- 
cerned;  but  the vote of  the two  Houses did not  result in 
the  execution of  the arrangement,  which  was  optional  in 
character and remained  a dead letter. 
Meanwhile,  the  debates and the  Parliamentary  inquiry 
were  revealing  the  most  scandalous  proceedings,  and the 
tone of  the discussion reflected the unmeasured wrath of  the 
public against  the company and  its  pr~moters.~  No  one 
seemed to realise that the nation  had been  as guilty as the 
company.  The nation was composed of  simple, hard-work- 
ing, honest  people,  despoiled  by  a  group of  thieves  who 
deseryed to be cast out without mercy.  This was the unani- 
mous  opinion  in  the country  and Parliament  was  hardly 
more reasonable.  The protest there was  the more violent, 
since several members tried in this way to throw dust in  the 
eyes of  the public. 
The Icing,  in  his speech at the opening of  the  session, 
hoped that it would be remembered that "  all your prudence, 
Mackay,  p. 69. 
a  For  this  celebrated  aRair  see the  whole  session  from  December,  1720, 
to August,  1721,  in  Furl.  Hist. (pp.  678-911). 
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your temper,  and resolution,  are necessary  to find out and 
apply  the proper remedies to our misfortunes." 
These lvords were  scarcely heard.  The House of  Lords 
content  to  urge  that  the  property  of  the  criminals 
should be confiscated.  But in  the Commons, Lord Rloles- 
demanded  that  extraordinary  penalties  should  be 
inflicted on extraordinary crimes,  and recalled  the example 
of  the ancient  Romans,  who,  having  no  law  against  the 
unforeseen crime of  parricide,  yet made one as soon  as it 
was committed, and threw the guilty wretch sewed up in  a 
sack into the Tiber.  He should, he added, be content to see 
these speculators, as the parricides of  their country, treated 
in  a like manner and thrown  into the Thames.  These views 
were shared by Parliament, and UTalpole who was the only 
person  who kept his head,  had much difficulty  in  calming 
the audience; indeed, on the following day he could not do 
so,  and  penalties  with  retrospective  force  were  passed 
against "  the Infamous practice of  Stock-Jobbing." 
A committee of  inquiry was appointed.9he governors, 
directors  and  officers  of  the  company  were  summoned 
before  the  bar  of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  since 
Knight, the treasurer,  had thought it  prudent to escape, a 
proclamation  was  issued, forbidding any of  the accused to 
leave the kingdom. 
General Ross,*  with more vigour than elegance, described 
to the  House how "  The committee  had  discovered a train 
of the deepest villainy and fraud that had ever contrived to 
ruin a nation."  Bribery had been  used  to pass the Act, all 
the directors who were members of  the House were expelled 
and all the officers of the company  who  held  Government 
Posts  were  dismissed.  The  inquiry  was  hampered  by 
obstacles  of  every  kind:  the  company's  cashier  was  in 
France  and  the  most  important  of  the  books  had  beer1 
with  or entirely  destroyed.  It  was  discovered 
however, amongst other things that $574,500  of  stock, said 
For  Lord  Molesworth's  speech  see Parl.  Hist., pp.  682-683. 
'  It included the  chief opponents of  the  South Sea project, amongst others 
Molesworth, Jekyll  and  Brodricl<;  the  latter  \\.as  elected  president  of  the 
colnn~ittee. 
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to  have been  sold,  had  been  distributed  among ministers, 
influential  nobles  and the King's favourites.  The Earl of 
Sutherland  had  had  L50,ooo;  hIr.  Secretary  Craggs, 
£30,000;  Mr.  Charles Stanhope, one of  the secretaries of 
the  Treasury,  £~o,ooo;  the  Sword  Blade  Company, 
£f;50,ooo.  Tile  Duchess  of  Kendal  having  accepted 
E~o,ooo,  the  other  favourite,  the  Countess of  Platen,  re- 
ceived  a  like  sum-an  impartial  treatment  which  Lord 
Mahon  thinks worthy  of  praise-and  her  two  nieces  were 
not forgotten. 
But  the  person  most  compromised  by  the  inquiry  was 
Aislabie,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.'  He  had 
advised the company  to increase its second subscription by 
half  a  million,  on  no  authority  but  his  own,  and  had 
apparently been  well  paid for this permission;  he had also 
received a  large  share of  the  stock  which  had  been  dis- 
tributed  in  the manner just  described.  Speedy and well- 
deserved punishment fell upon him.  He was expelled from 
the  House  with  ignominy, sent to  the Tower,  and all his 
property was confiscated for the benefit  of  the victims. 
This sentence  was  welcomed  with  extraordinary  enthu- 
siasm.  London was illuminated, fireworks were let off  and 
a  huge  crowd  assembled  on  Tower  Hill  to  witness  his 
degradation.  Rut  the  demonstration  was  caused  less  by 
pleasure at Aislabie's  condemnation than by indignation at 
Stanhope's acquittal on the previous day. 
Charles  Stanhope  had  been  the  first  to  be  sentenced,' 
and although his delence,  skilful as it was,  had convinced 
no one, he had been acquitted by a majority of  three.  The 
most  powerful  influence  had  been  exerted  to  save  him. 
Lord  Stanhope,  Lord  Chesterfield's  son,  had  approached 
the members of the  Mouse in  turn  and was able to  induce 
a  large  number  of  them  to  vote  for  the  acquittal,  or  at 
least,  to  abstain  from  voting.  'She  verdict  roused  much 
discontent  in  the country and was  the cause  of  numerous 
troubles in  London.  Similar dissatisfaction was  caused by 
the acquittal of the Earl of Sutherland.  It was stated  that 
For  his  trial  see  Purl.  Hist., p.  748.  The Secretary  of  State,  Craggs, 
co~ld  not  be trivd  since 11e h:id  ditd in  tltc  interval. 
'  l'arl.  Jlist.,  pp.  j+o-;.+;, 
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this  acquittal  was  due  to  the  necessity  of  staving  off  a 
political  crisis and  preventing the  return  of  the  Tories  to 
power.' 
The rest  of  the accused, the directors of  the South Sea 
Company, many of whom  had  themselves  been  ruined by 
the business, were all condemned.  More than two millions 
were confiscated;  the fines were based  more on the guilt of 
the speculators  than on the extent of their  property.' 
These proceedings,-a  justice  indulgent to  the great and 
harsh  to  the  poor,  to  quote  Figaro,-were  rightly con- 
demned by  the  great historian,  Gibb~n.~  He complains 
that, "  Instead of  the calm solemnity  of  a judicial  inquiry, 
the  fortune and  honour  of  thirty-three  Englishmen  were 
the topics  of  hasty  conversation."  All  the  accused 
-not  as individuals but in  a body, absent or unheard, and 
often on paltry evidence-were  condemned to arbitrary fines 
by a  passionate  and bitter  assembly,  some of  whose  mem- 
bers were glad to be able to satisfy their personal animosity 
by a secret vote. 
The force of  these criticisms, which Gibbon sets forth with 
a remarkable eloquence,  is undeniable.  But, nevertheless, 
before condemning the judges,  it is well  to  imagine  one- 
self living at that time and in the circumstances under which 
they were called upon to give judgment. 
No doubt injustices were committed.  The accused were 
not  spared either insults or  ridicule,  and  many  Members 
'  Lord  Mahon,  pp.  31-32,  is inclined  to justify  this  acquittal;  he  bases 
his  argument  on  the  fact  that  there  was  no  written  evidence  against 
Sutherland, and that the witnesses  were  not  to be  trusted.  Suthrrland was 
however  forced  by  public  opinion  to resign  his  post  of  First  Lord  of  the 
Treasury. 
'  The values  of  the estates and the amounts of  the fines  will  be  found in 
Parl. Hist., Vol.  VIl., pp.  This list is given  by  Francis but  accord- 
ing to his  habit he  does not  mention  the source  of  his information. 
'  Memoirs  of Life and  It'riting,  p.  12 of  the  1st  edition  (1796);  a large 
portion  of  this  work  is  in  French.  In  writing  these  fine  pages  Gibbon,  if 
not avenging his own wrongs, was at any rate  an officium  fiefatis. 
for his  grandfather  and  namesake  was  one  of  the  directors  of the  South 
Sea  Conlpany  and lost  a  large part of his fortune  through  it;  he  was con- 
demned  to pay  a fine  of &TO,-;  his estates had  been  valurd at A106.543. 
Gibbon, however,  was  not  the man  to yield  to personal  feeling,  even  in  a 
devoted  to  the  origins  of  his  family,  and  his  cvidencc,  which  is 
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seized  their  opportunity  of  revenging  themselves  for  the 
vanity and insolence displayed by the directors of  the com- 
pany  in  their  days of  prosperity.  Evidently,  too,  Parlia- 
ment hardly attained the standard of  a calm and impartial 
tribunal.  It was  excited by passions  which  were  exciting 
the whole nation  and by which any tribunal must have been 
affected.  But  it  should  be  noticed  in  its  favour  that, 
although we may think the sentences severe, contemporaries 
looked  upon them  as mild  and considered the  gallows the 
only fate worthy of  those whom they called the cannibals of 
Change Alley.'  Similarly, the French nation  showed but 
scant mercy to Law, who was yet a thoroughly honest man, 
and who, like some of  the South Sea directors, had gone into 
the affair rich and emerged from it poor.' 
The sentences having been  passed,  it  remained  to  deal 
with yet more serious problems.  It was easier to punish the 
guilty than  to  comfort  their  victims.  Something was  ac- 
complished  in  this respect  however,  thanks to  the ability 
of  Walpole,  who,  when  his first scheme failed,  was  ready 
to devise a second.  The capital of  the South Sea Company 
according to the estimate made at the end of  1720, was  in 
round  numbers  437,800,000,  whilst  the stock  allotted  to 
the various shareholders amounted only to R24,500,ooo;  so 
that there remained £13, joo,ooo belonging to the company 
in  its corporate  capacity and representing the  profit  which 
it had made out of  the  national disaster.  The State Sad a 
claim to £7,5oo,ooo  out of  this sum, this being the payment 
promised  when  the company was  founded.  But  to  set a 
good example,  the  Government  cancelled  five  millions  of 
this debt;  there was thus ~8,9oo,ooo  to divide among the 
shareholders,  i.e.,  334  per  cent. of  their  stock.  Many of 
these shareholders were,  however, 50 dissatisfied, and inter- 
rupted the  meetings of  ParliamentJ by  such constant dis- 
turbances,  that  the  Government ended  by  cancelling  the 
For  the  feelings  of  the  English  public, see  the  letter  of  Britannicus  in 
the London Journal of  November  19, 1720. 
I,evassrvr,  Rdcl~erchrs  historiques  sur  le  systkme  de  Law, p.  315; and 
Dubois,  Histoire des doctrines Economiques, Vol. I., p. 326. 
J  These disturbances  were  so violent  that  it  was  necessary  to  read  the 
Riot  Act,  to  which  the  crowd  retorted : "  You  pick  our  pockets  and  then 
imprison  us for complaining. " 
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rest  of the company's debt to it,  and the shareholders were 
paid a second dividend of  6$ per cent. 
In this way the credit of  the South Sea Company's  stock 
,+-as  maintained.  The Bank which had hitherto been power- 
less,  now  took action in its turn, and purchased annuities to 
the value of  &200,000,  which the company had been author- 
ised to se1l.l  To enable it to make this payment  the Bank's 
capital  was  increased  by  £3,4oo,ooo  and  now  stood  at 
£8,959,955.  The stock was subscribed for at I 18  per cent. 
so that the Bank made a profit of  &610,169 by the operation. 
The  Government  payed  £632,698  for  long  and  short 
annuities, and now had its annual revenue consolidated into 
a redeemable fund for which it had only to pay 4 per cent. 
after 1727.  It thus secured a yearly advantage of  £339,631. 
This was, according to Coxe,'  the signal for a reduction of 
the rate of  interest on several loans. 
But all these must not lead us to infer that the South Sea 
crisis was beneficial to England.  It had produced enormous 
agitation and an unjust  redistribution  of  wealth  and had 
very  nearly  ruined  the  Hanoverian  monarchy.'  Besides 
this the crisis had a deplorable influence on public morality. 
Queen  Caroline  compared  the  South  Sea  scheme  to  the 
Triple  Alliance  of  1735.  Those  who  shared  in  it 
knew  perfectly  well  that  it  was  only  a  fraud,  but  hoped 
notwithstanding  to  make  some  profit  out  of  it.  Each 
reckoned that he would be the first to withdraw after making 
his own fortune, and each thought himself clever enough to 
leave  his  companions in  the  lurch.  I  believe  no  more 
accurate analysis of  the speculators' state of  mind has ever 
been given.  These speculators-and  this is one of  the most 
painful  features of  the  crisis--represented  all  classes  of 
'  This  profitable  transaction  was  at first  the cause  of  some  anxiety; an 
expression of  this  will  be  found in a  contemporary pamphlet:  A letter  to the 
Governor of  the  Bank  of England  (Against  the  purchase  of annurtres  frona 
the South Sea Company), 1722, the  year  of  the purchase. 
Coxe,  op.  and  loc.  cit.  The  French  Government  secured  a  similar 
advantage  from the  crisis  of  the  Compagnie  des  Indes.  The  national  debt 
femained  the  same,  but  the  rate  of interest  was  much  reduced,  and  the 
rreasur~  had only  to pay  37  millions  instead of  80. 
'  For  the  hopes  raised  among  the  Jacobites by  this  crisis,  see  Mahon, 
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society, and things were  so arranged  that the poorest man 
might ruin himself as easily as the millionaire.  Hutcheson,' 
borrowing  the  language  of  the  gambling-house;  says: 
"  The South Sea stock must be allowed the honour of  being 
the gold-tables, the better  sort of  bubbles the silver-tables, 
and the lower forms of  these are the farthing-tables  for the 
footmen."  The evil  was  thus  as widespread  as  it  was 
serious, and it  was  the  less skilful  rathe;  than  the  more 
guilty of  the gamblers who were  ruined, so that the punish- 
ment was as objectionable as the offence. 
The crisis of  1720 was especially  serious in  the effect  it 
had on the Bank of  England.  It twice forced this institution 
to the verge of  ruin. 
In  the first place it led the directors to make proposals of 
so absurd a kind that, had they been accepted, they would, 
as Aislabie'  very plainly showed, have much intensified the 
crisis instead of  staving it off.  This was partly because the 
offers of  the Bank  were even less practicable  than  those of 
the  South Sea Company,'  partly because the  Bank  would 
inevitably have tried to keep up the credit of  its new  stock 
by that of  its notes, would have made over-issues, and, in  a 
futile endeavour to fulfil its rash promises, would have com- 
promised  an  institution  which  had  already  done  great 
services  to  England  and was  destined  to  do  still  greater 
ones.  It was in this way  that Law in trying to keep up the 
stock of  the India Company, compromised and finally ruined 
the  Banque  d'Escompte,  which  had  previously  been  both 
useful and prosperous. 
' A  collectiott  of  calculations  and  remarks  relating  to  the  South  Sea 
Srhctae  and  Stock,  p.  87  (1720)~  Published  at  the  end  of  A  collection  of 
treatises rclating  to  the  National  Debts  and  Funds. 
a  See his speech in  the  House of  Lords. 
'  The  inlpossible  nature  of  the  South  Sea  Company's  promises  was 
clearly  pointed  out  even  in  1720 in  a  pamphlet by  Hutcheson,  Some  calcula- 
tions  rclating  to  the  proposals  made  by  the  South  Sea  Company  and  the 
Rank  of  England  to  the  House  of  Commons.  The author  shows  that  the 
South  Sea  Company's  assumption  of  all  the  public  debts,  funded  and  un- 
funded,  would  raise its capital  to  ,&43,558,000.  And  hr proceeds  to  ask how 
it  can  undertake  a  trade  so  extensive  as to  enable  it  to  pay  an  interest 
exceeding  the  total  revenue  obtained  from  the  Customs  and  Excise  of  the 
whole  kingdom. 
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The Bank  owed  its escape from this first  danger  to  its 
enemies, who  secured  the  rejection  of  its  proposals.  It 
escaped the second and later danger which resulted from the 
failure of  the  South Sea  Company1 only  by  breaking  its 
word,  and  it  only  withstood  the  run  upon  it  by  using 
methods unworthy of  a great establishment. 
See above,  p.  137. THE REIGN  OF GEORGE  11.  I47 
SECTION I. 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE BANK OF  ENGLAND  IN  THE REIGN  OF 
GEORGE  11. 
Establishment  of  a  Reserve  Fund.  Renewal  of  the Charter  in  1742.  Con- 
temporary  idea of  the privilege of  Exclusive  Banking.  Definition  given 
by  the Act of  1742.  Importance of  the Act.  The Bank and the Jacobitc 
rising of  1745.  Black  Friday.  The Bank and  the conversion  of  1750. 
Relation between  the  Bank and the Treasury. 
THE  last years of  George I.'s  reign  and the first years of 
his successor's  were very  peaceful.  Walpole was the true 
ruler  of  England  and, despicable  as  he  was  in  many 
respects,  he had at least the indisputable merit of  securing 
tranquillity  at  home  and  preserving  peace  in  Europe.' 
Commerce and industry flourished under his influence  and 
the  history  of  the  Bank  of  England  became  uneventful. 
One important fact deserves notice,  viz.,  the establishment 
of  a  reserve fund, and the renewal  of  the Charter in  1742 
which confirmed and extended the  Bank's  privileges,  must 
also be  mentioned.  The period  of  peace  continued  until 
1745 when the great Jacobite rising endangered the Bank's 
existence once again. 
We  shall consider these three events in succession.  Then 
we  shall conclude  the chapter  by examining the relations 
between  the Bank and the Treasury during this period. 
I  attribute to Walpole's  love of  peace  what otherwise appears to be  the 
rather  exaggerated  admiration  felt  for  him  by  Mr.  Morley.  The  English 
Historical  Review published  in  ~gor  a  scries  of  rcrnarlcable  articles by  Mr. 
Basil  Williams on  The Foreign  Policy  of  England  under  Walpole. 
'(  The good  eNect  of  Walpole's  financial  rnanagcrnent  was proved  by  the 
high price  that the funds  had  reached.  A 3  pcr  cent.  loan  issued  in  1727 
stood at far in  1736, and in  the next year at 107.  Under such conditions it 
is plain  that  the  whole  redeemable  debt  might  have been  reduced  to  3 per 
cent.  or even  lower.  Political  expediency, which  made it an object to favour 
the  fundholders,  who  were  strong  supporters  of  the  Hanoverian  dynasty, 
prevented  this useful  measure "  (Bastable, 2nd  edition, pp.  631, 632).  It will 
be  remembcrcd that the conversions made  in  France under the Restoration  at 
first  aroused much  discontcnt. 
until 1722 the Bank divided all its profits  amongst the 
shareholders,  and provided  no reserve fund.  As a conse- 
quence,  the dividends had  been  exceedingly  variable,  and 
had ranged from  18t  per cent. in 1716 to 6 per cent. in  1722. 
The disadvantages of this  state of things were  keenly  felt 
and also the dangers due to the absence of  any reserve fund 
on  which  to rely  in  case of an emergency.  Urgent needs 
had  indeed  been  met  hitherto by  a  call  upon  the  share- 
holders, but this policy became increasingly inconvenient in 
practice as business developed  and the personal connection 
between  traders  was  proportionately  loosened,  so that  in 
1722 it was  found  necessary  to  establish  a  reserve  fund, 
known in England as The Rest. 
SECTION 11. 
- 
Each time that the question of  renewing the Bank charter 
came  to  the  front  during this  period  there  happened  in 
England what still happens in many countries on like occa- 
sions.  There were  always some persons who  opposed the 
renewal, and the Government took advantage of  this opposi- 
tion  to secure conditions  from the Bank that  were more to 
the  public  interest,  or  sometimes  merely  more  advant- 
ageous to  itself.  It  was  upon  such conditions,  and more 
particularly in return for a loan, that the Bank secured the 
renewal of  its privileges in  I 742, as well as in  I 764 and 1782. 
As  the  year  1742,  the  date  of  the  expiration  of  the 
monopoly,  drew  near,  the controversy  was  renewed  even 
more  fiercely than  before  and the Bank's  privileges  were 
even  more seriously endangered.  But when  the fatal date 
arrived  the Government was as usual involved  in  financial 
difficulties,1  and the Bank agreed to lend it ,&1,6oo,ooo with- 
'  The long peaceful interval rndcd in  1739.  When  peace  was concluded in 
'7@  the total of the national  debt had  rcachrd  .&~~,ooo,ooo. 148  HISTORY OF  THE BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
out interest.'  In order to raise this sum the directors made 
as usual a call upon  the shareholders, the response to which 
increased the capital to ~9,800,000.  In return  the  Bank's 
privileges  were  continued,  and  it was  provided  that  they 
should  not  be  cancelled  without  a  preliminary  twelve 
months' notice, which notice could not be given before 1764. 
The Bank:  thus  obtained  complete  security  for  22  years 
apart from  the additional  guarantee that  the  Government 
would  have to pay off  all the capital lent  to  it should the 
privileges be cancelled. 
Moreover  the  monopoly  introduced  into  the  charter  of 
1709 was confirmed and defined.  The new Act (statute 1742, 
c.  13, s. 5) conferred  on the  Bank  the  privilege  of  "ex- 
clusive banking."  The clause  in  question  explains  the 
nature of this privilege : "  It is the true intent and meaning 
of  the Act that no other bank shall be erected, established or 
allowed by  Parliament, and that it shall not  be lawful  for 
any body,  politic or corporate, whatsoever,  . . .  united  or 
to  be  united  in  covenants  or  partnerships,  exceeding  the 
number of  six persons, in that part of  Great Britain  called 
England, to  borrow, 070e1 or take  up any sum or sums of 
money, on their bills or notes payable at demand, or at any 
less  time  than  six  months  from  the  borrowing  thereof, 
during the continuance of  such said  privileges of  the said 
Governor  and  Company."  As  Macleod  remarks,  this 
clause  merits  "  the most  earnest  attention,"  firstly,  "  be- 
eause it is the one which contains the sole monopoly of the 
Bank  of England,"  and secondly, because "  it is a penal 
clause, and therefore, of  course, to be construed strictly." 
"  The sole monopoly  granted to the Bank  . . .  is that, 
during the continuance of  its charter, no partnerships  ex- 
ceeding  six  persons . . . should  issue  notes  payable  on 
demand, or at any less time than six months after issue." 
Banks of any other kind  and all other methods of  carry- 
ing on the business of  banking are left free and unaffected. 
This  in  fact reduced  the  interest  paid  hitherto  on  the  original  capital 
of ;GI  ,600,000  from  6 per cent. to 3 per  cent.  The aniount  lent  was doubled 
without  increasing  thc interest  paid,  which  was  equivalent  to  a  reduction  of 
50  per  cent.  in the  interest. 
'  3rd  Edition, p.  43o 
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And in  fact there was  nothing to  prevent  a foreign con,- 
pany from opening a  London branch  and carrying on  all 
forms of  banking,  with  the exception of  the issue of notes 
payable in a less time than six months. 
SECTION  111.  - 
THE BANK  OF  ENGLAND  AND  THE  JACOBITE 
RISING OF  1745. 
This was  not  the first occasion on  which  the  Bank had 
suffered from the Jacobites.  In 1722, the Duke of  Orleans 
had  revealed  to George I. the existence of  a  Jacobite con- 
spiracy.'  A proclamation by the Pretender was distributed, 
and the most  absurd rumours were  current.  All  was said 
to be in readiness, money collected, officers appointed, arms 
and ammunition stocked.  One of  the intended victims was 
the  Bank of  England  which  was destined  to be  pillaged. 
These rumours were believed.  The Jacobite party was still 
powerfu!  and  the  Regent  could  hardly  be  suspected  of 
making such statements without foundation ;  hence the stock 
of  the  Bank  fell, and, as usual,  the public hurried  to  its 
doers.  But vigorous measures were taken, the royal  troops 
were at once assembled, and the Jacobite peril vanished into 
smoke. 
The crisis  could  not  be  thus stifled  when,  in  1745, the 
Pretender  landed  in  Scotland at  the  end of  July,  almost 
alone, without anyone's support, trusting to his lucky star 
and to  the  help  of  a few  Highland chiefsa  The history 
of the rising is well  known, for its romantic side has been 
frequently depicted  on  the  stage  and  in  novels,  and  the 
personality  of  Prince  Charles has  always  had  a  strange 
fascination for historians.'  Hence  it would -be superfluous 
Mahon,  Chap.  xii. 
'  The  Highlanders formed hardly  a  twelfth  part  of  the  Scotch  nation. 
'  See Chambers, History  of the Rebellion.  John Hill  Burton, History  of 
Scotland,  Vol.  VIII., pp.  431-505.  Mahon,  Vol.  III., pp.  301-470.  There  is also an  excellent summary  in  Lecky,  England in the  Eighteenth  Century, 
VO1.  1.9  Pp.  421-423.  See  in  addition  Mr.  Andrew  Lang's  recent  book, 
Prince  Charles  Edward, a  work  containing  much information.  The  author 
'V'F  3'!3~^6  to  consult  the  Stuart  Papers  at  Windsor,  and  were  it  on this 
account alone h~s  boolc  would tiave  the  nttraction  of  a  tiovrl  treatmcant of a 
subject. THE REIGN  OF  GEORGE  11. 
to describe its extraordinary syccess at the outset : the defeat 
of  Sir John Cope, and the triumphal entry into Edinburgh. 
In a few weeks the royal adventurer was master of  Scotland, 
and on the 5th of  November he invaded England. 
Fortune seemed always in his favour;  he took Carlisle on 
November 15th  after a short resistance,' and marched as far 
as Derby without opposition.*  The alarm caused in London 
by this  news  may  well  be  imagined.  The Pretender  was 
only  127  miles away and what  was  worse,  had  numerous 
supporters in  the City.Y  The Duke af  Newcastle  was un- 
certain what policy to adopt  and debated whether he should 
not join  the enemy.  The fear of  a  French  invasion  added 
to  the general terror.  A  panic  resulted,  the  funds fell  to 
49,.  all the shops were closed, and the 6th of  December was 
known for a long time as Black Friday.= 
Finally there  came  the inevitable accompaniment  of  all 
panics-a  run on  the Bank,  for  which the directors were 
not prepared.  This run was instigated not only by political 
opponents,  but  also,  it  appears,  by  some of  the  Bank's 
rivals.'  The Bank  managed to resist  it,  thanks partly  to 
This siege of  Carlisle forms a  somewhat amusing interlude.  The town 
was defended  by a  Colonel  Durand,  and by  a  Mayor whose  name suggested 
a  Scotch  origin,  and who changed  it  in  order to inspire greater  confidence. 
See Walter Scott,  Tales of  a  Grandfather, p.  419. 
According  to a letter sent to the Duke of  Cumberland from Manchester, 
this town  I' was taken by  a  sergeant,  a  drummer,  and a  girl,"  who entered 
it  in  view  of  thousands  of  spectators.  See  the  whole of  this  exceedingly 
curious letter  in Mahon,  pp.  400-401. 
9  The chief  of  these  was  a  City Alderman  called  Heathcote. 
The Pretender  had  tried  to calm  the fears  of  the public  by  declaring 
in  the second  article of  his manifesto,  that,  although  the natjonal  debt had 
been  contracted under an illegal  government  and was a  heavy  burden on  the 
nation,  his father  would  consult  Parliament before  coming  lo any decision 
about  it.  But  a  mere  declaration  was  not  enough  to  satisfy  the  public 
creditors,  who  distrusted  an  unknown  Parliament  and  had  not  forgotten 
what the promises of  the Stuarts were  worth. 
'  See  note  to  a  letter  from  Horace  Walpole  to  Sir  Horace  Man  in 
the collection  of  these letters,  Vol.  I.,  p.  qog.  See  also Fielding,  The true 
Patriot.  Friday, May  11,  1866, received  the same name.  See  below,  Vol. 
II., p. 358. 
'  If  it  is  true  that  the  Bank's  rivals  took  an active share in  the  run, 
they  were  only  paying  it  back  in  its  own  ccin.  According  to  Francis 
(p.  164)  the  Bank  had  organised  a  run  on  thc  firm  of  Messrs.  Child. 
Jealous  of  the reputation  of  this  house,  it  had  secretly  collcctrd  the  firm's 
the  device  already described  of  paying  in  sixpences,  but 
more especially-for  this alone would have been  insufficient 
,thanks  to  the  support and loyalty  of  the  London  mer- 
chants  who agreed to accept  Bank notes in  payment,  and 
thus bore witness  to the important position  the Bank  had 
attained in  the commercial  world. 
A similar manifesto was issued with equally good results 
fifty-two years later.  That of  1745 was as follows : 
-  , 
6L We,  the  undersigned,  merchants  and others,  being 
sensible  how  necessary  the preservation  of  public credit  is 
at this  time,  do hereby  declare that we  will  not  refuse  to 
receive Bank notes in payment of any sum of  money  to be 
paid to us, and we  will use our utmost endeavours tb make 
our payments in the same manner." 
This declaration was signed in  the course of  a single day 
by  I,  140 merchants and fundholders. 
The retreat from Derby, followed by the retirement from 
England, happened  shortly  afterwards,  and improved  the 
situation,  relieving the Bank from all danger, though  not 
from all anxiety, for in  the following year the Government 
was obliged to apply again for its assistance on account of 
the  difficulty of  meeting  the  expenses  of  the  expedition 
against  the  Pretender,  and also those  of  the struggle  in- 
tended to safeguard the integrity of  Hanover.  The directors 
were empowered to cancel  A986,ooo of  Exchequer bills  in 
return for an annuity of  4 per cent.  and to issue new  stock 
for the  purpose.  This transaction  increased the paid-up 
capital to &10,780,000.  This was  the only increase in  the 
Bank's capital until  1782. 
receipts  which  circulated  like  cheques,  intending  to  present  them  for pay- 
ment at a time when there would  be  difficulty  in  meeting the demand.  Mr. 
Child  was only  saved  by  the  intervention of  the Duchess  of  Marlborough, 
who  sent  him  a  cheque  for L700,ooo on  the  Bank.  Thus armed  Child 
awaited his rival's demands;  as soon as they  were presented  he sent one of 
his partners with the Duchess'  cheque  to  the  Bank,  and the whole  value  of 
the receipts,  about Lt;5~,- or L600,ooo  was paid  in  Bank  notes.  Francis 
that  he  has taken  this storj from  Ireland,  but  gives no reference,  so 
that it has not been  possible to verify  the authenticity  of the incident.  Com- 
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SECTION  1V. 
THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND  AND  THE  CONVERSION  OF  1750. 
-RELATIONS BETWEEN  THE  BANK  AND  THE  TREASURY. 
In the  middle of  the  18th century there occurred one of 
the  most  remarkable  events  in  the  financial  history  of 
England-the  conversion  of  the  rate  of  interest  on  the 
national debt to 3 per cent.'  On this occasion  the consoli- 
dated 3 per cent.  stock was issued,  which  existed  until the 
conversion of  1888. 
The credit of  this conversion  rests  with  Pelham  and Sir 
John  Barnard.  The operation  was  carried  out gradually. 
The interest  was at first reduced to 3+ per cent.; this  rate 
was to be paid until  1757, when it was to fall automatically 
to 3 per cent.  The conversion  so successfully  carried  out 
by  Mr.  Goschen  in  1888 resembled  that  of  1750 in  this 
particular,  for the rate of  interest was at first reduced to 24 
per cent.,  anci then after a certain date, it fell automatically 
to 24 per cent.' 
The Government debt to the Bank at the time of  the con- 
version was composed as follows :" 
Futrdtd Debt. 
I.  Original Capital  -  -  -  ;G1,6oo,ooo 
New Loan in 1742  -  -  -  1,600,ooo 
(Interest already reduced to 3 %)  ---  -  .. 
~3,200,000 
2.  For  cilncellinp  the remainder  of 
the Excheq;er  Bills  (1709) at 
4%since1727  -  -  - 
3.  For purchasing  the Stock  of  the 
South Sea Company at 4 %  - 
4.  Annuity of  1728 at 4%  -  - 
5.  Annuity.of  1729'  at 4%  -  - 
b.  For  cancelling  Exchequer  bills 
(1748) at 4 %  --- 
Total National  Debt  - 
Capital.  Interest. 
' For  an account  of  the  conversion  of  1750,  see Sir  John  Sinclair,  The 
IIistory  of  the Public  Revettue of  tlte  Britislt  E~njirts,  Part  II., p.  86. 
For  the conversion  of  1888, see  Ifnmilton  (E.  W.), An  Accout~t  of  the 
operations under the  National  Debf  Co~laersiun  Act,  18Y8,  and  the  Natiotral 
1)rbt Redentption  Act,  1889. 
'  Martinuzzi  (Pietro), La Uatrra d'ltzgl~iltt,rra  wri  ristrordi  drl  scrz~ieio  dc,I 
Trsoro, p.  35. 
'  A  loan  madr  fur  the  war  with  Spain. 
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Out of  this annual payment of £435,472,  £96,000  repre- 
sented interest already reduced to 3 per cent. in  1742, which 
was  not  therefore  affected.  The  rest  of  the  annuity, 
~339,472,  was  reduced  to  £297,038  until  December  25, 
1757, and to £254,604  after that date. 
We may  also note  before concluding this chapter, that 
from this time (1751) the Bank of England  was  entrusted 
with the administration of the permanent debt.' 
1 See the Appendix to Vol.  11.  In particular  the section dealing with  the 
Bank  of  England  and  the  administration  of  the  national  debt.  See  also 
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CHAPTER  111. 
THE BANK FROM THE DEATH OF  GEORGE 11. 
TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
Renewals of the  Bank Charter (1764 and  1781).  Commercial Crises  of  1763, 
1772,  1783.  Re-coinage.  Cordon  Riots. 
THE  history  of  England during this first  part  of  George 
111.'~  reign includes the end of  the Seven Years'  War, the 
Rebellion  and the recognition of  the Independence of  the 
American  Colonies.  It  includes  also  an  unprecedented 
commercial and industrial development with which we shall 
deal when  we  come  to describe the economic condition  of 
England at the time of  the Revolution. 
As regards the history of  the Bank  the period of  twenty- 
five years covers two  renewals of  the charter (in  1764 and 
1781), three  economic  crises,  following  somewhat  closely 
on  one another;  another  recoinage,  which  need  only  be 
briefly  touched  upon,  and an attack  on  the  Bank  during 
the  disturbances  known  as  the  Gordon  Riots.  These 
various events,  grouped according to their character rather 
than  in  chronological order, will  supply  material  for  four 
paragraphs. 
SECTION  I. 
- 
RENEWALS  OF  THE  BANK CHARTER. 
The first of  these renewals was in  I 764.  The charter was 
continued until the repayment of  the Government debt, and 
for this six months'  notice was required, which notice could 
not be given before August r st,  I 786. 
This was in fact a renewal,  in the usual form for twenty- 
two years.  As usual also this  renewal  was  paid  for by  a 
financial sacrifice.  The Bank gave 41  ~o,txx,  to the nation, 
and lent the Government  a million  on  Exchequer bills  for 
two years  at 3 per cent.  These advances  were  of great 
service to the country which was just  concluding a glorious 
and  war,  which  had  however  been  an  immense 
expense.' 
By this same Act, "  it was made felony, without benefit 
of clergy, to forge powers of attorney, or other authorities, 
for receiving dividends, transfering or selling stock, or for 
Dersonating the  proprietors  of  any  stock,  for  such  pur- 
Similarly by an  Act  of  1773, the forging of  bank-notes 
-  - 
was  punishable with death.  This crime was a recent 
innovation.  As we  have  noticed above the first instance of 
it did not occur until 1758.  In order to prevent imitation of 
any kind, it was made illegal to manufacture any engraved 
bill  or promissory  bill  bearing the words "  Bank  of  Eng- 
land,"  or "  Bank  post  bill,"  or even  to state any sum  in 
white  letters on a black  ground so as to resemble "  Bank 
paper,"  under penalty of  six months'  imprisonment. 
According  to  the  law  of  1764  the  possibly  fatal  date 
when  the charter might be cancelled was  1786.  Five years 
before  this  limit  was  reached  the  second  renewal  of  the 
Bank's  privileges  was  granted, and in  the usual  formula 
these were continued until  1812 in return for a loan of  two 
millions at 3 per cent.  During the following year a call of 
8 per cent. was  made on  the Bank's  shareholders,  which 
brought  in  ,&862,ooo  and increased the company's capital 
to ,&I  I, 642,400. 
This  renewal  of  the  privileges  five years before  they 
expired  roused animated discussions; but the Ministry paid 
a well-deserved tribute to the services rendered by the Banlc 
and refused to make any modification  in its charter.  Tlley 
were supported by a large majority and the new agreement 
Was  passed by ~og  votes to 30.  When it is remembered that 
'he  3 per cent.'s stood then at 58, the Bank's offers must be 
Considered  very advantageous to the State, impoverished  as 
'  The  total  cost  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  is  estimated  at  L82.623.738. 
It ccldded  Lf;59,633,ooo  to  the  national  debt. 
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it  was by  the American  War which had cost  no less than 
,4.97,599,496 and whose results had been  very different from 
those of  the Seven Years' War. 
SECTION  11.  - 
COMMERCIAL  CRISES  OF  1763,  1772,  1783. 
The year 1763 was noted for the number of  serious bank- 
ruptcies on the  Continent.  The Seven Years' War seems 
to have given rise  to  much  speculation.  With  the peace 
came the day of  settlement bringing with it the collapse of 
many of  the speculators,  a collapse which  ruined the mer- 
chants who had traded  with  them.  The most  important of 
these failures was undoubtedly that of  Neufville  Brothers at 
Amsterdam.  This firm  left  liabilities of  330,000  guineas 
and not  only ruined  18 important Dutch  houses  but also 
a large  number of  rich  Hamburg merchants.'  The shock 
was  so great that for some time  business was only  trans- 
acted  for  cash.  These  disasters  could  not  of  course  be 
confined  to  the  two  great  commercial  cities  in  question. 
There were  numerous  failures  in  Germany and the crisis 
spread to  England, where  according to  Smith,  the  Bank 
advanced nearly a million to the merchants. 
England was shortly to be the headquarters of  a similar 
crisis,  which,  like  that just  described, was not confined to 
the country where it began. 
The years  1770 and 1771 had been  years of  great  com- 
mercial  prosperity  throughout  Europe,  but  this  was 
especially  the case in  England, whose  export trade in par- 
ticular  expanded  to  an extent  previously  unknown  and 
which  was  not  again  reached  until  1787.  Macpherson' 
remarks  that  a  number  of  failures  often  follow  after  too 
great  commercial  prosperity,  just  as certain  diseases  in 
mankind are the  result of  an undue  confidence  in  health. 
'  The  Amsterdam  merchants  had  been  warned  by  their  Hamburg 
colleagues  that  if  they  did  not  support  Neufville  Brothers  the  Hamburg 
merchants  would  suspend  payment.  Unfortunately,  thc  warning  came  too 
late and the  Ilamburg firms  had  to carry out their threat. 
\'0l.  I\'.,  p. 524. 
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This theory  was  fully  borne out by  the  facts  in  the  par- 
ticular case before us.  Speculative mania had broken  out 
afresh, and a partner  in  the firm  of  Heale having  disap- 
peared with 163m,ooo, this house failed on June loth, 1772, 
dragging  down  several  others  with  it.  The  Bank  and 
certain  merchants  endeavoured  to  maintain  credit  and 
for several  days were apparently successful; but  at length 
they could  do so no more and a general collapse followed. 
The number of  failures  reached  the amazing figure  of  525 
whereas since  1728 there had never been  as many as ;oo.' 
~t was  a  return  to  the  South Sea year,  and this crisis is 
memorable as the first of  those great modern panics which 
played  so important a part  in  the history of  the Bank.  In 
the following year the evil  spread to Holland, and it soon 
affected  all Europe, thanks to the general mania for specula- 
tions, whether commercial or in  the public funds.  Macleod 
estimates the total losses at ,&~o,ooo,ooo.' 
The evil  was cured  in  England by a series of  vigorous 
measures.  The Dutch merchants behaved  with  their cus- 
tomary good sense.  The Bank of  Stockholm lent its aid to 
all the firms of  really  good standing  and the Empress of 
Russia,  FrancisS asserts, secured the English merchants at 
St. Petersburg from  risk  by giving them  unlimited  credit 
at her own  bankers.  Thanks to these combined efforts the 
crisis  of  1772 was  calmed and for  eleven  years  the com- 
mercial world of  Europe was at peace. 
The crisis of  1783 like that of  1763, followed upon a treaty 
of peace.  When the independence of  the United States was 
acknowledged  in  1782,  international  trade  which  had suf- 
fered greatly from  the war,  developed  very rapidly.  This 
increase of business  and the opening up of  new  markets, 
led to extravagant transactiuns which  were  combined with 
a considerable  over-issue  of  notes.  An alarming drain  of 
precious  metals  from  the  Bank  produced  a  crisis  which 
ended  in  the suspension  of  cash  payments. 
There had becn  425 Banltruptcies in  1726,  446 in  1727, and  388  in  1728. 
Since then  there  had never bccn  as many  as 300  except in  1764,  when  there 
"ere  301.  For  the  failures  bctween  1700 and  1793 see  Chalmcrs,  Estiitlote 
of the Strength of  Great Britain (I~IO),  p. 36. 
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Fortunately,  the directors had  noticed  that  if  the  issues 
could be restricted  even  for  a short time,  the coin, instead 
of  being exported, flowed back  even  more quickly  than  it 
had been withdrawn ;  they had thus arrived at the following 
rule :' "  That while  a  drain  of  specie  is  going on  their 
issues should be contracted as much as possible, but that as 
soon as the tide had given signs of  ceasing, and turning the 
other way,  it was  then  safe to extend their  issues freely." 
The Bank therefore determined not to apply to the Govern- 
ment,  but merely to restrict  its issues for a time  until the 
exchanges were once more favourable.  The anxiety was at 
its  height  in  May,  1783.  All  further  advances  to  the 
Government  on  the loan  of  that  year  were  then  refused, 
though they did not demand the repayment of  the advances 
previously  made  which  amounted to  nine  or ten  millions. 
'This  policy  was  maintained  until  October when  the with- 
drawal of  precious metals finally ceased  and a movement in 
the opposite direction  began  to show itself.  As soon as 
these favourable signs were confirmed, the Bank made con- 
siderable  advances  to  the  Government  upon  the  loan, 
although  the  coin  then at its disposal was only £673,000, 
and was less than it had been at the time when the greatest 
alarm had been felt. 
SECTION  111. 
The year 1774 brings us back to a subject with which we 
have previously dealt at length  but which can now be much 
more  briefly  disposed of-the  subject of  the restoration of 
the  coinage.  During the  18th century  the  currency  had 
increasingly  deteriorated.  In  the  report  of  a  committee 
appointed  by  the  I-louse of  Commons,  it  was  estimated 
that there was a deficiency of  gold in  the ,dins  ot  nearly  g 
per  cent.  An  ounce  of  gold  which  had  been  worth 
k3  18s. 6d. in  1730, was £3  18s. ~od.  in  1761, and actually 
£4  IS. od. in  1772.  Consequently, in  1774 the Government 
' This  rltlr  is  dur  to  Bosanqurt.  Sre  Mnrlrod,  3rd  Edition,  p.  43;. 
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ordered a re-coinage,  which reduced  the value of  an ounce 
of  gold  to  63  17s. 6d. at which  price  it continued  until 
september, 1797. 
SECTION  IV. 
The  disturbances in  1780 involved the Bank 
in  dangers.  At first the excitement was confined to 
the neighb~~rh~~d  of  the Houses of  Parliament  where the 
rioters and their leader,  Lord  George Gordon,  treated the 
of  the two Houses with deplorable violence, hoping 
to prevent the passing of  a Bill favourable to the Catholics.' 
But,  as generally  happens  in  disputes whose  pretext  is 
religion, the objectors soon became rioters, and the members 
of the Protestant Association,'  as Gordon's supporters called 
themselves,  began to plunder the chapels and houses of  the 
Catholics, destroying the objects of  veneration, and not for- 
getting to carry off  the valuable pictures and the gold and 
silver plate.  The police  seemed  powerless  to  prevent  or 
suppress these proceedings,  and the rioters,  no doubt in a 
spirit of  tolerance, ceased to be content with plundering  the 
Catholics, but laid hands on the property of  all who came 
in their way, without regard to sect or creed; they even went 
so far  as to take Newgate Prison by assault  and to set free 
their imprisoned  comrade^.^  Emboldened by this success, 
the mob  proceeded to the Bank of England.  The Govern- 
ment  which  had  been  warned,  sent  some  help,  and 
fortunately this was supplemented by a band of  Volunteers 
formed by  the London citizens.  The rioters were daunted 
by  these measures:  they  only made a half-hearted  attack 
where  a  more  vigorous  effort  would  probably  have  suc- 
ceeded.  This attempt is  of  historic  interest.  It was only 
The  object  of  the  Bill  was  to  remove  some of  the  disabilities  under 
which Catholics suffered owing to a  law of  William  111. 
The  association  had  been  in  existence  for  two years, but  had hitherto 
Contented itself with peaceful agitation. 
'  An account  of  these  riots  will  be  found  in  all  the histories of  England. 
Dickens has given an  especially  vivid  description  in  Barnaby  Rudge.  one of 
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after it had been  made that the bank was guarded day and 
night. 
The next day an army of  20,000  men  was assembled, and 
after a somewhat severe fight the rioters were defeated, ym 
men being abandoned on the field of  battle.  Shortly after- 
wards, 192 of  them were condemned, and 25 were executed.' 
As for their leader, Lord George Gordon, he was acquitted 
after a lengthy sojourn in the Tower.  He died in 1793, after 
being condemned to five years'  imprisonment for two libels 
against Marie  Antoinette, and, a curious experience for a 
champion  of  Protestantism,  after  being  in  all  probability 
converted to the Jewish faith.  Most  people  thought him a 
little  mad,  but  he  had  warm  admirers,  one  of  whom, 
Watson, has left us a history of  his life.' 
Notes and  Queries.  A  meditrm of  intercommunication  for  Literary Men, 
etc.  Second series, Vol.  I., p.  518. 
Robert  Watson,  Life  of  Lord  George  Gordon,  with  a  philosoPhica1 
review  of  his  political  conduct.  For  an  account  of  these  trials  see--(]) 
Cobbett's State  Trials, xxi.,  pp.  485-687;  and  (2)  The whole Proceedings  on 
the  Trials of  two Informatiotts against  Lord  George  Gordon, 1787. 
PART  IV. 
THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND  DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
AND  THE NAPOLEONIC  WARS. 
- 
CHAPTER  I. 
ECONOMIC  CONDITION OF  ENGLAND AT THE 
TIME  OF THE FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 
Sketch  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  England.  The  Cotton  and  other 
industries.  The canals.  The steam engine.  Results of  the transformation 
of England from  an agricultural and commercial into a  commercial  and 
industrial  Country.  Its effects  on  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic 
Wars.  Its effects on the Organisation of  provincial  credit.  The Country 
Banks. 
TWENTY  years before the French  Revolution, England was 
still an agricultural and commercial  country.  Agriculture 
employed the great majority of  the population  and was the 
chief  source of  the country's wealth.'  Industry was indeed 
already  flourishing  in  the  18th  century,  but,  as M. Bry 
writes,'  it showed no signs of concentration of  capital or of 
masses of  workpeople in large factories.  Big fortunes at this 
time were still in the hands of  the trading companies.  The 
masters were  artisans who often  worked  themselves  with 
their wives and children, in the villages or in the country. 
The prevailing system was a combination of  agriculture and 
industrial work. 
' The i:opu!ation  of  England  was  estimated  at  8,joo,ooo,  and the  total 
annual income  at Allg,~oo,-.  The agricultural population  was 3,600,000, 
with  an  income of 66  millions,  and the industrial population  Was  3,-,OCJO, 
with  an income  of only  27  millions.  (See the list of  the different classes of 
'nhabjtants  with  the  amount of their  respective  incomes,  given  by  G. Bry, 
Hlstolre  Industrielle  et  Economipue  de  l1Angleterre,  p.  453).  The  agrl- 
cultural section  was thus not only the  most  numerous  but also the richest ; 
and  all  the  evidence  goes  to  show  that  it  was  contented  and prosperous. 
especially  Young's  conlparison  between  its  condition  and  that  of  the 
Peasant, Political  Arithnaetic,  pp.  133,  158, not  to speak of the Tour 
in  See also Sir J. Stewart,  Enquiry into  the  Principles  of  Political 
(1767).  Bk.  I., Chap. xviii,  and Adam  Smith,  Bk.  I., Chap. viii. 
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Twenty  years  after  the  Revolution,  England  was  in 
miniature the England of  today. 
To give one instance only,  that of  the cotton  industry. 
This industry was introduced into England at the beginning 
of  the 18th century owing to the infatuation of  the public 
for the calicoes and other materials imported from India, but 
its importance was still so small that even in I750 the value 
of  the cotton goods exported was only IC;45,ooo, while that 
of  the woollens was two millions.  In 1833 the woollen  ex- 
ports  had  increased  to  £6,539,731  and  the  cottons  to 
£18,486,408.' 
In the interval an industrial revolution  had taken place. 
When it  is remembered  that  during the period  we  are 
considering, that  is,  from  1793 to  1815, England was en- 
gaged in a struggle which  cost her more  than 80 millions 
a  year,  and  in  all,  more  than  830  millions,'  and  that 
during this same period she witnessed  the conquest  of  her 
allies, the frequent defeat of  her own troops, the increase of 
her national  debt  from  247  to 861 million  pounds and of 
her  yearly  burden  of  taxation  to  70  millions;  when 
it is also remembered  that English industry and commerce 
.was  faced  by  extraordinary  difficulties,  by  the  Bank  of 
England's  suspension  of  cash  payments,  by  the  sudden 
closing  of  the  markets  of  the  Continent  and  of  South 
America  to  English   good^,^  and  by  the  Berlin  decree, 
devised by Napoleon, which was a most formidable weapon 
against British trade, it is easy to infer that there must be a 
close connection between  England's final triumph and her 
economic revolution. 
Indeed  England's policy  during this period  can hardly 
be explained  and her financial history is incomprehensible 
if  the economic transformation is neglected-a  transforma- 
tion  which  can  only  be  compared  to  that  which  Europe 
The cotton  export  now  exceeds  70  millions and  the  home  consumption 
equals  this-in value,  so  that  this  industry  supports  a  commerce  of  140 
millions.  Ihe export of  woollens amounts to  24 ~nillions. 
'  The exact cost of  the war was ;G831,146,qqg. 
a  In  addition  to all this there  was the  difficulty  of  obtaining  certain  raw 
materials,  such  as  Spanish  wools,  which  were  indispensable  to  English 
industry. 
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underwent  after the discovery of  the new world, and of  which 
some brief account must be given. 
sketch of the  Industrial  Revolution  in England .'  We 
,ill  begin with the cotton industry to which we  have already 
referred, and  in  which  the  changes  were  most  striking. 
Between 1+7  and I 7612 the importations of  cotton increased 
from 1,~76,359-lbs.  to 3,870,392-lbs.  Progress was small and 
the work was done by hand.  In  1767 Hargreaves invented 
the spinning jenny,  which  by  means of  a wheel,  enabled 
eight spindles to be worked at once, and afterwards a still 
greater number, so that one man could spin  100  threads of 
cotton  at a  time.  Another  important  innovation  was that 
of  roller  spinning,  which  was  done  at  first  by  men  and 
later  by water power.3  Arkwright  perfected  this  machine 
and made it  for  the  first time an  important factor  in  the 
manufacture  of  cotton.' 
These great inventions were followed by a series of  others, 
such as Crompton's mule  and Berth'ollet's  use of  chlorine 
for the bleaching  of  cotton cloth,  and the process  was  so 
revolutionised  that  a  single  man  could  nuw  work  2,200 
spindles. 
These  important  discoveries,  which  made  England  the 
leading industrial country in the world, were at first greeted 
with terror, for it seemed evident that to enable one man to 
do work  which  had  hitherto  employed  2,200  was  to turn 
his 2,199  fellows into the streets6  But  it  soon  appeared 
that these fears were ill-founded  for whilst at the beginning 
of George  111.'~  reign  the cotton  industry only employed 
Amongst  general  works  on this question  the  reader  may  consult: Cun- 
nin&am,  op. cit.,  Bli.  III., Part  11. ; H. Traill, Social  England.  Vol.  V., 
xviii.  and xix. ; Bry,  op. cit., Bk.  V., Chaps.  i.  and  ii. ; Lecky,  op. 
tit., Val. VI., Chap.  xxiii. ; McCulloch,  Account  of  the British  Empire,  and 
on  Manufactures  (in  Treatises of  Economic  Policy) ; De  B. Gibbins, 
Illdustrial  Ilistory  of  Englond.  [Also  Paul  Mantoux,  La  Hd~*olution  In= 
dustriellc.1 
-1 
For  a  complete  list  of  the  fluctuations  during  this  period  see  Baines, 
His!or~  of the  Cotton Manufactitre  in Great Britain  (18351, p.  109. 
The  first  idea  of  this  process  is  attributed  sometimes  to  John Wyatt, 
Sometlme~  to  Lewis  Paul.  Set  for  the  first  opinion  Baines,  and  for  the 
S"cyd French,  Life  and  Times of  Crompton. 
Arkwright  Lecky  (pp. took  209-210)  out his  gives  patent  an  in  account  1769.  of  the  persecutions  suffered  by 
Kay:  Hargreaves,  Arkwright,  and  ?eel,  the  grandfather  of  the  Prime  Minister. 164  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
40,000  men,  in  1785  it  employed  80,000,  and  in  1831, 
833,000.~  The population  of  Lancashire,  the headquarters 
of  the industry,  was only 166,200 at the beginning of  the 
18th century; at the end of  the century it was 672,000;  now 
it is over four millions.  The  towns of  Manchester and Liver- 
pool have each more than half a million inhabitantsa 
We have seen that between 1697 and 1764 the quantity of 
cotton  imported  hardly  doubled,  while  the  exportations 
increased  in  an even  smaller proportion.  During the last 
twenty  years  of  the  18th  century,  the  former  multiplied 
seven-fold  and the latter fifteen and a  half-fold.3 
The enormous growth of  the cotton industry, though the 
most striking,  is  not  the only sign of  the progress which 
made the second part of the 18th century the most memor- 
able period in the history of  English industry.  Something 
must be said too  of  the manufacture of  pottery and china, 
which  was  introduced  in  the first  instance,  like  so many 
McCulloch,  Account  of the  British  Empire,  pp.  218,  219,  360.  Wages, 
however,  fell  considerably  between  1795  and  1815 ; Cunnlngham  (p.  468) 
estimates that during this period  they were only two-thirds  of  what they  had 
been  during  the preceding  decade.  On three occasions,  in  1795,  1800,  and 
1808,  it  was  proposed  to fix a  minimum  wage,  but  this  idea  was  rejected 
as likely  rather to increase the evil (on this point  see the Report of  the Com- 
mittee of  the  House  of  Commons,  Reports,  Vol.  II.,  p.  97).  Things were 
in  fact in  the state of  crisis distinctive of  all periods  of  transition. 
'  According  to the census of  1901  these  two  towns  have  populations  of 
543,969 and 686,332  respectively.  See Encyclopadia  Brit., Supplement,  Vol. 
XXX. 
'  I  quote from  Baines'  yearly  list  for the period  1781-1832  some  figures 
which  will  give a more exact idea of the  increase in  the cotton  imports :- 
Cotton imported 
Year.  for  spinning.  Year.  Wool imported. 
1781 .........  5,198,778 Ibs.  1771 ......... 1,829,000 Ibs.  ..  .........  1784  I 1,482,083  1790 ......... 2,582,000  ..  ..  .........  1789  32,576,023  ISOO ......... 8,609,000  .. 
1792 ......... 349971497  ?I  1810 ......... 10,914,000  ,, 
Decline  for five years,  followed by  another increase in  1798. 
1799 ......... 43,379,278 Ibs.  ..  1800  .........  56,010,732 
I 802 ......... 60,345,600  B,  ..  1807 ......... 74,925,306 
1810 .........  132,488,935  ..  (maximum  for the  war  period).  ..  1813 ......... 50,966,000  ..  1815 ......... 99,366,343 
1831 .........  ~80,080,000 .. 
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other  industries,  by  the  Huguenots,l  and  of  the  iron  - 
industries. 
The iron industries were old-established,'  but never really 
expanded until after the inventions of  Darby of  Colebrook, 
and especially of Cort of Gosport, who in  1783 introduced 
tk  process  of  puddling  and rolling  iron.  The industry 
did not attain its full development  until  the 19th century,' 
but even  in the previous century it had made considerable 
progress. ' 
One of the reasons  for the growth of  the  iron  industry 
was that  after the discovery of  the Darbys, father and son," 
coke could be used for smelting instead of  the wood char- 
coal which had been  employed before  and which was very 
scarce.  The  demand  for  coke  increased  daily  and 
stimulated the exploitation of  coal mines,  which soon grew 
to an importance  of  which  the list given below  will  give 
some idea.' 
The Canals.  All this industrial development would have 
been  impossible  if  it  had  not  coincided  with  increased 
facilities for attaining coal.  Progress in manufactures pre- 
'  For this  industry  see  Lecky,  pp.  210-211,  and  Bry,  p.  500.  Its head- 
quarters are in  Staffordshire,  which  stands fifth  among  English  counties  as 
regards population.  These industries owe their development  to Josiah Wedg- 
wood, for whose life see Eliza Meteyard, Life of  Wedgwood. 
McCulloch,  Essay  on  Manufactures,  p.  466  of  Treatises on Economical 
Policy. 
For  further  details  as to  the  iron  industry,  see  Fairbairn,  Iron,  its 
history, properties  and manufacture. 
In  1740  the  total  quantity  of  pig-iron  manufactured  in  England  and 
Wales  was  estimated  at 17,000 tons.  In  1796  it  was  125,079, and  in  1806, 
258,206.  It increased  to 678,117 tons in  1830.  Birmingham, ShefFteld  and a 
number of  other towns owe their  prosperity,  it  may  be  even  said their  very 
existence, to this industry. 
As  early as 1621 Lord Dudley took out a patent  for a  similar invention. 
He started some works  which came to an untimely end and then  the matter 
Was forgotten  in  the  confusion  of  the  Civil  War.  But  Dud  Dudley,  the 
natural son of  this Lord  Dudley,  published  in  1665 an account of  what  had 
under  the -title of  Metallum  Martis.  This  pamphlet,  which  had 
very rare, was reprinted fifty years ago. 
a  For  the  working  of  the  mines  and  its  difficulties  see  Traill,  Social 
England.  p.  314  - - 
Cunningham  (p.  463) gives  the following statistics of  the output of  coal 
at different  dates :- 
1660 ......  2,148,000  tons.  ......  ..  1700  Z,~IZ.OOO 
'750  ..a*..  4,773,828  ,, 
1770 ...... 6,205,400 tons. 
1790 ...... 7,618,728  .. 
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supposes and encourages improvement in the public roads; 
it  also stimulates great undertakings  such  as those which 
entirely  changed  the  methods  of  internal  communication 
in England.  I refer  to the construction of  canals.' 
Canals had been  used  for a long time on the Continent.2 
England  on the contrary, was  very  backward  in  this re- 
spect.=  Consequently transport rates were very high.  The 
carriage of  a ton  of  goods between  Manchester and Liver- 
pool cost 40s.  by land and 12s. by river.  It was not until 
1761  that  it  was  determined  to  make  a  canal  between 
Worsley  and Manchester.  This canal, the first  made in 
England,  was  constructed by  Brindley  entirely at the ex- 
pense of  the Duke of  Bridgewater.  It halved the cost of  coal 
in England  and its extension  supplied an easy and cheap 
means  of  communication  between  Liverpool  and  Man- 
chester. " 
After  this canal  Brindley made another  139 miles  long, 
connecting the pottery  centre^.^  He died in  i772 at the age 
of  56.  For a long  time his schemes had been  rejected or 
laughed at, but he lived long enough to  witness their suc- 
cess.  Eighteen years after his death canals were constructed 
according to  his plans  to  connect  the four  great ports of 
London, Bristol, Liverpool and Hull.  In the same year a 
canal joining  the Forth and Clyde, whose construction had 
H.  D.  Traill, op. cit., pp.  322-326,  and  Phillips,  A  general  History  of 
Inland  Navigation. 
a  Not  to mention  Italy and Spain, where canals had  been  constructed at 
a  very  early date, the undertakings of  Charles XII. and  of  Peter the Great 
may be noticed,  and in  France the canal from  the Seine to the Loire,  begun 
under  Henri IV., and the canal du Midi, finished  under Louis  XIV. 
As  early as 1656, it is true, Francis Mathew  suggested  joining  the  lsis 
to the Avon  by  a  canal, and various similar projects  were  brought forward, 
but nothing was done beyond  the improvement  of  certain  rivers. 
4  This first  canal cost the Duke EZZO,OOO,  but Brindley's  pay  formed  but 
a small part of  this sum, for he was only paid 2s.  6d.,  and afterwards 3s.  6d. 
a  day.  He was  uneducated  as well  as inexpensive,  his  letters being  full of 
uncouth  spelling mistakes,  but he  was none  the less  a  man  of  genius  who 
made  important  changes  in  his  country.  (His  biography  will  be  found  in 
Smiles, Lives of  the Engineers). 
'  Canals  arc  n  nirans  of  transport  peculiarly  adapted  for  pottery  since 
they  offer  little  risk of  breakage, hence they  are still  used  for this  industry. 
In  Brindley's  time  there  were  additional  considerations,  the  carriage  of 
pottrry cost nearly a shilling per mile  per  ton  and the expense  put  a stop to 
all  trade.  After  the  construction  of  the canal  thc.  cost  of  transport  frolo 
Etruria to I.ivrrpool  frll from 50s to 13%  qd. (Traill, p.  324). 
taken twenty-two  years,  was completed.  During the next 
four years parliament passed no less than 81 Acts authoris- 
ing 'he  of  navigable canals.' 
undertakings of  this kind  are still  of  much  importance. 
canals continue to be the best means of  internal transport 
for heavy goods and for such as do not require rapid transit. 
Hence great nations still devote considerable sums to  their 
extension  and improvement.  But  whatever  may  be  the 
actual importance of  canals, it is as nothing compared with 
what it was a century ago, or to speak generally, before the 
invention of  railways.  In those days the method  of  trans- 
port  they  offered  was the cheapest, the safest,  the easiest 
and not the least rapid.  In fact had it not been for them the 
greatest industrial  discoveries  would  have had but limited 
results, and English industry and commerce owes an eternal 
debt of  gratitude to Brindley. 
It  is estimated  that before the  introduction  of  railways 
no less than 2,600 miles of navigable canals had been con- 
structed, without counting those in  Irelanda and Scotland, 
which  owned  respectively  276 and 22j miles,  and  that  50 
million pou~~ds  had been  invested in these undertakings. 
But  if  inventions may  be judged by their consequences, 
the most important of  all was James Watt's8 improvement 
in  the steam engine. 
James  Watt,  who  was  born  at  Greenock  in  1736,  and 
details of whose life will  be found in  Lardner's  works and 
in  the biographies  of  hluirhead  and Smiles, took  out his 
first Patent in 1769, but it was not until long afterwards that 
he  succeeded  in  giving  to  the steam  engine,  which  had 
hitherto moved  only  vertically,  "  a  rotary  motion  and a 
Parallel motion, and, by  the regulating centrifugal force of 
the governor, in placing the machine in all its various corn- 
&  Leck~,  P. 214. 
With  regard  to Ireland see  Newenham,  View of  the  circumstances  of 
Ireland  (1809),  especially p.  202. 
R. H.  Thurston, History of the Steam Engine, gives an account of Denys 
Papin* the  Marquis of Worcester,  Savery,  Newconlen  and other forerunners 
Of  Watt.  There are no doubt excellent  works in  French on the subject, but 
It  has  been  easy  to find them,  since  the present book  has been .written 
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bined motions under the complete control of  the mechanic."' 
When once this result was secured the steam engine became 
a real influence in industry, and Watt may be said to have 
brought about an unprecedented revolution. 
These were the chief  among the inventions which  trans- 
formed  England from  an  essentially  agricultural  country 
into an essentially industrial country, and in the course of 
a few  years produced  those vast accumulations of  wealtha 
and those  great agglomerations  of  population  which  are 
now  her  predominant  characteristics.  There  is  nothing 
more striking from  this point of  view  than  the persistent 
growth in trade and population.  The following figures are 
quoted from the statistics given by Cunningham.' 
~;ade. 
Population.  Year.  Exports.  Imports. 
1700 .........  5,475,000  1613 ......... E2,487,435  ~2,141,151  .........  1760  ......... 6,736,000  1662  2,022,812  -  .........  1770  7  ,428,000  .........  q,jor,ooo  7,120,ooo 
1780  ......... 7,953,000  .........  6,910,899  6,090,083 
1790 ......... 8,675,000  .........  ~2,699,081  7,772,039 
1801  .........  8.892,536  .........  13,896,415  11,651,281 
.........  .........  1811  10,164,256  29,196,198  21,024,866  .........  1821 .........  12,000,236  3 1,064,492  28,2571781  .........  43,568,757  39,301,612  .........  58,624,550  32,438,650  ......... 197,330,265  100,460,433 
Volumes would not be long enough for a study of  all the 
results of  these changes from a  political  and from a social 
point of  view.  The emigration of  workpeople to the manu- 
facturing centres, the decline of  agriculture  and even of  the 
agricultural  industries,'  the  labour laws,'  the abolition  of 
tariffs  and the adoption of  free trade principles,  all follow 
directly from this revolution.  These however were  not  the 
only consequences,  and it  is safe to affirni  that the effects 
Lecky, op.  cit.,  Vol. VII., p.  279 (editiqn  1899). 
'  This  accumulation  was  the  more  rapid  owing  to  the  immense  profits 
made  in  the early  years.  Pitt,  when  he imposed  the  legacy  duty, thought  it 
absurd to consider the possibility of  any inheritance exceeding a million.  But 
things changed so rapidly that  after a  short  time  a  year  rarely  passed  with- 
out such a case occurring.-William  Johnston, England  as it  is, Chap, xii. 
'  Oji. cjt., p.  694-695. 
Espec~ally  when  water-power  was  no longer  the  principal  driving  force 
in use. 
.'  The first of  these  laws  was  passed  in  1802  and  was  introduced  by  Sir 
Robert  Peel,  the  father  of  the  Prime  Minister.-Jay,  Cours  de  Ligislation 
Indrtstrielle,  1897-1898. 
be traced throughout English social  life and in  all the 
marks of the English temperament. 
During this period  of thirty  years,  from  17&+181g,  We 
must confine ourselves to our particular  subject, and shall 
deal only with the effects  of the change on the course of the 
French  wars  and on the development of  provincial  bank- 
ing. 
,,-The  Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.  It may be 
confidently asserted that  had it not  been  for the industrial 
revolution, England,  even  with  a  commercial  monopoly, 
would never have been  able to muster the resources needed 
to  resist  the  Republican  army and to conquer Bonaparte. 
Attempts  have been  made  in  vain  to  explain  this  extra- 
ordinary vitality and energy by other causes.  It has even 
been  alleged  that  England could  not  have  provided  the 
capital  expended  during  a  struggle  of  a  quarter  of  a 
century without the  inconvertible  currency,  which  enabled 
her to coin boundless wealth from every piece of  money.  It 
will not be difficult to show how far removed this opinion is 
from the truth, for the fact is, that England made no attempt 
during Pitt's lifetime to profit by the situation  and to urge 
the Bank  to excessive  issues,  and that later  on, when  this 
policy was adopted,  the result was a cruel disillusionment. 
On the contrary,  it  is  due to  Arkwright,  Watt,  Brindley 
and their companions,  that England was  able to raise  the 
capital for  her immense loans,  to impose  taxes to  pay  the 
interest on them and to provide for the expenses of tlie Har. 
This fact is eloquently stated by hIr. Lecky :' 
I I  The first and most  obvious fact is  that the triumphant 
issue of the great French war was largely,  if not mainly, due 
to  tile cotton  mill  and the steam engine.  England might 
well  place the statues of  Watt and Arltwright by the side of 
those of Wellington and Nelson, for had  it not been for thca 
w  llich they created, she could never have supported 
"I1  expenditure uhich, during the last ten years of  the nar, 
"Vcr%fd  more than 84 nlillions a year, and rose in  1814  to 
'06  millions,  nor  could  she  have  endured  ivitl~out  bank- 
'"Ptcy  a  national  tltbl)t  uhich  had  risen  in  1816  to  885 
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2.-The  Cou~ttry  Banks.  The second  point which  we 
have  to  consider  is  the  effect  of  the  industrial  and 
commercial  development  in  extending  country  banking. 
Necessarily this effect was immense, but for special reasons 
the extension was not of  a very advantageous kind. 
Uank of  England notes did not  circulate outside London 
and  the  Bank  did  not  establish  any  branches  in  the 
provinces.  At  the  same  time  the  enormous  increase  in 
industrial  undertakings  demanded a  greater  extension  of 
credit  facilities  and in  particular,  an  increased  supply of 
paper  money;  this  need  was  supplied  by  the  issues  of 
country banks formed for this one object. 
The Bank  itself assisted in  the formation of  these banks 
in  the following manner : 
During the crisis of  1783 which  we  have described,  the 
Bank succeeded in putting a stop to the drain on its reserve 
hy an exceptional contraction of  its issues.  When the crisis 
was  over  there was  a  continuous  stream  of  gold  into its 
coffers, and the supply of  currency was necessarily increased 
by the issue of  notes in payment  for the gold.  Hence  the 
issues  which betmeen  1783 and 1785 had not  exceeded  six 
millions,  rose to Arr,121,8oo and the bullion  increased  to 
Lt'8,6qj,SGj.'  This increase in the coin and in the issues of 
the Bank occurring thus in time of  peace,  naturally caused a 
ciccline in  the rate of  interest, mhilst the Bank did not reduce 
its  rate  of  discount.  This enabled  the  country banks  to 
increase  thcir  issues  in  order  to  discount  bills,  some  of 
tjl~ich  at any rate, would have been discounted at the Bank 
11ad thc rate of  interest been  higher.  l'he  Bank's discounts 
\\ere  actually  reduced  from  A4,973,926  in  1785~  to 
A.t'a,o~g,oor in  I 789,  and, taking  into account  the general 
increase in business,  it may be concluded that the discounts 
of  the country hanks incrcascd by more than the difference 
11c.t~  rcn thcse two amounts. 
For all  these reasons  the development of  the banks was 
wry rapid, I>ut o~~ing  to the deficient organisation of  credit 
the extension wac; not, as \ie have said, very advantageous. 
Toolce,  Ilistory  of  Prices, Vol.  I.,  p.  194. 
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The  was as follows.  The Act of  1742 (c. 13, 5)' 
conferred on the Bank a monopoly of  issue in "  that part of 
Great Britain called England."  The only banks not affected 
by the monopoly were those having less than six partners.' 
The Bank of  England, playing in  this matter  the  part of 
dog in the manger, not only did not found branches to issue 
notes,  but was even unwilling to allow  powerful and well- 
established  companies  to  be  formed  for  the  purpose, 
although  this might on occasions have helped to strengthen 
its own  credit.  Further,  when  the country  notes  were  at 
a  discount,  it  refused  to  supply issues which  would  have 
taken their place.  The consequence was  that wealthy  and 
respectable companies were unable to issue notes, and that, 
since the country  needed  a  circulating medium  and could 
not get a good one,  it  was soon supplied with a bad one. 
A  number  of  shopkeepers,  chemists,  tailors  and  bakers, 
taking advantage of the clause authorising banks formed by 
less  than  six persons,  became  bankersJ  and  flooded  the 
See above, p.  148.  A  criticism of  the organisation of  the country  banlts 
is given  by  W.  Boyd,  Letter to the  IIonourable  IV.  Pitt  on the  Influolce  of 
the stoppage of Issues  in  Specie  at the Bank  of  England  (IRoI), p.  20 of thr 
c.dition of  1811, revised by the author; and more particularly by  H. Thornton; 
An  Enquiry into the Nature and  Effects  of  the Paper Credit of  Great Britaitr. 
Chap. vii., entitled.  Of  Country Banks; their adva~rtagrs  and  disadvnntnges. 
pp.  236-261 of  McCulloch's  reprint.  For a special  discussion  of  the  relations 
rtwcc-n  these banks and industry, see p.  245. 
'  The privileges  conferred by this Act were limited in  fact to borrowing or 
owing money on bills or notes payable on  demand.  The business  of banking 
was at that  time  actually  confined  to  this.  Since  the  clause  was  strictly 
interpreted  the device of using  cheques,  which  was  borrowed  from >Holland, 
wa.i  not forbidden by  the law.  Hence there was nothing to prevent companies 
from being formed and carrying on banking by  this means.  This did happen 
by  drgrers  and  without  bccasion  arising  for  Parliamentary  intrrfrrenre. 
Tho  custom  passed  unnoticed  until  it  was  too  widrsprrad  to be  forbidden, 
and  shortly  aftrrwards  hlr.  Joplin  pointed  out  that  the  foundation  of 
drposit  banks  was  absolutely  lrgal  (see  Supplementary  Observations  to  the 
thrd rdition of  an Essay ov Banl:inf, p.  84-1823).  In  1838 somr joint-stock 
rom~anies  were  rstablishcd  in  I.ondon  and undertook  banlcing  business,  but 
issuing notrs.  l'he  Banlc  of  England tried vainly to have them con- 
demned as illegal.  At  the prrsrnt  time thrre are nuntbers of  thcse joint-stock 
in  1-ondon,  which  enjoy  an  rscrllc.nt  rrputation  and  wcll-dcscrvrd 
ProsPcrit~. For this whole subject see bciow,  p.  ~j8,  el  seq. 
'.  In  1775  an attempt was made to remedy  matters by  an Act  forbidding 
!he  Issue of notes of  lower value than 20s.)  end two years later the limit  was 
Incrca';('d  to  -f.'~  See below,  p.  258,  Lord  I.ivcrp&l's  spc.rch  in  1:c.bru:lry. 
describing the prrsons  who  took  up  tho  profrssion  of  banking,  in  con- 
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country with  worthless  paper.  In  1750 there were  not  12 
banks outside London :  in  1793 there were 400. 
Some of  these 400 banks were no doubt well-established, 
and of  these a few still survive,  but the remainder did  not 
offer the same guarantee of  solidity, and in  their  eagerness 
for profit, they made the mistake  of  keeping an inadequate 
reserve of  coin to support their issues, so that they collapsed 
at the first unusual demand for cash.' 
The two great crises of  1793 and  1797 were due to  the 
defective organisation  of  the  provincial  credit system. 
The Bank  of  England had  not  chosen  to lend any  sub- 
stantial aid to the organisation of  credit  and it now suffered 
the  punishment  of  its  careless  selfishness.  The  speedy 
collapse of  the country banks  left it to maintain  credit un- 
assisted.  As we  shall see, it accomplisbed the task in  1793, 
thanks to  the  active  interference of  the  Government  who 
issued  five millions  of  Treasury  bills.  Four  years  later, 
however,  it  was thrown  upon  its own  resources and gave 
way. 
Nor did the evil cease with the year  1797; the same thing 
happened  in  1810 and  1812.  Macleoda informs  us  that 
during the three years 1814-1816, 92  commissions in  bank- 
ruptcy were issued against country banks, and that during 
the  28  years,  1791-1818, there  were no  less  than  273  com- 
missions of  this kind. 
The Act  of  1826  permitted  the  formation  of  joint-stock 
companies to carry on  the  business  of  banking  and with 
power to issue notes, at a distance of  not less than 65 miles 
from  London.  In  1844  however  the  law  deprived  both 
private  banks  (banks  having  less  than  six  partners)  and 
According to Sir Francis Baring,  banks had been  established throughout 
the country  in  the  interval  between  the  failure  of  the  Ayr  Bank  in  1772, 
and 1793.  This was  an important  change and as long  as credit  was well 
established it was a change bcnrficial  to the country, in  that it increased  the 
currency.  Unfortunately  these  banks were  founded  upon  an insecure  basis, 
and  they  were  quite  unable  to withstand  any  suddcn  disturbance,  for  they 
allowrd  interest  on  all  deposits  and hence  could  not  afford  to keep  even  a 
small reserve of  idle and unproductive  capital (see  Observations on the Estab- 
lishment  of  the Bank  of  England, p.  15.) 
a  3rd Ediliol!,  Vol.  I I., p.  380.  'l'ht:  author gars nli  to rc2ln:irk  that if  we 
allow thc usual  prupurtiu~i  wf tI111.c.  01 fcri~r  >u<pt.nsiot~\  to on<.  bankruptry  \r.e 
nlny  readily  calculiitc  Illat  up\r.~rds  of  n  thousand  b:~nl;-; stopprd  paynlcnl 
during this period. 
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joint-stock banks of  the right of  issue.  But those actually 
in  existence,  viz.,  72  joint-stock  banks  and  207  private 
banks, retained their privilege: of  issuing notes though only 
up to a fixed limit. 
The number of  these banks with issue rights has greatly 
decreased and continues to decrease; in  1888 there were only 
lg private banks and 44 joint-stock banks.'  Whenever one 
of these banks disappears its right of  issue passes over to the 
Bank of  England.  The note issue of  private and joint-stock 
banks  was  limited  in  1866 to  £8,648,008;'  it is now  only 
£2,762,323.' 
M.  Octave Noel,  Le Banques  d'kmission  en Europe  (Vol.  I., pp.  78, 82), 
gives a very complete  list of  the banks of  issue then  in  existence and of  the 
respective  limits qf  their rights of  issue. 
'  &,153,ooo  for the private  banks,  and A3,495,000  for  the  joint-stock 
banks. 
The actual issues  are much  less.  See  below,  p.  297, The  issue  defi~rt- 
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CHAPTER  11. 
FINANCIAL  POLICY  OF WILLIAM  PITT.' 
Pitt's  financial  policy  before  1789.  Pitt  and  the  Revolution.  Connection 
between  Pitt's  financial  policy  and  the  suspension  of  cash  payments. 
Skittch of  this policy.  Mr.  Gladstone's  speech.  The subsidies paid to the 
Allies.  The rate at which the loans were raised.  Loans versus taxation. 
Criticism  of  Pitt's  policy.  The Sinking Fund.  Conclusion. 
WHEN  the French Revolution broke out,  Pitt had been  in 
power since 1784;  his general policy was peaceful  and his 
financial policy especially fortunate.'  He began to pay off 
the  debt;  a  million  a year  was  set  aside for  this object. 
This million was to be devoted to the purchasing of  Govern- 
ment stock and was to be increased each ycar by the interest 
1 have thought  this  chapter essential  as an cxplanation of  those  which 
follow, but I have not  written it without  many hesitations and with consider- 
able difficulty.  It is very  difficult to judge  of  a financial policy  during such a 
remarkable  period,  and Pitt could  not reasonably  be  expected to foresee  all 
the events  of  which  he  was  to be  an eye  witness.  'To  this first  difficulty 
is added a second, that of finding data for an opinion.  'The political  struggles 
were  exceptionally  violent  and  they  influence  nearly  all  the  books  on  the 
subject.  Moreover,  Mr.  Lecky's  work  stops at 1793.  There  is  no  eneral 
history whatever  for this period.  Lord Stanhope's  Life  of  the Right Ifonour. 
able  W.  Pitt (4 volumes) is anything but a scientific  work. 
The following may be consulted for the subject matter of  the chapter :-A 
masterly  speech  by  Gladstone,  delivered  on  May  8, 1854  (see  Parliamentary 
Debates,  third  series,  Voi.  132,  columns  1472-70  devoted  to  this  matter). 
McCulloch,  Collection of  Tracts on the  National  Debt  (with a  preface);  The 
History  of  the  Bank  of  England  (1798),  a  work  already  mentioned,  whose 
standpoint  is  essentially  liberal.  G.  K.  Rickards,  The  Financial  Policy  of 
H'ar,  an  answer to Mr.  Newmarch.  Grellier,  Terms of  all  the public  Loans, 
with an appendix by R. W.  Wade (1812) ; very important. 
William  Newmarch,  in  a  valuable  pamphlet  which  contains  much 
documentary  evidence,  On the  Loans  Raised  by  Mr.  Pitt  during  the  first 
French  War, has given  a  brilliant  defence  of  Pitt's  financial  policy.  More 
recently  the  question  has  been  discussed  vcry  ably,  but  unfortunately  too 
briefly,  by  Lord Rosebery,  Pitt, pp.  148-156.  The appendices A  and B may 
also be read with advantage,  since Lord Rosebcry's  figures are more accurate 
than those given  by  Newmarch. 
Finally,  the Parliamentary Debates may be consulted, especially, of  course, 
the speeches of  Pitt and Fox, but they cannot be read with too great caution. 
Amongst  other  speakers, William Smith and his report  of  February g,  1796, 
deserves mention. 
a  Roscbcry,  op. cit., Chaps.  IV. and V. 
the  stock  already  acquired.  A  special  commission, 
independent of  the  House of  Comn~ons,  was to carry out 
this plan and to administer the Sinking Fund.  This system 
on which exaggerated hopes were based, continued to work 
througllo~t  the  wars of  the  Revolution.  It reduced  the 
national debt by EIO,~~O,OOO  between  1786 and 1793. 
~t  the first outbreak of  the  revolution  Pitt apparently 
intended to continue the same policy.  If  he did not actually 
ignore the Revolution, as Lord Rosebery says,'  at least he 
appeared to do so.  There is ample evidence to show that he 
had no thought of  interference, and he did all that he could 
to avoid the conflict.'  Further than  that  he  did not  go. 
After the  10th  of  August,  the  English  Government  re- 
called Lord Gower, the ambassador at Paris, and from  this 
time  onwards the hostility  to France felt by the Icing and 
the  English  people  continuously  increased.  Pitt tried  to 
resist  the  current  but the  French victories  in  the  Nether- 
lands were calculated to weaken  his resistance ; the behead- 
ing of  Louis XVI. dispelled his doubts.  The English, who 
regard  the execution  of  a  king as their  special monopoly, 
received  the  news  of this unfortunate prince's  death  with 
extraordinary  den~onstrations. The  theatres were  closed, 
everyone put on  mourning,  pulpit and platform  re-echoed 
with  the  murder  committed  in  France,  and the  Icing's 
chariot  was surrounded  by  a  mob  demanding "war  with 
France !"  "  Since  the  massacre  of  St.  Bartholomew," 
writes Lecky,""~  event in a foreign country had produced 
such a thrill of  horror  in  England."  Pitt, the author con- 
'  p.  96. 
'  In  February,  1792,  on  introducing  the  budgct,  Pitt  made  a  famous 
Speech,  one  of  thosc  exceptional  speeches  which  hc  rcviscd  with  a  view  to 
publication.  He proposed  the  removal  of  certain  taxes,  the  increase  of  the 
wnking  fund,  the suppression  of  the subsidies  paid  to the  Hcssian  mcrcrn- 
arm,  and a  rrduction  in the number of  seamen from 18,000 to  16,000.  More- 
Over  he declared that : "  Unqucstionably there never was a  ti~ne  in the history 
of this country when  from the situation of  Europe we might more reasonably 
fifteen ycars of  pcace  than at the prcscnt  moment." 
Lord Roscbcry, pp.  I 18 to 123, givcs numerous other proofs of Pitt's  state 
qf mind.  This view  is corroboratcd by  Newmarch,  p.  5, and Lccky, pp.  2-4 
See  also for Marct's  mission  to England and his interview  with  Pitt  (Nov., 
'792)1  Ernouf, Maret,  duc  de  Bassano. 
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tinues,  at once  seized  the  opportunity  of  breaking  with 
France, and on January 24th) Grenville,  the Foreign Secre- 
tary,  ordered Chauvelin  to leave the  country within  dght 
days.  On  February  1st  the  Convention  made  the  only 
response possible,  and declared war against both the King 
of  England and the Stadholder of  Holland.' 
The war  concerns  us  only  in  so  far  as it  affected  the 
Bagk of  England. 
Between  February  st,  1793, and March  17th, 1801, the 
Government was obliged  to increase  the  English  national 
debt by ,&25,211,460.~ 
The Bank,  on  the other  hand,  had  to suspend its cash 
payments in February, I 797. 
Was there  any  connection  between  these  two  facts? 
Would a  wiser  administration  of  the  public  finance have 
avoided this disaster?  This is the question  into bhich we 
must now inquire. 
Yearly loans had  to be  raised  from the outbreak of  the 
war until the peace of  Amiens. 
These loans, which were at first small, rapidly increased 
in amount, and after 1795 became excessive, but decreased 
slightly  between  1798 and  18m.  After this the  upward 
movement  began  again,  so  that  at the  end of  1801, the 
total  English  funded  debt had  increased  by  ~271,g80,ooo 
during the nine years of  Pitt's administration,  the average 
yearly increase being ~3o,ooo,ooo. 
Mr.  Lecky,  with  his customary  talent  and learning,  tried  to justify  the 
behaviour  of  England  and  to  niark  it  off  from  that  of  the  Continental 
monarchies.  It would  be out of  place  to discuss  the question  here,  but if  I 
had to express an opinion  I  should sum up the matter thus:  that, while the 
behaviour  of  England  in  these wars against Louis  XVI.  and  Napoleon  was 
justifiable  and  did  good  service  to  Europe,  her  conduct  during  the  whole 
period  1789-1793, now before  us, was unjust,  deceitful and full  of  hypocrisy. 
And  yet  I  am not  inspired  by  any excessive  admiration  for tho  Revolution, 
and willingly  acltnowledge  that the Convention,  by  indulging  ir~  iricongruous 
and  unsuitable  demonstrations,  played  into  the  hands  of  its  enemies  and 
supplied them with their strongest arguments. 
'  This  sun1 did  not  indeed  represcnt  the  whole  debt,  for  be$des  their 
shares, the subscribers received  a  certain  nrlniber  of  terminable annuities as 
part of  their security.  Those annuities,  known as "  Long Annuities,"  cxpired 
in  1860, and their value reckoned at 5 per cent.  interest would be  A9,323,976. 
Rut  during  this  time  the  Sinking  Fund  continued  in  operation  and 
.&~Z,SIX,~~Z  W.?S  rrdermrd  through  it,  which  sutii  must  be  subtracted  from 
thc total a11iount.-Roscbery  pp.  150-I~I. 
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And, since the shares in  all these loans were issued con- 
siderably below par, the Government only actually received 
~202,375,~  out  of  the  271  millions1 for  which  it  was 
indebted. 
For the same reason, the interest, nominally  3 per cent., 
was actually much higher.2 
This increase was mainly due to the disinclination felt at 
the outset to  impose fresh taxes.  The taxes levied during 
the  four  years  1793-1797  amounted  to  ~7o,ooo,ooo,  or 
£1  7,500,ooo  a year, whilst during the four years  I 799-1 802 
the  taxes  amolrnted  to  k134,75o,ooo,  i.e.,  there  was  an 
increase of 924 per cent.' 
And  finally,  a large part  of  the  money  raised  by  these 
loans was not used in the public service  but was absorbed 
in  subsidies paid to the allies.  These were of  two kinds : 
(I)  direct  subsidies, (2) Imperial loans, guaranteed by  the 
English Government  and raised in  England.  These loans 
ultimately became a charge on the English Treasury. 
Pitt's financial  policy  has been  severely  attacked on  all 
these  accounts.  We  will  proceed  to  examine  these 
criticisms, and  will  begin  with  those  of  Mr.  Gladstone, 
rendering honour  where  it  is due-  During the  debate of 
N~wmarch,  p.  39,  gives the annual amounts of  the loans contracted and 
the sums actually raised as follows :- 
Loans contractrd.  Meney aclually raised. 
1793 ............... 6.250  millions.  ...............  4.500  millions 
1794 ...............  15.676  ,,  ...............  12.9'37  ,* 
1795.. ............. 55.537  1,  ..............  e42.090  ,, 
1796 ...............  56.945  ,,  ............... 42.735  9, 
1797 ............... 28.275  ,,  ...............  141500  9,  ...  1797 ...............  3.669  ,, (Imperial loan)  I .6zo  ,, 
1798 ...............  39.624  ,,  ...............  20.000  ,, 
1799 ...............  27.125  ,,  ...........,,+,  15.50'3  1, 
180'3 ............... 32.185  ,,  ............... 20.500  ,,  ...............  1801 ...............  49.209  28.000  ,,  -- 
314.495  1,  202.372  1, 
But  out of  the 314.495  millions  r~nt~acted,  42.515  were  cancelled  by  the 
Si?lfini!  Fund,  so that the  actual  debt  incurred  by  the  State  was 271.g80 
mlll~ons. 
Most  of  the loans,  i.e., 271.597  miliions  of the  debt.,  were  issued  at 
3  Per  cent.  There were,  however,  35.593  millions  issued  at 5  per cent.  and 
7.305  n~illions  at  4  per  cent.  The average  rate  at which  the loans were 
raised  was A5  5s.  gd. per A;~oo. 
Bast;lblc,  Public  Finance, 2nd  edition, pp.  589-591. 178  HISTORY OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
May 8, 1854, this great statesman, who was then Chancellor 
of  the Exchequer, set  himself  the task of proving that all 
war expenses ought to be met by taxation,' an attempt which 
gave evidence of  a rare degree of  uprightness and political 
courage.  After  a  statement of  the  economic  and moral 
grounds for his opinion,  Gladstone passed on to discuss the 
lessons of  history, and criticised Pitt strongly for the policy 
he adopted at the beginning of  the war.'  He ridiculed the 
view which  had gained for  Pitt the title of  "  Heaven-born 
minister,"  though  at  the  same  time  he  acknowledged  a 
profound  respect for his memory,  and pointed out how he 
recognised  his  mistakes,  changed  his  policy  and  whole- 
heartedly sought the aid of  taxati~n.~ 
The speaker in  fact,  entirely  condemned  the continued 
resort  to loans.'  Otherss have criticised  the rate at which 
the  loans were  issued,  on the ground that, as only an in- 
adequate interest of  3  per cent. was  offered, much  larger 
sums had  to be borrowed  than were actually received,  and 
above all, the possibility of  future conversions was cut off. 
Finally,  Pitt has been  almost unanimously blamed for the 
subsidies given to the allies. 
Let us examine these various points. 
See the whole of this speech, Pad. Debates, Vol.  132 (March-May,  1854)~ 
PP.  1414 to 1479. 
P.  '472. 
'  p.  1474.  This is indeed  no accident  in  Pitt's  career  but an  instance of 
one  of  his  distinctive  characteristics.  It is  surprising  that  this  has  not 
attracted  more  attention.  Pitt made  mistakes readily,  but,  the  fault  once 
committed,  he  as quickly  realised  it, and  never  persisted  in  it  obstinately. 
Witness his  bchaviour  in  the war  with  France : he soon  recognised  that  it 
had been  a  mistake to enter upon  the struggle;  and when the Directory  gave 
him  an excuse  for changing his policy,  he  at once  opened  negotiations  and 
did all he could  to conclude an honourable peace.  Witness his behaviour to 
the Bank :  he exploited that institution so ruthlessly  as to force it to suspend 
cash payments; but when  the paper money was actually  in  use  he took every 
precaution  to  avoid  abusing  this  dangerous  weapon.  Other  examples  of 
the same kind could be given. 
Gladstone  also condemned  the Sinking  Fund, but since everyone agrees 
with his condemnation, this matter can be deferred  till  later. 
'  See Bastable, op.  and loc. cit. 
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SECTION  I. 
- 
SUBSIDIES  PAID  TO  THE  ALLIES. 
These subsidies, as we  have said, were managed  in  two 
Either the money was paid over directly,' or security 
given  for  the  loans  raised  by  the  German  Empire, 
security  "hich,  considering  the  state  of  the  Imperial 
finances, was equivalent to a loan.  The first of  these loans 
was  for ~4,600,000,'  the  second, guaranteed in  1797, was 
only for £1,620,~. 
Most  English  writers,  not  even  excepting  Newmarch,' 
condemn the payment of  these subsidies. 
It is  true  that some of  the allies deserved  the  name  of 
treacherousw given  them  by  Fox,'  and that  they  em- 
ployed the money  for anything rather than  the support of 
England  in  her  struggle against revolutionary France.  It 
was also true  that even  when  the allies were  honest, there 
was little or  no agreement between  them  and the English 
troops,  that the combination did  more harm than good to 
both  parties,  and  that  ultimately  England  gained  little 
advantage from  the  15 millions and more which she spent 
between 1793 and 1801.  But it cannot therefore be asserted 
as has too  often been  done in  England, that  Pitt's  policy 
was nothing but a mistake and a delusion.  In my opinion 
this is perhaps the very point where he is least to blame. 
In  fact, these payments only formed a  small part of  the 
war  expenses, and it  cannot be said either that they  were 
wholly  ineffectual, or  that  England was  not  justified  in 
hoping for still better results.  It is curious that these sub- 
sidies have been thought to play such an important part in 
I -.  Ihe amount paid  directly  was ~g,oz4,817.  Details  of  the distribution 
will  be  found in  Rosebery,  Aphendix  A,  and Newmarch,  p.  51,  Appendix  I. 
We  may  again  point  out  that  the  figures  given  by  the  former  are more 
accurate than those of  the latter. 
a  The first loan was guaranteed, at the request  of  the King, on February 
51  1795.  The guarantce gavc rise  to lively  debates.  The opposition  did not 
lack  arguments  which  were,  indeed,  justified  subsequently  by  facts,  for 
after 1798 the loan bccan.e  a  charge on England.  The grant was passed  by 
'73- votes  to 58. 
PP.  12-13,  contra  Rosebcry. 
'  Speech on  February 5.  The whole speech,  which  is entirely devoted to 
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the crisis from which England suffered after 1795.  Macleod 
still holds this view.  At the time they were believed  to be 
the sole cause of  the drain of  bullion.  The opposition re- 
peated  this  persistently  and  the  commercial  world  was 
convinced  of  its  truth.  People  apparently  attributed  the 
exportation  of  precious  metals  entirely  to  the  subsidies, 
forgetting  the  fleets  and armies  which  England  had  to 
maintain  abroad.  Sir  Francis  Baring1 pointed  this  out 
clearly enough : "  It must be  indifferent to the country,  if 
bullion is exported, to what service it shall be applied;  but 
it is of  infinite importance whether the magnitude of  the sum 
shall exceed, or fall short, of  the balance of  trade.  Whether 
money so exported shall be applied to the payment  of  the 
British  troops  in  Germany, for  the foreign expenditure of 
fleets  in  the  Mediterranean or Lisbon,  or whether  it shall 
be  for  an  Imperial  loan . . .  is  exactly  the  same  to  the 
country." 
Here, as in other cases,  the mistake lay in having under- 
taken  an unjust  and imprudent  war.  But,  this mistake 
having  been  made,  it  was  England's  duty  to  secure 
Continental  allies  in  the  first  instance,  and  then  to 
retain them  at all costs.  This was the only way  in  which 
Great  Britain  with  her  insignificant  army, could  threaten 
the French frontiers; it was the only way in which she could 
keep  the  Republican army from  her  own  coasts.  Hence, 
although  Pitt  may  be  blamed  for  distributing  several 
millions without adequate security for their  proper  use,  I 
cannot  in justice  criticise  him  for  trying  by every  means 
available to preserve his country from disaster. 
SECTION  11. 
Mr.  Newmarch  in  his apology,  tries  to prove  that Pitt 
failed to raise loans at 5 per cent.,  not from any unwilling- 
ness to do so, but because he could find no one to lend money 
on  such  terms,  since  the  public  wanted  to  enjoy  the 
Or.  cit..  pp.  50-51.  In  the  next  chapter  we  give the  sums  expended 
abroad on behalf  of  the  Government;  they  far  excced the  money granted to 
the  allied  Governments.  See Tooke,  p.  208. 
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of a  high  rate  and to  avoid  the  risk  of  con- 
version  Mr.  Newmarch'  suppiies very convincing proofs 
in support of this theory.  We  will merely notice the most 
striking of these. 
The first loan  of  &,~W,OOO,  issued at 3  per cent., was 
raised at £72,  that is, at an interest of  A4  3s. 4d. per AIW.' 
accordi~~g  to Newmarch,  Pitt,  to judge  by  his own 
statement  in  the  House  (March  17,  1793), seem;  to have 
tried in vain to borrow at 4 or 5 per cent., and to have been 
forced, without option, to borrow  at 3 per cent.,  although 
he realised that the conditions were more burdensome than 
he  had expected.  This fact  is confirmed by J. J. Grellier, 
who states that Pitt did everything he could to excite com- 
petition, but without success. 
The same  thing  is true  for  the  subsequent  loans.  In 
November,  1796, a part of  the floating debt which circulated 
in the form of  Naval bills and Exchequer bills, was funded. 
The holders were  offered a choice between  stock  bearing 
respectively  3, 4, and 5 per cent. interest.  The offers were 
so arranged that in actual fact all the stock paid more than 
5 per cent.,  and there was  a bonus on that at 4 and 5  per 
cent.  The first paid  5s.,  the second  ~os.,  and the 
third  A5 16s. per £100  of  capital.  But even this was not 
enough to attract the subscribers,  who were alarmed at the 
possibility of  conversion, and out of  a total of  A13,ozg,33g 
funded, 85 per cent. were subscribed at 3 per cent. 
There remains another  yet  more characteristic fact.  In 
I796  England  was  in  an  isolated  position  and  was 
threatened  with  an apparently  inevitable  invasion.  The 
budget showed a deficit  of  18 millions,$ and as, under the 
circumstances, the yield from ordinary loans seemed insuffi- 
'  PP.  7-20. 
'  Mr.  Gladstone  laid  great  stress  on  the  fact  that  to  issue  these  loans 
nominally  at 3  per  cent.  was  a  deception,  and  that  Pitt  borrowed  first  at 
f;4  3s.,  then  at  &+  los., thcn  at Eq ~ss.,  and  finally  at A5  14s. and  at 
g6 6%  rod.,  which  is the  rate  at  which  the  loan  in  1797  was  raised.  But 
'his  fact was perfectly clear to contelnporaries nnd deceived no one. 
It  was  intended  to raise fresh  troops,  viz., 15,000  foot, 20,-  irregular 
and 60,000  militia. 182  HISTORY OF THE BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
cient, it was determined to raise a patriotic subscription, the 
Loyalty Loan. 
Everyone  who subscribed £100  was  to receive  £1  12 in 
5 per cent stock.  This loan was inconvertible until after all 
other 5  per cent.  loans had been converted, and the share- 
holders were always to have the option of  A100  in  cash or 
£133  in 3 per cent. stock.  In spite of  all these advantages 
these  shares,  which  were  subscribed  for  amidst  great 
patriotic  enthusiasm,'  fell  so  low  that  Pitt  thought  it 
advisable to help the shareholders by adding to  the above 
conditions a long annuity of  7s. 6d. per-share, hoping in this 
way to stop a fall which  had already reached  14 per cent.' 
To sum up : the accusations against Pitt as regards this 
second point do not seem to us  well-founded;  those made by 
Mr. Gladstone with respect to the continual appeal to loans 
are certainly more justifiable,  without being wholly sound. 
SECTION  111.  - 
LOAN  versus TAX. 
Mr. Gladstone's  arguments will be remembered.  With- 
out disputing their  correctness  in  principle,  we  may  note 
that it has been  said in  reply:  first,  that in this particular 
case Pitt could  not  levy fresh taxes without  risk of  crush- 
ing the  new-born  English  industries; and  second,  that 
those industries were not  in  a  position  to bear the burden 
of  the war  until after the naval  victories had assured them 
a commercial monopoly; this, however,  was not  until  1798. 
It has been pointed out  too, that the first years of  the war 
were  not  only  years  of  great  commercial  distress,  as is 
proved  by the number of  failures,  but also of  agricultural 
distress  due to the remarkable series of  bad harvests.  The 
conditions  were  thus  very  unsuited  to  the  imposition  of 
new  taxes,  and Pitt was well-advised  not  to  impose  any. 
This is  true,  but  I  am not  convinced that  Pitt gave  any 
thought to the economic condition of  the country and rather 
'  The loan  was  cornplctely subscribed  within  15 hours. 
a  Pitt's  scheme only passed the  House by  36 votes to 35, and consequently 
was not carried out. 
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with  Gladstone  that  he  was  chiefly  concerned  to 
maintain his OW"  popularity. 
Mr.  Gladstone's  criticisms  however  only  refer  to  the 
period  1793-1797;  he has only praise  to bestow  on  Pitt as 
the succeeding years.  In  1797, he says,'  Pitt made 
a first effort towards a more healthy policy "  by proposing 
to  raise  £7,000,000  by  assessed  taxes2  The plan  broke 
down . . .  and he only got £4,000,000.  In the year  1798, 
not  daunted  by  that  failure,  he  proposed  to  raise 
+-Io,ooo,ooo  by means of  the income  tax;  and from  that 
time  his career  was one series  of  continued and 
almost convulsive efforts to . . .  extricate the country from 
the frightful consequences of  former  laxity, and to provide 
against a recurrence of  similar evils in future." 
The revenues for the years  1799-1802 were,  as we  have 
said, 92  per cent.  higher than  those  for  1793-1797.  The 
peace of  Amiens was of  short duration.  In 1803 the revenue 
was  638,600,000,  in  1805 it was  kfo,goo,ooo.  In  1806 a 
further attempt was made to increase it.  Lord Lansdowne 
increased the income tax to 10  per cent.  The taxes brought 
in  £59,30o,m,  that is, an increase of  15 per cent.  From 
this date until  1816 the revenue never fell below 60 millions 
and sometimes exceeded 70." 
But from the breaking of  the peace of  Amiens until  1816 
the national debt was only increased by £360,ooo,m;  that 
is, a yearly increase of  25  millions.  The period  1793-1802, 
though  the  expenses  were  much  smaller,'  had  witnessed 
an increase  in  the debt of  30 millions a  year.  This com- 
paratively  satisfactory result  was only obtained by a  bold 
increase  in  taxation.  Mr.  Gladstone states  that if  the in- 
come tax had been imposed in time it would have saved the 
"ation  from these enormous loans, since the annual expen- 
diture except for the interest on the debt, might have been 
I 
p  1474. 
'  These  taxes  afford an  interesting  study  from  the  fiscal  point  of  view. 
were  taxes on luxury,  sumptuary  taxes.  Compare  Stourm, Systemes 
GCn~raux  d'impdts, p. 95, and Leroy-Beaulieu,  Sciences des  Finances,  VO~.  I., 
P  429. 
'  From  1793 to  179,  the yearly  revenue  averaged .&17,5~,000. 
'  The  increased  expenditure  was mainly owing tb the very expensive  wars 
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covered during the later years by the returns from taxation. 
But even  if we  assume that all the excuses made for Pitt 
are justified;-if  we admit, as we did at the outset, that Pitt 
was not wrong to send subsidies to the allies;  if we  admit 
that  he  could not issue loans under  more favourable  con- 
ditions than those forced upon him by circumstances;  even 
if we  admit, what is very doubtful, that Pitt could not have 
relied  more  than  he  did  on  taxation-he  yet  made  three 
mistaltes  which  are  inexcusable.  These  are,  the  con- 
tinuance of  the Sinking Fund, his forecast as to the duration 
of  the war, and his treatment of  the Bank; and all three, 
especially the last, are unworthy of a great1 statesman. 
For the present  we  will  confine ourselves io a considera- 
tion of  the two first of  these mistakes, the third will occupy 
the following chapter. 
The Sinking Fund.'  "  The sinking fund established by 
Mr. Pitt,"  says Gladstone, "  was another form of  mischief. 
By means of  the sinking fund you were continually buying 
up stock at 3, 4, or 5 per cent. below the rate at which you 
were  simultaneously  creating  stock  in  order  to  find  the 
money  to  make  the purchase.  You  were  buying stock  to 
reduce it at 60, and creating it again sometimes as high as 
68.  Thus what  the ' heaven-born  policy ' did was  to  re- 
establish the patient by putting a  seton  into the body; for 
this process was  nothing but a  perpetual  drain upon  the 
resources of  the country." 
Lord Grenville, Pitt's cousin, has tried to exonerate him' 
by pointing out that the nation accepted  the sinking fund 
almost  without consideration  and with  unlimited  belief  in 
what was regarded as an all-powerful remedy.  This being 
so  he concludes that "  It can  be  no reproach  to any indi- 
vidual to have partaken  largely in  these feelings, and least 
of  all  to that  able  and  excellent  statesman  who  carried 
We  express  our  own  firm  conviction,  but,  as  we  have  already  pointed 
out, the  subject  is  so difficult  and involved  that  we do  not  maintain  that our 
opinion  is the right one. 
- '  See also ~kulloch  and Rickards, op.  cit. 
'  Essay  on  the  supposed  advantages  of  a  Sinking  Fund  (1828).  The 
nitthor himself,  I~owcver,  condcn~ns  the  policy. 
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through the Act of  1786."  To  which  it may be replied that 
pittVs  mistake  was  not  excused by  the fact,  if  it be  one, 
that he only believed  in the sinking fund because the public 
looked upon it as  a universal remedy. 
1-1~~ilton's  criticisms'  in  1813,  and  Ricardo's  seven 
yearsP later,  showed  plainly  the fallacies  involved  in  this 
invention, and the sinking fund as a special institution was 
abandoned in  1829.:' 
False  judgments  as to  the duration  of  the  war and  the 
strength of  the enemy.  Pitt was confronted by a vigorous 
though small Opposition, led by  men who may indeed have 
mistakes, and who,  in my opinion, were too ready to 
remember that the government of their country was  in  the 
hands of  their political opponents, but who exercised a real 
influence over the House by their eloquence and remarkable 
controversial skill.  The Opposition speakers, whose names 
are preserved in history, pointed out untiringly that the war 
was unjust, that it would be long and unprofitable and that 
it would bring about the ruin of the country.  The uninter- 
rupted victories of  the Republican armies and the disloyal 
behaviour of some  of  the allies  provided  them  daily  with 
fresh  arguments.  Pitt  endeavoured  not  to  disgust  the 
country  by  increased  taxation and to pacify  the House by 
describing the war as necessarily of  short duration, because 
France had exhausted her resources and was "  on the verge, 
nay,  in  the gulf of  bankruptcy."'  This was  one of  his 
favourite  arguments;  he  was  always  referring  to  the 
assignats and to the condition of the Republican finances. 
'  Inquiry  into  the  Rise  and  Progress.  the  Redemption  and  the  Manage- 
ment  of  the  National  Debt. 
a  Essay  on  the  Funding System. 
'  The  idea  of paying  off  the  debt  did  not  however  perish.  Conversions 
and  purchases  in  various  forms  have  appreciably  reduced  the  national  debt 
under a wise, patriotic and far-sighted administration.  Amongst  the measures 
used,  that  of  terminable  annuities  was  imitated  in  France  by  M.  Ceillaux. 
When  the  South  African  War  broke  out  (Autumn,  1899)  thv  r~:iliot>:~l  dvl>t 
had been  reduced  to  622: millions.  - 
'  This phrase  served  as a motto to a reply to Pitt's  ,tntcments,  written at 
Paris in  1696 by  Tom Paint, and called  The I)rcline  and  Fall  ol Ilrr.  l<trgli\lr 
of  Finance. 186  HISTORY OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
It may be acknowledged that Pitt was sincere in what he 
said : and it is comprehensible  that at first  he  may easily 
have flattered  himself  into the idea  that  the war would  be 
short and that the chaotic state of  the  French  Government 
would  prevent its carrying on  a vigorous campaign.  But 
how long could he have kept up this illusion 3  How could a 
statesman  such as he  have  cherished  these  ideas after  the 
battle of  Fleurus ?'  and when  he could no longer reasonably 
believe them, was  it  loyal, in Fox's2  picturesque phrase,  to 
"amuse " the country "  with  his ideas on the finances of 
France,"  with  calculations  as to  the  assignats  and  the 
French bankruptcy, when  he was himself  leading the way 
to an inconvertible currency and to the verge of  a similar 
bankruptcy.= 
Even  in October, 1795, he wrote to Addington that peace would be made 
before  Easter. 
a  See  Fox's  speech  on  the occasion  of  the suspension  of  cash payments, 
an  analysis  of  which  is  given  below.  See  also  Sheridan's  speech  on  the 
same occasion.  "  Surely it  was  not for want of  warning.  The Marquess of 
Lansdowne and several  other enlightened  senators in  both  Houses of  Parlia- 
ment predicted  the approach of  this melancholy event.  Mr.  Pitt was so busy 
on the calculation  and  depreciation  of  French assignats  and mandats that he 
had  not time,  it  is presumed,  to attend to our own immaculate paper credit, 
as Lord Grenville,  that  lumioous statesman, called it about two years ago." 
--(See  The I-listory  of  the  Banlz  of  England, etc.,  1797, p.  105). 
Pitt's  apologists  (see  Newmarch,  p.  23),  emphasise the fact that these 
illusions  were  shared by  the majority of  the nation  and that traces of  them 
are found in  Burke's  last work.  Letters on a Regicide Peace, published at the 
end of  1796.  As regards  Burke, his opinion  here is of  little value.  He had 
taken  too  important  a  part  in  the  declaration  of  war  against  France  to 
acknowledge  his  mistake  openly,  and,  moreover,  some  doubts  must  have 
survived  amidst the  reasons  which  induced  this champion  of  liberalism  to 
write the Reflections  on  the  Revolution  in France.  As to the  fact that Pjtt 
shared  in  a  general  delusion,  it  is of  this  especially  that  I  cdmplain.  This 
"  heaven-born  minister "-to  use  the phrase  quoted  by  Gladstonehad suffi- 
cient genius to enable  him,  in  this matter as in  that  of  the Sinking Fund, 
to form his own opinion ;  he ought not to have been  reduced, like any ordinary 
politician, to accept the errors of  his contemporaries. 
CHAPTER  111. 
THE  CRISES  OF  1793  AND  r797.-THE  BANK 
RESTRICTION  ACT.-THE  SUSPENSION  OF 
CASH  PAYMENTS BY  THE BANK. 
crisis of  1793  Crisis  of  1797.  Pitt's  unwise  treatment  of  the  Bank. 
Advances  to Government forbidden  by the Bank Charter.  Modification  of 
this.  Incessant loans from 1793 to 1797.  Exportation and drain of  specie. 
Disturbances among the Country Banks,  Panic due to the landing of a 
handful  of  French Troops.  Policy of  the Rank  directors.  Suspension  of 
cash payments.  Decision  of the Privy Council.  Message  from the King 
to  Parliament.  Position  of the  Bank and  parliamentary  debates.  The 
Bank Restriction Act. 
THE  war  began  under  gloomy  auspices.  The harvest  in 
1792 was  very  bad, as were most of  the harvests between 
1789  and 1802,  the  price  of  corn  had  risen  I~s.,  and 
in  addition to the agricultural distress, a serious economic 
crisis  occurred  just  before  the  declaration  of  war.'  This 
declaration, however much it may have been expected, gave 
the last blow to the tottering public credit.  "  In the month 
of  November  this year,"  says Macpherson,'  "  there  were 
no fewer  than one  hundred  and  five  bankruptcies.  There 
were  very  few  months  in  all  the  years  preceding  1792 
wherein the gazette . . .  has exhibited above the half of  that 
number."  But this was only the beginning.  On February 
19,  the Bank refused the paper of  Lane, Son & Fraser, who 
suspended  payment  the  next  day,  leaving  a  deficit  of  a 
million.  This failure was followed  by several  others and 
the  numbers  continued  to increase  during  the succeeding 
months. 
Failures  among  the  country  banks  occurred  almost 
simultaneously.  The crisis began  at Newcastle,  where the 
'  Tooke (History of Prices, Val.  I., pp.  176-177) seems to me to minimise 
unduly  the  importance of  the declaration  of  war.  Baring,  op. cit.,  p.  19, 
&W"s  a juster  account. 
a  Annals  of  Commerce, Vol.  IV.,  p.  a51 
a  There  were  105 in  March,  188 in  April, zoq  in  May; then they declined 
158 in June and 108 in July. 188  HISTORY OF THE BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
banks stopped payment  after an unexpected  run although 
the  shareholders  had  adequate  resources  to  meet  all 
demands, 
The evil  spread throughout  the provinces,  where  credit 
facilities, as we have said, were very badly organised.  The 
country  banks  mismanaged  their  issues,  and  although 
they were not all ruined,  their credit was  severely  shaken. 
Distrust prevailed both in the capital and in the provinces; 
no  money  could  be  borrowed  on  the shares of  industrial 
undertakings  or canals and still  less could loans be  raised 
without  security.  The  Bank  itself  gave  way  to  alarms 
which  Sir Francis Baring1 condemns as ill-founded,  con- 
tracted  its issues,  raised its rate of  discount and looked  on 
unmoved at the rapidly increasing number of  failures going 
on around it.Z 
Matters became urgent, the more so because the evil had 
spread to  Scotland  and one of the directors of  the Royal 
Bank of  Scotland had come to London to request assistance, 
declaring that unless the Government gave immediate help 
there would be a general bankruptcy. 
At the suggestion of  Sir John Sinclair and after a meet- 
ing of  the City merchants to  consider  the situation,  Pitt 
agreed  to  advance A;5,ooo,ooo  in  Exchequer  bills  to  the 
merchants upon  the  security  of  commodities of  all kinds. 
The House passed  the  scheme,  in  spite of  the somewhat 
short-sighted  opposition  of  Fox3 and  Grey.  The remedy 
was so effective that, as  soon as the vote was known, A70,ooo 
were sent to Manchester and Glasgow.  This had excellent 
For all this crisis see Baring, op.  cit., pp.  15-35. 
According to Twke (p.  193, n3te) the number of  bankruptcies  in  1793, 
compared with those in the two previous years,  was as follows :- 
1793-1,956 failures, of  which  26 were country banks. 
1792-  934 failures, of  which  I  was a  country bank. 
1791-  769 failures,  of  which  I  was a  country bank. 
Fox declared that the proceeding involved a violation  of  the Constitution 
(p.  757),  and placed  unsuitable  and  excessive  powers  in  the  hands of  the 
executive (see his speech in Parl.  Hist., Vol.  XXX.,  pp.  755-788).  At bottom 
Fox's  speeches are spoilt by  his  habit of  condemning  all  measures,  whether 
good  or  bad,  which  were  proposed  by  the Government.  A  little  more im- 
partiality  and  a  more  serious  study  of  the  questions  on  hand  would  have 
improved  his orations, which  from many  points  of  view  were  masterpieces. 
Fox's  speeches  were  published  in  1815  in  six  volumes,  but  this  edition  is 
incomplete and defective. 
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results in a crisis caused partly by lack of  sufficient currency 
and prtly by the general want of  confidence.  The feeling 
that credit could be obtained was enough to calm people's 
fears and to prevent many from actually asking for it.  As 
Macpherson says : "The  very first intimation  of  the inten- 
tion of the legislature to support the merchants, operated all 
over the country like a charm, and in  a degree superseded 
the  necessity  of  the  relief,  by  an  almost  instantaneous 
of  mercantile confidence." 
It was not found actually necessary to advance the whole 
of the five millions voted by  Parliament.  There were 338 
requests for L3,855,624 ; 235 of  these were granted, the total 
amount advanced being L2,202,200.  Of  the other demands, 
49 were refused and the rest were withdrawn  by the appli- 
cants themselves.  Far from losing by this transaction, the 
State made a net profit of A4,348 ; only two of  the borrowers 
went bankrupt  and some of  the  others  repaid  their debts 
before they fell due. 
B.-CRISIS  OF  1797. 
Sir  Francis  Baring1 and  Mr.  Tooke2 are  agreed  that 
nothing could be more satisfactory than  the economic con- 
dition of  the country during 1794 and part of  179.5.  Both 
also  recognise  that  the  difficulties  which  ended  in  the 
catastrophe of  1797 began during the second half of  1795. 
The  quiet,  the  confidence  and  the  general  prosperity 
were,  Baring  states,  so extraordinary  during this  period, 
P-  43. 
a  pp.  178-179  and  192-211.  Tooke reckons the crisis  as beginning  rathrr 
earlier  than  Baring does.  He considers that owing to the esceptionally  hard 
winter  of  1794-5,  fears were felt even  in  the following  spring with  regard  to 
the coming harvest, and prices rose very  quickly.  In the succeeding autumn 
the situation became so strained that the King drew the attention  of Parlia- 
ment  to it  in  the  following words : I'  1 have  observed  for  some  time  past 
with  the greatest  anxiety  the very  high  price  of  grain,  and  that anxiety  is 
increased  by  the apprehension  that the  produce  of  the wheat  harvest  in  the 
Present  year inay  not  have  bcen  such  an elledual onq,to relieve  my  people 
from the dilliculti<-s  with  wl~ich  they  have  to contrnd  (Spccch  of  October 
'91  1795). 
Several remedies  were suggested, the principal  one  being to offer  bountirs 
On  importation  until a certain quantity of  corn had bcen brought in.  Amongst 
"'inor  proposals  one  is  rather  curious : the  Members  of  Parliament  agreed 
to rrducc the consu~nptiotl  of whcat in  tlicir  houses by  one-third,  and to ulgr 
their friends to do the same. 19  HISTORY OF THE BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
that  it  was  difficult to  get 4  per  cent.  for  money.  The 
country  was  about  to  pass  suddenly  from  abundance  to 
scarcity, from scarcity to famine, and from famine to brnk- 
ruptcy. 
On February 27,  1797, the  Bank  stopped its cash  pay- 
ments.  What were the causes of  this suspension ? 
According to Baring' they were as follows :- 
I .-Disorders  among the country banks and in  the paper 
circulation in the provinces,  which  produced a crisis similar 
to that of  I 793. 
2.-The  general alarm due to a French invasion. 
3.-The  excessive  exportation  of  bullion  or coin  to  the 
Continent. 
+-The  unwise influence of  the Government. 
Changing the order adopted by Baring, we  will begin by 
studying together causes 3 and 4,  which  are closely  con- 
nected.  We  shall then examine causes I and 2  in the same 
way. 
SECTION  I.' 
'I The enormous abuses,"  says Macleod,'  "  which  might 
be  perpetrated  by  an  unscrupulous  Government,  and  the 
dangerous power which so potent an engine as the Bank of 
England would  confer upon  them,  had  been  clearly  fore- 
seen  by  its antagonists at the time of its foundation.  We 
have seen  that stringent precautions were taken  in  the first 
Act of  1691 to prevent the Bank  making any advances to 
Government without the express permission of  Parlia~nent.~ 
It had  been  the  custom,  however,  time  out  of  mind,  to 
advance for the amount of  such Treasury bills of  exchange 
as were  made  payable  at  the  Bank."  These  advances 
amounted to twenty or thirty thousand pounds; complaints 
were made if  they reached  fifty  thousand.  This limit  was 
'  p.  65. 
*  For  this  Scftion  see  Macleod (jth edition),  Vol.  I., p.  516,  et scq. 
a  Vol.  I., p.  445.  5th edition,  pp.  516,  517. 
'  Sce above, p.  63. 
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greatly exceeded during the American  war, and sometimes 
k,  50,000 was advanced.  The legality of  these proceedings 
Seemed doubtful to  Bosanquet, the governor of  the  Bank, 
who discussed the matter with  the directors;  it  was agreed 
to apply to  the Government for a bill of  indemnity  for the 
past  and for authority to continue these transactions in  the 
future, but only on condition  that  they were kept within  a 
fixed  limit.  This  limit  was  to  be  ~f;50,000--~1oo,ooo. 
Bosanquet  went  out  of  office  at  this  time  and could  not 
continue the negotiations, but Pitt was too clever not to see 
at once what immense powers would be given to the Govern- 
ment by  an Act of this kind.  He therefore hurried the Bill 
through Parliament,  but was  careful to  omit  the  limiting 
clause.' 
No government had ever had such  a formidable weapon 
placed in its hands.  The Act allowed the Bank to be drawn 
upon  without  any  restriction,  for  the directors  dared  not 
dishonour the Government drafts.  Henceforward the Bank 
was completely at Pitt's mercy and he made large demands 
on the resources thus placed at his disposal.' 
'  Statute 1793, C.  32. 
'  See an  analysis of  the  sums  advanced  to  the  Government  according  to 
the  oficial  documents laid  before  the  House of  Con~mons  at the  request  of 
Tierney  (History of  the  Bank  of England,  p.  110).  Bank  of  England,  9 
March,  1797.  An  account  of the  amount  of  Money  advanced  for  the  public 
service  by  the  Bank  of  England  and  outstanding  on  the  25th  of  February. 
1797. 
Advances  on  the  Land  Tax-1794  .....................  ,000 
1795  .....................  gr2,OOO 
.....................  1796  I ,624,000 
1797  ..................... 2,000t000 
Total  ...A+  077,000 
.....................  On the Malt Tas-1794  fi96,ow 
1795  .....................  158,000 
.....................  1796  750,000 
1797  .....................  7509- 
Total  ...A  I ,854,000 
.....................  Consols  in  1796  1,323,000 
Vote of credit for 2) millions in  1796  .....................  821,400 
Total  ...A  ~,tqq,400 
-- 
............  GRNERAI.  TOTAL  L8,075,400 
To this  total  of A8,075,400 must be added the  advances  without  interest 
made  on  Exchequer  Bills  to  the  amount  of  A376,739,  and  on  Treasury 
Bills  to  the  amount  of A1,512,274.  ?.his  raises  the  total  advar~ced  by the 
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At  about this  time  the  English  Government  began  to 
send subsidies to the Continental powers.  And as we  have 
explained,  these were  not  the only  sums remitted  abihoad. 
For various  purposes  k2,715,232 was  exported  in  1793; 
£8,335,592  in  1794; .&I  1,040,236 in  1795.  To which must 
be  added  &,702,818  sent  abroad  for  naval  expenses.' 
These  enormous payments  had  the  effect  of  malting  the 
exchange adverse and caused great anxiety at the Bank.  At 
the very time when this withdrawal of  bullion was going on 
the Treasury bills  were increased  to an unheard-of  extent, 
and  the  demands  made  by  the  commercial  world  were 
equally pressing. 
On December  I I,  1794, the directors,  seeing that things 
were getting worse and worse,  remonstrated with  Pitt.  In 
January,  1795, when  they heard  that a foreign loan and a 
home loan  were about to  be  raised,  they declared  that the 
Treasury could not expect further assistance from them, and 
that in particular, they could not allow the advances on the 
Treasury bills to exceed  ~500,ooo. Pitt promised  all they 
asked, then pretended that he  had forgotten his promise in 
the stress of  business,  and finally,  instead of  lteeping  it, 
he asked in  August for a  fresh advance of  2 millions.  He 
even began  by demanding 24 millions. 
The exchange began  to fall rapidly  at the end  of  1794, 
and in  May,  1795, it was so unfavourable that specie point 
was  reached."The  only  way  to counteract  this adverse 
tendency would have been to reduce the issue of  Bank notes. 
Instead of  this,  the Bank,  worried by Pitt's demands,  fell 
into the mistake of  increasing the issue by issuing notes for 
£5,  £10  having  hitherto  been  the  lowest  value  issued. 
Tooke,  p.  208.  In  1796  the  exportations  were  A10,649,916;  these 
figures are quoted by  Tooke from the Appcndiccs Nos.  23 and 27 of  the Report 
to the House of  Lords. 
'  Sir F.  Baring (p.  49) shows that the profit  on sending gold  from Idondon 
to Hanlburg was 74 prr ccnt.  in January, 1796, 6&  prr cent. in  February, and 
Sf  per  cent.  in  March.  Aftrr  that,  thanks to good  harvests.  the  exchange 
was once  more favourublr until  Iccbruary,  1800 
On this  question sec  Sir John  Sinclair,  1.ettcrs  written to the  Governor 
and  1)irectors  of  the  Ilatak  of  Ettgland  in  Septentber,  1796.  'I'he  author 
suggrsts four re~nedics  :- 
].--An  incrc:asc  ill  thc capital  of  thc  L;a~ik.  A  ~t,r~lrdy  uscd  on  various 
occasions. 
2.-The  issue of  At or Aj notes. 
3.-l'he  issur, with  the authorisation  of  Government, of  a  million  Rank 
~loks,  i~lco~l\.crtiblc  lor onc  yar.  'I'hcsc  notes  would  circulate  witllout  dis- 
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In  gust,  1794,  the  total  circulation  did not  exceed  10 
in  February,  1795,  it  rose  to  14 millions.  The 
drain  of  coin  began  to  take full effect in  the  autumn  of 
1~95;  the  reserve  declined  more  and more.  The Bank 
directors saw that  all their  measures were unavailing  and 
that they  must choose  between  their own  bankruptcy and 
that of  the Government.  Consequently in a resolution of 
December 31, 1795, it  was announced that  the sum to  be 
in  discounts  should  be  fixed  for  each  day  in 
advance.  Any excess in  the demands was to be dealt with 
by  returning "  a  p70 rata  proportion  of  such bills in  each 
parcel as are not otherwise objectionable . . .  without regard 
to the respectability of  the party sending in the bills or the 
solidity of  the bills themselves."' 
count,  in  consequence  of  an agreement  with  the different  merchants  whose 
bills the Bank discounted. 
These  three measures  would  tend  to increase tJle  circulating  medium. 
4.-An  alteration  in  the coinage : since "  while  we continue to maltc our 
gold coin so much finc!r  than  that of  other nations,  and almost give a  bonus 
to the srncltcr  by  dcmanding  nothing  for  the  cxpencc of  the nianufacturc~,  it 
is impossible  that our coin  should  not  eithcr  be  cxported abroad  or smelted 
down-  at home." 
Sir  John  Sinclair  proposed  in  fact  to alter  thc  coinage  "by  mixing  a 
creater  proportion  of  alloy,"  and  this  supplies  thc  subject  matter  of  the 
second  oi th'c  two letters of  which his pamphlet  consists. 
See  the text  of  the declaration  in  Tooke,  p.  200,  note.  The policy  of 
the Bank, combined  with  the restriction of issues and the high profits result- 
ing  from  the  export  of  precious  metals,  produced  a  great  scarcity  in  the 
circulating medium  and caused  much  protest  in  the co~nnlercial  world.  On 
April  2  there was a large gathcring of  merchants at the 1.ondon  Tavcrn; the 
meeting  passed  a  resolution  stating that the scarcity of  coin  was due to the 
increasc  of  trade,  and  in  particular,  to  the  measures  takcn  by  thc  Bank. 
A  committee  was  appointed  to find  a  means  of  increasing  the  circulating 
rncdium without violating the Bank's charter.  See for this,incident Thornton, 
pp.  87-89, and especially  a  pamphlet  by  W.  Boyd, the secretary  to the corn- 
mitter.  Letter  to the  llonourable  W.  Pitt  on  the  Influence  of  the  Stoppage 
of Issues in Specie  at  the  Bank  of  England  (I~GI),  in  particular  pp.  86-102 
of the edition of 1811, rcvisrd and corrrctcd by  the author.  Mr.  Boyd  makes 
a  long  report,  suggesting that  Parliament should appoint a  Board, consisting 
of 2s of  its Mrmbers, authoriscd to issue notcs payable at six months, braring 
a daily  intrrcst of lid. per  LIOO,  and exchangcablc for gold or silver or for 
bills of exchange due in  less than three months.  This scheme was submitted 
to the Chancellor  of the Exchequer.  He replicd  that the Bank had already 
"URfirst~d a  remedy,  the consolidation  of  thc floating  debt,  which  would  be 
hcfo:c  :he  ?roposal  of   lie  committee.  Mr.  Boyd adds (p.  102) that the 
no at in^  dcbt  was fundrd by  nirans of  a  loan of  ~7,500,000  raised  on  vcsry 
liberal terms, after the subscribrrs had been  led to understand  that there was 
going to be  an entire change in the policy  of  the Bank.  The distress in  May, 
'795,  shows how this pro~nise  was krpi. 
Sir  Francis  Raring  dcvotcs  a  short  pamphlet  to  a  criticism  of  Boyd's 
Srllc'mcs,  Observations  on the P~tblicution  of  [IJ. Boyd, Esq.. M.P. 194  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
This resolution ought to have restrained the demands of 
the Government, but it proved insufficient to curb the Prime 
Minister's  rapacity.  Pitt had never carried out his repeated 
promises  to  reduce  the  advances  on  Treasury  bills  to 
£5oo,ooo ;  on June 14, 1796, the  total  of  the advances was 
£1,232,649.  He demanded  &3oo,ooo  at the end of  July 
and a like sum in  August.  The directors were  induced  to 
grant the  first, but refused the second.  Pitt said that  the 
one was useless to him  without the  other and invited them 
to revoke their decision.  This they  did after indulging in 
some platonic remonstrances. 
In November Pitt proffered a new request for ~2,750,ooo 
on the security of  certain taxes.  This was granted on con- 
dition that the advances on the Treasury bills, which  now 
amounted to £1,513,345,  should be repaid.  Pitt secured the 
money,  but was careful not  to  redeem  the  bills.  Then he 
returned to the attack and asked for fresh advances, intended 
for San Domingo and Ireland.  The sum needed for Ireland 
was at first to be only ~zoo,ooo,  but in the end it amounted 
to ~1,750,000. 
SECTION  11. 
- 
THE DISORDERS  AMONG  THE  COUNTRY  BANKS  AND  THE 
SCARE  OF  A  FRENCH  INVASION  WI-ZICH  LED  TO 
AN  ACTUAL  PANIC. 
Henry  Thornton calculates that after the crisis of  1793, 
the  issues of  the  provincial  banks had  been  decreased by 
one-half,  and he  adds that the  requirements  of  trade had 
attracted an enormous quantity of money to counteract this 
decrease.  At  the  same  time  although  the  exchange  was 
now favourable, the  Bank of  England continued  to restrict 
its issues.  During the  three last months of  1796  they did 
not  exceed those of  1782, although the  total of commercial 
payments made was several times greater than  the total  in 
that year.  The payments  had  to be  made  whatever  hap- 
pened  and for want  of  paper  money  they  were  made in 
coin, so that  calls  were  constantly  made on  the  reserve, 
which  fell from L2,972,ooo in  March,  1796, to ~2,502,008 
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in December  of the same year,  when  a serious withdrawal 
of bullion began. 
~t  the beginning of 1797 the political situation was worse 
than  ever.  The country  banks,  scenting  the storm,  took 
and tried to withdraw as much coin as possible 
from London.  This helped  still  further  to diminish the 
reserve.' 
An  occurrence of but small importance strategically  pro- 
duced a definite crisis.  The landing uf  a handful of  French 
troops, says Baring,2  caused a general alarm, which showed 
itself  chiefly  in  a  demand for coined  money, even  bullion 
being refused.  All ranks of society were seized with  panic : 
traders,  artisans  and  especially  women  and  farmers,  all 
wanted guineas merely in order to conceal them. 
These, then, are the four causes enumerated by Baring as 
having  led  to  the suspension  of  cash  payments.  Baring 
refrained from  criticjsing  the  behaviour  of  the  directors. 
What must  be  thought of  this?  The directors denied  all 
share in  the suspension  and threw the whole  responsibility 
on  the  Government,  which  had  reduced  them  to  this  ex- 
tremity by its excessive demands.  They declared that if the 
Government  had  repaid  them  they  would  have  had  no 
hesitation  in  assisting  the  commercial  wbrld,  and of  this 
there  seems  to  be  no  doubt.  But  many  contemporary 
writerss allege that even  the advances made to the Govern- 
ment should not have prevented the Bank from continuing 
its  issues  and helping  commerce.  Ultimately, then,  it  is 
upon this point that the matter turns, and good arguments 
are not wanting to those who adopt this adverse view.  They 
point  out  that  the  undue  restriction  of  issues  caused  an 
A very vivid description  of the crisis of  1797, and in particular of  its vicis- 
situdes  in  Scotland,  is given  by  Sir  William  Forbes  in  his  Memoirs  of  a 
Banking  House.  These  memoirs  were  not  published  until  1860  by  Robert 
Chambers,  although  Sir William  had died fifty years before  and  deserved  the 
tltlc Riwn  him  by  Stephens, p.  93, of  the  Evrlyn  of  the  Rank. 
a  Baring* PP.  45-54. 
See especially  ?.hornton,  Chap.  iv., pp.  172-210 of McCulloch's  reprint. 196  HISTORY OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
unusual demand for guineas, that in consequence, the pro- 
vincial  notes were  discredited, and that the Bank  took  no 
steps to  supply  the  gap left  by the  disappearance of  the 
notes.' 
Moreover this contraction had caused the forced sale and 
the consequent depreciation of  the public stock, which would 
have been  avoided  if only the Bank had kept up its issues 
to the level of  1795.  Finally,  it was stated that when  the 
exchange was most  unfavourable  and it  was  profitable  to 
export gold, the directors had  issued  notes to the  value of 
~I~,OOO,OOO,  and that, on the contrary, they  had  reduced 
their  issues  to  A8,640,225  when  the  exchange  had  been 
favourable for several months.  To put the matter briefly, 
the  contraction  of  the  issues  had  largely  contributed  to 
empty the coffers of  the Bank during the autumn of  1796, 
when an extension of  issue would have helped to replenish 
them 
The  Bullion  Report  adopted  this  opinion,  which  was 
in  fact  the development of  the Expansive theory set forth 
by Bosanquet in  1783, and  together with most  of  the con- 
temporary authors, it condemned the Restrictive theory put 
into practice by the directors. 
It thus seems evident that the Bank had a large share of 
responsibility  in  the crisis  of  1797  and this  was acknow- 
ledged by the directors themselves before the Committee of 
1810.  But, as Macleod3 very clearly  points out, it may be 
asked  whether  any  administration,  however  wise  and 
prudent,  could  have  avoided the suspension  of  cash  pay- 
ments-a  measure which  Robert Peel  in  1844 described as 
"  fatal."  Macleod is driven to believe that it was fortunate 
that the suspension occurred at this time, since later on the 
situation  became still  worse.  The Irish  rebellion  and the 
naval mutiny joined  with the permanent  risk of  an invasion 
to produce such an alarming combination, that a convertible 
paper currency would have had small chance of surviving. 
Finally,  "  the  constant  power  of  producing  public  em- 
See above, Chap. i., Part Ill.,  pp.  170 and 171, what we have said as to 
thc  bad  ot.gnniqation  of  pro\~incial  rrcdit. 
Rlnrlt.o(l, -3rd  I<cli~ion,  Vol.  I., p.  461  (5111  Edition,  p.  533). 
'  1'1'.  4'1 1.403. 
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barrassment  by  demands  for gold " would  have  been  a 
weapon  in  thc  hands of enemies who would  have 
been supported in  England by political sympathies. 
The measure thus removed  a  perpetual  source of  alarm, 
and the extreme depreciation of the  notes which  took place 
some  years  later  was  in  no  sense  a  necessary  result  of 
the suspension,  but was entirely due to a surprising want 
of foresight on the part of the Government and of  the Bank 
directors.  The suspension  of  payments  was  inevitable, 
and it was better for the country that it occurred  before the 
greatdisasters. 
The crisis began  with the failure of  the Newcastle  banks 
on  February aoth, 1797.  The news quickly reached 1,ondon 
and  from  this  moment  the  events  followed  one  another 
in rapid  succession.  The reserve of  the Bank was reduced 
on  February 25th to A1,272,oo0.  The Bank  had also con- 
siderably  decreased  its  issues;  they  were  reduced  from 
A10,550,830  (January  21)  to  k8,640,000  (February  25). 
This only gives an inadequate idea  of  the decrease in  the 
paper currency,  for it must be remembered that the private 
banks  were  forced  to  imitate  the  Bank  of  England's  ex- 
ample.  Several of  them  were  obliged  to make enormous 
sacrifices to meet the demands on them, and to sell securities 
at a considerable loss.  The 3 per cents. were at 51 and the 
other funds fell in a similar manner. 
The fatal hour had  come : the suspension of  cash  pay- 
ments  was  not  to be  averted.  The directors of the Bank 
applied to  Pitt for advice and assistance.  Pitt induced the 
King to preside  at the council  meeting summoned to con- 
sider the situation.  The council  unanimously agreed1 that 
the Uank should be forbidden to make any payment in  cash 
Until  Parliament should have decided  on  the policy  to be 
adopted. 
this order  of  Fcb  26  ill  l'arl.  Ilist., Vol.  SSXII.,  p.  1 j18, 198  HISTORY OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
The Bank,  when  it stopped cash payments on  February 
27,  1797, published1 a statement that the satisfactory and 
prosperous condition of  its affairs was such.as might remove 
all doubts as to its solvency.  At the same time.  what was 
more important, a  large meeting  of  well-known  financiers 
and bankers passed a resolution undertaking to accept Bank 
notes in payment of  sums due to them.    his resolution was 
supported  by four  thousand signatures,  including  all  the 
names of  any importance in  the City. 
The  King thought  fit  to  announce  the  unprecedented 
event to the Commons in a Royal Message.Vitt comrnuni- 
cated  this  message  to  the  House3 and  proposed  that  a 
committee should-be  appointed to inquire into the position 
of  the Bank,  although as he added, he felt no doubt of  the 
solidity of  the establishment.  Fox replied in a rather dull 
speech4 and  Sheridan5 in  a  violent  oration,  but  neither 
opposed the nomination of  the committee. 
The discussion  was resumed on the question of  the reply 
to be  giwn to the  message  and this gave Fox an oppor- 
tunity  to  make  a  magnificent  speech,O which,  however, 
suggested no remedy except the speedy conclusion of  peace. 
In the House  of  Lords the speeches of  Lord Grenville, 
Lord Bedford  and Lord Lansdowne,'  are worthy  of  men- 
tion.  The latter remarked that his colleagues would do him 
the justice  to remember  that he  had "  foretold the present 
'  This notice  is givcn  if'  History  of  the  Bank  of  England  (1797)~  p.  43. 
'  See The King's Message  respectittg  the unusual  demand for  specie. 
'  Parl.  Hist., pp.  1518-1519. 
*  Parl.  Hist., pp.  1519-1520. 
5  Parl.  Hist., pp.  1520-1522. 
'  pp.  1526-1538.  The following  are  some  extracts  from  its  conclusion : 
"  Let us see now  what  has been  the  conduct  of  the  $resent  minister  in  the 
course  of  this  war,  upon  the  subject  of  finance.  Have  any  three  months 
passed  in  which  he has not produced  some new  expedient?  And  have  they 
not, every  one  of  them  without  a  single  exception,  proved  erroneous?"  (see 
also Fox's  S)eeches.  Vol.  VI., p.  289), and again :  iL The minister  has con- 
ducted  the  war  upon  the  hope  t1.at  wc  should  be  able  to defeat  the  French 
by  a  contest  of  finance,  and  you  now  see  the  expedients  to  which  we  are 
driven."  "Year  after year  the  minister has been  amusing us with  his ideas 
of the finances  of  France-now  on the  verge, now  in  the  gulf of  bankruptcy !  . . . But . . . while he was thus amusing us he has led  us to the  very  same 
verge,  aye, into the  very  same gulf." 
'  pp 1564-1568. 
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exigency " since  1793.  He compared  public credit  to the 
soul of England : everything had been  done to ruin credit, 
in  the  first  instance  by  "  the  inordinate  increase  of  ex- 
pense,"  then  by  the  war  and the  subsidies sent  abroad; 
now the death-blow was to be struck by decreeing an incon- 
vertible currency.  "  Mark  my prophecy,  my  lords,"  he 
exclaimed in conclusion,'  "  and do not disdain  the counsel 
while yet in time.  If you attempt to make bank notes a legal 
tender, their credit will perish.  They may go on for a time, 
but the consequence is certain . . .  We  do not speak upon 
conjecture, the thing is matter of  experience.  A fever is as 
much a fever in London as in Paris or Amsterdam ; and the 
consequences of a stoppage of payment  must  be the same 
in  whatever country it shall happen." 
On March 3rd, the Committee of  the House of  Commons 
presented  its report.  It stated that "  the  total amount of 
outstanding demands on the Bank on the 25th of  February 
last . . .  was A13,770,3go;  and that the total amount of  the 
funds for discharging those demands (not including the per- 
manent debt due from Government of  ,&I  1,686,800, which 
bears an interest of 3 per cent.) was . . .  A17,597,280;  and 
that  the  result  is  that  there  was . . . a surplus . . . of 
.&3,826,898."2 
The situation thus seemed  all that could be desired, but 
the committee omitted to mention that out of  the A17,597,280 
of  funds,  more  than  ten  millions  had  been  lent  to  the 
Government, which  reduced  the sum immediately available 
to seven millions.  This fact was brought out very clearly by 
Sheridan.3  The  speaker  began  by  remarking  that  the 
lf;111686,800 of  Government debt could not be regarded as 
capital, since  the Bank could  not  demand  its repayment. 
All  that should be counted was  the annuity of ~130,000. 
Moreover,  he  continued,  it  appeared  that  besides  these 
millions, the Bank had advanced nearly ten  millions 
for  the  public  expenses.  What was,  then,  its  position? 
:  "01.  XXXII., p.  I  567. 
See this report in  Pall. Hist., Vol.  XXXIII., pp.  25-26,  and the  report 
Presented in  the name of the Committee of the House of Lords by  the Earl  of 
'hastham,  Pitt's elder brother, which  supports this conclusion,  Ibid., pp.  16-29. 
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Its debts amounted to only 13  millions, 10  millions of  which 
stood to the account of  a single debtor, and the debtor was 
most  generously offering  support.  Suppose a  merchant, 
owing in  all &13,ooo, and with a  sum of  ~10,000  due to 
him from one man, "  would not that merchant think it very 
extraordinary conduct in  that man  if  he  should say,  'Sir, 
I understand that your affairs are in a ticklish way,  let me 
make an inquiry into them, and if  . . .  I discover that you 
have wherewithal in due time to . . . discharge your debts, 
I will not say that I may not guarantee them for you.'  . . . 
The gentleman  would  say, ' Why do you  not  pay  me  the 
money you owe me, . . .  and then I may be able to satisfy 
every demand without your interference.' " 
With regard to bankers,  Sheridan inquired, "  What are 
the  bankers?  The stewards and guardians of  their  con- 
stituents.  What consolation  will it be to those creditors to 
hear that those stewards lent this money to the minister, and 
that  the  minister  lent  a  considerable portion  of  it  to  the 
emperor, and that the emperor gave it  to  his soldiers, and 
that these soldiers are killed off  3'" 
Warnings, Sheridan repeated, had not been wanting, but 
"  Mr.  Pitt,  indeed,  was  so  busy  in  the  calculation  and 
depreciation of  French assignats and mandats, that he  had 
not time,  it is presumed,  to attend  to our own imntaculate 
paper credit,  as Lord  Grenville, that  luminous statesman, 
called it, about two years ago."= 
These Parliamentary criticisms3  were followed by a series 
of  epigrams4  and puns similar to those aimed at Law and the 
See History  of  the Bank  of  England,  etc., (1797)~  p.  106. 
Loc. cit., p.  105. 
The History  of  the  Bank  of  England, published  in  1797, may  be  profit- 
ably  consulted.  This  work,  written  directly  after  the  suspension  of  cash 
payments by an ardent supporter of  Fox and Shcridan,  gives a good su~iitnary 
of the opinions of  the Liberal  Opposition on the crisis, with  which  it is almost 
entirely occupied. 
Lord Stanhope has prrserved the following,  which  was much in vogue :- 
"  Of  Augustus and Rome 
The Poets  still  warble, 
How hc found it of  brick 
And  left  it  of  marble. 
So of  Pitt  and  England 
Men say  without  vapour 
That he found  it  of gold 
And left  it of  paper. 
According  to  the author of  The Life  of  Pitt, this is only a rhyming version 
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,,ignats,  and  such  as are  the  usual  accompaniment  of 
financial disasters. 
BU~  neither speeches nor epigrams prevented the passing 
on  ~~y  3 of  the Bank  Restriction  Act, as it  is  generally 
called.  Its chief  provisions were as follows1 :- 
I.-A  clause of  indemnity  was granted to the Bank and 
all  persons connected  with  it,  for  anything  done in  pur- 
suance of the Order in Council. 
*.-The  Bank  was  forbidden  to make any payments in 
cash  to any creditors, or to use cash for any payments except 
to the Army and Navy,  or in  pursuance of  an order from 
the Privy Council. 
3.--The  Bank  might make no  advance above  k6oo,ooo 
for the public service, in  cash or notes, during the restric- 
tion. 
4.-If  anyone deposited a sum not less than L5oo in  ~pld 
at  the  Bank,  he  might  be  repaid  three-fourths  of  this 
amount. 
5.-The  payment  of  debts  in  Bank  notes  was  to  be 
deemed as payment in cash, if offered and accepted as such. 
6.-No  debtor  could  be  held  to special bail  unless  the 
affidavit stated that  payment  in  bank  notes  had  not  been 
offered. 
7.-Bank  notes were  to be received  at par by  all public 
offices in  payment of  taxes. 
%--The  Act was to remain in force until the 24th of June 
following. 
Finally,  an Act  dated May  1st  and intended to  remedy 
the scarcity of  currency, suspended the Statute 1775, c. 51 ., 
which restricted the circulation of  Rank notes of  tow  values. 
In a few days the Hank had arranged for the preparation 
and issue  of  &I  and An  notes..  To meet  the demand  for 
of an  epigram  which  hod previously  appeared in  a Society journal. 
These verses recall  those  written  in  France three or four years earlier :- 
'I  Ah ! le  bon  billet qu'a  la Chatre I 
Disait  Ninon  d'un  air  folgtre 
Dans ses 6bats 
Gydez-veus, ddtracteurs frivolcs, 
1)  appliquer jn~iiais  ces parolcs 
Aux  assigt~ats." 
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small money, the directors announced that they had obtained 
a large quantity of  Spanish dollars valued at 4s. Gd.' 
In short, it may be said that the Act of  1797 allowed the 
Bank  not  to cash  its notes  and gave these notes a highly 
privileged  position,  but  did  not  make  them  legal  tender 
and left people free to refuse payments not made in cash. 
By  a curious coincidence, at the very  moment when  the 
Rank Restriction Act was passed in  England, the system of 
assigrtats collapsed in  France, and the mandats which  suc- 
ceeded then1 were destined shortly to disappear also. 
:  It was discovcrcd  latcr  that thcy  werc really  worth  ad.  morc,  and thrir 
current pricc was increased by  3d.  This left a profit of  ~d.  per dollar, and thr 
goldsmiths  bcgan  to  manufacture thern ; thcy  issued  dollars so like  thosc  of 
thc Hank that thc lattcr could  not distinguish than and was obligcd to accept 
both kinds. 
In ordw to natumlisc thcsc coins, a little hcad of  Gcorgc 111.  was stan1y1c.d 
over  the  image  of  Fcrdinand,  King of  Spain.  This  inspired  the  following 
xcvcrc but just  Ianlpoon :- 
"  The Bank to make thcir Spanish dollars current pass, 
Sta~nprd  the head  of  a fool on  the hcad of  an ass." 
-Scc  Lawson,  History  of  Bunlcing,  p.  104, 
CHAPTER  1V. 
RESULTS  OF  THE  BANI<  I<ESTI<ICy'ION 
ACT. 
~~,~lts  of thc Act  bctwccn  I 797  and  1808.  Pitt's  cat~tioti. I'l-rvailitlg  c.rr:,l-s 
on  the: subject.  lncrrasc in  thc issues and in  the advalicc-s to (;o\.~~rl~liic~~lt. 
~~~ults  of  the  Act  in  rcfercncc  to  Economic  thcorivs.  l':~rli;i~~i(bnt;~ry 
debates.  'Theory  stated by  Addington.  Spccchcs of  I:os  and I.ord  Kiiig. 
-rhc economists  and  the  influence  of  escc.ssivc  issues  on  tl~c  forcigl~ 
rschangcs and the pricc of  gold.  Crisis of  1800.  Statc of  public opinion. 
l'heorics  of  Waltcr  Boyd,  'Thornton,  Lord  Icing  and  Ric:~rdo on  thr- 
drpreciation  of a  papcr  currcncy.  Monctary  crisis  in  Irc~lalid.  Parlin- 
lncntary  inquiry.  Opinion hcld  by  thc Dircctors of  thc Uanlc  of  Irrland. 
Report of  thc  Committcc. 
SUCH  was  the  Rank  Restriction  Act.  It  lias bee11 credited 
with producing important and even extraordinary results. 
It has been stated that England owed to it those inirnensc 
resources which enabled it to carry on and to concludc suc- 
cessfully the greatest of modern wars; that  it was o~ving  to 
the paper currency that Pitt and his colleagues  werc able to 
raise  thosc  loans  which  amazed  the  world;  that  to  the 
paper  money,  also,  various  other  advantages  must  be 
attributed; that in  short, by passing the Restriction Act the 
English Government had discovered the pliilosopher's stone 
for which  the  alchemists of the  Middle Ages Iiod  searcllcd 
in  vain. 
These  opinions  spread  rapidly.  'I'lle  dcbatcs  on  thc 
Bullion  Iieport  of  1810  \\ill  en;~l)le  us  to  sl~ow  tl~itt  tllcb 
majority  in  Parliament  belicvcd  tlicnl  tirmly.  Sinc:t:  tllctl 
the doctrine Ilas been continually rc*vi\.ccl,  and evcxn its lalc 
as  1861, after  the  Act  of  1819,  iifter  (he publicatiuris of 
.rooke and hlacleod, an author of  I.ord  Stanhope's rcbput:t- 
tion, in a book which is regarded in  1Jngland as tlie standard 
life of Pitt,' could write as follo~.s  :2 
I ' 
It nlust he  ol)scrved, however, that so  long  its tile  L\ar 
'l'l~is  appreciation  is  suficirntly accurate to  givc  a  solnewhat  dcprcbhinl: 
idla  of  the  otller  books  drv0tc.d  to  this  subj(.ct  and  of  lllq!  ct,t~ditioli cbf 
historical study in  I.:ngland.  It is much  to bc  rcgrettcd  that  I.ord  Koscbcry's 
"~'k did  not cxcrcd ttlc narrow  lilnits of  an essay. 
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continued,  the  system  of  inconvertible  paper  money  did 
good service in  England.  Expanding precisely in  propor- 
tion  to the exigencies of  the public service, and supported 
by  an  undeviating  reliance on  the national good  faith, it 
enabled us, as certainly no other system could, to raise year 
by year loans of  unparalleled amount ; to transmit  repeated 
subsidies to  Foreign  Powers  in  alliance with  us; and  to 
bear, without sinking beneath it, the burthen of  accumulated 
taxes.  It was, in  short, a gigantic system of  paper credit, 
giving us power to cope with no less gigantic foes." 
In our sketch of the condition of  England at the end of  the 
18th century we  stated, basing our opinion upon  undisput- 
able authorities, that England's success in withstanding  the 
onslaught of the revolutionary  armies, and the final defeat 
of  Napoleon  were less due to the genius of  her sailors, of 
Wellington  and  of  Pitt,  than  to  that  of  Brindley,  Watt 
and Arkwright.  It was owing to  the remarkable  stimulus 
given by these great men to her industry and commerce that 
Great Britain was able to raise such immense loans, to keep 
Europe in  her pay,  to maintain  her armies and fleets  and 
to endure  steadfastly until  it pleased  fortune to favour her 
arms.  We shall proceed to show that  Pitt, who supported 
the liestriction Act from necessity alone,' did not make such 
use of  it as his clumsy admirers have  alleged; and that as 
soon as his successors began  to  follow this policy,  and the 
Bank directors,  with  extraordinary blindness, took  advant- 
age of their  exemption  from cash  payments  to make over- 
issues,  England,  instead of  reaping  any benefit  from  their 
action, found  herself  involved in  endless difficulties-diffi- 
culties which,  had  it  not  been  for the  Russian  campaign, 
must have  brought disaster on  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
from  whose effects  the  public suffered long  after  the con- 
clusion of  peace. 
Our  study of  the  effects  of  the  Restriction  Act  will  be 
divided into two parts:  the first including.the last years of 
Pitt's  ministry  and  extending,  strictly  spealring,  up  to 
' Lord  Grenville  said  during  the  discussion  on  the  Stanhope  Bill  (I~II), 
that  the  day  when  Pitt  was  forced to propose  the  restriction  was one  of  tho 
niost painful  in  his lifc.  Sw.bclow, p. 236,  notc 3. 
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,gO9  the second dealing with the period from 18ug to 1819. 
During the first period the privilege conceded by the Act 
of  1797 was  used  by  both  the  Government  and  the  Bank 
with the utmost prudence.  The inconveniences of  the sus- 
pension of  cash payments were  not at first great, but  they 
were beginning to  make themselves felt and to attract  the 
of able  men,  who  from this  time  onwards tried 
to  define  the  rules  and  conditions  of  a  healthy  paper 
currency. 
The second  period  will  show  the  effects of  those  over- 
issues to  which some have attributed  England's  salvation. 
The  disastrous results,  of which  warning  signs could  be  - -- 
detected as early as 1801, definitely drew public attention to 
the problem of  the circulation.  They gave rise to a discus- 
sion which was the first, and is still perhaps the most famous 
of  the  great monetary  controversies  in  the  19th century. 
The study  of  this  celebrated  controversy,  which  centred 
round the Bullion Report, will form the subject of  the next 
chapter.  For the present we  shall deal with the first period 
only. 
When  the  Restriction  Act  was  passed,  the  exchanges 
were so favourable that gold was being imported in consider- 
able quantities.  On May 30th~  Mr. Manning informed the 
House of  Commons that  very large quantities of  gold had 
come in to the Bank both  from at home and abroad.  The 
Government and  the  directors  were  however  agreed  that 
it  would  be  unwise  to  resume cash  payments  just  at the 
time  when  the  Restriction  Act  expired,  and  the  Act  was 
accordingly continued  until a month after the beginning of 
the next session. 
Parliament  met  on  November  2nd.  On  the  15th the 
House of  Commons appointed a committee to consider the 
'  We  may  notice  here  three  French  books  which  appeared  about  this 
tilue, and which  are, I  believe, the first French  works dealing  with the  Bank 
of England. 
I.-J.  H. Marnibre  (I~I),  Essai  sur  le  crt'dit  con1111ercia1. Thc author 
describes the Banks of  Genoa and of  England. 
2.-Considbrations  sur la facilitd  d'ktablir d  Paris une  banque  Pgale  d  celle 
d~ Londres  (1802),  by  the same author. 
3.-J.  H. Lassale,  Des  finances  d'Angleterre  (1803).  A  consideration  of 
the results of  the  Restriction Act, and  a discussion on the burden of  the tares ; 
book  is  full of  political  discussion. 2~6  I-IISTORY  OF THE BANI<  OF ENGLAND. 
question, and the report of  this committee, presented on the 
17th, stated that on the 11th the total liabilities of  the Bank 
amounted  to  £1  7,578,910,  and the assets  to A2 1,418,460, 
leaving a favourable balance of  £3,839,550  without count- 
ing the Government debt of  Ar I ,686,800 ; that the advances 
made to the Government had  been reduced to A4,258,140; 
whilst  the stotk of  coin and bullion  was  five times greater 
than  it had been on February 25th and much  larger than it 
had been  since September, 1795; and that the exchange on 
Hamburg was  remarkably  favourable  and  was  to  all  ap- 
pearances  likely to continue so; that finally, and above all, 
the  London  bankers  and merchants  experienced  no  incon- 
venience from the Act, since, although the law allowed them 
to  withdraw  three-quarters  of  their  deposits,  they  had 
actually withdrawn only one-sixteenth. 
Notwithstanding all  these statements  and in spite of  the 
directors'  assertion  that  the  Bank could  resume  cash pay- 
ments without danger, the Government chose to keep things 
as they were, and a law was passed pralonging the Act until 
one month after a peace should be concluded. 
The note issue was managed with great care:  the issue 
in  1797 hardly exceeded  by  half  a  million  that  for  1796, 
which had been £1  1,030, I lo, and this in spite of  the lack of 
coin for ordinary transactions.'  In August, 1798,' the note 
circulation had increased to Aro,Qg,550 in  notes of  A5 and 
upwards, and to A1,531,oho in  notes of  under £5,  the total 
being ,f;12,180,610. 
'I'wo  years after the suspension (on February qth, 1799), 
the issues amounted  to £12,ggg,800.  The metallic reserve 
had risen to £7,563,900;  it exceeded one-third of  the Bank's 
liabilities, which were only 21 millions, including 8 millions 
of deposits.  This favourable state of  things was maintained 
throughout the remainder of  the year  1799. 
The Charter was  to  expire  in  1812.  In  1800 the Bank 
secured a  renewal  for  21  years,  reckoned  from  this  date, 
'  The total  of  issues  had  bcen  A13,539,160  in  1795. 
'  'rookc,  p.  207.  At  this date  the  drposits  amounted  to  A8,300,720,  as 
against k:4,H~1,53o  in  February,  I 747. 
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i.~.,  until  1833, making in  return a loan  of  3 millions  for 
three years without  interest.'  This sacrifice  of 3 millions, 
drawn  from the reserve,  was a  heavy  one,  in  spite of  the 
considerable profit which the Bank made from its righf to a 
co,,mission  on  the  public  loans  subscribed  at  its offices. 
The Bank agreed to it nevertheless, because it was just  then 
the object of vigorous attacks-made  especially by Pulteney, 
who proposed the foundation of  a national bank-and  it was 
hence of  particular  importance to secure the renewal  of  its 
monopoly. 
But to return to the question of  the issues.  On December 
25tI1,  1799, there were cf;12,335,920 of  notes over  &5 in cir- 
culation.  This total  was  not  greatly superior  to  the total 
issues on the day of  the suspension of  cash payments.'  At 
any rate  an increase of  two million pounds could have been 
very  little use  to  Pitt for his  European payments,  and for 
meeti~~g  the expenses of  a  terrible war.  .The  fact  is that 
Pitt was fully conscious of  the mistake he had made in mis- 
using the Bank's credit;  his was not a nature to be obstinate 
when  once he had realised a  mistake, nor  to profit  by the 
Restriction Act to obtain artificial resources.  He knew  too 
much of  the disadvantages of  paper  money  to  indulge  in 
excessive  issues  and  thus  convert  the  Bank  of  England 
notes into conlmon assignats.  Whatever his past mistakes 
may  have  been,  from  1797 onwards  his  policy  deserves 
nothing but praise ; he made vigorous use of  taxation,  was 
not afraid of injuring his popularity by the introduction of 
the income tax, consolidated by  successive loans a  floating 
debt  which  had  attained  formidable  proportions,  and 
finally, arranged  that  the  advances  made  by  the  Bank, 
so far from increasing after the Restriction Act,  should on 
the contrary, be reduced. 
He thus set an excellent  example to his successors,  and 
the wise policy of his later years was maintained even after 
At  the end  of this time  the  loan  was  continued for  six years,  but  at an 
interest  of  3  per  cent. ; finally  the  repayment  was  deferred  until  the  con- 
clusion of  peace. 
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his death.  This was shown by Tooke  in a work which has 
made a study of  this period  possible. 
Tooke first of  all1 showed that  after an almost negligihle 
rise during 1802 and 1803,~  the total issues declined again. 
The  average  for  the  five  succeeding  years  was  only 
A12,957,404,  whilst  from  1802  to  1803  it  had  been 
A13,450,727.  The  study  of  averages  being  somewhat 
deceptive, it is better to say that "  the total of  issues in  1808 
was less than that in 1802,"~  and Tooke could justly  remark 
that the position of  the Bank in  February, 1805, was prob- 
ably the same as if it had been paying in  gold.' 
But,  what  is  better  still,  TookeS showed  the surprising 
moderation  in  the  advances  made  by  the  Bank  to  the 
Treasury . 
He proved,  from some documents laid before  Parliament 
at the repeated request of  Mr. Grenfell, that the average of 
the  Government  deposits  was  A12,197,303  *  in  1806, and 
that  this  average  varied  between  11 and  12 miliions for 
several years.  But,  during these same years,  the average 
of  the advances made by the Bank to the Government was 
rather less than 14) millions.  Hence the actual advances in 
cash, and likewise the actual sums employed by the Govern- 
ment in excess of  its deposits did not much exceed 3 million 
pounds during the period  1804-1808. 
'  Op. cit., p.  281. 
'  The years  1800  and  1801 witnessed  a  crisis  with  which  we  shall deal 
presently. 
'  The totals for the seven years are :- 
1802, rf;13,917,977.  1806, Lf;la,697,3sa. 
1803, L12,g83,477.  1807,  ;C;13,221,+8. 
1804, .&12,621,348.  1808,  L13~4oz.160. 
1805, Lla,844,170. 
'  Its assets were &5,a39,550,  of  which A;7,855,470  was metallic reserve; 
its liabilities were L30,150,820,  of  which  Lrr,g61,960 were deposits  (Tooke, 
p.  281).  Thus the totals of  its metallic  reserve  and of  its deposits  exceeded 
those  of  179, although  this  was  an  exceptionally  prosperous  year.  The 
metallic  reserve fell  to 5 millions in  1800, to 4 and 31 niillions  from  1801 to 
1803, then  it  increased  again and was 6 millions  in  1804,  and L7,644,500 in 
1805.  It will  be  remembered  that  after  the  crisis  in  1793  the  reserve  in- 
creased in  1794 to .&6,77o,"o,  but afterwards fell to iC;1,186,17o in  February, 
1797. 
'  pp.  286-287. 
In  18m the average of  deposits was AG,z51,488 ; in  1806, Lf;rz,197,3n3  ; 
and during thc ten years 1807-1817 it varird between  11 and  12 millions. 
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The  advances  to  the  Government,  reckoned  in  yearly 
averages, exceeded the deposits of  the Treasury : 
From  1780-178q by ~4,841,000. 
,,  1785-1789  ,,  A2,335,000* 
9,  1790-1796  9,  E5,664,00o. 
,,  1799-Is03  ,,  A5,364,oos. 
T  9  1804-1810 ,,  A4,146,0oo. 
This comparative smallpess of  the advances to Govern- 
ment,"  says Tooke,l "  completely negatives the supposition, 
so commonly entertained and reasoned upon as a point  be- 
yond doubt, that the Bank was rendered, by the restriction, 
a  mere  engine in  the hands of  Government.  . . .  And 
whether this moderation in the amount of  advances resulted 
exclusively  from the forbearance of  Government  in  not  re- 
quiring, or from the firmness of  the directors  in  refusing, 
such accommodation,  it equally tends (especially when com- 
bined with the consideration of  the large amount of  treasure 
in  possession  of  the Bank  during the  greater part  of  the 
restrictiona) to strengthen the presumption that the Govern- 
ment  and the directors  of  that  period  were  sincere in  the 
declaration that there constantly existed, on the part of  both, 
a reference to the eventual  resumption of  cash payments." 
It is evident how  little foundation  remains for the state- 
ments of  those historians and economists who have tried to 
make out that Pitt was a more fortunate Law. 
We shall soon see the results of  the over-issues into which 
the Bank allowed  itself  to be drawn after this period.  But 
first  we  must  consider  the  economic  theories  which 
sprang from the Restriction  Act.  For notwithstanding the 
moderate use \\ hich the Government had  made of  this Act, 
it  had  hat1  its  influence  upon  the  economic  life  of  the 
The troubles due to it aroused  the interest of  the 
' Val.  IV., p.  96.  In this  volume Tooke reconsiders  the question  rather 
more in detail. 
Thr amount of  this rcscrve shows that the Bank intended  to resume its 
rash payliirnts,  for what othrr\visc could  have bern the object of  buying gold 
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intelligent public,  and resulted  in  the discovery  of  truths 
whose existence had hitherto been only suspected. 
Effects  of  the  Restriction  Act  O~L  economic  theories. 
The theoretical  side of  the question  came  to be discussed 
in  Parliament  through  an  accidental  circumstance which 
deserves notice.  The Restriction  Act  should have expired 
in  September,  1802; six months before  that date the Peace 
of  Amiens  had  been  concluded,  but  although  the  Bank 
declared its readiness to resume cash payments, the Act was 
prolonged  by  the advice of  Addington,  the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, until R4arch,  1803.  The arguments brought 
forward in support of  this policy showed complete ignorance 
of  the subject.  Addington, in  proposing the delay,  based 
his view on the fact that the exchanges were unfavourable. 
He said1 : "  It cannot be  necessary  for me  to  inform  the 
Mouse that the rate of  exchange between  this country and 
foreign  parts  is  disadvantageous  to  ourselves-that  tlie 
export trade has been for some months at a stand, that while 
the rate of  exchange is disadvantageous to us, an augmenta- 
tion  of  the circulating  cash  would  create  a  trade  highly 
injurious to  the commerce of  this country.  For  several 
months past there has been  a trade carried on for purchase 
of  guineas with a view to exportation."  These were the very 
reasons for which cash payments should have been  resumed 
without delay.  Guineas were being bought up on account 
of  the excess of  paper ;  the paper was  declining  in  value 
compared  with  guineas  and  as a  necessary  result  the 
guineas were being exported. 
In spite of  this the Act of  Restriction was prolonged until 
RIarch  a st,  1803.  Naturally the exchanges did not improve 
in  the  interval,  and  arguing  from  the  same  principle, 
Addington  proposed  a  further  continuation.  This  he 
secured, and as the mar broke out again shortly after, there 
was no further question of  repealing the Act of  1797, which 
remained in force until  1819. 
'I'his  time  however  the prolongation  was  not  agreed to 
without discussinn.  Fox points out2 that arguments of  this 
' Ptrrl.  Ilist., Vtrl.  SSSVI., p. 540. 
S(*I,  illis  S~C'CCII in  I'uri.  lli~t.,  \.101.  SSxVI. (the lust), pp.  1150-1153. 
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kind would logically establish it as an axiom that cash pay- 
ments ought to be suspended whenever the exchanges were 
41 so unfavourable  as to leave no room to expect the importa- 
tion  of bullion."  "  Perhaps even,"  he went on, "  it might 
happen that the unfavourable turn of  the exchange against 
this country might be owing to the very  restriction  on the 
nank. . . . In 1772, or 1773, when there was a great quantity 
of bad  money  in the  country, the course of  exchange was 
then  much  against us; but  when,  in  the room of  this 
adulterated money  good  gold  was  substituted,  the conse- 
quence was that the exchanges  turned almost imnlediately 
in our favour.  As long as our currency continued  bad, the 
exchange was against us; so is it now, because paper is not 
much better than bad gold; or, it is attended with  the same 
inconveniences.  hlay it  not therefore he expected,  that as, 
in the former case, when our currency was ameliorated, the 
course of exchange turned in our favour, so also if the Bank 
now  resumed  its cash  payments the  same  favourable cir- 
cumstances might attend tlie  change?'!.' 
The theory  thus suggested by  Fox was  expounded with 
much  skill and clearness  in  the  House of  Lords i~y  Lord 
King, who, a few months later,= gave an admirable exposi- 
tion  of  the  principles upon  which  a paper currency ought 
to be based.  In his opini~n,~  "  The natural and only true 
limit of  every  paper currency was the power  of con~pelling 
paymcnt in  specie, . . .  paper currency not convertible into 
specie had  no rule or standard except tile discretion  of  the 
Persons by whom it was issued.  To determine the quantity 
of currency necessary for circulation was in a11  cases a diffi- 
cult  and delicate problem.  iZ  very  strict  attention  to  the 
price  of bullion,  and  the state of  the foreign  exchanges, 
' P.  1153.  This  \\.as  thc  first  tinic  that  thr  cnttscs  of  ~~nfnvournblr 
P"~~l:l~lfi("s  wt~l-o  sc.t  forth  in  thc  House  of  Commons.  Fox  has  bccw  tiiuch 
Pr?is('d for  his  rcfcrcnre  to  thc  subject,  and  his  biographers  also  mnlce  a 
Point  of the  fact  that  it  was  he  who first  quoted  Adam  Srnith  in  a  Parlia- 
lllClltar~  dcbntc.  It  is unfo~.tunatr  that  in  thc  first case his statemcnt  of the 
was  ~~cccdingly  hcsitntinf,  and  that  in  the  second  he  rcferrcd  to  a 
boolc  \vhich  hc  afterwards  conft.sst,d  never  to  have  rend.  For  thc  second  Point  the  Z)irlionary  of  Naliowol  Iliogrophy  undrr  '' Adnn~  Smith." 
'  On Drcrmbcr  13, 1803. 
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was alone capable of  affording a just  criterion by which the 
quantity could be truly ascertained."  In  the present case 
it was evident from the derangement in the price of  bullion 
and  in  the  foreign  exchanges  that  the  directors  had 
exceeded the proper limit. 
The question  discussed  before  Parliament  had  already 
attracted the notice of  the public in the following way. 
We know  that the exchanges were  favourable up to the 
end  of  1799.  The  price  of  gold  was  maintained  at 
£3  17s. 6d. an ounce.  A  bad  harvest and some serious 
failures at Hamburg led to a great exportation of  coin and 
entirely changed the situation.  The price of  bullion'  rose 
to 44  5s. an ounce, and the exchange on Hamburg fell  14 
per cent.  below  par,  whilst  the cost  of  transporting gold 
was not more than 7 per cent. 
These  phenomena  were  only to  be  explained  by  the 
depreciation  of  the  currency; but  at  the time  their  cause 
entirely escaped the notice of  the stupefied public.  Macleod 
gives the following excellent analysis of  the prevailing state 
of  mind: "  We have already seen  that.  in the great mone- 
tary crisis of  1696-97,  it was  universally acknowledged  by 
Parliament  and the  most  eminent merchants,  that  it  was 
the bad state of  the coinage which produced  the great rise 
in  the market  price  of  bullion  and  the  heavy  fall  in  the 
foreign exchanges.  . . .  At that time Bank notes were not a 
legal tender, and the language invariably applied to them, 
when their current value differed from their nominal value, 
was that they were at a discount. . . .  There is no trace of 
anyone having thought of  saying that it  was the notes that 
denoted the pound sterling, and that bullion had risen.  . . . 
Adam Smith laid it down as a principle that any permanent 
difference betxeen the market and the Mint price of  bullion 
must be  necessarily caused by the condition of  the coinage 
itself;  and Hume had  observed  that  the  exchange  never 
could vary  but little beyond  the cost of  the transportation 
of  specie.  . .. .  Such were  the truths established,  when  a 
' Since  the  cspori  of  gold  coin  was  forbidden,  gold  bullion  was  the  only 
Illc,:in.;, csccpt  smugglitlg, of conducting transactions  abroad, hence the  true 
condition of  the  foreign c%xchangcs  must bc  estimated by  its value. 
rnetaHic currency was the only one thoughtof, in estimating 
value.  But at this time a new  principle was introduced- 
'there  was  what  was  substantially  an inconvertible  paper 
currency."  What rules were to be applied to this new form 
of money? 
The  question  did  not  at  first  arise,  for "  the general 
of  bankers and merchants to support  the credit 
of the Bank, the determination of the Government to receive 
Bank notes in payment of  taxes at their par value, and the 
gfeat caution  exercised  by  the  directors  during  the  first 
few years after  the  restriction,"  removed the apprehension 
which had been generally felt that as soon as the suspension 
took  place  the  Bank notes would  be  depreciated,  and for 
some time the notes circulated at par. 
It  was  not  until  after  the  crisis  of  1800 that  the 
great truth  was suspected, "  that  if  a  deterioration  of  the 
coinage produced a rise of  the market price of  bullion above 
the Mint price,  and a fall in the foreign exchanges under a 
metallic currency,  then  that  the  opposite  proposition  was 
also necessarily true.  That under a paper currency, which 
was  only  the  representative  of  a metallic  currency,  if  the 
market price of  bullion  . . .  exceeded the  Mint price,  and 
the  foreign exchanges  fell  beyond  the  cost  of  the  trans- 
mission  of  specie,  that  excess could  only  arise  from  the 
depreciation  of  the representative of  the metallic currency, 
and,  therefore,  when  these  circumstances  occurred,  they 
infallibly  indicated  that  the  paper  currency  was  depre- 
ciated."' 
It is not clear who ought to be credited with the discovery 
of this important truth.  Walter Boyd, in  his letter to Pitt,' 
was certainly  the first to state it.  Boyd guessed, from the 
effects of  Pitt's  policy,  although the  amount of  the issues 
was kept secret,  that the  number of  notes must  have been 
increased;  and, in actual fact, in  1801,  when  his pamphlet 
' Maclcod,  3rd  Edition,  VoI.  II., pp.  2-4, 
A  lel,ev  io rne Rigkt Hoirournble  W.  Pitt  on the influence of  the stoppage 
the issues in Specie,  ctc.,  a  work  to which wc have  rcafcrred  above. 214  IIISTORY  OF THE  BANI<  OF ENGLAND. 
appeared,  this  increase  exceeded  three  millions.'  Boyd's 
pamphlet served to call attention to the matter, and it was 
followed by the more complete works of  l'hornton  and Lord 
King.2 
A  financial crisis  in  Ireland  very  soon  afforded  oppor- 
tunity for defining and completing this theory. 
Filtan.cia1 crisis in I~cland.~  In spite of  the fact that the 
exchanges were  favourable to  ~relahd and  that gold was 
plentiful there, the Uank of  Ireland was ordered to suspend 
its cash payments by an Act passed by the Irish Parliament, 
which followrd on the Act of  I 797  and was prompted solely 
by a mania for uniforn~ity. 
-The exchange  at  Dublin  on  London  had  always  been 
favourable  to  Ireland,  and  this state of  things continued 
until  1797.  Then  the situation suddenly changed,  and a 
steady  fall  began,  which  was  stated  by  Lord  Archibald 
Hamilton4  to coincide with  an increase in the issues of  the 
Bank of  Ireland:  these  had  been  ~~600,000  in  1797, and 
were  now  £2,  j00,ooo.~  Moreover there was a difference of 
10 per cent. in  the exchanges at Dublin and Belfast, which 
were only  loo miles  apart, and the exchange  on  London 
was  20 per  cent. against  Dublin.  At  the same time,  the 
price of  gold rose,  and guineas could only be  bought at a 
premium of  2s.  6d. 
A  committee was  appointed  to  inquire into the state  of 
the Irish currency.  It included the lead in^ statesmen of  the 
day and  was  the first committee appointed  by  the  British 
Parliament to make an  inquiry into tlic paper currency. 
l'hc  increase  was  not  largc, but  the organis;~tion  of  the currency  was so 
delicate that  the  slightest slioclc was enough to disturb  it. 
'  We  have  frequently  referred to  Thornton's  /In  Enqwiry  into  tlre  nature 
nt~d  effects of  tlte paper  credit.  1.01.d King's pa~ill)hlrt  only  :~pprarcd  in  ~Sog, 
alter his spccchcs : we sh:~ll  discuss it prcscntly. 
'  Mr.  Bastablc kindly called my attrntion to a worl;  by  John 1,rslic Fo.;icr, 
Essay  on  the  Principle  of  Comt~~erctal  E.r,,/tarrgcs, t~rorc  parlirulorly  on  the 
relations  betweett  Englarld  and  Ircluird  (~Soj).  Unfortunately  thc  British 
Muscum,  though  possessing  other  worl;s  ntld  sprcch~~s  by  Fostcr,  has  no 
copy of this.  An  analysis of  it is givcn in  the  1)iclrorrury  of  l'olitical  Econotlty, 
Vol.  II., p.  121.  Dillon's  boolc  (llistory  of  Unn1;itrg  in  Ircluitd)  contains 
nothing of  intcrcst  about  this  crisis. 
'  Sce  Parl.  Debutes  for  February  13,  1804,  on  the  Irish  Restriction  Bill, 
pp.  108a-lng8. 
'  p. 1083. 
0pirtions  of  the  directors  of  the  Bank  of  Ireland. 
Amongst the witnesses who gave evidence  were  Mr.  Col- 
ville  and  Mr.  D'Olier,  directors  of  the  Uank  of  Ireland. 
The  former  explained  the  increase  in  the  issues by  the 
adverse state of the exchange;  the coin of  the country was 
esported  to pay  the balances of the remittances  and hence 
it was necessary to supplement the scarcity of  gold by paper. 
IJe did  not  believe  that  the  increase  in  the  issues  was  a 
cause of  the adverse exchange;  on  the contrary, the paper 
replaced  the gold  and alloued it  to  be  exported, hence  it 
was "  a clear and decided cause " preventing  the exchange 
from falling still lower. 
His companion  entirely  agreed  with  him.  As regards 
the depreciation of  the notes, they were of  opinion that "  the 
circulation said to be  depreciated  must  first  be  proved  to 
have  become  burdensome to the holders,  and  bargains  to 
have been made by unnecessary purchasers to get rid of  that 
which they  have found inconvenient, or were apprehensive 
to  hold.  The mere  buying of  gold at an advanced price 
beyond  that of  the Mint,  is the effect, and not  the cause, 
of  the exchange, and, therefore, no proof of  the depreciation 
c~f  the paper  itself."  Uoth the directors considered that the 
sole cause of  fluctuation  in  the exchange was an unfavour- 
able balance of  trade, in  other words,  the fact that Ireland 
oued more  money than she could pay. 
In reality  the basis of  their reasoning was entirely false. 
The inquiry heid by the committee showed that the balance 
of trade, instead of  being unfavourable to  Ireland,  was the 
opposite, and that in the only district in the country (Belfast) 
where  paper  money  was  tabooed,  the  exchange  was  un- 
favourable to  Great  Britain. 
In short, a theory was beginning to be currcnt in  Ireland 
which  was soon to prevail in  England; it  nlay he  suln~ned 
up  thus :-It  is  inaccurate  to  speak  of  dcpreciatt,d  paper 
money;  the paper is not  depreciated  but the price o?  gold 
has increased.' 
Tllis  thcory  was  vigorously  disputed  by  Mr.  Marshall,  the  Inspector- 
Gcncral  of  Imports  and  Exports  at  Belfast.  He pointed  out  that  the  Dublin 
e~cllangcrs  were  selling guincas at the  rate  of  a  paper  guinea  plus  as.  zd., 
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With regard to the regulation of  the issues, the directors 
of  the  Bank  of  Ireland  suggested  the  following  theory, 
which was afterwards adopted by the directors of the Bank 
of England : "  that the issues of  a bank should be governed 
on  totally  different  principles  under a  convertible and an 
inconvertible paper  currency."'  That in  the  first case the 
issues  ought  to  be  regulated  according  to  the  price  of 
guineas  and the  rate of  exchange on  London,  and  that, 
supposing there  to  be an unusual  demand for guineas, or 
an adverse  exchange,  the  issues  should  be  decreased  in 
order to stop the withdrawal of  coin. 
Rut  in  the case of  an  inconvertible currency a different 
policy would be adopted.  A bank, under prudent manage- 
ment, might issue notes in proportion to the demands made 
on it, and without taking into account the rate of  exchange 
and the price of  guineas;  always provided  that  the  notes 
were  issued  in  exchange  for  real  and convertible  assets, 
such  as  commercial  bills  of  undoubted  solidity,  payable 
at fixed dates, and based on actual commercial transactions. 
After  prolonged  consideration  the  committee  decided 
that  the  paper  was  depreciated  and that  the  theory  that 
gold had increased in value was absurd.  Thc report added 
that normal  fluctuations in  the rate of  exchange could  not 
exceed  those  in  the cost  of  transporting specie  from  one 
country to another, and hence  that any increase in  excess 
of  this cost must be  due to other causes.  In  reference  to 
this  the  report  pointed  out the  enormous  increase  in  the 
Irish issues, which, since the Restriction Act, had not been 
restrained by the convertibility of  the notes. 
The con~mi  ttee  after suggesting some minor  remedies, 
in  particular  the  assimilation  of  the  English and lrish 
currencies,'  advised  the  directors  to  regulate  their 
in  gold or I3ank  of  England notcs, whilst.it  cost L116  in  lrish paper  money, 
and that this difference existed  whatever the nature of  the goods  purchased. 
If  this fall of  lo or 12 per cent.  in  prices  wcre due to the increased  value of 
gold  the  effect  would  necessarily  be  to  attract gold  from  England,  for  the 
precious  ~iietal  could  not  remain  in  a  country  where  its  value  contiliucd 
btationary.  Morcover  the  Uank  notcs,  which  were  issued  at par  with  the 
coin, should have risen pari  passu  with it, so that one could  be  exchanged for 
the other.  Sincc the contrary had  happened,  there had  been  a  fall  in  the 
original value  and thus depreciation. 
Macleod,  3rd  Edition,  Vol.  I!.,  p.  17. 
'  Also Irish  Uank notcs wcre to be payable in  Banlc of  England  notcs and 
the Uank of  Ireland was to keep a deposit account at London for this purpose. 
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issues  in  future upon  the price of guineas and the  foieign 
exchanges. 
The presentation of the report on the Irish currency does 
not appear to have aroused much interest,  and it had little 
effect.  The issue of notes of  a value below AI was indeed 
forbidden in Ireland in  1805, but a proposal, made in  1809, 
by  Mr.  Parnell,  to  assimilate the English and Irish  cur- 
rencies,  was  rejected  without  discussion.  Moreover  the 
report  itself  was  not  printed  until  1826.  It must however 
have been communicated to the Bank of  Ireland, and appar- 
ently had some influence upon it, since the directors reduced 
their issues from 3 to 24 millions during the months of  May, 
June, and  July,  1804, and  the  exchanges  were  affected 
thereby;  but  the  improvement was short-lived  for  in  the 
succeeding months  the directors relapsed into their former 
errors. 
Some time  afterwards,  Fox took  advantage of  Adding- 
ton's  statement  that  the  over-issue  of  notes  led  to  their 
depreciation, to congratulate him' and to assert triumphantly 
that  the  House  would  never  hear  again  the  fantastical 
opinion that the  paper  was  not  depreciated but  the value 
of  gold increased. 
We shall see later how far this prophecy  Mas  fulfilled. 
It must be  noted, however,  that Addington continued  to say that it  was 
heresy  to  believe  that  the  depreciation  of  the  paper  could  influence  the 
exchanges. 
'  With  regard  to  the  theories  suggested  by  the  Act  of  1797  see  Lord 
King's  Thoughts oft the  Restriction of  Payments  in Specie  at  the  Banks  of 
Etlgland  Lord  and  King,  Ireland  writing  (1803).  of  the  Irish crisis,  anticipates  Ricardo in  his  statc- 
mcnt  of  the  true  method  of  demonstrating  the  depreciation  of  a  paper 
currency : "  A  rise  of  the market or  Paper  price  of  gold  above  the  Mint 
price, and a  fall in  the foreign  exchanges beyond  the cost of  sending bullion 
from one place to another, is the proof  and the measure of the depreciation 
of  the  Paper  money."  (See  Stephens,  Contribution to  the  Bibliography  of 
the  Bank  of  Englatrd,  p.  34, the account of Kjng's.pamphlet).  Lord King's 
pamphlet  is  followed  by  a  very  useful  append~x,  gtvtng  the rates of  the ex- 
change with  Hamburg, Paris,  and  Dublin, and the prices of standard  silver 
since 1789. 
This little  work,  which  is  superior  to those  of  Boyd  and  Thornton,  has 
since been  thrown  into the shade by  Ricardo's  pamphlet,  The high price  of 
Bullion  a Proof  of the depreciation of  Uank notes (1810).  This was originally 
Published in thc forni of  letters jn  the Morning Chronicle.  The first appearcd 
on  September  g,  1809.  See  McCulloch's  one  volume  edition  of  Ricardo's 
works,  pp.  261-290.  See  also another of  Ricardo's  writings on  the subject 
which  is  published  in  the same cdition, pp.  303-360,  A  Reply  to Mr. Bosun- 
'Pet's Practical  Observations. CHAPTER  V. 
THE  BULLION  COMMIT'SEE  AND  THE 
BUL1,ION  REPORT. 
Appointment  of  thc  Bullion  Committee.  Thc  Berlin  Decree  and  the  Spanish 
Wars.  Speculation  due  to  these  events.  Inlprudrnt  policy  of  the  Hank. 
Crisis of  1800.  Appointment  of  a  Comtnittee of  Inquiry.  l.11~ Bullion 
Rcport.  Corhpnrison with  thc  Irish  Crisis  in  1804.  'I'he  prob1t.t~ put 
beforc  the  Bullion  Comtnittee.  Discussion  on  the  depreciation  of  the 
notcs.  Discussion on  the effects of  inct.casing the  note  issue.  Discussion 
on  thc  effects  of  decreasing the  note  issue.  Discussion  on  the  policy  to 
be adoptcd with  regard to the  Issues.  Conclusions of thc  I3ullion  Rcport. 
Discussion  of  the  Bullion  Rcport  in  Parlialnrnt.  Sperchcs  of  Horner, 
Roe,  Thornton,  Vansittart  and  Canning.  fiorncr's  resolutions  thrown 
out,  those of  Vansittart  passcd. 
A .-APPOINTMENT  OF  THE "  BULLION  COMMITTEE." 
WE have seen that  the Bank of  England avoided the folly 
of  over-issue during the first years of  the Restriction Act. 
The  prudence  of  the  directors,  the  moderation  of  the 
Government  demands, the  wisdom  and  patriotism  of  the 
commercial world,  all combined  to save the  English  notes 
from the  fate of the Irish  issues.  The inconvertible  Bank 
notes  circulated  at  par,  and  the  most  celebrated  of  the 
French economists has justly  remarked that this was one of 
tlie best experiments in political economy ever made.  This 
admirable state of things continued even after Pitt's death, 
but  did  not  long  survive him;  a  succession  of  political 
events combined  with  a change in  the  policy  of  the  Bank 
suficcd  to transform everything.  .  .  I lie  transformation  began  with  the  Berlin  and  Milan 
decrees.  These had the effect of  closing all European ports 
to England, with  the exception  of  the  Swedish.  England 
responded by a series of  similar measures, which served to 
prohibit  the  importation  of  a number of  French  products 
and of products of  countries under  the direct  influence of 
France, such as Spanish wools and Italian silks, and hence 
encouraged  speculation  in  all  such  goods.  Moreover  the 
blow given by these measures to the rights of  neutrals nearly 
led to a nar wit11 America, and thc  possibility of this new 
war  caused  an  artificial  rise  in  the  prices  of  American 
products, especially tobacco and cotton. 
Speculation, favoured by tlie scarcity of  commodities, was 
still further stimulated by the following facts : 'She  invasion 
of  Portugal,  and later of  Spain, by  the French, gave prac- 
tical  indepc~idence  to  the  colonies  of  thcse  two  countries 
and  hence  opened  the  South  American  ports  to  English 
products,  which  had  hitherto  been  entirely excluded  from 
them.  This offered a wide field to speculatio~l  and the oppor- 
tunity  \\.as seized  without  delay.  Very  soon  there  was  a 
repetition  of  the events of  1720.  Joint-stock  companies of 
all kinds were  formed to  construct canals and bridges, to 
found breweries and insurance compa~iics  and to carry out 
undertakings  of  every  kind  imaginable.  'She  Uank  of 
England,  instead  of  applying  the  curb,  encouraged  the 
prevailing  fever to the  full.  Sir F. Baring  stated  in  his 
evidence before the Bullion Committee, that he knew several 
clerks  not  worth  ,&loo, who, since  the  restriction, had set 
up as merchants, and to whom thc Bank had granted credit 
accounts of  5 to 10  thousand pounds ; these accounts had no 
connection  with  tlie  real  requirenlents of trade, and would 
never have been opened if it liad not bcen for the suspension 
of  cash payments.' 
The value of  the paper  discounted  by  the  Bank, which 
was  £2,946,500  in  1795,  was  Lrg,47g,ioo  in  1809,  arid 
£20,07o,ooo  in  1810.  Nor  was  tliis all.  The speculative 
mania coincided with  an increase of  country banks, which, 
as  in  1793, flooded  the  provinces  with  their  notes.  The 
numbcr  of  these banks,  which  in  I 797  liad  been  reduced 
to  270,  was 600  in  1808, and soon rose to 721.  It stood at 
the latter figure two years later when  tlie Bullion Committee 
was appointed.  During this same year (1810) the  Bank  of 
England had issued notes to the value of  ~21,ooo,ooo,  and 
the  issues of  tlie  country  banks  appear,  according to  tlie 
best  estimates,  to  have  exceeded  this  figure  and  reached 
30 millions. 
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basis, was accompanied by two phenomena already observed 
in  Ireland in  18o+-a  rise in  the price  of  gold, and a fall 
in the exchange.  These two phenomena assumed disquiet- 
ing proportions;  the price of  guineas rose to  26s.  or 27s. 
On February  st, 1810, Mr. Horner demanded explanations 
from  the  Government.  At the  conclusion  of  his  speech, 
the I-Iouse decided to make an inquiry into the causes of  the 
rise  in  the price of  bullion  and the  famous Bullion  Com- 
mittee was charged with this task. 
The Bullion Committee included some of  the most com- 
petent among the  Members of  Parliament, such as Messrs. 
Baring,  Huskisson,  Horner,  and Foster,  but  it  contained 
fewer  political celebrities than the committee of  1804, with 
whom it  had only two members in conimon,  Mr. Sheridan 
and Mr.  Foster. 
The  report  of  this  committee,  drawn  up  by  Horner, 
Huskisson  and Thornton, has become celebrated under the 
name  of  the "  Bullion  Report."" 
RIacleod2 rightly  points  out  that  although  the  Bullion 
Report  made  a  great  stir,  and threw  into  the  shade the 
report of  1804, yet  both  deal  with  similar  facts,  state the 
same theories, and draw the same conclusions. 
The greater success of  the second of  these two reports is 
probably due to the fact that  it referred  to matters of  more 
general interest, and that it was drawn up more scientifically 
and in  a more literary form.  In addition  to the  points of 
likeness already noticed  it may  be remarked that a strong 
analogy  existed  between  the  evidence collected  on the two 
occasions.  In  both  cases  the  witnesses  examined  were 
drawn  from  four  classes : (I)  Bank  directors,  (2)  private 
bankers, (3) merchan&,  (4) independent witnesses.  Further, 
the evidences given by the English Bank directors and mer- 
' For  the  Report  and  the  Minutes  of  Evidence  see  Parl.  Debates,  Vol. 
XVII., Part  VllI., p.  ccii., cl scq. 
'  See  the  masterly  analysis  of  the  Bulliotr  Report  given  by  this  author, 
op. cit., 5558-80. 
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,-hantsl agreed with that of  their  Irish  colleagues in  1804 : 
they,  too,  maintained  that the price of  gold  had risen and 
that  the  paper  was  not  depreciated,  and  held  the  same 
theories as to the  regulation  of  the  issues and the various 
other points in the controversy. 
The  problem submitted to the Bullion Committee.  What 
was the exact point of  dispute which  the committee had to 
decide ? 
It was as follows :a  Three facts were agreed upon :  (I)  that 
whilst the Mint price of  gold bullion ought to be A3  17s. 6d. 
an ounce, the market price had risen to A4 10s ;  (2) that the 
foreign exchanges had fallen below par,  14 per cent. in the 
case of  Paris, g per cent. in  that  of  Hamburg, and 7 per 
cent.  in  that of  Amsterdam; (3) that  whilst  the  note-issue 
was  increasing, specie  had  disappeared  from  circulation. 
There was however  no agreement as to the causes of  these 
facts, and the controversy centred chiefly round  four points 
which we shall consider in order : 
I.-Whether  the notes were depreciated,  or whether, on 
the contrary, the price of  gold had actually risen. 
2.-Whether  the increase in  the  issue  had any influence 
upon  the rate of  the exchanges. 
3.-\%'hat  effect a restriction of  the issues would  have on 
the price of  gold and the rate of  the exchanges. 
4.-What  policy ought to be followed with regard to the 
regulation of  the issues. 
These are the four points which  formed the object  of  the 
Bullion  Committee's investigations  and were dealt with  in 
the conclusions of  the  Bullion Report. 
$1.-The  depreciation  of  the  notes.  The condition  of 
England in  1810  was exactly  like  that  of  Ireland  in  1804, 
with  one  exception.  In  Ireland  the  bank-notes  were 
obviously  depreciated : there were two  prices in  trade,  the 
one in  notes, the other in coin,  and there existed  shops in 
which guineas were sold for bank-notes at a higher nominal 
I.  The  merchants had something  to gain  from  the  victory of  the  directors' 
theory,  for  it  was  natural  that  they  should  wish  to  sect  their  bills  discounted 
in the largest  nnumbc*rs possibl,,, and  thrre  wrr(. frwrr  facilities for  this  when 
the  notes  were convertible. 
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value.  This was not  the case in  England,' partly  because 
Banlc  notes were  accepted  at their  face  value,  but  mainly 
owing  to  the  fact  that  it was  a criminal  offence  to  sell 
pinias at more than  PIS.  and the  law  in  this matter  was 
not  a mere dead  letter.  About  this  time  a  nian  named 
YoungZ  narrowly escaped the penalty imposed.  IIad it not 
been  for  this there would  have been  two prices for  every- 
thing as there had been  in Ireland.  As it was no onc paid 
for bullion in  guineas, but only  in paper. 
Apart  from  this  the  problem  was  the  same  and  the 
doctrine that the notes were not depreciated found numerous 
and determined  supporters.  One of  these,  hlr. Cliambers, 
a  well-known  merchant,  defended  it  with  ren~arkable 
ability.' 
Mr.  Chambers  was  willing  to  recognise  that  forced 
currency affected  the  exchanges,  but  he  did  not  conceive 
it possible that a currency which  was not  forced could  be 
excessive:  there  nas no  forced  currency  so  long  as the 
paper mas a.cceptcd willingly, whicli was only the case when 
the  said  paper  \\as not depreciated.  In  the  same  nay, 
altllough hlr. Chambers believed tliat an excessive increase 
in tlic metallic currency, such as might result,  for instance, 
from tlie discovery of  new  mines,  would  raise  tlic price of 
a11  coniniodities, he denied tliat a sin~ilar  effect would follow 
nn  c.sccssive  incrcase  of  paper  money.  l'lic  latter  ~ould 
n~nintnin its  full  vnluc  because  paper  n1onc.y  could  not 
be  increased  l>eyond tlie  needs of  tlic  pul~lic,  who  wollld 
otl~erwise  refuse to exchange any article of  value. for n piecc 
of  paper. 
hlr.  Clian~l)crs,  under  pressure  of  questions,  ;~ftrr\~nrcls 
At  11-:tst in grncral, but nl;iny  inslanccs to the contrary  wvrr  suppli~-cl  by 
Mr111b1,rs  of  Pal-li:~nicnt  during  the  drbatrs  on  thc  nullion  Rrport.  SILI, 
b~.low,  pp.  232  2nd  23% 
Soriir timc:  afterwards the Court of  Common I'lcbas  nnnull~d  t11v  s~.~it~.ncr 
prono1111crd  on  Yot~ng  and  d~.citlc.cl  that  it  wits  not  cri.nin:~l to  st41  gtiin1.n.; 
:II  n  prrnli~~n~.  Morrovcr  thc only  c.flrct  of  reviving  an  obsolt.t~.  I:lw  w:ts 
to  c:tuscb  tllr  guinvns  to  bc  1111.ltc.d  into  blcllion.  This  \vas  ill~y!:~l,  I)11t 
11111  prolit  was  12s. an oilnrr, and pc~plct  prcfcrt.c*d to incur  a  pct~~alty  rnt111.r 
tl1;111 c.scl~:l~ig~.  their  guinrn.;  for  pn1)c.r.  'l'lius  tlir  g11i11r:is tli.;npp1>:11-c~l,  n~~cl 
tlirrcb  w:ls  cotr~l):~rativc.ly  lilll~.  opl>ot.l~ll~ily  lo Ir:~n.;fi~-~'s.;  t111-  I:I\\~  II~  ~*.l:~l)li\ll- 
it~g  t\vo 1wi1.c.s for con~t~~c~tlili~*s. 
I'ttrl.  1)t.h.. VuI.  S\'Ii., p. crcsr. 
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had  to acknowledge that, according  to  the Mint standard, 
the  price of  a one-guinea  note  was  5-dwts.  3-grs.,  whilst 
on  the  market  it  was  only  4-dwts.  ggrs.,  and hence  that 
the  Bank  note  was  not  exchangeable  for  the  amount  of 
gold  it represented.  But the  witness,  who  was  not  to  be 
embarrassed by  so  small a  difficulty,  added : "  I  do  not 
gold to he a fairer standard for Bank of  England 
notes than  ~ndigo  or broadcloth." 
The reply  might  have  been  that  a  Bank  note  was  a 
promise to pay  a definite weight of  gold of  a certain stan- 
dard, but  that  it  could not  be said to represent  any given 
quantity of  indigo;  hence, as soon as it was not worth the 
5-dwts.  3-grs.  of  standard  gold,  it  was  depreciated. 
Chambers'  mistake,  and that of  all who  agreed  with  him, 
was that he had come to believe that  the paper money was 
the  real  measure  of  all  commodities  and that  gold  was 
only one of  those  comn~odities  whose  value is determined 
by  reference to this invariable and u'niversal standard. 
This is the theory which Canning ridiculed with so much 
eloquence  and whose untenability  was sufficiently exposed 
in the Bullion Report.  According to the report  the notion 
that  the  market price of  gold could exceed  the Mint  price 
was due to a misconception.  Gold was the measure of  value 
in  this country.  Commodities were  thought  to  be cheap 
or  dear according to the greater or lesser  amount of  gold 
for which they were exchangeable.  "  But a given quatttity 
of  gold will never be exchaltged for  a greater  07  a less qua,)- 
tity of  gold  of  the same stasda7d fineness "'  except there be 
a slight difference depending on special causes.'  An ounce 
'  p.  ccix. 
'  The difTcrence rnight for instance arise from  the grcatcr convcniencc of 
having  coin  rather  than  bullion.  The  Report  also nlcntions  other possiblct 
cnusrs :  thc  dctrrioration  of  the  coinagc,  thc  delay  involved  in  111intinfi 
the coin, obstacles to exportation,-the  two latter causes cornbincd  producing 
an  actual diffcrcncc  of nearly  5) per  cent.  None  of  thcsc  cause.;  ruistcd  at 
Hamburg with  rrgard to silvcr, the currency there being of a  dcfinitcly  fiurd 
wc%ight  and  of  standard  fincncss and  no  opposition  bring  nindc  to cxporta- 
lion.  In  Ihgland,  the  Rrport concludes,  the  difference  had  nrvrr  rxc~~dcd 
5i  Prr cent. $0 long as the Bank paid  in gold and thc coin  was of  full  weight.  .  '111'  .  dlflcrrncta  111ig11t  have  brrn grcatrr in  countrirs whcre the  Mint  chargrd 
lhl' r-\l)l,n,l,, of 111a1;ing the coin, but  in  England pcoplr  only  had  to ~uITrr 
'I  of inter1.4t for tllr  ti111c dltring \\hit.h  tlic coin  was krpt at 111~  Mitit. 224  HISTORY  OF  THE BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
of standard gold could never fetch more than 43  17s. 14d. 
on the market unless A;3  17s. 14d.  in our currency contained 
less than an ounce of  gold. 
Since  the  suspension  of cash  payments  however,  gold 
had  partially  ceased  to  be  the measure  of  value,  and the 
only standard was the circulating medium, issued partly by 
the Bank of England and partly by  the country  banks- 
a circulating medium whose value varied only in proportion 
to its quantity.  It was most desirable that its value should 
correspond to that of  the real and legal standard, gold. 
Finally, the Bullion Report compared the state of  things 
under  a  depreciated  metallic  coinage  with  that  under  an 
inconvertible  and  excessive  credit  currency  and  showed 
that the  two produced the same effects, i.e., a general rise 
in prices, including that of  gold, and a fall in the exchanges 
on all countries except those which  had  an equally depre- 
ciated currency. 
$11.-The  possible  effects  of  an increase  of  the  issues 
t~pon  the  rate  of  exchange.'  In  order  to  discuss  this 
the report  began  by  stating, as an indisputable principle, 
that the difference of  the exchange between  two places can- 
not  exceed  the expenses of  transport,  that  is,  the charge 
for  freight and insurance.  Dangers  in  war  time  might, 
of  course,  increase  these  expenses.  But  the  evidence 
collected  showed  that  the  total cost  of  sending bullion  to 
Holland  did not  exceed  7  per  cent.,  and that  of  sending 
it to Paris was still less.  The depression of  the exchange 
had,  however,  been  20 per cent.,  and the problem  was  to 
account for this fall of  13  per cent., which was independent 
of  the  cost  of  transport.  It  could  only  be  explained  by 
the depreciation of  the currency. 
It  was  said,  indeed,  that  the  difference  was  due  to  a 
demand for  gold on  the Continent.  But  if  this were  SO, 
the price of  the  metal must  have risen  to a like degree on 
the Continental markets, and it was clear that no such rise 
had taken place. 
One witness,  who gave evidence on  two occasions  under 
pp.  ccxv.-ccxxvii. 
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the name of  "  a Continental merchant,"'  displayed a know- 
ledge  on  this  question  of  the  effect  of  Ehe  issues on  the 
which  might  well  have  been  envied  by  his 
English colleagues.  He considered that  as the balance of 
trade was considerably  in favour of  England,= the  fall in 
the  exchange  could  only  be  accounted  for  by  excessive 
issues.  This effect of  excessive  issues,  he  remarks,  is of 
constant  occurrence; "  we  have seen  a  strong instarrce  of 
it  last  summer"  (i.e., the summer  of  18og),  in  Austria, 
when  "  a  considerable  additional  issue became  necessary, 
in consequence of  which  the exchange on that country fell 
an additional 50 per cent., and gold coin fetched from three 
to four times its nominal value there." 
5 I1  I .-The  influence which a decrease in the issues may 
have on the price  of  gold  and  the rate of  the exchange.  It 
is easy to see  after what has been said, that in the opinion 
of  the Bank directors such a decrease could have no influence 
whatever.  Obviously  if  an increase  of  issues is  thought 
to have no effect, a decrease must be equally fruitless. 
At the same time  it is clear that the decrease in the paper 
money would raise its value compared  with  all other com- 
modities,  including gold.  And, since  the market price of 
gold was determined entirely with  reference to the price as 
paid in  Bank notes, and not  in guineas, evidently a reduc- 
tion in  the quantity of  paper would  have reduced the price 
of gold expressed in paper, and would have tended to make 
the real value of  the notes correspond more closely to their 
nominal  value.  To raise  in  this  way  the  value  of  the 
currency  must,  if  the decrease was sufficiently large,  raise 
the exchange to par, and bring back  gold  into circulation. 
In addition to these theoretical  considerations, the  Bullion 
Report,  working out  the analogy between  a  metallic  cur- 
rency and a paper currency when both are alike depreciated, 
instanced,  amongst  others,  the  historical  example  of  the 
For his evidenc~  see Purl.  Debates, Vol.  XVII., Part VIII., pp. CCCXXXV. 
and cccliii. 
'  The following figures are given  in  the Bullion  Report,  p.  ccxxiii.  The 
balance of trade had been  favourable to England :- 
In  1805  by  A6,616,m.  1808  by  E12,481,ooo. 
1806  ,,  Ll0,437~0C'J.  1809  ,,  d1418341~4~0. 
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crisis of  1696-1697, when  the restoration of  the coinage had 
the effect of  lowering the price of  bullion  and of  restoring 
the rate of  exchange to par. 
5IV.-The  policy  to  be  adopted  in  regulating  the 
issues.  I rt  particular  the  question  whethe7  this  policy 
ought  to  vary  according  to  the  convertibility  or  incon- 
vertibility  of  tlte  notes.'  According  to  the  directors, 
there was no need after the restriction to regulate the issues 
by  reference to  the  price  of  bullion  and  the  foreign  ex- 
changes;  the only criterion  was the  demand for discount. 
The directorsa  and some of  the  merchants  were  eager  to 
establish a theory of  whose truth they felt assured, i.e.,  that 
an  over-issue was  impossible so long as the advances took 
the  form  of  discounts  of  "  paper  of  undoubted  solidity 
arising out of  actual commercial transactions, and payable 
at short and fixed periods." 
The Bullion  Committee set itself  to  refute this doctrine, 
which  had  already  been  supported  by  the directors of  the 
Bank of  Ireland.  According to  the  report : "  The fallacy 
upon which it is founded, lies in  not distinguishing between 
advance of  capita1 to  merchants  and an  additional  supply 
of  currency to the general mass of  circulating  medium.  If 
the advance of  capital only is considered as made to those 
who  are  ready  to  employ  it  in  judicious  and  productive 
undertakings, it is evident that there need be no other limit 
to the total amount of  advances than  what the means of  the 
lender and  his prudence in  the selection  of  borrowers may 
impose.  But,  in the present  situation  . . . every advance 
. . . becomes an addition, also,  to the  mass of  circulating 
medium.  In the first instance, when  the advance is made 
by  notes paid  in  discount of  a bill,  it is  undoubtedly  so 
much capital, so much power  of  making purchases,  placed 
in the hands of  a merchant  who  receives  the  notes;  and, 
if these hands are safe, the operation  is so far, and in  this, 
its first step, useful and productive to the public.  But . . . 
as soon as the  notes are exchanged by him  for some other 
article which is capital, they fall into the channel of  circula- 
' Rullion Report, p. cccxxviii., et seq. 
'  See in  particular  the  evidcncc of  Mr.  Whitmore, a  former  Govcrnor  of 
the  Bank  of  England,  and  of  Mr.  Pcarsc,  who was then  Governor. 
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tion, as so much circulating medium,  and form an addition 
to the mass of  currency.  The necessary effect of  every such 
addition to the mass is to diminish the relative value of  any 
given portion of  that mass in  exchange for commodities."' 
And,  since  the  notes  are  inconvertible,  they  cannot  be 
returned to the Bank by the free working of  economic laws, 
and the  increase  continues  in  existence  until  the  Bank is 
repaid the principal of  the bills originally discounted.  But 
before the  notes  are  thus paid  in,  fresh  issues  will  have 
already neutralised  the good results which  might have fol- 
lo%7ed from their return.  "  Each successive advance repeats 
the  same  process.  If  the  amount  of  discounts  is  pro- 
gressively  increasing,  the amount  of  paper  which  remains 
out  in circulation  over and  above  what  is wanted  for  the 
occasions of  the  public,  will  progressively  increase  also; 
and  the  money  prices  of  commodities  will  progressively 
rise."" 
7'he  report then gives various statistics as to the quantity 
of  notes in  circulation  at different periods.  But  it  denies 
that the quantity of  notes can be a test of  over-issue or the 
reverse.  Different commercial conditions  require  different 
quantities of  notes.  The state of  public credit must also be 
taken  into account,  and various  methods  of  economising 
the use of  money  may alter the quantity required  appreci- 
ably.  The only real  test is to  be found  in the  state of  the 
foreign exchanges and the price  of  bullion. 
Conclusions of  the Bullion Report.  hlacleod sums up the 
general conclusions thus :3 "  That at that time there was an 
excessive paper  currency, of  which  the  most  unequivocal 
symptom was the very high price of  gold bullion, and next 
to that  the  very  depressed  state of  the  foreign  exchanges. 
l'hnt  tlte excess was  to  he  attributed to  the  removal of  all 
control on  tlie issues of  the Rank  of  England by  the sus- 
pension of  cash  pnynitwt.  It was  grt.atiy  to  be  regretted, 
therefore, that this Act, wliicli at best was only intended to 
be  temporary,  had  been  continued  as  a  permanent  war 
' S1.r  hlnc~l(wc1,  \.'ol.  I  I.,  5th edi~ion,  pp.  269,  270. 
Mnclcod,  loc.  tit. 
'  Src- hl:n.lcod, 3rd  rdilion,  Vol.  II., pp. qj, 46. 228  HISTORY  OF THE BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
measure."  That the fatal results of  the existing  situation 
were too well known  to  need  description, and it was  more 
than likely that things would  get worse; the  integrity and 
honour of Parliament demanded, therefore,  that an immedi- 
ate remedy should be found. 
"  That the continuance of  this state of  matters held out 
a temptation to Parliament to have recourse to a depreciation 
of  the pold coin bv an alteration of  the standard, which had  " 
been  done  by  kany  governments  under  similar  circum- 
stances, and which might be the easiest remedy to the evil. 
But it  would  be a  great breach of  public faith  and of  the 
primary duty of  the-~overnment,  toprefer the reduction of 
the coin  down  to the  paper,  rather than the  restoration  of 
the paper  to  the legal standard of  the coin."  Some had 
proposed  to  remedy  the  evil  by a  legal  restriction  of  the 
Bank's  issues. but  such a measure would  be fruitless, be- 
cause the  required  proportion  could  never  be  determined, 
"  and even  if  it  were  so, might very much  aggravate  the 
inconveniences  of  a  temporary  pressure "; in  any  case, 
such an interference  would be incompatible with  the rights  - 
of  commercial property. 
"  The only  true  and proper  remedy  . . . was  ..  . . a 
resumption  of  cash  payments.  That, however,  was an 
operation of  the greatest delicacy, and it must be left entirely 
to the discretion of  the Bank. . .  Parliament should merely 
fix the time, and leave it to them to carry out the details." 
In any case, the committee judged  that an interval  of  two 
vears -would be  necessary  and-sufficient  to  conclude  the 
*atter  satisfactorily. 
This, then, is the Bullion Report; it stimulated the publi- 
cation of  a'  conlplete economic literature,'  and caused  long 
l  This literature is most abundant, and  it  would  be  a  considerable  under- 
taking to study  it in  detail.  It would  be  almost  impossible  to attempt here 
what  we  tried  to do  with  regard  to the literature advocating the  foundation 
of  the Bank.  Neither  is there anything new  to be  learnt from the pamphlets 
published  about  1810; they only  reproduce  the  well-known  arguments.  The 
most able criticism  of  the theories  contained in  the Bullion  Report is that of 
Mr.  Rosanquet,  who has given  an excellent summary of  the doctrines which 
we have already described, in  his Practical  Observations on the Report  of  the 
B~tllion  Committee.  This pamphlet is famous less for its own merits than on 
account  of  the crushing  reply  made  to  it  by  Ricardo.  See  Reply  to Mr. 
Bosatiquet's  Practical  Observations. 
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discussions  in  Parliament.  These debates must be  briefly 
considered.  But we shall not attempt any detailed analysis 
of the speeches, and we  shall only refer to those which raise 
not already dealt with. 
C --DISCUSSION OF  THE  BULLION  REPORT  IN  THE 
HOUSE  OF  COMMONS. 
The report was presented by Horner on June g, 1810.  It 
was not formally considered until the 6th of  May, 181  I. The 
discussion was opened by Mr. Horner, who spoke at great 
length.'  His speech  may  still  be  read  with  interest and 
pleasure;  in  it  he  stated  the  arguments which  we  have 
already sufficiently  discussed  and concluded by moving a 
series of  resolutions, of which  we  give the substance in  a 
note,l and which embody in the main the conclusions of  the 
Bullion  Report. 
Mr. Rose answered Mr. Horner in  another long speech,' 
stating  arguments  on  the  opposite  side  which  are  also 
familiar to us. 
The debate became  more  interesting when  it was taken 
up  by  Mr.  Henry Thornton,  in  the  most  original  of  the 
speeches * heard  by  the  House  on  the  subject.  In  his 
opinion  the  main  point  at  issue  was  whether  it  was 
'  The speech  lasted three hours.  It will  be  found  in  Parl.  Debates,  Jot. 
XIX., pp.  799-832. 
a  See pp.  830-832.  The first 7  resolutions  reterred  to  the legal  standard 
of  value  in  the  country.  8.-"  That the Promissory  Notes  of  the  Bank of 
England  are stipulations  to  pay  on  demand  the  sum  in  Pounds  Sterling 
respectively specified  in  each of  the said Notes."  9.-l'hat  when  Parliament 
passed  the  Restriction  Act  it  did  nbt  intend  that  any  alteration  should 
take place  in  the value  of  such  Notes.  lo.-That  it appears that they  have 
for a considerable time been below their legal value.  I ].-That  this fall "  has 
been  occasioned  by  too abundant Issue of  Paper Currency, both by  the Bank 
of England and by  the Country Banks."  12 and 13.-That  the extraordinary 
depreciation of  the foreign exchanges has brrn in  a great measure occasioned 
by  the depreciation  of  the  currency  of  this country.  '+-That  during  the 
suspension "  it is  the duty of  the  Directors of  the Banlc  of England to advert 
to the state of  the Foreign Exchanges as well  as to the price  of  Bullion  with 
a view  to regulate the amount  of  their  issues."  15.-That  the oqly  method 
of Preserving the paper currency  at its proprr value  is to make it  payable on 
demand.  16.-That  cash  payments  ought  to be  rpsurnrd  in  a  period  of  two 
Years from that time.  See hl3cleod,  5th  ~dition,  Val.  11 , p.  48. 
See pp.  833-895. 
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expedient  that  the  Bank  should  regulate  its  issues  with 
reference  to  the price  of  bullion  and the  state of  the ex- 
changes, and whether these were influenced by the quantity 
of  paper.  Iie set  himself  to  prove  the affirmative,  firstly 
by stating in his turn the principles contained in the Bullion 
Report, and then  by  the  help  of  a  number  of  historical 
exakples.  In particular, he referred to the case of  the Bank 
of  France as remarkably to the point.'  This bank was for- 
bidden  by  its  statutes  to lend money  to the Government, 
and the  latter  was  obliged  in  1805  when  the  war  again 
broke  out,  to  borrow  from  various  "merchants  and 
capitalists,  who  then  contrived  to  fabricate  among them- 
seives,  and proceeded  to  discount  at  the  Bank,  as many 
securities as were sufficient . . .  so that  the  Bank  was the 
true lender."  The consequence of  this transaction  was  a 
great increase  in  the paper of  the  Bank  of  France.  "  A 
drain of  their cash  followed;  the diligences were found to 
be carrying off  silver into the departients,  which the bank 
. . . had  continually  to bring back,  with  much  expense." 
It  was  obliged  at length  to stop  payment,  and  its  notes 
were at a discount of  10  per cent.  Almost immediately there 
was a corresponding fall in the exchanges.  The bank now, 
acting on the advice of  Dupont de Nemours, * the secretary 
of  a special  commission,  restricted  its issues.  In  three 
months'  time  payments  were  resumed  as usual  and the 
exchanges becake normal. 
Another  useful example of  conditions analogous to those 
in  England  was  supplied  by  the  Bank  of  Sweden. 
Thornton "riefly  described  the  Scandanavian  banking 
See p.  907.  For  the  causes  of  the  crisis of  1805 see also the  report of 
Dupont  de  Nenlours,  especinlly  pp.  48-55,  1-ondon  edition,  1811.  The  more 
recent work  of  M. V. dc Swarte should  also be  consulted : Les vingt pretnihrrs 
anndes de Id  Banque dc. France, p. 18, et seq. (author's note). 
'  The  secretary's  words  wcrr  as  follows : "  The  Bank  should  always 
draw  in  its  discoutlts as soon  as it  pc.rcclves the  existence  of  a  more  than 
ordinary  disposition  to  exchange  Bank  pnpc-r  for  ~~~otic~y.  For  what  nlean 
thc.sr applications for  money7  'I'hey  imply  that  thcrc  arc.  more  Bank  notes 
on the spot  than the  circumstances of  thc.  time dcniantl.  And  how arc you  to 
provide against this evil?  By dinlinishing  thrir quantity  through  a rrduction' 
which  shall  exceed the  new  emissions." 
The exact  titlr of  the Report  is, Sur In  Rancllre  dr Francr  r.1  lcs cuuses dr 
lu  <rise qu'clle  a  dprouvCe 
pp.  glo, y11. 
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system  and remarked  that although  the paper  money  was 
at a discount of nearly  70 per cent. after the suspension of 
cash  payments, "  the public in Sweden . . . were not fully 
of the  depreciation  of  their paper;  for many of 
their commodities, their iron  in particular,  had not risen  in 
any proportion to the fall of  their currency." 
In  Russia, too,  although  the rouble  had  fallen from  its 
original  value of  48 pence  to  that of  12 or  14 pence,  and 
it  was  known  that  the quantity  of  paper money 
had been largely increased, yet the Russian merchants and 
business  men,  amongst whom  the speaker had  lived for a 
long time, persisted  in ascribing the fall to an unfavourable 
balance  of  trade,  or  to  political  events  which  were  quite 
incapable of producing such a result.  The same  mistake 
was made by the American  public with regard to the crisis 
of  1720, which  was  entirely due to the excessive  issues of 
the American banks.' 
Mr. Thornton compared the public to a man  in  a  boat, 
"  who seems to see the shore departing from him.  . . .  In 
consequence  of  a  similar  prejudice,  we  assume that the 
currency, which is in all our hands, and with  which we our- 
selves are, as it were, identified,  is fixed,  and that the price 
of  bullion  moves."  Then  with  regard  to  the  balance  of 
trade, which Mr. Rose believed  unfavourable, Mr. Thornton 
refuted this opinion by  a previous statement made by  Mr. 
Rose  himself,  in  which  he  declared  how  uncommonly 
favourable  the balance  of  trade  had  been.  And,  in  fact, 
according to the annual  report of  the Custom  House, the 
balance in  favour of  England amounted  to &16,ooo,ooo. 
The second part of  Mr. Thornton's speech dealt with the 
standard  of  the  currency.  He showed that a permanent 
currency of paper  money  was  most  dangerous  in  that  it 
tended to swell the numbers of  those who advocated a return 
to  a  metallic  currency  combined  with  a  lowering  of  the 
standard.  "  The very argument of  justice,  after a  certain 
time,  passes over to the side of  deterioration  . . . if  eight, 
ten, or  even  fifteen or twenty  years, have passed  since tlie 
Paper  fell,  then  it  may  be  deemed  unfair to  restore  the 
See Marshall,  Ilistory  of  IVashinpton. 234  HISTORY  OF THE BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
Mr.  Horner's  resolutions,'  it  also  passed,  in  spite  of 
Canning's2 protests, a series of  counter-resolutions  moved 
by Mr.  lTansittart at the end of a  second speech.'  These 
resolutions,  contained  in  sixteen  articles,  included  such 
statements as that  Bank  notes "  have  hitherto been,  and 
are at this time,  held in public estimation to be equivalent 
to the legal coin  of  the realm."' 
The first resolution  was thrown out by  rga  voles to 75, and the remain- 
ing ones by  increasing majorities,  with  which  Robert Peel voted.  See Parl. 
Debates, p.  1169. 
'  At  the end of  his speech (see Parl. Debates, Vol.  XX.,  pp.  94-123)  Can- 
ning proposed  an amendment, which was rejected by  82 votes to 48.  Canning's 
two speeches have been  published under the title of  Substance of  two Speeches 
delivered  on  the 8th and  13th of  May,  1811. 
a  See Mr.  Vansittart's  second  speech, Vol.  XX., pp.  1-74. 
'  See the 2nd  and 3rd resolutions.  The statements are contrary to all the 
evidence. 
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SECTION  I.  - 
RESULTS OF  THE  REJECTION  OF  THE  BULLION 
REPORT.-ACTION  OF  LORD  KING.-THE  STANHOPE 
ACT. 
ONE  inevitable result followed from  the vote in  Parliament, 
to wit, that the Bank was encouraged to issue as many notes 
as  it  wished;  in  this way  it  could  make  prices  fluctuate 
continually, and the value of  land and of  everyone's income 
depended on its good pleasure. 
As  the  depreciation  of  notes  continued  to  increase, 
debtors had everything to gain by prolonging  the existing 
state of  things,  but creditors  were  being ruined.  Things 
reached  such  a pitch  that  Lord  King, as much to protect 
his own  interests as to  decide a  theoretical  question,  sent 
a circular to his farmers and tenants requesting to  be  paid 
for the  future either  in  gold or  "in  guineas,  in  Portugal 
gold  coin,"  or "  in  Bank  notes of  a sum sufficient to pur- 
chase at  the  present  market  price  the  weight  of  standard 
gold requisite to discharge the rent."'  The reason  for this 
action,  which  Lord  King also stated in  the  circular,  was 
that in  1807, when the farmers had agreed to pay "  in good 
and lawful  money  of  Great  Britain,"  gold  uas worth  A4 
an  ounce, but that  its present  value  was  A4  I~s.,  which 
meant a difference of  A17  10s. per L~oo. 
See the complete test of this circular given in  Lord  King's  speech  in  the 
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This claim  was  perfectly  legal,  since  the  Act  of  1797 
while authorising the Bank to suspend cash payments, had 
not  decreed  a forced currency.  It  was moreover  just,  for 
besides  the reasons given  by  Lord  King, there is another 
very  obvious  one:  the  price  of  the  farmers'  crops  was 
rising  whilst  they  were continuing to  pay  the  same rents 
in  depreciated notes. 
But  however  legal  and however just  the  request  might 
be,  it nevertheless completely  upset  the theory  which  the 
House had just  taken such pains to establish.  Lord Stan- 
hope'  brought in  a  Bill forbidding all differences  between 
payments  in  paper  and in  coin;  he  justified  this  by  the 
assertion  that  27s.  had  been  asked  for a  guinea,'  a  state- 
ment which  was confirmed by  Lord Holland, who opposed 
the Bill,.and which is an additional proof  of  the inaccuracy 
of  Vansittart's assertions. 
The Bill  was opposed  by  Lord  Gren~ille,~  a member of 
the Cabinet which  had  brought in  the Act of  Restriction, 
and by the Marquess of  Lansdowne, Lord  Grey and Lord 
King, who spoke in explanation of  his action in  the matter 
of  the ~ircular.~  It was  easy enough for these speakers to 
show that  since the inconvertibility of  the notes had been 
authorised, such a measure as the  present  would inevitably 
lead the way to a forced currency. 
As a matter of  fact, the Restriction  Act  led on  naturally 
to-  the passing of  the new  law  and ultimately  to a  forced 
currency.  This was  ably  demonstrated  by  Lord  Eldon, 
who supported the Bill.  1-Ie took as an illustration the case 
' Scgndal-mongcrs  alleged  that  Lord  Stanhope  owed  EIOO,MW),  and  that 
\\hen  hr pleaded  so earnestly on behalf  of  debtors he  was really pleading  Pro 
domo.  But  he  himself  made a  formal denial  of  the  accusations.-Parl.  De- 
bates, p.  762. 
Lord  Stanliope  thought  that "  there  was  no such  thing  in  this country 
as a  nirasurr  of  value  founded  on a  quantity of  bullion  of  standard fineness. 
l'hc.  Icgal  coin  was  the.  mor1r.y  with  the stamp upon  it.  . . .  If  Bank notes 
and  gold  bore  a  fixed  proportional  ratio to the  pound  sterling  by  law  they 
wvrr equal to  one anothvr, and  to prove this he  need  go no further than the 
first  book  of  Euclid,  where  it  w:~s laid  down as an  axiom  that  things  rqual 
to the 3nnle  thing arc equal  to one another."  '  It  \\.a$ on  tliis  orrn\ion that  (;rrnrillr  said that  the  day on  which  Mr. 
Pitt  :~nd  t~e  ti:111 bt+n  forcrd  1,)  proposrs tlir.  Kvztriction  :kt  was  on(. of  ttle 
1110st painful  in  thr-ir political life. 
51.1,  tliis \p~.c~.h,  pp.  iqo-814 
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of a young professional man  who  has to make his way  in 
the world.  Suppose that he has a private fortune of A3,ooo 
on deposit at the Bank, which ought to yield him an annual 
income  of  Ago.  His landlord demands his rent  in  gold, 
while the  Bank  refuses to pay  his  interest in  specie.  He 
may  reasonably ask whether  it  is  just  that  the  same law 
which forces him  to accept the notes also forces him to pay 
his  rent in  gold, when  he cannot obtain  any and is hence 
reduced,  if  not  to  prison,  at any  rate  to  the  sale  of  his 
property. 
Whatever may be thought of  these speeches, the Act was 
passed,1 and though originally its effects were  to .cease on 
&larch 25,  1812,  it was afterwards continued as long as the 
Act of  Restriction was in force. 
It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  things continued  as 
before  in  spite of  this Act, and  the  price  of  an ounce of 
gold rose to  10s.  But the law had a bad effect on  busi- 
ness.  Creditors of  long  standing lost 30  or  40  per  cent. 
of  their outstand:ng debts, and in particular,  those who had 
granted long  leases received  only  two-thirds of  their rent. 
The Bank did not restrict its issues, and country banks con- 
tinued  to  be  established,  hence  general  prices  went  on 
rising : the price of  corn indeed, reached a  level  hitherto 
unknown. 
SECTION 11. 
The conclusion of  the war, plentiful harvests and a great 
reduction  in  country bank  issuesa so  improved  the  situa- 
tion  that the  Bank  began  to consider the  possibility  of  a 
return  to  cash  payments.  By  November,  1816,  the 
directors had collected  so much  gold that they  announced 
'  'The  Act  was passrd  ii  the House of  Lords by  43  votes  to  16, and in  the 
Commons by 95  to zo.  Its form differed somewhat from that at first proposed 
by  Lord Stanhope, but it  would  be useless  to give details which  have  only a 
retrospective interest. 
This reduction was chiefly due to the failure of  89 country banks of  issue, 
which occurred between  1814 and 1815 ;  as a  result,  and in  proof  of  the truth 
of the principles  of  the  Bullion  Report, gold  fell  from A5  6s.  the ounce to 
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their  readiness  to  redeem  at  once  all  notes  issued  before 
1812, and in  April,  1817, all  those  issued  before January, 
1816.  People  hzd  however  grown  so accustomed  to  the 
notes  that  they did not  present them at the Bank,  and in- 
deed in many cases they preferred them to gold.  The partial 
resumption of  cash payments was nevertheless quite success- 
ful and preparations were being made for a general resump 
tion, when a steady demand for  gold made its appearance. 
This withdrawal  was  mainly due to  the big loans at high 
rates raised  in  England by the Continental States in  order 
to  replace  their  depreciated paper  currencies;  and also in 
part to a reduction  in  the interest  paid on  Exchequer bills, 
which caused these bills to lose some of  their popularity. 
The price of  gold began to rise,'  the Bank directors, far 
from  reducing their issues, made an advance of  28  millions 
instead of  20 millions to  the Government,  and the country 
banks displayed even  less intelligence.  Matters became  so 
serious  that  on  February  3,  1819, the two  Houses each 
appointed a committee  to  inquire into the  position  of  the 
Bank. 
The  two  committees  examined  a  certain  number  of 
witnesses on the subject  and the inquiry had a  surprising 
result.  Whereas in 1804 and 1810  the majority of  the com- 
mercial  world denied that the  issues had any effect on the 
foreign exchanges or on the price of  gold, in  1819  it was in 
entire agreement with the theories of  the Bullion Committee. 
This  may  be  seen  from  the  evidence  of  most  of  the 
witnesses, even  that  of  the governor,  the  deputy-governor 
and several other directors of  the Bank.  The general court 
of  the Bank directors was alone in maintaining the opposite 
opinion in spite of  everything, and on March 25th it passed 
an official resolution to give firm expression to its belief." 
The committees of  both  Houses agreed in recommending 
that after  February  the  t st,  1820,  the  Bank  should  be 
required  to deliver gold  of standard fineness in  quantities 
It  was A4  3s. an ounce  in  January, 1819. 
'  The  Bank  maintained  this  opinion  for  eight  years.  It  was  not  until 
1827 that this resolution  was solemnly expunged  from its books. 
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not  less than 60  bunces,  at £4  IS.  an  ounce;  that after 
October  the   st,  1820,  the  rate  should  be  reduced  to 
f;3  19s. 6d., and after May the  st, 1821, to the Mint price of 
gold, viz., £3  17s. 14d. This obligation to pay in bullion 
was  to  continue for  not  less than  two  and not  more  than 
three years after May  st, 1821, when cash payments should 
be resumed. 
The report  was presented to the House of  Lords on hlay 
~1st~  1819. Lord Harrowby very shortly afterwards brought 
forward, on behalf  of  the ministry,  some proposals  which 
embodied  those of  the  report.  These were  discussed,  but 
the debate was somewhat strangely diverted by a resolution 
moved by Lord Lauderdale to alter the Mint price of  gold to 
correspond  with  the  market  price.  Robert  Peel,  in  a 
masterly  speech,  demonstrated  (I) that it  was  essential  to 
resume cash  payments,  (2)  that  the  standard of  the coin 
ought not to be lowered.' 
With regard  to the first point  Peel freely acknowledged 
that  his  opinions had  undergone a  material  change since 
181  I.  Every sound writer agreed that the true standard of 
value consisted of  a definite quantity of  metal of  an equally 
definite fineness, with an inscription stating the weight and 
fineness.  KO doubt  the  Bank  was  perfectly  solvent,  but 
it did not  therefore follow that an over-issue of  paper  was 
an  impossibility.  If  solvency  alone  was  sufficient  proof 
that there was  no excess,  Law's  theory was just,  and the 
land as well as the funds might be converted into a circulat- 
ing medium. 
Peel strenuously opposed  any lowering of  the standard. 
His arguments were  as follows :-"  There could be  no in- 
convenience in compelling the Bank to pay  in specie at the 
Mint  Price.  It  had  done  so  from  1776 to  1797,'  and 
the price of  gold had  never risen above  £3  17s. 6d.  The 
fact that this price had since risen  to £5  2s.  did not  there- 
fore  prove  that  the  standard was  variable.  What  had 
happened  was  that  a  substitute for  gold  had  been  intro- 
See Parl. Debates, pp. 676-705, for this speech, also Macleod, 3rd edition, 
Vo'.  II., p. 84, et seq. 
There had been  a restoration  of  the coinage in  1774.  See above, p.  158. 240  HISTORY  OF  THE BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
duced,  and its  price  was  considered  in  relation  to  that 
substitute.  Let not the  House be led away by any calcula- 
tion to mistake the price for the value.  When people talked 
of  gold rising in  price,  were they prepared to show  that it 
had risen in intrinsic value?  So far from gold having risen 
in  value  during the last fifty  years,  it had actually fallen, 
jxtrtly from the greater abundance of  the metal itself, partly 
from the substitutes that were used for it.' 
A very  prevalent theory was,  that  instead of  regulating 
paper by the  value of  gold-gold  should be  regulated  by 
the value of  paper.  This was  nothing  less  than  a  fraud 
upon  the public creditor.  It was vain  to think that foreign 
nations could be imposed upon  by such a deception.  The 
only result would be that  after the public creditor had been 
cheated, the coin  would  be  debased. 
We ought to follow the example of  our wisest  and most 
distinguished ancestors, and return  to the ancient standard 
of  the coins.  Three great reforms of  the coinage had already 
been  undertaken  on these  lines-in  the  reigns of  Edward 
III.,  Elizabeth  and  William  111.'  In  all  three cases the 
difficulties were much greater than on the present occasion. 
The idea  that  the  country owed  its glory  and military 
honours to an inconvertible paper currency was ridiculous : 
there  had  been  great military  victories  even  before  1797. 
Peel believed  that the true difference between  England and 
This was also pointed out by  Lord Liverpool in  a  speech in  the House 
of  Lords which deserves  to be mentioned  in  connection  with  Peel's 
With regard  to the  first of  these reforms see Ruding,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  190- 
206.  For  the  third  see  above,  p.  9,  the  chapter  entirely  devoted  to 
this subject.  For the second see  Ruding,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  332-343,  and  Froude. 
History  of  England  from  the  fall  of  Wolsey  to  the  defeat  of  the  Spanish 
Armada, Vol.  VII., pp.  453-460.  Elizabeth  found the coinage in  an appalling 
state of  depreciation.  By  the  advice of  Burleigh,  the founder  of  the house 
of  Cecil, she ordered  a  genrral re-coinage in  spite of  the enormous difficulties 
which  such an undertaking involvrd.  The operation was most successful, and 
the Crown made a  profit of  f;14,o79  out of  it. 
As  Froude remarks (p.  453), no measure  in  Elizabeth's  reign  has received 
praises  which  were  better  merited.  Sometimes, to be  strictly  accurate,  the 
praises have exceeded  the  merits,  for some historians  have described  the re- 
form as carried out at the cost of  the Crown. 
Elizabeth  was  very  proud  of  her  reform.  Official  congratulations were 
offered  by  Parliament (see  Parl. tlist.,  Vol.  IV., p.  214).  She caused a medal 
to  be  struck  in  comme~noration with  the  inscription,  Bene  constituta  re 
nummaria, and her  monumental  inscription  concludes  thus : Gallia domata, 
Belgium  sustentum,  Pax fondafa et  Moneta  in justum  valorem redacta. 
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other  States was  that she always kept her  faith  inviolate. 
~t  was  this  feeling  that  enabled  the  country  to  resist 
adversity and to secure a final triumph.  Now  that they had 
reached the other shore in  safety, let them not abandon the 
great  principle  which  had  supported  them  through  the 
dismal voyage. 
The rest of  the discussion in the Commons threw no fresh 
light on the subject.  Amongst the other speakers  we  may 
mention  Canning, whose  speech  at  the  end of  the next 
sitting  seems  to  have  had  a  brilliant  reception,'  and 
Ricardo,'  who pointed  out with considerable effect that the 
evidence given by the directors as individuals contradicted 
their  resolution  as a  court; he concluded that  in  view  of 
their past conduct, the only course open to the House was to 
deprive them  of  their extraordinary powers. 
The Act  (statute 1819, c.  49)3 was passed  unanimously 
after amendment by the House of  Lords.' 
Its chief  provisions were  as follows t- 
I.-The  Acts restraining  cash  payments were continued 
until May  st, 1823, at which date they were to cease. 
Temporary provisions adopted from the reports : 
I.-Between  February  1st  and  October  rst,  1820,  the 
Bank was bound to pay all notes presented to  them at the 
rate of  A4 IS. an ounce.& 
2.-Between  October 1st and May  st, 1821, the rate was 
to be A3 19s. 6d. 
3.-Between  May  st,  1821, and May  rst,  1823, the rate 
of gold bullion was to be A3 17s. 14d. 
11.-The  trade in bullion and coin was declared free. 
111.-Moreover,  a law of  July 6th, 1819 (statute 1819, c. 
76), forbade the Bank to make any advance to Government 
without the authority of Parliament.  Supposing a request 
of this kind to be  thought necessary,  it was to be  made  in 
See Parl.  Debates, p.  800.  According to this journal,  the conclusion of 
his very  short  speech was greeted with "  Loud  and Universal cries of  hear, 
hear." 
'  See Ricardo's  Speech, pp.  742-748. 
'  Statutes  of  the Realm, Vol.  LIX., p.  156. 
'  See Parl.  Debates,  p.  1137. 
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writing and laid before both Houses of Parliament  together 
with the answer made to it by the court of  directors. 
It was hoped that this would put a stop to a liberty which 
had  rapidly  degenerated  into  licence  and  which  had 
resulted in  this terrible crisis lasting  22 years. 
Resumption of  caslz  payments.  The Act fixed  May  st, 
1823, as the  latest  date for the  resumption  of  cash  pay- 
ments.  But  this final  date was  anticipated,  and on  May 
 st,  1821, the paper  currency, established  since  1797, was 
replaced  by  a  currency  on  a  metallic  basis,  of  which  the 
country had been deprived for 24  years and 2  months. 
During  this  period  the  crisis  had  at  times  been  very 
intense, and the scarcity of coin had caused a depreciation in 
the  notes  issued  by  the  Bank.  This depreciation,  from 
being £8  7s. per £100 in  1801, had varied in the following 
manner :- 
&7  5s.  in  1802.  Azg  3s.  in  1814. 
&2  3s.  trorn  1803  to  1809.  619  14s.  in  1815. 
&13  9s.  in  1810.  A16 14s.  in 1816. 
A7 16s.  in  1811.  A2  13s. from  1817  to 1818. 
A20  14s. in  1811.  A4  9s. in 1819. 
A22  18s.  in  1813.  &z  11s. in  1820. 
VOLUME  11.  1819-1903. 
The depreciation continued until  1821, at which date the 
notes once more circulated at par. 
END  VOL.  I. INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER. 
Difierence  between  Volume  11.  and  Volume  I.  in  respect  to their  subject 
matter.  The  possibility  of  omitting  references  to  general  history  in 
Volume 11.  Necessity  for dcaling in  one part of  the present  Volume  with 
the  working  of  the Banlc  under  the existing  system.  The Act  of  1826 
regarded  as one of  the causes  of  the Act  of  1844.  Method  adopted  in 
examining the intention of  Peel's  Act. 
THE  first volume of  this book  dealt with  the early  history 
of the Bank of  England,-the  causes leading to its founda- 
tion,  the foundation  itself,  and subsequent  developments. 
In this volume we propose to examine the later history,-the 
system  under  which  the  Bank  has carried  on  its business 
since 1844,-and  a few introductory remarks on this subject 
may not be out of  place. 
The materials made use of  in the present volume will  be 
found to differ slightly from  those studied in  the preceding 
one. 
In the first place, it has been possible to ignore the general 
history  of  England.  The Government  and the  English 
public have learnt to understand  better their own  interests 
and the part that should be played by the Rank; hence this 
general history has become  less and less closely connected 
with  that of  the Bank, or rather the connection  has ceased 
except when absolutely unavoidable. 
The ignorant hostility  of  one section  of  the  nation,  and 
the "  runs,"  or worse still,  the actual  assaults to which  it 
gave  rise,  have  vanished.  The Government,  too,  grown 
wiser by  experience and helped by the remarkctble increase 
of facilities for public credit, no longer applies to the Bank 
whenever  it has need  of  money  and  hence  does  not  now 
involve that institution in all its financial enlbarrassments.' 
' On  the other  hand  thc  normal  connection  between  the  Hank  and  the 
Treasury has become closer and closer as regards all that concerns the business 
of the  'l'r~:asury acroutit  and  thc adl~iinistration  of  the  national  drbt,  both 
floating and permanent ; we have ~.uaniinrd  this subjrct at some lrngth  in  an 
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In the second place, a study of  the actual working of  the 
Act of  1844 has not seemed to us out of  place in  the history 
of  the  Bank, though we  have  reduced  this  study  to  com- 
paratively modest proportions.  A mere analysis of  the Act 
followed by a description of  the crises which  the Bank has 
since experienced would  not constitute a history; just as an 
analysis of  the constitution of  a country, accompanied by a 
description of  the wars in which it has taken part, do not by 
themselves  make up  its history.  The history of  a country 
must include some study, however short, of  its internal life; 
at the least it must point out the general lines of  its develop- 
ment.  Similarly in  the case before  us the section  dealing 
with the working activities of  the Bank  is  in all essentials 
an historical study.  After an analysis of  Robert Peel's Act 
as it appeared in 1844, we shall study the Bank as we find it 
after an existence of  sixty years.  During this interval we 
shall find  that  the Bank  of  England has undergone  con- 
siderable  change  in  several  important  particulars.  For 
instance,  the  Act  of  1844 contemplated  that  silver  would 
play a considerable part in the reserve, but for a long time 
past  the reserve has consisted entirely of  gold.  Again,  in 
1844  people  were  very  far  from  anticipating  what  has 
actually  been  the  case since  1893, viz.,  that  the  metallic 
reserve  would  exceed  the  paper  currency.  Nor  was  it 
realised that the Bank would cease to be a bank of  discount 
and would become the guardian of  the cash  reserve for the 
commercial world, etc. 
In  this part of  our work  we  shall have occasion, also, to 
discuss various questions of  a  more or less historical  char- 
acter,  mhich  it  would  have  been  dificult  to  deal  with 
elsewhere;  such  matters,  for  example,  as  the  irlcreasir~g 
importance  of  cheques,  of  current  accounts  and  of  the 
bankers' reserve, and Mr. Lowe's scheme for reform in  1873, 
etc. 
To pass to another  point-it  may seem  strange that \ve 
have included in  Part I.,  amongst the causes of  the Act of 
1844, the crisis of 1825 and the Act of  1826, which  enforced 
tilose  very  regulations  in  opposition  to  which  Peel's  Act 
mas  passed.  But a moment's  thought  \{ill  shuw that  just 
hecause  Peel's  Act  involved a  reaction  against the  Act  of 
;826, we are justified in describing it as  a consequence of this 
~ct.  In fact, especially  in  the mid  19th century, the con- 
ception  of a monopoly could  hardly  have been  arrived  at 
making preliminary  trial  of  a system  of  freedom. 
The crisis  of  182j  was  generally  attributed  to  the  bad 
organisation  of  provincial credit ;  the  remedy  had  been 
sought in  the removal  of  those  restrictions placed on  the 
issue of  notes in  the provinces by the Act of  1742.  Then, 
when this policy was  found to be inadequate and was even 
regarded by &me  as .the cause of  the  crisis  of  1836-1839, 
it was judged  necessary to centralise the control of  the note 
issues and to take the management of  them out of  the hands 
of the Bank.'  But the debates in  Parliament and the con- 
temporary pamphlets show clearly enough that such a policy 
would  never have been  adopted  if  people  had  not  first ex-  .  - 
prienced the effect of  the opposite system.' 
Finally, to gain a better understanding of  the Act of  1844, 
we  have  traced  the  origin  and  development  of  its  main  - 
~rovisions,  first in  the works of  its chief  Dromoters,  Lord 
Overstone, Torrens  and Norman, and then in the speeches 
and Memorandum of  Sir Robert Peel, who presented  it to 
Parliament  and by  whose  name it  is  known.  This plan 
seemed more satisfactory and more suited  to  an historical 
study like  the  present,  than  the  alternative  of  giving  a 
detailed criticism of  each provision of  the law. 
The Report of the Committee of  1832 brings out the  theories according to 
which the  Bank  regulated, or at least  was supposed to  regulate,  its issues. 
The  Act  of  1833,  which  forms  the  subject  of  our  second  cllapter,  by 
making  Bank notes  legal  tender,  by  insisting  on some degree  of  publicity  for 
the Bank's balance sheets, though less,  it is true,  than  is imposed to-day, and 
by  granting official recognition to the joint-stock banks and to the employment 
of their  cheques, gave to the  existing system of  English  banking  three  of  its 
most salient  featurrs.  Con.iequently,  this  Act  may  be  regarded as one of  the 
causes of  that of  1844, notwithstanding the  great differences between  the two. CRISIS  OF  1825  AND ACT  OF  1826.  249 
PART  I. 
CAUSES  AND  ANALYSIS  OF  ROBERT PEEL'S  ACT. 
CHAPTER  I. 
THE CRISIS  OF  1825  AND  THE  ACT  OF  182G. 
The Crisis of  1825.  Effects  of  the resumption of  cash  psyments.  Renewal  of  speculative mania.  Its causes.  Speculatibns in  South American  and 
Foreign  Loans.  The crisis.  Policy  of  the Bank during the crisis.  The 
Responsibility  of  the  Banks  and  the  effect  of  over-issues  on  the  crisis 
exaggerated.  The Act  of  1826.  Meeting  of  Parliament:  Speeches  of 
Lord  Liverpool,  Peel  and  Huskisson.  The  Act  of  1828,  its  two-fold 
object.  Reorganisation  of  the provincial  credit  system.  Suppression  of 
the  Bank of  England's  privileges  in  the  Provinces.  Abolition  of  small 
note?.  Snlall notes continued  in  Scotland.  Action  of  Sir Walter Scott. 
THE  resumption of cash payments and the ease with which 
the Bank had anticipated the date fixed by the law of  1819~ 
quickly restored  public confidence.  The harvests,  which 
had  been  scanty  during the  last  three  years  of  what  had 
been  practically  a forced currency, were  plentiful  for three 
seasons  after  1821.  According  to  Tooke  the  trade  and 
industry  of  the  country  had  never  been  in  a  more  satis- 
factory  condition  than  they  were  between  1821 and  1824. 
Indeed, at  the end of  the  session  of  1823, the  King con- 
gratulated  Parliament  on  the  general  prosperity,  and he 
repeated  his  congratulations at the  end  of  the  following 
year and even at the beginning of  the year  1825. 
The Bank  of  England  shared  in the  general  prosperity 
and  its  bullion  reserve  rose  to  ,&14,2m,cxxran immense 
sum at that  date. 
At the same time an Act passed in April,  1822, empowered 
the Bank of  England and the country banks to increase their 
'  The latest date fixrd  for the resumption of  ca.;h  paymt2nts wns  Moy  ~.;t, 
1823, but  the  Hank  had actually rrsunied them two  y(.31..;  mrlier. 
issues.  The result of  this was a rise in prices, which enabled 
the Government to reduce the rate of  interest on the National 
Debt from 5 to 4 and from 4 to 34 per cent.,  with the help 
of an advance of  Af;5,ooo,ooo  made to it by the Bank. 
The conversion  of the 5 per  cents.  affected stock  to  the 
value of  135 millions,  while that of  the 4 per cents. applied 
to 80  millions. 
Such  an  important  reduction'  of  the  rate  of  interest  on 
capital caused many of  the holders of  public securities, who 
could  not be satisfied with  a  small  income, to  sell  out  as 
quickly as possible.  There was, in  fact, a proverb  current 
in  the  financial  world  that  "John  Bull  can  stand  many 
things but he cannot stand  2  per  cent."  When the  price 
of  money  remains  at  a  low  level  for  any  considerable 
period,  people  will  turn  to  risky  investments  if  no  good 
ones offer  themselves,  and a crisis  is the  necessary  result 
of such experiments. 
This fact  has  been  frequently  noticed;'  the  period  of 
which we  write affords an illustration of  it.  Spculation of 
all  kinds reappeared,  but  especially  in  the  form  of  trans- 
actions with  South  America,  which  had  already  been  a 
notable  feature in  1809 and  18x0.  The South American 
Revolution  had  excited  intense  interest  in  England.  As 
soon as the independence of  the Republics had been  recog- 
nised,  their  appeal  was  responded  to  with  unreasoning 
eagerness by  investors and traders,  who  subscribed indis- 
criminately  to all the  loans  raised  by  these  Slates,  w11ic.h 
generally proved quite incapable of  meeting their liabilities. 
At the same time increased support was given to a nun1bt.r 
of other public loans.=  The commercial world allowed itself 
to be deceived into a false estimate of  the value of  tllc ncwr 
'  The rcdurtion  in  tlie  intrrcst  on  thr public  funds was nrcomponi~~cl  by 
a  reduction  in  the half-yearly  dividend  of  tho  Bank  from  to 4  paar  rtLtit. 
This caused a  number of  sales and the Bank stork fell  16 points. 
*  This fact is so obvious that after the cri.iia  of  1866 Willianl Nen.tnarcl1 
suggested that a minimum limit should bc  fixvd, below  which the Bank might 
not  lower  its rate of  discount.  This limit was to IIP 4 per  cent. 
'  Thp public  1ot1n.s raised  between  1822  and  1825  arr given  in  n  wcll 
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nlarlicts  thus opened  up,  and  especially  in  regard to  the 
Colonial food stuffs. 
i\lacleodl  estimates  that  150  millions  were  invested  in 
various ways in  Mexico and South America.  Transactions 
of this  Itind,  essentially  speculative  in  nature,  multiplied 
continually and the Lord Chancellor  thought  it  necessary 
evcn at the beginning of  1825 to call the attention of  Parlia- 
ment to the prevailing mania, while seven weeks later Lord 
1,audcrdale stated that ,42oo,ooo,ooo had been  subscribed to 
companies of  all kinds. 
Very  soon  the  situation  recalled  memories  not  only  of 
1810,  but of  1720 and the time of  the South Sea Bubble. 
Companies were formed with  the most absurd objects,'  and 
as the first subscriptions paid up did not often exceed 5 per 
cent. of  the nominal  value of  the shares,  persons of  very 
modest fortunes were able to  take part  in  the transactions. 
'I'lle  number of  companies formed  rose to 624, involving a 
nominal  capital of  k.372, I 73, loo.  This enormous  sum re- 
 resented  A150 per  Iiead  for  the  13  million  persons  who 
I.  I.  p. I.  '1'11~ following list shows the amount of  tho  loans  raisvd 
in  I.ondurt  :lrld  thc prices at which  thcy  were issued :- 
.fnrou,rt  Ptlrg  .4  ,,IUU?I~  /',  ice 
1  .car.  of  Loan.  offsrur.  J'car.  of  Loon.  o/ls,car. 
1822  Chili  ... .&~,ooo,ooo 70%  1824  Greece  ...  f;8oo,ooo  5gr/, 
Columbia ...  z,ooo,ooo  84  %  Mexico  ...  3,zoo,ooo  58 % 
Denmark ...  z,ooo,ooo  774 %  Naples  ...  2,500,ooo  914 % 
Peru  ...  450,000  88%  Peru  ...  750,000  82  0/0 
Kussia  ...  3,500,000  81  %  18a5  Brazil  +,ooo,o~~  85  % 
...  1823  Austria  1,500,ooo  82  %  &"mark"'  ~,5oo,ooo 75 % 
Portugal  ...  1, joo,ooo  87  Greece  z,ooo,ooo  564 %  ...  ...  1824  Brazil  1,686,000  75%  Guatemala  167,000  73 xo, 
Ruenos Ayres  ~,ooo,ooo 85  %,  blexico  ...  j,zoo,ooo  89t 1, 
Columbia ...  4,7jo,ooo  881 /,  Peru  ...  616,000  78% 
As  rcagards. these  loans,  the  prices  at  which  thcy  were  issued  should  be 
nOticcd,  and  it  lnay  also  be  remarked  that.  at  any  rate  in  the  case 
of  the  (;reel<  lo:~ns, only  a  small  part  of  the  sums paid in  reached their 
int1.ndt.d  dltstination  in  the hands of  the Greek Government.  l'he  remainder 
\v:cs  frittrrc.d  a\vay  in  tile  form of  ordrars  insisted  on  by  the  banking  firms 
wl~ich  undertook  the  issue.  Thus  the  Cirecsks  were  forced  to  buy  certain 
frigntcts  which  were never  ablc to reach  Gibraltar, and some fire-arms  which 
esplod1.d as soon as they  were used.  Probably much the same thing happened 
in  the case of  the other loans, and most  likely a good  deal of  the money  sub- 
hcribrd  never  went out of  England. 
' I'lzeury  UIIJ  I'rurticr  of  Banking,  3rd edition,  Vol.  II., p.  log. 
'  On*. rompany,  which  was able  to  secure subscribers,  was promoted  in 
order  to drain the  Red  Sea  with  a  view  to  recovering  the  treasure  :[ban- 
don1.d  by  t11cs  I<gyptians af1c.r  tl~c  crossing  of  the  Jews.  Juglar,  Lrs  crisrs 
t'ro~lu~~liyltrs,  p. 334. 
then  constituted  the population  of England, and was eq~li- 
,,,lent  to a third of the total u-ealtll of  the country.' 
'The  price of the shares in  several of  the new  cr)n~panies 
rose  very  quickly.  T!l:)se  of  Tlte Anglo-Jlexictl~~  Ali~lirlg 
c,)nlpa,ry,  for  instance,  which  were  issued  at  ,(,'1o,  rose 
within a month  from A43 to A15o; and the shares of  thcb 
Real dcl hfo~~tc,  issued at ,&;o,  rose from  L550 to Ar,35o.' 
,I  still pore significant feature was  that the prices of com- 
modities  wen:  doubled  and  sometimes  tripled  in  a  few 
'The  inevitable  reaction  came.  I'rices  began  10 
fall at the beginning of  the summer, and this was followed 
by a collapse in  securities upon  which  no further paymcnts 
could be obtained.  At the end of  November  the failure of 
large firms which  speculated  in  cotton  produced  :i 
get~eral panic.  l'he  Bank  of  England  thought  fit  to 
abandon the policy of  I;()!  and to  increase its issues freely. 
Its  reserve  sank  from  It in1500,tm in  January,  1824,  to 
r ,400,ooo  in  October,  1824.  It persevered  in  this  con- 
duct  in  spite  of  an unfavourable  eschange, and in  April, 
1925, its reserve was only  _t'6,6jo,m, while  its issues ex- 
cceded  tlie total in circulation in  January, 1824.  'l'lle  Dank 
only  realised  its  mistake  at  the  very  height of  the  crisis, 
but on  Uecember  31st  it  raised  its discount  rate  to  5  per 
cent.  This did not  prevent a further decli~le  in  tlie reserve 
from over 3 millions in  November to ~.I,~GO,S~C)  (I)e(:v~lll)t'r 
31st),  which threw the circulation into unhcard-of confusion.' 
Conant. A  Ilistory of  Alodcr,~  Ba111is of  ISSUP,  p.  446. 
'  The Hurtuntions  in  the  share  valurs  of the  diHerent  milling  cotllpanir.~ 
will  be  found  in  J'algrase,  1)ictionary of  t'olitical  Ecowomy (Vol.  I., p.  458). 
"  ?'he  following table fro111 Juglar (p.  337)  \vill  gibPe  nn cxarl  id1.u  ul  ll~r 
continued fall  in  tl~c  Bank  reserve :- 
1824.  1x25. 
A  JL 
January ........................ ~g,~clo,ooo  ..................  9,4009000 
..................  ......................  I:a.bruary  lg,Xw,tmo  8,Xw,cm0 
March  ..........................  13,8w,(mo ..................  8,100,ocm 
...........................  ..................  April  rg,qoo,otlo  6,bw,wo 
..................  ............................  May  1z,8w,ooo  6,1oo,cmo 
June ............................  12,80o,ooo ..................  5,4w,ooo 
.............................  ..................  July  II,~OO,(K)O  4,100,000 
August  ........................  I 1,700,~  ..................  3,600,000 
September  ....................  1  I ,800,000  ..................  3,400,wo 
October  ........................ I l,qoo,ooo ..................  ~,IW,OOO 
Novl.nlb8.r  .....................  I r .joo,ooo ..................  g.ow,ou~ 
I)vrl.l~~ber  ..................... IO,~O~,~JOO  ..................  I ,~~JIJ,O~L> 252  IIISTORY  OF THE BANI<  OF ENGLAND. 
The scarcity of coin increased,  notwithstanding  the action 
of  the Government which ordered the Mint to be kept work- 
ing day and  night;  and  this  scarcity became a  veritable 
famine after the  failure of  the  London  Bank,  one  of  the 
leading banking firms, which  dragged down  with  it sixty 
other financial companies. 
The drain on  the coin  was so  great  that  the  Bank was 
obliged  to  put  into circulation  600,000  one  pound  notes, 
which, although they  had  been  created  when  the  Restric- 
tion  Act  was  passed,  had  lain  for a  long  time  forgotten 
in its safes.  This measure was effective in saving the Bank 
of  Norwich, but could not materially alter the unprecedented 
state  of  affairs.  No  one was  willing  to  part  with  such 
money  as  he  possessed,  and  according  to  Huskisson's 
statement  in  the  House  of  Commons,'  it  was  impossible 
during  the  greater  part  of  December  to  realise  even  the 
best  securities, such  as Government stock  and  the shares 
of  the  Bank of  England and the  East India Company. 
The general distress was increased by the failure of  thirty- 
six country banks which the Bank could not assist in time; 
and several of  the important London commercial firms were 
threatened with a like fate.  The  .Bank, under pressure from 
the Government,  decided finally  to  increase  its issues;  it 
granted new  loans to the value of  ,&400,ooo.  This afforded 
substantial assistance to those firms which were solid enough 
to  offer  resistance  to misfortune, and at  length,  when  the 
weaker  ones had  all  collapsed,  things gradually  improved 
and two years later money was being lent at 4 per cent. 
These are the broad outlines of  the  crisis of  182.5.  The 
attempt  has been made, and indeed is still made,  to  throw 
the  tvhole  responsibility  for  it upon  the  over-issues of  the 
Bank of  England and of  the country banks. 
On  this  point  hlacleodz  very  fairly  remarks  that: 
' Porlionlr~lfllry  D1,hatcs. \'ol.  XI\'., p. 230.  Sre  the whole of  Husl;isson'.; 
Spt'ech,  pp.  219-244. 
'  3rd  Edition.  \'ol.  It., pp.  117,  118. 
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~hough  it is indisputable that the Bank acted on the most 
unsound principles  in  not  contracting its  issues when  the 
great drain of bullion for exportation  was going on, it  is a 
mere delusion for men to attribute the consequences of  their 
own wild and extravagant mania to the Bank of  England, or 
to any bank.  The errors of  all the banks put together were 
trivial compared  to  the  outbreaks  of  speculative  insanity 
which seized upon all classes.  . . .  Was it the issue of  Bank 
notes  that  led  a  respectable  book-selling  firm  to  risk 
,&loo,ooo on  a speculation  in  hops?  The Bank  had com- 
mitted many errors before, as serious as those of  1825, with- 
out leading to any such disaster." 
B.-THE  ACT  OF  1826. 
When  once  the  crisis  had  subsided,  the  time came  to 
search  for  its causes and to  find  a remedy  for  them;  this 
task devolved on Parliament when it assembled on February 
3rd. 
The King's Speech' specially  drew  the attention of  Par- 
liament  to  the  question  and  neither  House  showed any 
disposition  to  neglect it. 
The  Prime  Minister,  Lord  Liverpool,  in  a  speecha of 
which we  made use in studying the condition of  provincial 
credit  on  the  eve  of  the  French  Revolution,  criticised 
severely both the system on which this credit was organised 
and  also  the  Act  of  17q, which  limited  the  number  of 
partners in  a bank  of  issue  to six,  so  that any small pro- 
vincial tradesman, a fruiterer, a grocer or a butcher,  might 
open a bank  whilst the right of  issue was refused to genuine 
companies,  well deserving of  confidence.' 
Peel  supported these  views  in  the  House  of  Commons4 
and contrasted the monopoly which existed in England ~vith 
the  free Scotch system.  He pointed  out that  in England 
100 banks  had  failed in  1793,  157 between  1810 and 1817, 
' Pnrl.  Debntcs,  Vol.  SIV., pp.  2-3. 
For this speech  see Yarl.  Debates,  pp.  454-463, 
p.  461 
'  Scc  the  sitting  of  February  13, pp.  286-298. 254  HISTORY  OF  THE BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
and  76 during the. recent  crisis,  and  that,  moreover,  the 
numbers recorded would have been  much greater had  it  not 
been  for the different ways of  making composition, and so 
on; whilst  in  Scotland, on  the contrary,  there  was only a 
single bank  failure on  record,  and even  in  that  case  the 
creditors had ultimately been paid in full. 
Peel  then  described  the  terrible  condition  of  country 
banking, and declared his conviction that a system of  well- 
established  joint-stock  companies  would  supply  a  more 
secure basis for the circulation. 
With reference to the small notes, which had just formed 
the subject of  a strong speech by  Huskisson,'  Peel  agreed 
with the latter in thinking that the EI  notes only served to 
drive out the sovereigns ;  that the over-issue of  paper money 
was one of  the worst evils from which  the country suffered 
and that the present was an excellent opportunity of  getting 
rid of  it. 
The Act of  1826 was passed by a very large majority. 
This Act had a two-fold object, corresponding to the two- 
fold criticism  brought  against the  previous  legislation;  it 
attempted  (a) to  reorganise  country  credit  by  abolishing 
the monopoly established by the laws of  1708 and 1742;  (bf 
to suppress the small notes. 
A.-The  Reo~ganisation  of  Count~y  C7edit.  'ITe  are 
already  familiar  with  the  organisation  of  country  credit 
previous to  1826. 'IVe have seen its ab~urdity.~  The situa- 
tion was made still worse because the Bank, while insisting 
on its monopoly in the provinces and preventing the forma- 
tion of  banks of  issue with more than six partners, j7et  made 
no attempt to secure the right of  establishing branches.  In 
other words,  the Bank  hindered  the provision  by  others of 
any satisfactory  form  of  paper  currency, and  at the same 
time  refused  to  take  the  matter  into  its  own  hands.  It 
played  the  part  of  the  proverbial  dog  in  the  manger. 
The effect  of  this  mjstaken  policy  was the introduction of 
an absurd and dangerous system of  provincial  credit facil- 
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ities,  which allowed every small grocer to set up a bank and 
to issue notes which he was unable to honour. 
The Statute  1826  (c.  46),  in  order to  remedy  this  evil, 
authorised the establishment of  banks 65  miles or more from 
 don, having any number of  partners and wit11  potver to 
issue notes.  In  this way encouragement  was given  to  the 
creation of  joint-stock banks of  issue.  The Dank of  England 
was at the same time empowered to establish branches in any 
part of  England. 
B.-The  Suppression of  the Small  Notes.  l'he small 
notes were  said to be  of  no use  except  to  raise prices and 
encourage  speculation.  The Statute  1826  (c. 6) abolislied 
Bank  notes of values  less  than As; the primary  result  of 
this  was  to  force  the  Bank  to  redeem  between  7  and  8 
millions of  notes. 
This latter Act  was  to  have  been  extended  to Scotland. 
But  the  measure  was  strongly  opposed  in  that  country, 
where  ,&I  notes  were  established by  long custom,  and it 
found a celebrated  opponent in  the  person  of  Sir  Walter 
Scott.  Sir Walter, under the pseudonym of  Malachi hlala- 
growther, published three letters containing a most amusing 
satire on  the mania for uniformity.'  These letters  made a 
great  stir  and the  Scotch  were  ultimately  victorious.  By 
an  Act  of  1828 (c. Gj), however, the circulation  of  Scotch 
notes in  England was forbidden. 
' These thrce letters, which  originally  cnlnc out  in  thc  Edinburgh  IVrcbly 
lournal  in  February  and March,  1826, wcrc soon  afterwards published  in  one 
volurnc.  They  arc  also to be  found  arnong  the complete works  of  W. Scott. 
-See  The Miscellaneous Ptose  Works of  U'.  Scott  (3 vols., Edinburgh,  1854- 
56), vol. I.,  pp 725-756. 
'  The  small  notes  were  attacked  with  equal  vigour  in  the  course  of  the 
debate by  Lord  King,  Baring  and various  other  speakers. 
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have some value as the  result  of  experience;  but  it would 
be a mistake  to suppose that the  proportion  one-third  can 
have any absolute value as a safeguard.  It has sometimes 
been  found in a crisis that a reserve of  more than one-third 
of  the issues was insufficient." 
M. Gidel also observes  that  if  "  the proportion  is  fixed 
at one-third, not only discounting but also the conversion of 
the  notes  may become  impossible !  Suppose that  there  is 
a  reserve  of  IOO  millions  and  notes  to  the  value  of  300 
millions;  the  Bank  has preserved  the required  proportion. 
But it has done this so exactly  that at the moment  it  can- 
not cash a single note without breaking the rule and causing 
the reserve to fall below one-third of  the value of  the notes, 
for  gg is not a third of  299.  Thus the precaution leads to the 
very danger it  was  intended to avoid. 
This point requires  some explanation ; we  have already 
briefly  referred to it.2  The Statute 1742 (c. 13-15),  an Act 
often  referred  to  in  this  work,  gave  to -the  Bank  the 
monopoly  of  issue  in  "  that  part  of  Great  Britain  called 
England "; only  banks formed by  fewer  than  six persons 
were exempt from this monopoly.  But  the  privileges  con- 
ferred  by  this  Act  were  limited  to  borrowing  or  owing 
money on notes payable at sight.  The business of  banking 
was  really  limited  to  this  at  that  time.  The  clause  was 
interpreted strictly and hence the use of  cheques, which was 
borrowed from  the  Dutch,  was not  forbidden  by  the  law. 
Thus  there  was  no  obstacle  to  prevent  banking  being 
carried on  by  the help of  the cheque system.  This custom 
spread little by  little without  giving Parliament any excuse 
for interference and by  the time  its existence was  realised 
it  had  extended too  widely  for  prohibition  to be  possible; 
'  Principes  d'bconognie Politique, p.  374, note.  See also Wilfredo  Pareto, 
Cours  d'kconomie  Politique  professt!  d  l'llniversitt'  de  Lausatme,  p.  386. 
"  No rule can  be  laid  down  as to  the amount of  thr  reserve.  The  rrsc-rvc*  is 
needed solely  to  insure  the  convertibility  of  the  notes  into gold, and  for  this 
purpose it has sometimes to be a largr fraction and qornetimrs a small fraction 
of  the paper circulation. 
'  Sce above, pp.  171, 172. 
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moreover a short time  afterwards, Mr. Joplin  pointed  out 
for the  first  time  that the establishment of  these  banks  of 
deposit1 and their transactions were absolutely legal. 
This was  the  state of affairs when  the  Act  of  1826 was 
passed authorising  the  foundation of  joint-stock  banks  of 
issue outside the 65 mile limit. 
This  Act  however  said  nothing  as to  the  legality  of 
similar  institutions in  London (of  course, without  the right 
of issue).  The question  thus remained  unsolved.  It was 
dificult to deny that from a legal point of  view the right to 
form  companies carrying on  all  kinds  of  banking  trans- 
actions except that of note issue was absolutely established. 
Joplin's reasoning was irrefutable.  The Bank of  England 
tried in vain to dispute it  and applied unsuccessfully to the 
Government for a  modification of  the  law.  The question 
was, however, brought before the Committee of  1832 ;%ven 
those who supported the  new  banks  realised  that  to  avoid 
uncertainty  it would be better to settle the matter by  legisla- 
tion. 
The Bank of  England notes had  never been  legal tender. 
Even  under  the  regime  of  the Restriction  Act,  the  notes, 
though  inconvertible,  were not legal money and it was this 
fact which enabled  Lord  King to write his famous circular 
to his tenants.  'She problem now was whether it was advis- 
able to give them this  legal character.  This question  was 
raised before the Committee of  1832 as well  as before Par- 
liament. 
'  Joplin, Supplen~entary  Observatiotrs to the  third  Edition  of  an  Essay  on 
Banking, p.  84  (1823).  . .  -. 
'  It is  interesting  to  note  that  the  question  was  raised  as a  matter  of 
theory,  not of  practice.  In  fact,  notwithstanding  Joplin's  discovery,  no joint- 
sock banlc  had  bccn  rstnblishcd  in  1-ondon,  thougli  the  Govrrnmcnt  had 
obtained  a  decision  from  the  Court  of  King's  Bench  in  case such a diflicult 
Problem presented  itself. 
'  Our  readers  will remember  that  the  founders  of  the  Bank  and  in  par- 
ticular  Godfrey,  so  far  from  asking  that  the  notes  should  be  legal  tender, 
assl.rtc*d that  the  only  thing  which  cnab11.d notes  to  circulate  was  that  the 
hearcat.  cot~ltl  co~lvcrt  thrm  into cash wl,enc.\~rr  hr desired.  Ser above, p.  83. 260  HISTORY  OF THE BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
Lord  Althorp'  spoke  in  favour  of  the  measure  in  the 
House of  Commons.  He explained very ably the advant- 
ages which would result if the notes were made legal tender. 
In ordinary times it was true the change would  have  little 
effect, for, now that the small notes were  suppressed,  gold 
and  notes  would  be  able  to  circulate  together;  the 
directors would take care of  that.  But  on the other hand, 
the proposed  alteration  would  protect  the  Bank  from  any 
drain which  was  not  due  to  the  state of  the  exchanges. 
Under existing conditions,  when  a provi+ncial  bank feared 
a run on its reserve, it was forced to send for  bullion from 
the Bank of  England, not only for the amount immediately 
needed,  but for that much larger sum which  would be  ce- 
quired  if  it  had  to  meet  all its liabilities.  The Bank was 
thus liable  to unexpected  withdrawals for  home  use  and 
suffered from  the  effects  of  every  run  on  the  provincial 
banks. 
The proposal to make the notes legal tender was opposed 
by Sir Robert Peel during the sitting of  July  st,^ as being 
contrary  to the  true  principles  of  a  paper  currency.  In 
Peel's opinion  the matter resolved  itself  into a question  of 
confidence  and confidence could not be had to order.  No 
doubt  anything  that  tended  to  increase  confidence  and 
security  in  a  country was  a  good  thing,  but  this result 
could not be obtained by Act of  Parliament. 
This was another important question  which came up for 
discussion  in  1832.  There were  many general arguments 
to be given in  favour of  the repeal  of  the usury  laws.  In 
the case of  the Bank there was a special reason, which was 
that these laws hindered the rate of  discount from working 
freely enough to withstand an actual or impending crisis. 
This  particular disadvantage of  limiting the rate of  interest 
' Parliamentary  Debates.  Vol.  XVIIJ., p.  179.  See  the  whole  of  the 
speech  made by  Lord  Althorp  in  introducing thc  Act  of  1833, pp.  169-187. 
a  Parl.  Debates,  pp.  1369-1370. 
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was  felt in  France also.  There a  special  law  had  to  be 
passed in  1857 authorising the Bank of France to raise  its 
discount rate above 6 per cent.' 
The necessity for a publication of  the accounts was fully 
recognised  at  this  time.'  There were  no differences of 
opinion  on the  subject in  Parliament;  though  there  was 
some opposition  before the Committee of  Inquiry on  the 
part of the directors of the Bank.3  There was, however,  no 
suggestion as yet of  a  weekly  statement, it  was  merely a 
question of deciding between  monthly and quarterly publi- 
cations. 
The Act of  1833 (Statute  1833, c. 98) embodies the solu- 
tions  generally  accepted  of  the  problems  we  have  just 
considered.  It made the Bank three concessions of  appreci- 
able value : 
I.-The  Bank notes were made legal tender,  which they 
had never been hitherto.' 
2.-The  Bank was exempted from the action of  the usury 
laws so far as the discount of  bills not having three months 
to run was concerned.  It was thus enabled to raise its rate 
above 5 per cent. 
3.-The  Government  repaid  to  the  Bank  one-fourth  of 
its capital,  which  was  thus reduced  from  A14,52o,m to 
'  Cauwes, p.  322.  It  will  be  remcrnbered that  6 per  ccn!.  was tl~cn  the 
maximum rate for  commercial  business. 
a  See Lord  Althorp's  spccch,  pp.  176-178. 
'  Palmer  declared himself  opposed  to any  publicity.  See Abstract,  p. 20. 
Norman,  on  the othcr  hand,  was  willing to  agree to a  quarterly  statcmcnt- 
See  p.  44.  Conlparc  the  vcry  discrcet  evidcnce  of  Richards,  a  fornlcr 
Governor. 
'  l'he  corrcspondcnce  between  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchcqucr  and  the 
Hank  of  England at thc time  of  this rencwol of  the  chnrtcr  was published by 
the Bank  in  1858.  See A  Copy of  the  Correspondence  between the Chancellor 
of the  Eachequer  and  the  Bnnl;  of  England  relative  to  the  renewal  of  the 
Charter in 1833. 
This proposal, which, as wc ha\,c sccn, was opposed  by  I'ecl,  was passed 
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Aio,8go,oocj.  But  in  return  the  Treasury  reduced  by 
,4120,000  the yearly sum paid to the Bank for the manage- 
ment of  the public debt;  this sum was now only ,4131,~. 
On the other hand the Bank had to furnish the Chancellor 
of the  Exchequer with  exact accounts of  the amount of  its 
bullion, of  the  number of  notes in  circulation  and of  the 
total of  its  deposits.  The London  Gazette was  to publish 
monthly the balance sheet for the previous quarter. 
The Act of  1833 also affirmed the  legality  of  joint-stock 
banks which  issued  cheques--a  legality  which  the  Bank 
had long contested in  vain.  And it was not long before the 
first  joint-stock  bank,  the  London  &  Westminster,  nas 
established in  London.  It was  followed by  many  others. 
Amongst the most  famous of  these were the  London Joint- 
Stock  Bank in  1836, and the Union Bank and the London 
& County Bank in  1839.' 
Finally, the  Bank's charter was renewed  until  18j5, but 
the Government reserved the right to suspend it, under cer- 
tain conditions, at the end of  twelve years.  It will be seen 
how  the English Government  was induced to make  use of 
this power. 
' Thc  Rank  of  England  was  not  to  bc  dctcrrcd  from  its  opposition 
and  it  took  advantagc  of  thtr  wording  of  soiiie  of  thc  laws  to  wage  n 
violent  war  against  the joint-stock  banks.  l'hc  latter  having at their  head 
such  tt1c.n  as  Gilbal-t  and  (;c,orgc  I'ollard,  nict  this  attack  by  tlic  inost 
ingenious  dcviccs  and  Irgal  interference  was  again  nrcrssary  in  1844.  'l'he 
struggle  by  which  the  joint-stock  banlts  sccurcd  tlicir  indcpcndcncc  would 
alTord  a inost atnusing subject of  study. 
CHAPTER  111. 
THE  CRISIS  OF  1836-1839. 
Condition  of  public  opinion  from  1833  to  1836.  Extensive  speculations  at 
homc.  Foreign  Loans.  Thc Bank's  policy  during this  period.  Rapid 
fall  in  the  Uanlc  reserve  in  1836.  Its  causes:  Prcsidcnt  Jackson's 
nionrtary  rcforin in  America : the crisis  in  Ircland.  Refusal  of  Bank  to 
re-discount papcr already discounted  by  a joint-stock  bank.  Outbreak of 
the crisis in  Lancnshire.  It spreads throughout  England.  Firm policy  of 
thc Bank, thc crisis apparently over.  Return of  thc crisis  in  1838 on  the 
Conlincnt  and  in  the  United  Statcs.  The  Bank  of  Bclgiuni  suspccids 
paytiicnt.  Remarkable  imprudence  of  the  Directors  of  the  Bank  of 
England.  Violrncc  of  the  crisis on  thc I*ondon Market.  Thc Bank on 
tlic  verge  of  ruin.  Assistance  of  the Bank  of  France.  Painful  and pro- 
longed  liquidation  of  the crisis. 
THE  three  years  which  followed  the  Act  of  1833 were .a 
time  of  great  prosperity.  The harvests were  remarkably 
abundant.  Moreover the  foundation of a  number of  joint- 
stock banks'  in the provinces increased the facilities of  credit 
and considerably  lowered  the rate of  interest.  Finally the 
success,  as great as it was unexpected, of  the first  railway 
lines, encouraged the formation  of  numerous railway  com- 
panies.= 
1111  these  things combined  to  make  the  English  public 
forget the crisis of  1825 and plunge anew into a speculative 
mania  which  was  only  distinguished  from  those  we  have 
already described by  the fact that this time the speculation 
' Bctwcen  1833 and 1836, 72 joint-stock banlts were founded in  England and 
13  in  Ireland.  See  The Causes  and  Co,asequences  of  the  Pressure  on  the 
hfo~rey  Marlcet, with a statement of  the action of  tltc  Bank  of  England  from 
1st  October, 1833 to 27th  December,  1836, by  J. H. Palmer, p.  10.  Palmcr's 
worlc  is intcrcsting rcading ;  hc states clearly enough the causes of the crisis 
of 1836, but he tries unsuccessfully  to absolve the Bank of  England, of which 
he  was a director, from all responsibility.  Palmrr criticises most severely  the 
joint-stock  banlts, whose  continued cxistencc he thinks incompatible with that 
of  the  Bank  of  England.  His pamphlet  givcs  in  an  appendix  the  corre- 
spondcnce  betwcen  the Treasury  anti  thc  Bank  in  1826  with  regard  to  the 
rstablishlncnt of branches in  the provinces.  Thc work  is best known  through 
the reply  iiiadc  to it by  S. J  1-oyd, afterwards Lord Ovcrstone. 
'  For  !lie  Railway  Mania  see  1,croy-Beaulieu,  ~'Etat  modcrne  et  ses 
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was mainly in home enterprises.'  This did not  prevent an 
additional dabbling in certain foreign speculations nor sub- 
scriptions to the numerous foreign loans which were issued 
on the London market.' 
How did the  Bank  of  England act  when  confronted  by 
such a situation ? 
The rule according to  which  it was supposed to conduct 
its business was as follows : the  reserve kept,  composed of 
bullion  and securities,  was  to  be  equal  to  its  liabilities; 
while the regulation  df  the note circulation  was left  to the 
public  through  the  natural  movement  of  the  foreign  ex- 
changes,  and  meanwhile,  whether  the  demands  on  the 
Bank came from at home or abroad,  it was  to  maintain  a 
metallic  reserve  equal  to  one-third  of  its liabilities.  This 
These speculations led  to the formation  of  a  great many companies,  of 
which  some few were useful  but  the majority  entirely  futile.  The following 
list of  them is given by Levi, The History of  British  Commerce, p.  220,  note: 
Companies.  Nominal Capital. 
IG 
Railways ............................................  69,666,000  ..............................  Mining Companies  7,035,200  .........  Packet and Navigation Companies  3,533,000  ...........................  Banking  Companies  23,750,000 
Conveyance  Companies ........................  5O‘-',O@J 
Insurance Companies ...........................  7,600,000  .........................  Investment  Companies  1,730,000 
Newspaper  Companies .........................  35'J0"= 
................................  Canal Cornpanics  3,655,000 
Gas Companies  ..................................  890,000  ..........................  Cemetery  Companies  4359000 
Miscellaneous Companies .....................  16,  104,500 
'  Hyde  Clarke,  roc.  cit..  gives the following  list  of  these  loans and the 
prices at which  they  were  issued :- 
State.  Amount.  Price  of  Issue. 
1832  Greece ................................  Ez,344,000  ............ 100 P.C. 
(Loan guaranteed by  the three Powers protecting Greece). 
State.  Amount.  Price  of  Issue. 
1833  Portugal ..............................  ,~Z,OM),OOO  ............  48  P.C.  -  Russia  ................................  3,000,000  ............ - 
-  Portugal  .............................  ~,m,ooo  ............  94 P.C. 
1834  Spain  (Cuba) .......................  450,om  ............ - 
-  Spain ..................................  4,tm,ooo ............  Go p.c. 
1835  Portugal .............................  6,000,000 ............  70 p.c. 
1836  Belgium  .............................  ~,zoo,ooo  ............  92  P.C.  -  Florida  200,000  -  ...............................  ............  -  ..............................  Portugal  go0,000  ............  80 P.C. 
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Supposed rule was not easy to keep inviolate and between 
,833 and 1835 it was often broken.' 
At  the  beginning of  1836 the  reserve  of  the  Bank  was 
sufficiently large ;  it was over 8 millions.  Towards the end 
of March  it began  to decline and fell to 6 millions in June, 
to  5 millions  in  October  and to  ~3,640,000  at the end of 
November.  The  Bank's  liabilities  at  this  last  date 
amounted to more than 30 milli~ns.~  A  vain attempt had 
been  made to  stop this withdrawal  of  gold  by  raising  the 
rate  of  discount, at first to 4i  per cent.  and then  to  5  per 
cent. 
The  drain  was  the  result  both  of  foreign  and  home 
demands. 
As regards the former, President Jackson had determined 
not to renew  the charter of  the United States Bank and to 
give  what  he  considered  to  be  a  more  secure  basis  to 
the curren~y.~  A  large number of  securities of  all  kinds 
were sold in  England to obtain the gold needed for this re- 
form; this transaction  was  made  easier by  the low  rate of 
discount and by the multiplication  of  country banks. 
In the  autumn of  1836 there was another  exportation  of 
gold,  this time  to  Ireland,  where the  failure  of  the  Agri- 
cultural  and  Commercial  Bank4 made  the  other  banks 
afraid of a run upon their reserves.  They were only able to 
prevent this by importing 2 millions of  gold, borrowed from 
the Bank of  England.6 
' On  September  9,  18-34,  for  instance,  the  reserve  was  ~7,01o,ooo,  as 
against liabilities  of  A31,058,ooo,  and in  May,  1835,  it  was  ~j,951,000,  as 
against  liabilities  of Azg,417,ooo.  For  details  see  Levi,  p.  221,  note,  and 
Maclcod,  Theory of  Credit, p.  1011. 
'  Exactly .&30,941,000. 
'  For an account of President Jackson's  reform and of  his famous  Specie 
Circular of  June 11, 1836, see  Conant,  A  History  of  Banks  of  Issue,  p.  481. 
The following may also  be  consulted  with  advantage as regards the reasons 
which  led  to  this reforn~. Poor,  Money  and  its  Laws, pp.  489-j37'; Knos 
(J. J:),  Unifed States  Notes, pp.  40-46,  and in  particular,  A  llistory of 1Iank- 
lttg  In all  h ations, \'ol.  I., pp.  191-335.  .  . 
I he  United  Statrs Bank, which  Jacltson  opposed, still csists, but  i5  now 
only  the  Bank of  Philadelphia. 
'  For  the history of this bank  and its charter sec  Dillon  (hlalcol~u).  The 
IIistory  and  Development  of Barzl:i,lg  in  Ireland,  pp.  71-77.  It is  not  how- 
ever, too severe a criticism to say bat  this booli  of  Dillon's  is  worthless. 
This  enormous  importation  of  gold  confirmed  Lord  Althorp's  theory, 
which  was  that so long  as the notes of the Banli of  England  were  not  lr&!al 
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The inevitable  settlement  after  a  period  of speculation 
which had already lasted three years, began in Great Britain 
simultaneously with the crises in  Ireland and America. 
One of  the most prevalent forms of  speculation had been 
the  re-discount  of  bills,  which  had  been  largely  practised 
by the joint-stock  banks.  In August however, the Bank of 
England was  not  content with  merely  raising  its discount 
rate to  5  per cent. but  also  refused  flatly  to  discount any 
bill which had been already endorsed by a joint-stock  bank. 
This was a  fatal blow  to most of  the  American securities, 
which  had  been  bought  by  the joint-stock  banks and put 
into circulation again after endorsement. 
The actual crisis began in Lancashire, a county which had 
become deeply involved in American and Irish investments. 
As early  as November  the Northern  and Central  Bank of 
Alanchester  applied to  the Bank of  England for help.  At 
first  this was  refused, but the failure of  this establishment 
which  had 39 branches  in  industrial districts,  would  have 
be~n  so  disastrous that the  Bank was  forced  to  consent to 
make  advances,  at  first  of  £5oo,ooo  and  ultimately  of 
.€1,370,-. 
In January, 1837, similar difficulties were experienced in 
London : the  American  houses  were  in  urgent  need  of 
assistance.  It  was  found  upon  examination  that  these 
houses were  actually solvent, although unable  to meet  the 
demands made upon  them at the moment.  Besides this, it 
was evident thar to allow them to fail would produce a com- 
plete  upset  of  credit.  Under these circumstances the Bank 
determined on a bold  step and advanced them  6 millions. 
It had no cause to regret its courage :  not only was a terrible 
crash avoided, but the advances made were repaid almost in 
full and, since  the  previous  liquidation  had  withdrawn  a 
large quantity  of  paper  from  circulation, gold  now  flowed 
~ack  into its safes. 
This  influs of  gold continued  throughout  1837; in  De- 
\\.as a  disputcd point  whether  the  Bank  of  England  notes  were  legal  tender 
in  Irclnnd.  Owing  to this uncertainty,  the  Hanlc  of  Ireland  had  to import 
a  much  lnrgcr  quantity  of  gold  than  it  would  othcrwisc  have  nccdcd  and 
the  Bank  of  England felt  the  cffects  of  the  run  upon  thc  Banlc  of  Ircland. 
During the crisis tllc Bank of  England notca were depreciated  2i pcr  ccnt. in 
Ircla~~d. 
cember  the metallic reserve  was  10,5m,8oo.  In  March, 
,838,  the desired proportion was again attained, the assets 
being  k10,527,ooo in  coin  and bullion  and k21,046,w, 
while the liabilities were kf;31,573,000. 
The crisis seemed to be over.  In reality it was only just 
beginning. 
The harvests, which had been excellent from 1833 to 1837, 
were very bad in  1838.  Such scarcity had not been  known 
since  1816;  corn to the value of  k~o,ooo,ooo  had to be im- 
ported.  The natural result was a great exportation of  gold. 
Other causes combined with this primary one to increase 
the  drain of  gold.  During the preceding years  'here  had 
been  a  great  misuse  of  credit  and  of  paper  rlkrlney  in 
America,  France and Belgium.  This in  itself, by attract- 
ing  large  quantities of  gold  to  England, had  helped  the 
Bank to replenish its coffers more  rapidly.  But  this exten- 
sion  of  credit  stopped  suddenly,  as was  indeed  to  be 
expected,  and  to~ards  the end of  1838 a general collapse 
came, the Bank of  Belgium giving the signal for the crisis 
by  suspending its  payments.  The Bank  of  France  was 
obliged almost  immediately  to  send  to London for  money 
in order to withstand a run  upon  it, u hilst America,  where 
the crisis was complicated by a currency reform, also helped 
to  increase the drain on  English  gold. 
During this time the  Bank  of  England  had been  acting 
in  a manner very far from prudent.  Seeing that gold came 
in plentifully, it reduced  its rate of  discount from 5 to 4 per 
cent., and in  Noven~ber,  1838, even  LO 3i  per  cent.  Con- 
sequently, at this latter date, at the very moment when  the 
collapse of  the  Bank of  Belgium gave clear  warning of  the 
imminence of  a serious drain, the Bank rate uas louer thai~ 
the market  rate.  By  way  of  meeting  the danger, and not 
content  u ith  increasing  its  discounts  w hen  it  was  evident 
that  everyone  was  exporting  gold  to  America,  the  Bank 
thought  fit-in  the face  of  an unfavourable exchange-to 
send a million  to  America  on  its oun account !  "  Of  all 
acts of nlisrnanagement in the whole history of  the Bank," 
says i\Iacleod,' "  this is probably  the most astounding." 
When the drain began  the  Bank did not  at first  change 
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its policy and it was not until  May  14th that it  decided to 
raise  its discount  rate  to 5 per  cent.  Its metallic  reserve, 
which, acco ding to  the statements of  the directors, ought 
always  to  equal  one-third  of  its  liabilities,  was  then 
A4, I 17,000, whilst the liabilities amounted to ,&f;z5,71  r ,000. 
After this matters got worse, and on July 16 the reserve had 
fallen to ,&2,987,ooo and the  Bank of  England was face to 
face with  bankruptcy. 
Some expedient  had  to be  devised  to  avoid  the  suspen- 
sion  of  payments.  At  first an  attempt was  made  to  sell 
"  dead weight "  annuities, but no purchaser could be found 
at the price demanded :  it  was then  decided to  sell  public 
securities to the value of  ,&7oo,ooo and later, in  May,  bills 
were  drawn  upon  Paris for  A600,ooo.  But  when  these 
expired  the Bank was quite  unable  to  meet  them  and the 
foreign  bankers,  understanding the  situation,  hastened  to 
realise their securities in London. 
Things seemed desperate, and would actually  have been 
so if  the Bank of  France had not come to the rescue of the 
Bank of  England, as indeed it had to do on a second occa- 
sion,  fifty  years  later.  But  since  the  Bank  of  England 
was not  in  the habit  of  drawing on foreign  countries  and 
the Bank of  France was unaccustomed to make loans except 
by  discounting bills of  exchange or  on  public securities, it 
was  arranged  that  Baring  Brothers  should  draw  bills  of 
exchange  on  twelve  Parisian  bankers  to  the  amount  of 
L2,ooo,ooo,  whilst  the  Bank  of  France  undertook  to  dis- 
count  these  bills.'  A  similar  transaction  with  Hamburg 
brought  in  Agoo,ooo. 
These measures were gradually successful in stopping the 
drain of bullion.  The reserve was at its lowest on  Septem- 
ber and, 1839, when  it amounted to A2,406,000; after this it 
slowly  rose.  Bankruptcy  had  been  avoided,  but at  what 
cost !  The liquidation  went on  until  1843  and during the 
crisis  sixty-three  country  banks,  of  which  twenty-nine 
issued notes, had had to suspend  payment^.^ 
'  Cornparc  Lcvi, p.  224. 
Scc Robcrt  I'ccl,  Speeches, Vol., IV., pp.  357-358. 
CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  BANKING  PRINCIPLE  AND  THE 
CURRENCY  PRINCIPLE. 
BA ti^^  movement  for  reform  aroused  by  the  crisis of  1836-1839.  Numerous 
proposed.  Two main tendencies : (a)  The Banking  Principle : Its 
chief csponcnts, Tooke, Fullarton and Wilson.  The essence of  the  Rank- 
ing  principle,  Current  errors on  this subject.  Criticism  and dangers  of 
the  theory.  (b) The  Currency  Principle : Statement  of  the  Currency 
principle.  The theoretical  and practical  errors  involved.  Succrss of  the 
Ctltrencv  Principle.  Need  to  examine  the  practical  form  under  which 
- 
this theiry presented itself  in  England. 
THE  experience  of  these  three  years  was  not  lost  upon 
England.'  The most competent financiers and men of  busi- 
ness were convinced that the intensity of  the crisis was due 
to the fluctuations in  the currency  and that  unlimited  free- 
dom of issue was a danger for a  country exposed,  by  its 
exceptional  position  as commercial centre of  the world,  to 
the effects of  the crises occurring on all the other markets of 
production  and consumption. 
It was pointed out on all sides that most of  the banks of 
issue that had failed had not  been  on  a satisfactory basis; 
that  they  had  usually  been  founded  in  the  hope  of 
finding, through  the  issue  of  paper  money,  the  means to 
negotiate  big enterprises and hence to  make large  profits, 
and  that  of  the  twenty-nine  institutions  which  had  dis- 
appeared beween  1839 and 1843, seventeen had  never paid 
any dividend.  .4n  epigram  much  in  vogue  at  the  time 
asserted that, "  Free  trade in  banking is synonymous with 
free trade in swindling." 
This being the  prevailing  state of  mind,  it was not  sur- 
prising  to  find a  number  of  pamphlets  appearing and  a 
thousand systems being proposed, each of  which, according 
to  its author, would  prove a sovereign  remedy. 
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It would  be  impossible here  to discuss all the plans sug- 
gested.'  Moreover  the  various  schemes quickly  grouped 
themselves round two opposing theories-the  Banking Prin- 
ciple and the Currency Principle.  We propose to examine 
these two theories and seek to find out the partial truth con- 
tained in each, while briefly  noticing the chief  of  the works 
in  which they were originally stated.a  Then we shall con- 
sider the practical form assumed by that one of  the systems 
which ultimately won  the day. 
I  .-THE  BANKING  PRINCIPLE. 
A.-Statement  of  the Banking  Principle.  The advocates 
of  the  Banking Principle were believers,  not,  as has often 
been  wrongly  asserted,  in  unlimited  competition  in  the 
matter of  issues, but in  the absence of  a definite limit im- 
posed on the issues, which is quite a different thing.3  They 
The chief  of  these  have  been  very  clearly  stated  in  Gilbart's  Currency 
and  Banking (1851).  See the works of  this author in  six volumes, Vol.  IV., 
PP.  289-356. 
Apart from contemporary writings and the evidence, which is well  worth 
study,  given  before  the  various  Committees  of  Inquiry  between  1840  and 
1858, statements of  the controversy  between  the  Banking  and the Currency 
Principles  are given  by  J.  T. Danson,  On the  Account  of  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
lnnd  under  the operntion  of  the  Act  7 and 8  C'ict., ch. 32  (in  the journal  of 
the Statistical  Society, Vol.  X.), by  Roscher,  Nationalokonomik des  Handels 
und  Gewerbfleisses, pp.  314-332,  and  in  several  other  works  on  Political 
Economy or on Banking. 
More recently  the question has  been  summarised  in  a  most  able  manner 
by  Dr.  N.  G.  Pierson,  the well-known  Dutch economist.-See  Principles  of 
Economics, English translation, by  A.  A.  Wotzel, pp.  454-461. 
This is  especially true of  Tooke,  who is the chief  representative of  the 
Banking  Principle.-See  History  of  Prices,  Vol.  III.,  pp.  201-208.  Tooke, 
far from desiring competition  in  the issue of  notes, lays down most strongly, 
as a  principle,  the right  of  the State to make regulations  in  such a  matter. 
"  I am here assuming,"  he says (p. 206), "  as an undoubted right on the part 
of  the State, the principle  that banks of  issue are properly subjects for regula- 
tion.  As to free banking, in the sense in  which it is sometimes contended for, 
1 agree with  an American  writer,  who observes that free trade  in  banking is 
synonymous  with  free  trade  in  swindling."  On the  following  page Tooke 
adds that there can be  no question  of  free competition, since the issue of paper 
as a  substitute for coin  is  not  a branch  of  productive  industry; it  is a  thing 
which ought to be regulated  by  the State and be  included  in  the department 
of  administration.  Compare a  similar statement in  Tooke's other  book,  An 
Inqttiry,  p.  105. 
The full  exposition  of  Toolie's  theories  on  banking will  be  found  in  his 
History of  Prices, particularly  in  the 3rd volume, chapters iii.  and v. ; in  his 
,  rvidcnce  before  the (lommittees  of  Inquiry, of  which  a  critical  summary is 
given  by  F'oor,  op. cit., pp.  313-317, and  in  a special  \vork,  Apt  It~qrciry  into 
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had  no  objection  whatever  to  legal  measures  taken  with 
the object of  guaranteeing the quality of  the notes, but they 
were opposed  to any which  tended to restrict  the  quantity 
of the paper money issued.  In fact, they maintained that an 
over-issue  could  involve  no  danger either for  the  issuing 
bank or for the public so  long  as  the  notes remained  con- 
vertible.  If  the conversion of  the notes  into gold was not 
assured,  the danger  from an  excessive  issue  was  evident 
enough.  But otherwise there was  no  risk  whatever  to  be 
feared, because  it was impossible that an over-issue should 
occur.' 
For how could such an over-issue take place 3  In the first 
place  the  notes  are only  issued  in  the  course of  banking 
transactions,  that is, in  discounting or making advances on 
securities.  The  amount  of  the  issue  therefore  depends, 
not  on  the wishes  of  the Bank,  but  on  the  needs  of  the 
p~blic.~  The number of  notes  issued  by  the  Bank  will 
depend on  the  amount of  the bills presented  for discount 
and this in its turn will depend on the activity of  business. 
the  Currency  Princihle,  the  connection of  the  currency  with prices,  and  the 
expediency  of  a separation  of  Issue  from  Banking. 
Tooke's  two most important supporters were J. Fullarton, On the Regula- 
tion of Currencies and  the  working  of  the  new Bank  Act  (1844)~  and James 
Wilson.  Capital,  Currency atad  Banking. a  collection  of  articles re-published 
from  the Ecottomist,  2nd  edition,  1859.  The latter has been  translated  into 
Italian.-See  Biblioteca dell'  Economtsta, and series,  Vol.  VI. 
All  these  writers  have  been  answered  at great length,  if  not  with  great 
ability, by  Torrens.  See The Principles  and  Practical Operation of  Sir Robert 
Peel's  Act  of  1844 explained and defended, pp.  189-299.  The 3rd edition, 1858, 
of  this  work  also contains a  refutation  of  J.  S.  Mill's  theories  on currency, 
and of  thr article by  Danson  to which  we have just  referred. 
For  the  sake  of  completeness  we  may  notIce  also  a  work  by  Charles 
Tennant called The Bank  of  England  and  the organisation of  Credit in  Eng- 
land,  which  contains, pp.  15-17,  a  refutation  of  the currency principle.  But 
this lengthy (990  pp.)  book  is  hardly  worth the trouble  of  reading.  The 3rd 
edition,  1867, contains  a  translation  of  the  evidence  of  the brothers  Pereire 
before  the  Co~nmittee  of  Inquiry  in  1865 concerning  the  Bank  of  France, 
and a correspondence  brtwcen Tennant and Wolowski. 
See especially Chapter V.  in  Fullarton's  book, a  chapter entitled, Proof 
of the impossibility of  Over-Issrte. 
' "  It is  not,"  says Tooke, "  in  the power  of  Banks of  Issue,  including 
the Bank  of  England, to make any  direct addition  to  the  amount of  notes 
circulating  in  their  respective districts,  however  disposed  they  may  be  to do 
SO."--See  Inquiry, p.  123.  Compare History of  Prices, Vol.  III., pp.  373-374. 
M.  Gide,  op. cit.,  p.  377,  remarks that this  is  only  true in  theory, since 
an  unscrupulous  banker,  whose  sole  object  is  to  attract  customers,  could 
always by  lowering his rate  of  discount enough,  unduly  extend his  business 
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In the second place, Bank notes only remain in circulation 
for a very limited time,'  they return to the Bank a few weeks 
after issue.  Hence, even if the Bank managed to issue notes 
in  very large quantities, it could not  keep them  in circula- 
tion,  for  if  too  many  notes  are  issued  they  necessarily 
become  depreciated  and  the  least  depreciation  will  be 
enough to bring them all back  to  the Bank in a body. 
To  sum up, it is evident, say the advocates of  the Banking 
Principle, that a bank can only circulate a certain quantity 
of  notes,  which quantity is  determined by  force of  circum- 
stances, and that any over-issue will return to the bank as if 
contracted by an iron law. 
B.-Criticism  of  the  Banking Princifile.  This is  the 
tbeory known  as the  Banking Principle; it  has often  been 
refuted  and  Mr.  Pierson  has  quite  recently  once  again 
demonstrated  its  weakness.  This able  Dutch  economist, 
while  admitting  that excessive  issues are  returned  to  the 
Bank, expresses surprise that this should be  considered  a 
safeguard, whereas it is precisely in  this fact that the danger 
lies.  "  The amount of  the circulation continues the same, it 
is  true, but its components are  no longer  the  same; ' un- 
covered ' is  substituted  for  ' covered ' circulation  and  the 
relation  between  metallic  reserve  and note  circulation  be- 
comes less favourable." 
Mr.  Pierson2 gives the following illustration  in  support 
of  his reasoning : Suppose that a bank  has a note circula- 
tion  amounting  to  A18,ooo,ooo  and a  metallic  reserve of 
LS,ooo,ooo.  "  It grants loans for a further At,ooo,ooo, but 
the public does not require more than A18,ooo,ooo in notes; 
the extra ~z,ooo,ooo  put into circulation will therefore cause 
a redundancy of  money.  It now  becomes advantageous to 
export coin or bullion  and that coin or bullion  is obtainable 
at the bank in  exchange for  notes."  The extra  2  millions 
will now return to the bank and the circulation will be again 
' This  is  tru?.  As  we  shall  see  below  (Part  XI.,  p.  298),  it  has b~rn 
calculated that the average time during which each note remains in circulation 
is 70 days  for 65  notes  and from  58 to 9 days for notes of  higher values; 
indeed, the ,&I,OOO  notes only circulatr, on the average, for a  single week. 
a  Srr op.  cil., pp.  4.58-46" 
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reduced  to  18 millions.  But against these  18 millions the 
bank's reserve will now be only 6 millions.  "  The bank may 
pursue  this  course  for  a  long  time.  It may  increase  its 
loans up to ,&18,ooo,ooo, the amount of  its note circulation 
remaining all the while at the old figure."  But the whole 
reserve,  that  is,  the  guarantee of  the  convertibility of  the 
notes, will  have been exhausted. 
I  I  .-THE  CURRENCY  PRINCIPLE. 
A.-Statement  of  tlte  Czirreltcy  Principle.  According to 
the  Banking  Principle  the  business  of  the  Bank  was  to 
extend  its  transactions  as much  as possible,  provided  of 
course,  that  these  were  sound  in  character,  without  any 
feeling that it had a special function  to  perform  of  greater 
importance than  all  its other functions and to which  these 
must of  necessity  be  sacrificed.'  The Currency  Principle 
embodied a totally different view of  the position of  the Bank 
of  England.  The primary  function  of  the  Bank  was  not 
the transaction of business,  but the maintenance of  a sufli- 
cient  reserve on  behalf  of  the nation  to enable the latter to 
meet its liabilities with other countries. 
The supportersZ  of  the  Currency  Principle took  up the 
following position as their starting point.  There was, Lord 
Overstone repeatedly asserted, a certain quantity of  gold in 
the world; each  country naturally  possesses  that share of 
it  to  which  it has a right.  R  country  might certainly  be 
' I.croy-I3caulicu,  Cours d'Ec.  Polit.,  Vol.  III., p.  590. 
" l'hr  invrntor and thr [nost important advocate of  the Currency Principle 
is undoubtedly thc 1-ondon banlter, S.  j. Loyd,  who was afterwards raised to 
thv p(vragc as Lord Ovcrstonr.  Rctwcen  1837 and 1848 Loyd  wrote a  srries 
of  parnphlcts  in  support  of  hi9  systcm.  These panlphlets,  together  with  the 
Irttrrs contributrd  by  I.ord  Ovcrstonc  to  the  Tiines  between  1855 and  18-57, 
on  thc.  stat(. of  thr currctncy and his c,vidcncc bcforc  the Comrnittccs of  1840 
and  1848,  were collc-ctrd and  publishvd  in  a  volurnc  by  McCulloch  in  1858, 
undcr  thc  title  of  l'rclcts  and  othcr  Publicatiot~s on  Metallic  and  Paper 
C'rrrrcnry 
I.ord  Over.;tonr  was  vijioroirsly  supportrd  by  Colonel  Torrcns,  sce  A 
Letter  to  the  Right  Ilotz.  C'isrour~t  lll~lliournc,  on  the  causes  of  the  recent 
J~'rni~g~.*nent  of  tlre  illoney  Alarl~et  (1837), and ?'he  Principles  and Practical 
Opcrutio~r  of Sir I(. I'c~,l's Act cxploincd and dcfrndcd (3rd edition.  1858), and 
by  Gco. W~trde  Nor~nan.  Rrtraarks  on sonre preualerzt  errors with respect  to 
rrcrrctircy  urrd  han1:ing  (1838), and 11  letter  lo C.  TVood,  Esq.,  on  llloney  and 
the  ilf~~uirs  of  Eronolnisinfi it (1841). 
'l'ooltc.  has givvn  a sorn~~\vhat  colot~rlcss  surnrnary of  the Currency Principle 
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poor,  but its capital  would  always include such a propor- 
tion of  coined money as might be needful.' 
In fact, in the case  of  a  country  without any paper  cur- 
rency,  there could be  no scarcity of  metallic  money.  An 
unfavourable  balance of  trade  could not  cause the perma- 
nent exportation  of  the coin  and bullion; for a scarcity of 
money  increases  its  value,  this  produces  a  fall  in  prices 
and hence a decrease in imports and an incr6ase in exports, 
which  will  continue  until  the  country  has once  more  an 
adequate supply of  coin. 
Things are different in  the case of  a country which  has a 
mixed currency, that is, paper money combined with coined 
money.  Here,  if  the balance of  trade is unfavourable and 
gold  is  exported, there  is  no  ground  for  hoping  that  its 
absence will be short; in actual fact the banks will increase 
their paper circulation and since the circulating medium  is 
no scarcer, prices will not fall.  It may even be feared that 
the situation,  instead  of  improving,  will  become  increas- 
ingly serious.  The metallic  money  may  even  be  entirely 
driven out without prices being at all reduced. 
What is the remedy for such a state of  things? 
The supporters of  the Currency Principle maintained that 
it was as follows :a  A decrease in the circulation, of  what- 
ever  kind,  must never be  replaced  by paper.  It ought  to 
be illegal for banks to substitute paper for the gold exported, 
or better still, the banks ought to be obliged to reduce their 
.  issues in proportion  to the gold exported. 
Compare Norman, A  letter to C. Wood, Esq., p.  17. 
3  See Torrens, A  Letter  to Lord  Melbourne,  p.  29 ; S.  J.  Loyd,  Further 
Reflections  on the Currency, p. 34. 
Norman also,  who  is at times  hesitating  in  his  conclusions,  seems  to  be 
quite  decided  upon  this  point.  Before  the  Committee  of  Inquiry  (Question 
1749)  he  stated  that  notes  are  preferable  to  coin  because  they  are  cheaper 
and  more  convenient,  but  that  they  ought  not  to  be  preferred  unless  they 
also  possess  the  other  qualities  of  a  metallic  currency  and  in  particular, 
unless  they  increase  or  diminish  in  the  same  way  as a  metallic  currency 
would do.  In his Remarks, Norman alleges that the existing paper circulation 
suffered from the following disadvantages, which  were due  to the  fact that it 
was  not regulated upon the metallic  circulation :- 
"  I.-A  tendency  to vary  in  amount  both  as to  excess or  deficiency  in  an 
unnecessary  degree and  at unsuitable periods. 
"  2.-A  liability  to discredit  . . . in  a  large  proportion,  if  not  the  whole 
of  it. 
"  3.-Insolvency  on the  part of  many  of  the  issuers." 
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B.-Defects  in  the  Currency Principle.  The defects  in 
the Currency Principle have been  set forth  very clearly by 
Mr. Pierson.' 
The first mistake made by the advocates of  the Currency 
Principle was that  of  supposing "  that  a  bank  invariably 
does wrong when  it  supplies a  deficiency  in  the  monetary 
circulation  by  issuing notes."  This view  would  oblige us 
to forego "  one of  the greatest advantages of  a well-regulated 
banking system."  In fact, in the case of  a demand due to 
a panic or to a great exportation of  bullion resulting from a 
bad  harvest,  it is the bank's duty to assist the public, lest, 
in  order to  obtain  precious metal  for  which  paper money 
might  quite  well  be  temporarily  substituted,  people  are 
forced at an unfavourable moment to  sell either securities, 
which  may  be excellent  in  themselves,  or,  in  the case  of 
farmers, machinery or cattle.  It will be time enough for the 
bank gradually to restrict its issues and to refill  its coffers 
when the crisis is past and the public have been helped. 
The Currency Principle involves a second no less serious 
mistake.  "  It is not true that,  in a country where no bank 
notes are in  circulation,  exportation of  specie results in  an 
immediate fall in prices and consequently in an alteration in 
the balance of  payments.  It would be so if bank notes were 
the only  possible  substitutes for  specie; but bank deposits 
also serve as substitutes for specie."  But "  bank notes and 
bank deposits differ only in form, since both take the place 
of  specie when they are not covered by a metallic reserve." 
"  Let  the needful stock of  media of  payment,"  says Mr. 
Pierson in illustration,' "  be represented by the figure loo, 
and suppose it  to be made up of specie and bank  deposits 
each  to the extent of  50.  If  specie be now  exported to the 
value of  10, but the banks at the same time grant credits to 
their  depositors  to  the  same amount,  how  is  the  fall  in 
prices to take place? . . .  -2 bank of  circulation issues notes 
Op. cit., pp. 456-458.  In  spite  of  the defects he points out, Mr.  Pierson 
considers  that  the  Currency  Principle  is  less  dangerous  than  the  Banking 
l'rinciplr  and  agrrcs  \v~th  I3ngt.hot in  prefrrring  the  mediocre  rules imposed 
on  the  Bank  directors  by  the  Act  of  1844,  to  those  which  they  might have 
invcntcd  for  themselves.-See  p.  461. 
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. . . with  which  people  pay  each  other.  A  deposit bank 
credits its depositors'  accounts, and the balances produced 
in  this way also constitute a medium  of  payment." 
The  exponents  of  the  Currency  Principle  refused  to 
recognise  this  fact,'  hence  their  theory  has  never  been 
accepted  by  economists.  As the  Dictio~zary  of  Political 
Economy2 puts it : "  It marks the difference between  those 
who  fegard bank  notes  as ' money,'  and those  who  con- 
sider  them,  in  the  words  of  Huskisson,  as  'circulating 
credit,' and a ' substitute for money.'  . . .  While insisting-, 
and  properly,  on  adequate  security  being  given  for  the 
bank  note,  the  Currency doctrine  leaves  out  of  sight  the 
operation of  all other instruments of  credit, equally effective 
in their  way,  as bank  notes,  on price  and the  movements 
of  commodities." 
In excuse for Lord Overstone it has been pointed out that 
notes then  formed the principal part of  bankers'  liabilities, 
deposits  played  only a secondary  part.  For  instance,  in 
February,  !820,  the circulation  of  the  Bank  amounted to 
A23,ooo,ooo,  while  the  deposits  were  E4,otm,ooo;  in 
February,  1890,  they  were  respectively  A23,joo,ooo and 
A'3j,ooo,ooo.  13ut  although  the  deposits  were  small  in 
amount in  1820, their  character,  their advantages and the 
future before  them were clearly  understood by  1844.  And 
l'ooke,  after pointing out that  the  deposits,  thanks to  the 
use of  cheques, served the purpose of  money as well or even 
better  than  Bank  notes,'  distinctly  foretells  the  extension 
which this method of  payment would  undergo. 
It is difficult to decide in  favour of  either one of  these two 
'  Apparently  Torrens  must  be  inrluded  among  those  exponents  of  the 
Currency  Principle who  were  unwilling to recognise  this.  Compare  pp.  6-12 
of his letter to Lord Melbourne, and pp.  6 and 9 of his Principles and Practical 
Operations.  On p. 8  of  this  latter  work  'l'orrcns  finally  says that  a  cheque 
is distinct  from  nionc.y,  because  it  possesses  a  power  of  purchase  but  not  of 
liquidating debt, since if  it  is not subsequently honoured the transaction comes 
to  nothing. 
=  Vol.  I., p. 473. 
a  Cheques, according to Tookc (Inquiry. Chap. v., Deposits  and Cheques), 
possess  the  following  advant:igcs  r0mparc.d  with  bank  notes : they  save the 
worry of  hnving  to pay  the  fractions  of  t11(.  sum o\vc.d  in  roin  and thr risks 
of  111(,ft and fir<.; thvy  do not  nc*c(-;\it:~t(*  :I  rrsrc.ipt, sincr  the banlcrr's  boolts 
nrc sirflirirnt  proof  of  pnymcsnt, c'tc., rlr. 
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opposing principles.  Apart from  defects  of  theory,  they 
both  have  their  practical  disadvantages, and in  general  it 
may  be  said, that as regards  the  regulation  of  issues, all 
systems risk  one or other of  two dangers :  either the paper 
currency  is unduly  restricted  or it is  left  so free as to en- 
danger its security. 
For the rest, the discussion of  the merits and demerits of 
these  two  systems is not  only,  speaking generally,  some- 
what futile and very dull, but is also rather out of  place  in 
an historical work. 
Whatever may  in  reality be the advantages of  the Bank- 
ing  Principle  (and  it  may  be  noted  that as applied  in  a 
prudent  manner  in  France its results are far  from bad),  it 
was  very  soon  rejected  in  England.  Hence  it  is  more 
important to examine the practical  form  given  by  the ex- 
ponents of the Currency Principle to  their  theory, and the 
methods by which they wished to enforce it. 
For this purpose we judge it ad~isable~to  begin by analys- 
ing Lord Overstone's numerous pamphlets, and in so doing 
to compare his proposals with those of  Torrens and Norman. 
This study  will  have  the double  advantage  of  giving a 
closer knowledge of  the Currency Principle and of  explain- 
ing beforehand  the ideas which  inspired  the legislation of 
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CHAPTER  V. 
THE  CURRENCY  PRINCIPLE  AND  THE 
PROMO'TERS  OF  THE LAW OF  1844 
(LORD  OVERSTONE,  COLONEL  TORRENS,  G.  W.  NORMAN). 
Lord  Ovrrstone,  the  chief  promoter  of  the  Act  of  1844,  his  pamphlets  and 
his throries.  .4nalysis  of the "  Reflections  Suggested  by  MI.  Palmer's 
Patltphlet."  Lord  Overstone and the  Bank  of  England : Criticism of  the 
organisation of  the  Uanli.  Suggests two rcfor111s  : (a) Full publication  of 
accounts,  (b) Division  of  Bank  into  two departments.  Colonel  Torrens' 
plan.  Bank obliged to purcbase bullion at a fixed price.  Lord  Overstone 
and  the  country  banlcs  of  issue : Numerous  disadvantages  in  the  niulti- 
plicity  of  banks of  issue.  Need for strengthening  the central  tnonopoly of 
issue-Su~nniarp  of  the  proposals  of  the  advocates  of  the  Currency 
Principle. 
THE  Currency Principle was expounded for the first time in 
a pamphlet  by S. J. Loyd, published  in  1837  and entitled, 
Reflections  suggested  by  a  perusal  of  Mr.  1. Horsley 
Palmcr's  pamphlet  on the causes and  cortseqvences  of  the 
pressz~re  on the Mov~ey  Market, which is  a reply to a work 
of  Palmer's already referred to, on the crisis of  1836. 
This pamphlet, the first which Loyd wrote,' merits careful 
study for  it contains in  germ  the  Act  of  1844.  It  recom- 
mends, indeed, as much the reform of  the Bank of  England 
as the reform of  Engllsh banks.  The author begins by  an 
examination  of  the  rules which  govern  the Bank  of  Eng- 
' He wrote many others afterwards ; McCulloch's  edition, to which  all our 
rcfcrcnccs  arc madc, contains  the  fo!lowing :-- 
I.-Hetnarks  on the  Afut~agemetrt  and  Iltc  Ciuculafion, nnd  on  the  condi- 
tions and  conduciion of  fire Ilank  of  Ettgltind  ~III~  oj tl~e  cout~try  iss14es duritrg 
tlte year  133') (1840). 
11.-A  Lcrter  to j. B. Smiih, Bsq.. f'rcsidcnt  of  the  Mnr~chcsttsr Chamber 
of Commerce. 
111.-Effects  of the  Adminiszration  of  thc  Batrk  of  England.-A  second 
letter  to J. U. Smitlr, Esq  (1840). 
1V.-Thoughts  on  the  Separation  of  ;he  departments  of  the  Bank  of 
Englatrd  (1s4& 
\r.-TIIC  petttton  of tllrL  ~~LILI!UIILC,  Bankt,~s  and  Tlt~dcrs  of  London 
ogal~rvt  the  Bank Clrurtf  r  Ict, wtllt cotnrnent~  on cach clause.  In collabora- 
tlon  w~th  lolrcns,  1847. 
land  and after pointing out their  absurdity, suggests two 
remedies : (a) the publication of  the accounts in full, (b) the 
separation  of the  Ban'k  into two departments.  Loyd  then 
passes on to consider the system of  country banking, finds 
numerous defects  in  it, criticises the system  of  joint-stock 
banks and the confusion between  banks of  issue and banks 
of  deposit  and finally suggests as a remedy  the extension 
of the monopoly of  central issue. 
We  shall proceed to discuss these various points. 
According  to  Lord  Overstone  the  Bank  "  acts  in  two 
capacities " :- 
I .-"  As a manager of  the circulation." 
2.-"  AS a body performing the ordinary functions of  a 
banking concern." 
These two  functions are in  themselves  entirely distinct. 
Unfortunately  this  distinction  has  not  been  sufficiently 
regarded  in  the principles  laid  down  by  the  Bank  for  its 
own guidance. 
Lord  Overstone'  proceeds  to  describe  this  principle  as 
formulated  by  Mr.  Palmer  as  follows :  that  "  against 
the amount of  notes out it shall hold at its disposal securities 
and specie, that the amount of  securities shall be invariable, 
and that consequently all fluctuations in the amount of  notes 
out  shall  be  met  by  a  corresponding  fluctuation  in  the 
amount of  specie in  deposit;  thus the public, and not  the 
Bank, will be made the regulators of  the amount of  the cir- 
culation, and that amount will by  this principle be made to 
fluctuate precisely as it would  have fluctuated had the cur- 
rency been  purely metallic." 
Lord  Overstone  goes on  to  point  out  that  this  rule  is 
only accurate in  reference to the Bank as a manager of  the 
circulation ;  it is quite unworkable in  regard to the Bank of 
England considered as an ordinary banking concern.  For 
"  it is in the nature of  banking business that the amount of 
its deposits  should vary  with  a  variety  of  circumstances; 
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and as its amount of  deposits varies, the amount of that in 
which  those deposits are invested (viz.,  the securities) must 
vary  also."  Hence  it  is  absurd  to  expect  the  Bank  of 
England, as a banking concern,  to keep the amount of  its 
securities  invariable,  any more  than  this is  done  by  any 
other banking establishment. 
The rule  as stated by the  Bank's  directors  is  therefore 
false.  What method should be adopted to secure a circula- 
tion  which will fluctuate as though it were metallic? 
The methods are two :  (I) The publication of  simple, full 
and intelligible accounts.  (2)  The separation of  the  Bank 
into two departments. 
I.-"  The rule ought to  be,  That the  variations  in  the 
amount of  circulation shall correspond  to  the  variations  in 
the amount of  bullion, and the adherence of  the Bank to this 
rule ought to  be  obvious upon  the face  of  the published 
accounts.  By this means, and by  this means only, can we 
obtain a paper circulation varying in amount exactly as the 
circulation would have varied had  it been  metallic; and, in 
addition  to the establishment  of this only  sound principle 
of  currency,  we  shall  obtain  a  simple  and  intelligible 
account, requiring no further explanation,  nor  the produc- 
tion of  any information not at the command of  the public."' 
2.-Were  the  management  of  the  currency,  Lord 
Overstone  continues, "  entrusted to a  body  established ex- 
clusively  for that purpose, this is the rule  by  which  such 
body must govern its operations. . . .  The importance of  a 
rigid  adherence to this rule cannot be over-estimated; and 
if it be incompatible, as is alleged by some, with the mixed 
functions-of the Bank of  England, it seems to become a very 
serious  question  whether  it  is not  better  to separate  alto- 
gether the business of  banking from that of  regulating the 
currency,  rather than suffer so essential a rule to be in any 
degree compromised.  . . . .  , , 
Moreover  it  is  difficult  to  see  any  insurmountable 
obstacles to this separation.  "  In  proportion as these two 
functions are  kept  distinct  will  each  be  rendered  more 
pp.  10,  11. 
effectual for its purpose.  The two branches of  the business 
of  the  Bank  thus  divided " suggest "  those  animals  de- 
scribed by  naturalists, whose  peculiar  property  it  is  that, 
when cut into two parts, they move off  in opposite directions, 
each half  equally full of  life and energy." 
Torrens, in his letter to Lord Melbourne, had suggested a 
scheme for the division of  the Bank  into two departments. 
This scheme, which was much more detailed than that just 
described by Loyd, was imitated in the Act of  1844; it must 
therefore be briefly  noticed.' 
The issue department,  or  the department  of  circulation 
as Torrens called it, was to confine itself to exchanging gold 
for notes, and notes for gold.  It was also to be subject to 
the following regulations :- 
I.-It  was to be  free to buy or sell silver to the value of 
2 or 3 million  pounds.  2.-It  was  to  be  obliged  to  buy 
foreign gold in bullion  at a fixed price of  £3  17s. 6d. the 
ounce, with permission  to sell it at £3  17s. gd.  3.-It  was 
to be authorised to lend notes on  coin or bullion at a very 
low rate, say I  per cent., so as to give facilities to trade with- 
out disturbing the circulation. 
The accounts were to be published in full. 
After criticising  the rules according to  which  the  Bank 
of  England  was  managed  and pointing  out  the  changes 
which  he  thought  were  needed,  Lord  Overstone  goes 
on  to  criticise  the  organisation of  provincial  facilities  for 
credit. 
The existing system, he says,?  combines and confuses two 
'  Torrcns'  scheme  was  ably  sun~mariscd  by  G. W. Norman,  who  was  in 
the  main  also  an  advocate  of  the  separation  into  two  departments.  Sec 
Remarlzs, pp.  98 and  105. 
'  p.  13.  In  the  author's opinion  these  criticisms  applied  as much  to  the 
Bank  of  England  as  to  the  country  banks.  Hence  he  sug ested  a  little  T  further  on, p:  38,  that  the  issue  department  should be  control ed  by  a  com- 
mittee on whlch a representative  of  the Government should sit.  For a  similar 
proposal  sce  Torrens, p.  64;  he  advocatcs  thc  appointment  of  a  committee 
choscn  by  the Govcrnn~cnt  and  Parliament. 282  HISTORY  OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
absolutely  distinct  functions.  Moreover  the  persons  who 
exercise the right of  issue are "  not a body  of  individuals 
qualified  (by their total separation  from all such interests) 
to exercise a dispassionate and disinterested judgment ;  but, 
on the contrary, men the most largely engaged in  mercan- 
tile and monied operations,  and, therefore,  more than  any 
other class exposed in their private interests to the immediate 
effects of  any action upon the currency. 
"Again,  with respect  to joint-stock  banks,  we  create by 
law large and powerful establishments, to which is given the 
right to issue paper money without any absolute restriction ; 
and even that knowledge of  the action of  the Bank which is 
essential to enable them  to take a just view of the condition 
of  the currency and of  their corresponding duty, is afforded 
to them only through .  . .  imperfect and delusive accounts."' 
Besides  this,  Loyd  continues a little further  on,'  banks 
of  issue are confused  with  banks of  discount,  whereas the 
objects of  the two  are entirely different.  "  The sole duty 
of the former . . . is to take efficient means for  issuing its 
paper  money  upon  good  security  and  regulating  the 
amount of  it by one fixed rule.  The principal  object and 
business of  the latter . . . is  to obtain  the command of  as 
large a  proportion  as possible  of  the  existing circulating 
medium and to distribute it in such a manner as shall com- 
bine security for repayment with the highest rate of  profit." 
Loyd concluded that it  was  necessary  to strengthen the 
central monopoly of  issue.a 
He explains4 that "  when  prices  are rising,  profits  in- 
creasing, and every merchant . . . is desirous of  extending 
his operations,"  and demands credit for this purpose,  the 
banker's position  is  difficult.  His  relations with  trade are 
intimate  and it  is unpleasant for him to refuse  the credit, 
however much it may be his duty to do so.  "  If  under these 
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circumstances the banker, in  addition  to what may be  pro- 
perly  called  his ordinary and legitimate  resources,  is also 
entrusted with the power of  issuing paper money ad libitum; 
is it not inevitable that he should abuse that power?  Can 
expect that under such circumstances, whilst all his other 
resources are strained to the utmost for the accommodation 
of his customers,  he will  still keep a firm  and unyielding 
restraint over the amount of  his issues?  Will he under such 
temptation  in  no  respect  confound  or compromise  his re- 
spective  duties  as a  Banker  of  Issue  and  a  Banker  of 
Deposit  and Discount ? " 
A knowledge of  human nature and experience, combined 
with a study of  the  Bank  returns, prove  that  he will  not 
resist, and that the result will be a confusion of  and a com- 
promise  between  the  two  functions.  "  The effect  . . . of 
such an application by the Banker of  his power to issue will 
be to give a further stimulus to the existing  cendencies of 
the trading world, and ultimately  to aggravate the convul- 
sion to which  they must lead." 
This is  the  outline  of  the  practical  application  of  the 
Currency Principle put forward by  the chief  exponents of 
the theory.  The plan  may be summarised, as far as con- 
cerns the Bank of  England,  under three heads :- 
I .-The  regulation  of  the paper circulation according to 
the fluctuations it would have undergone had it been coined 
money. 
2.-The  separation  of  the  Bank  into two  departments, 
and the regular publication of  clear and full balance sheets. 
3.-The  obligation  imposed on the Bank  to buy gold at 
a fixed price. 
As regards  country  banks,  the  multiplication  of  banks 
of  issue  was  opposed  and  the  extension  of  the  central 
monopoly of  issue was demanded, so that the indirect control 
exercised over the provincial issues might be more powerful 
and more efficient. 
Norman,  who  arrived at the  same conclusion, points  out, pp.  33-34,  the 
abuses  in  the  management  of  the  issues  and  the  resemblance  between  the 
right of  issue and that of coining money as possessed by  powerful  subjects in 
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CHAPTER  VI. 
SIR  ROBERT  PEEL AND  THE ACT  OF  1844. 
((1)-~NTERVENTION  OF  SIR  ROBERT  PEEL;  @)-THE  ACT 
OF  1814; (c)-THE  ACT OF  1844 AND  RICARDO'S  PLAN 
FOR  A NATIONAL  BANK. 
Action  of  Sir Robert Peel.  Peel's  theories on banking.  His two Speeches in 
the House of  Cornnions.  His Memorandum  to the Cabinet.  Peel's  rejec- 
tion  of  free con~petition  as regards  note  issue.  Argument  from  reason. 
Argument  from  experience;  disastrous  part  played  by  country  banks. 
Necessity  for  a  central  bank  of  issue : Reasons  why  this  should be  the 
Bank of  England.  The Act  of  1844 passed  without  opposition.  Chief 
provisions of  the Act.  As regards the Rank of  England.  As regards the 
country banks of  issue.  Limitation and gradual loss of  the right of  issue. 
Ricardo's  plan for a  National Bank.  Points of  likeness  to Robert Peel's 
Act.  Its useleesncss. 
THE  dispute between  the advocates of  the Currency and of 
the  Banking  Principles  might  have  gone on  for  a  long 
time.  The Committees of  Inquiry had been sitting for five 
years, and had asked  more than  14,000 questions1 without 
reaching  any  definite  conclusion ;  indeed,  without  even 
presenting a report.  Fortunately there was then at the head 
of  affairs a man  whose  intelligence was equal to  his high 
character,  and who,  with  Canning and Gladstone,= ranks 
among  the  most  eminent  English  statesmen  in  the  19th 
century. 
Robert Peel,  for  it  is to him  that we  refer,  had been  a 
Conservative all his life, but a Conservative of  that English 
type which does not confuse conservatism with reaction and 
never shrinks from a necessary reform.  He considered that 
That is, 3,000 questions in  1836; 4,570 in  1837; 1,700 in  1838; 3,859 in 
1840; and  nearly  1,000 in  1841.  See  Peel's  speech  on  December  3,  1847, 
Parl. Debates, Vol.  XCV.,  p.  655. 
'  Were  it  not  for  my  national  feeling  I  should  rank  Peel  even  above 
Canning and Gladstone; he  was placed  in  more  difficult  circumstanct:~  than 
the  former  and  showed  himself  equally  courageous ,but  less  nervous  than 
the latter.  It must also be  noted  that Gladstone  owed some of  his greatest 
financial successes to the apprenticeship which  he served under Peel. 
it was time to have done with theoretical  discussions and to 
come to the actual reform for which everyone wished, but as 
to whose exact form no one could agree.  Peel took advant- 
age of  a clause in  the law  of  1833 which  empowered  the 
Government  to  suspend  the  Bank's  charter in  1845, and 
after careful reflection he brought in  the  Bill which  was to 
become the Bank Charter Act of  1844. 
This Bill  is  obviously  inspired  by  the  writings  of  the 
exponents of  the Currency  Principle.  We shall examine 
presently  the reasons which  decided  Peel  in  their  favour, 
but it may be noticed at the outset that Peel did not come to 
the  study of  banking  problems  with  an absolutely  open 
mind.  He had been  so strongly impressed by  the evils of 
over-issue, the most dangerous of  the abuses to which bank- 
ing is liable, which  had  displayed  themselves  with  extra- 
ordinary  violence  between  1836 and  1839, that  he  became 
almost blind to any other consideration.' 
(a)-SIR  ROBERT  PEEL'S  OPINIONS  ON  BANKING. 
Although  the  banking  question  finds  no  place  in  the 
MemoirsZ  of  the great English statesman, Sir Robert Peel's 
views on the matter are fully stated in a Memorandum which 
he laid before the Cabinet3 and in two speeches, remarkable 
'  It is interesting to notice that the misuse of  paper money always produces 
a demand  for remedies of extraordinary severity  and an entire  forgetfulness 
of  the possible uses of  this paper.  Macleod (Vol.  I., p:  267), quotes a  Chinese 
author, who,  writing in  1309, at a  time when  the Ch~nese  currency  had  been 
thrown  into extreme disorder  by  over-issues, regretted former days in  the fol- 
lowing words :  'I Then it was ordered that at the offices of  the rich merchants 
who  managed  the enterprise,  when notes  were paid in  the money  came out, 
when  the  bills  came out  the money  went  in.  'I'he  money  was the  niothc>r, 
the note  was the son.  The son and the mother  were reciprocally  exchanged 
for each other." 
"This doctrine,"  adds Macleod, "put  forth in the year  1309 by  a Chinese 
writer,  is  the  Currettcy  Prittciple."  (Theory and  Practice  of  Ratzking,  3rd 
edition). 
a  See  Memoirs, published  by  1,ord  Stanhope and  Lord  Cardwrll.  These 
mrmoirs  are divided  into  three parts : (I) The  Roman  Catholic  Qurstion ; 
(2) The New  Government,  1834-5; (3) Repeal of  the  Corn  Laws, 1845-6. 
'  This  Memorandum  has  bcrn  recently  publishrd  in  a'work  by  Charlps 
Stuart Parker, Sir  Robert  I'rc.1  from  his  Private  Papers, Vol.  III., p.  134, et 
seq.  Lord  Roscbery  published  an analysis  of  1'arkc.r'~ book  in  the  Anglo- 
Sayon  Rcvic.w:  this  analysis,  which  is  in  fact  a  brilliant  essay,  has bccm 
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alike for high purpose and closeness of  reasoning, made on 
hqay  6 and May 20 in  the House of  Commons, and which 
supplied  the  explanation  and  justification  of  the  law  of 
1844. 
After inquiring, "  What is the signification of  that word 
' a pound,' " and answering that  it  is "  a  quantity of  the 
precious metals of  certain weight and certain fineness,"  Peel 
proceeded to deduce from  this definition  the various conse- 
quences implied in it.VI-Ie then pointed  out the distinction 
between  bank  notes and other forms of  paper  credit  and 
tried  to  show  that  the  convertibility  of  the  note  did  not 
afford sufficient  guarantee against the dangers of  excessive 
issue.  I-Ie  rejected  the doctrine of  free competition  in  the 
matter of  issue from grounds both of  reason and experience. 
(a)-Argume.nt  from Reason. 
"We should infer, certainly, from reasoning,"  says Peel,' 
"  that free competition  in  the  supply of  any given  article 
will probably  ensure us the most  abundant supply of  that 
article at the cheapest rate.  Rut we do not want an abundant 
supply of  cheap promissory paper.  We  want only . . .  just 
such a quantity of  paper . . .  as shall be equivalent in  point 
of  value to the coin which  it  represents. . . .  That system, 
therefore, which  provides a constant supply of  paper equal 
in  value to  coin, and so varying in  amount as to ensure at 
all times  immediate convertibility  into coin,  together with 
perfect confidence in  the solvency of  the issuers of  paper, 
is the system  which  ought to be preferred."  Quality,  not 
For Peel's two sprrchcs src The SPccchrs of  the Right  IIon. Sir R. Peel, 
dclivcrcd  in  the  IIousc  of  Co~n*~tons,  Vol.  I\'.,  pp.  349-366  and  374-385  re- 
spc,ctivcly  and,  11  Corner in Gold. Appendix,  p.  113.  A  translation  of  thcm 
has  bcrn  pi~blishcd  in  the  Journnl  des  kcono~,~istcs.  Vol.  III., pp.  251  and 
357.  \Villiam  Taylor gives  a  summary  of  thcm  in  Life  and  l'intes  of  Sir 
It'.  Peel,  Vol.  III., pp.  2.50-276.  l'aylor's  work,  in  three  volumes,  is  un- 
finished;  a  fourth  volume has  brrn  addcd  by  Ch.  Maclay, and contains  an 
account  of  Peel's  life  from  his retircmrnt  until  his dcath.  ?'he  whole  work 
is  of  little- value. 
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cheapness, is required, and this quality cannot be regulated 
by an unlimited competition.  "  Unless the issuers of paper 
conform to certain principles, unless they vigilantly observe 
the causes which  influence the influx or efflux of  coin, and 
regulate  their issues of  paper accordingly, there is danger 
that  the  value  of  the paper will  not correspond  with  the 
value of  the coin."  That is, there will be an excessive issue. 
(b)-Argument  from  Experience. 
Peel1 goes on to discuss the arguments which  he deduces 
from the history of  the country banks of  issue.  Competition 
among the country banks is determined by the feeling which 
makes each  issuer say, "  naturally enough, ' It is  vain for 
me individually to contract my issues when  others will  not 
do the same.  I  shall suffer by doing so.  My efforts will 
produce no effect on  the aggregate, while some competitor 
will  take that share of  the circulation  which  I  may  with- 
draw.'  And  thus,  each  refusing  to  make  the  individual 
sacrifice, . . .  the crisis comes." 
The principle of  free competition had exposed the Bank of 
England to  great danger Peel  thought, on four occasions, 
owing to the unwillingness or inability of  the country banks 
to contract their issues.  The history of  the country2 banks, 
in spite of  the value of  their services, was not in their favour. 
Between  1839 and 1843, 82 banks, of  which  29 were banks 
of issue,'  failed ; 240 suspended payment between  1814 and 
1816  and similar disasters occurred from 1825 to 1840.  The 
great losses resulting from these failures ought  to be con- 
sidered and it must be remembered  that the worst  suffering 
fell upon those who were least able to resist it; the situation 
of the victims,  artisans, small farmers and so on, deserved 
the more pity because they could not choose between several 
' For what follows see Sfieeches, pp.  357-358. 
See  p. 381. 
'Out  of  these 29,  17 had paid  no dividend. 
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banks, but were forced to make use of  the one in their own 
neighbourhood. 
Peel  concluded  his criticism  of  the existing system  by 
citing  in  addition  to  the  example of  the English country 
banks,  that  of  the  American  banks,  an illustration  which 
appears somewhat  ill-chosen ;  then he passed on to explain 
the system whose adoption he recommended. 
In brief  the new system consisted in  this : that a central 
bank of  issue should possess  the right to  control  the pro- 
vincial  banks. 
With respect  to the central bank, Peel remarks that this 
single bank  could  no  doubt  be  specially  established,  but 
"  the true policy  in this country is to work,  so far as it  be 
possible, with the instruments you have ready to your hand 
-to  avail yourselves of  that advantage which  they possess 
from having been in use, from being familiar from constitut- 
ing a part of  the habits and usages of  society.  They will 
probably  work  more smoothly  than perfectly  novel  instru- 
ments of  greater theoretical  perfection.'  . . . We think  it 
the  wisest  course  to  select  the  Bank  of  England  as that 
controlling and central body." 
So  much for the theories which inspired the legislation of 
1844  ;a it remains to examine Peel's  Act  in  detail. 
The Act  of .IQ~  was  passed  by the  House of  Commons 
with hardly any opposition by 185  votes to 30.  In the House 
of  1r)rds things  went  even  more  smoothly  and  after  a 
single protest from  Lord  Radnor, it was  passed  without a 
division. 
Ser p.  3h.  In his hfrn~orandurn  Prc.1  rejects the idea of  a  special board 
of  issur,  indcpendvnt  of  thc (;overnmrnt  but  responsible  to Parliament  (see 
pp.  135-137).  An~ong<t  other di\advantages,  he thinks that it would  be incon- 
vvnicmt  to inipo\r  a  uniform  5>stctni  upon  rnch  of  thr  thrcr divisions of  thc 
United  Kingdom,  when,  as things  arc, rnch  has a  differently  organiscd cur- 
rrncy.  Compare, cot~lra,  Ricardo's  Plun, p.  73. 
'  Peel,  in  \peaking  of  thc  regular  publication  of  accounts  (p.  3Cm),  says 
111:tt  "nothing  will  morc conducr  to the credit  of  thr Banlc  itself  and to the 
prcvrntion  of  nl rdlcss alarm. " 
Chief  Provisions  of  the Act  of  1844. 
The chief provisions of  the new law can be grouped under 
two heads :  those which  concern  the Bank of  England and 
those which concern  the country banks.  We shall discuss 
each in turn. 
I.--Provisions  Concerning the Bank of  England. 
I.-After  August 31st, 1844, the Bank of  England was to 
be divided into two departments, the issue department and 
the banking department. 
On the same day the Governor and Company of  the Bank 
of England must transfer to the issue department securities 
to the value of  E~q,ooo,ooo,  of  which the Government debt 
to the bank (say A1 ~,ooo,ooo)  was to form a part, and also 
all the gold coin and gold and silver bullion  not  needed  in 
the banking department. 
The silver in  the Issue Department,  it  should be  noted, 
was never to exceed one-fourth of  the gold.' 
In return the issue department was  to  hand over to  the 
banking  department  an  amount  of  notes  equal  to  the 
securities, coin and bullion, so transferred to it. 
In  other  words  the  Bank  might  issue  notes  against 
securities to the amount of  14 millions, but beyond this sum 
it could not issue a single note except against coin or bullion. 
2.-If  any banker  who  had  retained  the  right  of  issue 
ceased to exercise this privilege, the Bank of  England might 
increase the amount of the securities in the issue department 
by a sum not  exceeding two-thirds of  the  notes withdrawn 
from circulation. 
In  this way  the  Bank gradually  inherited  the  rights of 
This proportion  has never  actually been  reached,  but  the Bank  has  at 
times  held  a  considerable  quantity  of  silver  bullion.  The  maximum  was 
attained on  October 3rd, 1846, when  the Bank had  a  reserve  of  .&2,727,CmO 
In  silver and ~12,632,000  in gold.  Since August aoth, 1853, the balance sheet 
of the  Bank has ceased  to quote the stock  of  silver  except  during the very 
short interval  between  November  28th,  1860,  and July  3rd,  1861,  when  the 
Bank held  some silver  bullion,  though  no  great  amount.  For  the stock of 
silver  bullion  held by  thr Banlc of  England see  Palgrave, The Bank  Rate and 
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issue of  those country banks which  resigned their privilege 
or which ceased to exist.  We shall see that, thanks to this 
clause in  the law,  the Bank of  England  has extended  its 
right  of  issue  considerably,  i.e.,  from  £14,ooo,ooo  to 
.418,450,000.' 
3.-The  Bank was exempted from all stamp duty on  its 
notes,  but  in  return  for  the  privileges  granted  to  it  the 
annual  sum paid  to  the  Government  was  increased  from 
.4120,000  to £180,0oo. 
4.-Anyone  was entitled to demand notes from the Bank 
in exchange for standard gold at the rate of  £3  17s. gd. per 
ounce. 
In other words, the Bank is forced  to buy at a fixed  .price 
ail  the gold offered  to it. 
5.-Weekly  accounts in a specified form were to be sent 
to the Government and published in the London Gazette. 
The importance  of  this  last  reform  will  be  understood 
from a comparison of  the balance sheets of  the Bank before 
and after the law of  1844. 
Weekly  Return  of the Bank of  England,  week  ending 
September 7th,  1844 (New form) :- 
Banking 
Issue  Department. 
Notes  issued  .  . . .  ,428,351,295  Government  Debt  . .  ,&~~,org,loo 
Pruprietors'  Capital  . A14,553,000 
Rest  .  .  .  . . .  3,564,729 
Public  deposits  . .  .  3,630,809 
Other  deposits  .  .  .  8,644,348 
Seven-day  and  other 
bills  1,030,354 
A2893511295 
Department. 
Other  securities  . .  2,984,900 
Gold  coin  and  bullion  12,657,208 
Silver  bullion  . . .  1,694,087 
,428,351,295 
Government  securities, 
(including  the  dead- 
weight  annuity2  .  . ,414,554,834 
Other  securities .  . .  .7,835,616 
Notes  .  .  . . . .  8,175,025 
Gold  and silver coin  .  857,765 
,431,4239240 
M.  MARSHALL,  (Chid Cashier). 
For  further details see below,  p.  299. 
'  The dead-weight annuity was a yearly payment  of  A588,740 made by  the 
Government  in  return  for  an  advance  of  ,41g,ooo,ooo, granted  in  1823  for 
the  n'aterloo pensions,  etc.  This annuity expired in  1867. 
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The same Return, before the  law  of  1844,  would  have 
appeared in the following form :- 
Circulation. 
London  . .  .  . . A14,802,000 
Country  . . . . .  6,405,000 
,421,207,000 
Deposits,  Public,  vie. : 
Exchequer  Account  .  ,4z,198,ooo 
For  Payment  of 
Dividends  3~5,000 
Savings  Banks,  etc.  .  501,ooo 
Other  Public  Accounts  617,000 
Deposits,  Private, vis. : 
Railways  .  .  .  .  i&30,000 
London  Bankers  .  .  963,000 
East  India  Co.  .  .  636,000 
Banks  of  Ireland  and. 
Scotland,  etc.  . .  175,000 
Other deposits  .  .  .  5,631,000 
Deposits  at Branches .  1,209,000 
Total  Liabilities  A33,482,000 
Public  Securities. 
Advances  on  Exchequer 
Biils- 
Deficiency  Bills  . . - 
Other  Exchequer  Bills  ,4870,000 
Exchequer  Bills  pur- 
chased  .  .  . . .  311,000 
Stock and  Annuities .  11,821,000 
A14,OO2,000 
Private  Securities. 
Bills  discounted- 
London  . . . .  ,4113,000 
Country  .  . . .  2,003,000 
,42,116,000 
Bonds. 
East  India  Bonds  . .  f;xg8,000 
City  Bonds  .  . . .  3*357~000 
Mortgages  . .  . .  6~0,000 
Advances. 
Bills  of  Exchange  . .  883,000 
Exchequer  Bills  .  .  .  661,000 
,4577?3*- 
Total  . .  .  . . .  A21,837,000 
Bullion  .  . . . .  I j,zgg,ooo 
Total  dssets  .  . .  A37,046,000 
The difference  between  the  liabilities  and the  assets is 
explained  by  the  omission  of  the  Rest,  which  was 
&3,564,000  and which  when  added  to the liabilities made 
the total ~37,046,000. 
It  will  be  noticed  that  the  Proprietors'  Capital  of 
A1;'4,553,ooo and the public  securities corresponding  to  it 
are omitted in  the old  form of  Return. 
It will also be  remembered  that before  1844 the balance 
sheets were not published weekly, but that according to the 
Act of 1833, the London Gazette had to publish every month 
the balance sheet for the previous quarter.' 
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11.-The  Act of  1844  and the Coliat~y  Buds. 
The Act provides that the right of  issuing notes shall be 
confined to those bankers who possessed this  privilege  be- 
fore 1844. Even in their case the right of  issue was regulated 
as follows :- 
The right of  issue of  each country bank was not to exceed 
the average issue of  the twelve weeks preceding April 27th, 
1  844. 
Any banker who became bankrupt was to forfeit his right 
of  issue.  If  two or more  banks  afterwards became  united 
they  might not  issue notes should the number  of  partners 
exceed six. 
The notes issued by country banks  were  not  to be  legal 
tender.' 
It is evident that the whole tendency  of  the Act of  1844 
was  to eliminate by  degrees all  notes  except those  of  the 
Bank of  England. 
Such are the leading provisions of  the Act of  1844. 
Its  complicated  nature  is  obvious,  as  are  also  the 
numerous  precautions  with  which  it  hedged  in  the  right 
of issue.  Wagnera might  well  speak  of  Peel's  Act  as a 
"  strait waistcoat." 
But laws, like men, cannot be judged  by appearances, and 
in order to judge  of  the  value of  legislation,  its practical 
results  and the  degree  to  which  it  has attained  its objectS 
must be examined. 
A  banking  system  must  moreover  be  studied  both  in 
ordinary times and in periods of  crisis if a just appreciation 
of  its influence is to be formed.  We propose to do this with 
regard to  the system  of  the  Bank  of  England.  But  first 
we  must say a word  or two concerning a scheme which  re- 
'  For  the practical  results of  this clause see below, p.  299. 
'  In  his  article on  Kredit  und  Banken  in  Schijnberg  (Handbuch  d. Pol. 
Oekon.).  See the  Italian  translation,  Bihlioteca  dell'  Econornista,  3rd  series, 
Vol.  XII., p.  953. 
We  may remark  at once that  if  the  framers of  the  law of  1844 intended 
through  it  to  secure  a  strict  application  of  the  Currency  Principle,  i.e., to 
restrict  the  home circulation in  exact proportion  to the exportation of bullion, 
they  were the victims  of  illusion.  See below, the  discussion,  p.  333, on  the 
crisis  of  1847 and  the  Bank  of  England. 
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tains  a  certain  interest  from the  name  of  its author  and 
which undoubtedly attracted Peel's  notice.  The scheme in 
question is Ricardo's plan for a National Bank.' 
(c)-COMPARISON  BETWEEN  PEEL'S ACT AND  RICARDO'S 
PLAN  FOR  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 
Ricardo  had  previously  recognised  that  the  Bank  of 
England had two distinct functions,  (I) the issue of  notes, 
(2) the business of  banking properly so called.  He wished 
to create a special body,  a  State bank,  to which he would 
have entrusted the duties imposed by the Act of  1844 on the 
issue department, but not those of  the banking department. 
In short, Ricardo's National  Bank  was a State Treasury 
which issued notes.  The notes were all to be issued against 
gold,  with  the exception  of  a  quantity,  not  to  exceed  25 
millions in value,  which the  Bank might issue uncovered. 
Of  these  25 millions,  15  millions  would  have  sufficed to 
repay to the Bank of  England the capital lent to the Govern- 
ment, and the 10  millions remaining would have served on 
the one hand to buy bullion, and on the other to redeem the 
Government debt to the Bank, which took  the form of  Ex- 
chequer bills.2 
"  At  first  sight,"  says  Courcelle-Seneuil,3 "  Ricardo's 
plan of  a bank appears very different from the system estab- 
lished in  England by  Sir Robert Peel's  Act.  Ricardo,  in 
fact, wished  to  have  only  a  single  bank  of  issue  for 
the  United  Kingdom,  whereas  several  such  banks  still 
continue to exist  in  Great  Britain.  He suggested  a State 
bank,  while  in  actual  fact  the  Bank  of  England  has 
been maintained.  But these two points are only secondary 
details in  the plan of  the great economist.  The originality 
of his  scheme lies  in  the  definite  restriction  of  the paper 
circulation, the prohibition  of  the issue of  notes payable to 
bearer in  excess of a certain amount, except when  secured 
' See  Ricardo's  posthutnous  work,  Plan for  a  National  Bank  (1824). 
a  See articles  a  and  3  of  the  scheme.  A  French  translation  of  the  Plan 
is given at the  end  of  M. Courcelle  Seneuil's  book,  appendix  No.  a. 
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by  gold.  This feature is also the  distinctive characteristic 
of  the system established by Robert Peel." 
Ricardo's plan was answered as early as 1831 by McCul- 
loch,'  and quite  recently  it  has been  again  condemned  by 
RI.  Leroy-beau lie^.^  According  to  the  latter,3 the  only 
profit  which  the  State could  derive from  Ricardo's  bank 
would  be that resulting from the issue of  notes in  excess of 
the reserve.  If  it happened, as is the  case to-day, that the 
metallic reserve exceeded the issues, the State would actually 
lose. 
' See Chap.  111, of  his  Historical  Sketch of  the  Bank  of  England, headed 
The Bank  of  England  in  cotttrectiotl  with the  Governn~enf  and  the  Publrc. 
This little  work  was  published  anonymously,  but  McCulloch  acknowledged 
the authorship of  it by  placing  it ~nder  his name in his Literature  of  Political 
Economy. 
See  the  analysis  and  refutation  of  Ricardo's  plan,  0).  cit.,  Vol.  IV., 
pp.  639-645 ; see  also  above,  p.  288,  and  note  Sir Robert  Peel's  criticisms, 
especially  hlemoratrdum, pp.  135-137 
'  p.  641. 
PART  11. 
THE  BANK OF  ENGLAND  IN  ORDINARY TIMES. 
- 
INTRODUCTION. 
THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  THE  BANK  OF 
ENGLAND. 
The weekly  Bank  Return.  The worlts of  Clare  and Raffalovich.  Outward 
form of  the  Return.  Comparison  with  a  French  balance  sheet.  The 
separation of  the  Bank into two departments; the issue department and 
the banking department.  The plan both  dangerous and artificial. 
The amount of  the issue and the part played  by  cheques.  The issue of  notes 
:tom  an administrative stsndpoint.  Manufacture of  the notes.  Destruc- 
tion of  all notes  returned to the Bank.  Average circulation of  the notes. 
The issue of  notes  from a  legal standpoint.  Rules governing the issue: 
Except for a  fixed amount, the issue to be  against gold.  Rights of  issue 
held  by  certain  country  banks.  Present  position  of  the  question. 
Authorised issue much reduced since  1844, the actual issue much less than 
the  authorised  issue.  Statistics.  The issue  and  circulation.  Quantitv 
of  notes  in  circulation  kss during the last  ten  years  than  the  metallic 
reserve of  the Bank.  Explanation of  the fact.  The function of  cheques. 
The Clearing  Houses in  London  and the provinces.  Consideration of  the 
English  system of  note  issue.  The English  system  indefensible  from  a 
theoretical standpoint.  The practical aspect of  the question.  Comparison 
between  the 4ct of  1844 and the German Laws of  1875 and 1899. 
The  Banking  Department  of  the  Bank of  England  is  like  any other  bank 
except that it must publish  a  weekly balance sheet.  This balance sheet, 
like all others, states the liabilities and the assets.  The liabilities of  the 
banking department.  Proprietors'  Capital and the Rest.  Amount of  the 
Capital ; Comparison with  that of  the Banks of  France and of  Germany. 
The Rest and its amount.  Public Deposits.  Amount and  fluctuations of 
these.  Other Deposits.  The current account of  the bankers.  Advantage 
of publishing  a  separate statement of  this account, discontinued in  1877. 
Seven  Day and other Bills.  The assets of  the Banking Department.  The 
four headings  under  which  the assets are divided  are : (a) Government 
Securities, (b)  Other Securities, (c)  Notes,  (d) Gold  and Silver Coin.  The 
two first constitute  the  investments  of  the  Bank,  and  the  two  last  tts 
reserve. 
THERE  is  no better guide to a study of  the working of the 
Bank of  England than one of the Returns which the Bank 
issues weekly. 
Since 1844 the Bank's balance sheet has been remarkably 
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its own sake, will  help us greatly in our study of  the ques- 
tions now before us.' 
By way of  illustration  we  give the Bank  Return for the 
week ending September 16th, 1903 :- 
Issue  Department. 
,Notes  issued  . . . .E50,654,5~)  Government  Debt  .  .~r~,ol~,~oo  I 
Other  securities  . . .  7,434,900 
Gold  coin  and  bullion  .  32,204,joo 
Banking  Department. 
Proprietors'  Capital  .  .A14,553,aw,  Government  securities  .,416,9jo,841 
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Rest  .  .  .  .  .  .  3,753,869 
Public  deposits  .  .  .  7,117,298 
Other  deposits  .  .  .  37,184,730 
Seven-day and other bills  118,502 
The same balance sheet in  the  form which, according to 
M. Noel, a is generally used in France, would appear thus :- 
is  not  only very  artificial  and also unnecessary,  but  may 
sonletimes be actually harmful. 
M. Wolowski,  one of  the advocates of  the  .4ct  of  1844, 
crilicises it as follows :  -' 
"  The expedient of  separating the  Bank into two  depart- 
ments  does not seem to  US to possess  that  high degree of 
importance which has been attributed to it; a good system of 
accounts,  like  that  of  the  Bank  of  France,  is  enough  to 
enable people to judge of the various factors in  the balance 
sheets  issued.  It would be easy, were it thought 
necessary,  to impose a definite limit to the  issue of  notes, 
without  having recourse  to the public parade of  a division 
of functions between  two  branches  of  the  same establish- 
ment." 
From another point  of view,  Mr.  Palgrave,  in  a recent 
and most valuable book  to which we  have already referred,' 
expressly  condemns  the  division  of  the  Bank  into  txo 
departments  and attributes  to  it  a considerable  share  in 
producing those variations in  the discount rate which are so 
frequent in England. 
In fact,  the division  of the  Bank  into two  departments 
involves the separation  of its resources  into two  very  un- 
equal parts, upon the smaller of  which all the demands fall, 
-demands  which in  England are naturally very large and 
may  be  unexpected.  The Bank has thus to guard against 
a continual danger  which  would  be  far  less formidable  if 
a less artificial plan  had been adopted. 
Other  securities  .  .  .  21,b5j,87j 
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  22,011,110 
Gold and silver coin . .  2,109,573 
Assets. 
Specie  (gold  and  silver 
coin  and  bullion) .  .L34,314,073 
Securities  .  .  .  .  .  a1,655,875 
Government  securities, 
advances,  and  other 
marketable securities  16,950,841 
Government  debt  and 
other  non-marketable 
muritiecl  . . . .  18,450,000 
A91  9360,789  SECTION  I.  - 
THE ISSUE DEPARTMENT. 
(a)-The  amount of  the issues and the part  playetf  by 
cheques. 
A62~27~399  E6297~9399 
Liabilities. 
Notes  payable  at  sight 
in  circulation  . .  .A28,643,390 
Warrants  and  seven- 
day  bills  . .  . .  .  118,soa 
Current  account  with 
Treasury  .  .  . .  7,1r7,ag8 
Current  accounts  and 
deposit  accounts  . .  37,184,730 
Dividends  unpaid  .  .  3,753,869 
Shareholders' capital  .  14,553,- 
A91  1360,789 
The Return of  the issue department shows the following 
figures for September 16th, 1903 :- 
The study of the Bank of  England's balance sheet natur- 
ally falls. into two  sections : 
Section  I.  The Issue Department. 
Section  I  I.  The Banking Department. 
But we  may remark at the outset that this division of the 
Bank  into  two absolutely separate departments,-into  two 
watertight compartments which are entirely disconnected,- 
'  For  this examination  consult  Clare  (George),  A  Money  Market  Primer 
and  Key to the  Exchanges.  The first part of  this excellent work  deals with 
the  Returns  of  the  Bank  of  England.  A  complete analysis of  it  has  been 
given  by  M.  Raffalovich,  Bilan  de  lo  Banque  dlAngleterre,  in  the  lournal 
des  Bconomistes for June,  1893. 
*  0). cit., p.  44.  '  I.,,  Qtrcstiorz  drs Rn~zqucs,  p.  362. 
7'he Rn~rk  Rote a~rd  tlre  hlorrcy  blnrl:et, p.  I~X. 
Notes  issued  . . .  .A50,654,5~ 
.4509654t500 
Government  Debt  .  .A1  1,015,100 
Other  securities  .  . .  7,434,,,00 
Gold  coin  and  bullion  .  32,204,500 
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Thus the  notes  issued  amount to  £50,654,000  and  the 
total  issued not  'I covered " by gold  is  ~18,450,000.  The 
issue of  notes is subject to certain interesting administrative 
regulations and also to certain  legislative provisions,  which 
latter it is essential  to understand. 
From the administrative point  of  view the issue of  notes is 
subjected  to  the following  regulations:- 
Every  note issued'  is entered in  the registers of  the issue 
department  with  its proper  number  and  date,  and  these 
registers are duly made up at the end of  each day, when the 
notes  remaining  over  are  returned  to  the  cashier,  whose 
accounts must thus show the number of  notes issued  in the 
course of  the year. 
At  the  Bank of  England the  notes cashed  by  the  issue 
department are never  returned  into circulation-a  practice 
contrary to  that adopted  by  most  European  banks.  Such 
notes  are  first  cancelled  and  then,  after  they  have  been 
submitted to the  test  of  a special  system of  book-keeping, 
they  are put away  in the strong boxes, where they  remain 
for seven years before being de~troyed.~ 
The number of  notes cashed each day varies roughly from 
25,000 to 60,000.  It has been  calculated  that  the average 
time during which each note stays in  circulation  is 70 days 
for £5  notes, 58 days for £10  notes, 27  days for £20,  £50, 
and £100  notes, 9 days for  £200,  £300,  and L~oo  notes, 
and 7 days only for £1,000 notes. 
From  the legislalive point  of view: 
The notes are bound to be tssued against gold, except that 
notes to a certain fixed amount are issued against securities 
of  which the greater part represent the Government debt to 
the Bank. 
According  to  the  Act  of  1844  the  "  uncovered " issue 
amounted  to  14 millions,  of  which  I I  nlillions  represented 
the  Government debt.  How  has  this amount come to  be 
'  With  regard  to  the  preparation  of  the  Banlc  notes  see  Hankey  (4th 
edition),  p.  106,  and  a  most  interesting lecture bv  Mr.  Henry  Bradbury  On 
the Security  and  Manufacttcre  of  Bank  Notes; compare  also  as a  curiosity, 
Barlow,  On a  Bank  of  England  Note,  of  which  a  summary  is  givcn  by 
Lawson,  Ifistory  of  Banking,  pp.  149-150. 
a  Nocl,  p.  46. 
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increased  to  £18,450,0001  This  increase  is  due  to  the 
loss of rights of issue possessed by country banks, of  which 
rights, it will be remembered, the Bank of  England inherits 
two-thi rds. 
The Act  of  1844 recognised : 
207 Private Banks with a right of  issue amounting to f;5,153,417  ...............  72  Joint Stock Banks  3,478,230 
In January, IWI,  the position ivas as follows :--I 
Aufhorisrd Issue.  Actual Issue. 
......  33 Private Banks  f;1,120,588  L344~7'53 
27 Joint Stock Banks  ......  1,541,735  825900g 
The reduction  in  the  rights  of  issue  possessed  by  the 
country banks was one of  the vbjects of  the law of  1844 and 
this object  has evidently  been  attained  most  suc~essfully.~ 
hloreover,  the  notes  of  the  country  banks  are  not  legal 
tender and hence the bankers shrink from the risks involved 
in  the issue of  notes payable to  bearer  at  sight  and keep 
well  within the legal  limit.  It is on this account that  their 
actual issues are so much below  their authorised issues. 
' Encyc. Brit., supplement, Vol.  I., p.  113. 
'  'I'he following table from the Quarterly Journttl of  Econotnics (Vol. XIV., 
p.  561,  number  for  August,  IF)  shows  thc  various  dates at  which  the 
Rank  of  England's  right of issue has been  increased  and the alnounts of  the 
rcspcctivc  increases : 
Years.  Amoutat  of  Increase. 
E 
1855 ................................................  475,000 
1861 ................................................  1 i5 
................................................  1866  3  jo,ocr, 
................................................  1881  750,000 
................................................  1887  450,o~l 
1800 ................................................  zgo,ooo 
1894 .............................................. 350,wl 
................................................  1 goo  975,000 
Total  ......... &9775mJ 
To this must  be  added  the original  sum of  ,&~q,ooo,ooo,  making a  fresh 
total  of  ,&17,775,000  for   goo.  l'hcrr  has  thus  been  a  further  increase  of 
.&675,m  since this date. 
Many  country  banks have  lost  their  right  of  issue  through  amalgamation 
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We must  now  consider  the  amount of  the  issues from 
another and a very important point of  view. 
The note issue  in  England is smaller than  in  the  other 
great  European  countries,  but.  notwithstanding  this  it 
would be quite wrong to suppose that the whole of  this issue 
passes into circulation; the greater part of  it is  kept  at the 
Bank as "  reserve."  For the last ten years the value of  the 
notes in  circulation has been less than  the value of  the gold 
in the issue department. 
Thus on September 16, 1903, out of £50,654,500  of  notes 
issued, ,422,01 I,I 10  were in the banking department, which 
reduces  the  total  of  notes  in circulation  to  £28,643,390, 
against which a gold reserve of £32,204,500  was held.  Thus 
we  get  a  curious  application  of  Vico's  theory  on  spiral 
progression  and are carried  back  to  the  banking  systems 
at the end of  the Renaissance ;  bank notes, in fact, have once 
more  become certificates of  deposit, but  resting  on  better 
security than did the original ones. 
And  more even  than  this, a considerable  portion  of  the 
28 millions, i.e.,  more than 4 milli~ns,~  is not actually in cir- 
culation, but  locked up  in  safes, and forms  the  reserve of 
banks and bankers. 
'  Before  1893  the  value  of  the circulation  exceeded  that  of  the  metallic 
reserve ;  since then  it may be  seen  from  the following figures,  taken from  a 
recent  paper  by  Mr. Jackson  (Table I.),  that the opposite has been  the case. 
Years.  Metallic  Reserve.  Circulatiota. 
A  A 
1893  ..................... 26.425  ..................... 25.858 
I 894  .....................  34.414  .....................  25.262 
I 895  .....................  38.951  .....................  15.815 
I 896  ..................... 44.319  ..................... 
1897 
26.474  ..................... 35.551  .....................  27.198 
.....................  1898 .....................  33.567  27.448 
1899 ..................... 32.268  ..................... 27.878  .  . 
1  900 .....................  33.321  ..................... 
1901  ..................... 35.831  ..................... 
29.3b6 
1go2 
29.559  ..................... 35.644  ..................... 29.404 
Avrrcrgc  A35.030  E27.429 
Thus for  the  last  ten  years the proportion  of  the  ~netallic  reserve  to  the 
circulation  has been  128 per cent. ;  it was only 91  per cent. for the ten  preced- 
ing  years,  during  which  the  avcrage metallic  rrsrrve  was Aza,~c)~,nno,  ns 
compared  with  a  rirc~~lation  of ~zq,XX4,rm, 
According  to \I'ilfrrdo  Pnrcto. 
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The question then arises, how, with a paper circulation of 
28 millions1 (of  which,  we  repeat, at most  24  millions  are 
actually in the hands of  the public), and a metallic currency 
much scantier than that of  Fran~e,~  England is able to carry 
on more transactions than the latter country ?  The explana- 
tion  of this  must  be  sought in  the  fact  that  in  England 
notes and coin  are  merely a subsidiary means of  making 
payments.  The latter are made  through  bills and, above 
all,  through cheques,  thanks to that  admirable  institution 
known as the Clearing House. 
The Clearing  House system  is familiar to all who  have 
an  interest, however slight, in  banking transactions, and a 
study of  this institution would be misplaced here.  We may 
content ourselves with  saying that  it  developed  rapidly  in 
LondonQnd  that payments made there in paper and coined 
- 
money have very quickly been reduced to a mere fraction of 
the whole. 
Thus in  1864  and 1881  payments were made in London in 
the following proportions :-' 
1869.  1881. 
Coin  .........  .6  .728 
.........  Xotes  2.6  2.039 
...  Cheques and Bills  96.8  --  97.2'3  -- 
i 00.  100. 
and since  then  the change  of  method  has been  still more 
noticeable. 
About  7m million  francs;  the  average  paper  circulation  in  France 
during  the  last  ten  years  has  been  3,768,200,000  francs,  and  in  Germany 
1,38q,3oo,ooo  francs (see Jackson, Table  I.). 
'  According  to M.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  Vol.  Ill., p.  609,  the English stock of 
metal  is  hardly  equal  to  40  per  cent.  of  the  French;  it  is  ,&I~I,&,ow 
(3,2go,ooo;ooo  francs),  of  which  IIO millions are in  gold  and Az1,6do,ooo  in 
silver,  as compared  to a  French stock of  about ,&32o,000,ooo  (8,000 million 
of francs), of  which  180 millions are in  gold  and  140 millions  in  silver. 
a  AS  early  as  1858,  according  to  Courcelle-Sencuil  (p.  336),  out  of  a 
million  pounds,  the methods of payment wrre in the following proportions :- 
Rills  .................................................  ,&422,948 
.................................  Cheques  at  sight  510,694 
Bank  iiotes  .........................................  453649 
........................  Coin  and  I'ostal  Orders  20,709 
,&I  ,~#.oo 
Pownall, The insufficiency of  our rush  resrrzles  arid  of  our ret~tral  stork 
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In the country the developlilent has been slower, but still 
sufficiently marked;  thus in  the  case of  Manchester,  Mr. 
Pownall'  gives the following figures for the cash payments 
(coin and notes).  They formed : 
In 1859 about 53 per cent. of  the total turnover. 
#*  1'364  ,,  41  11  I*  $1 
.,  1871  ,,  31  ,,  ,,  I . 
,,  1881  ,,  ao  ,,  ,, 
The transactions of  the Manchester  Clearing House have 
increased from a total of  72  millions in  1873 to a total of  163 
millions in  1891. 
The movement  may  be  more  vividly  realised  from  the 
following  detail : the number of  impressed  stamps,  which 
arc principally used for cheques, was 13 millions in  1857, in 
1891 it was more than 152 millions. 
And since 1891 the employment of  cheques in the country 
has increased more and more.  In the ten  years from  1892- 
1902, the  deposits  at country  banks have risen  from  184 
millions to 3341 millions, that is an increase of  814 per cent., 
and this  increase  is  due to  the  increase  in  the  branches 
established by the country banks.  These were I ,271 in 1892, 
as compared  with  2,578 in  1go2.~ 
(b)-Merits  and  Demerits  of  the  English System of  Xote 
I~sue.~ 
Leaving on one side the question whether the tendency of 
the  country  banks  of  issue  to  disappear  should  not  be 
resisted,'  and, a fortiori,  also the question  whether it urould 
not  be better to return  to freedom of  issue and the system 
existing before  1844,  it may  be  asked,  to refer  only to  the 
Bank of  England, what judgment  must  be  pronounced  on 
the organisation of  the issue departmet~t  ? 
' 1-oc.  cit. 
See Jackson, p. 9. 
'  We give only an outline of  the  matter here.  It will  be discussed in more 
detail  in  the  last  chapter  of  this  rolunle. 
'  This is  the opinion  of  M. Leroy-Beaulicu, (Vol.  111..  pp.  59;  and  606), 
and of  many  other  eminent  econolnists. 
From  a  theoretical  point  of  view  it  can  o~lly  be  con- 
demned.  The amount of  the ''  uncovered " issue was fixed 
at 14 millions in  1844 because the Government debt and the 
public securities held  by  the Bank amounted to that sum ! 
A  curious method of  determining the amount of  the paper 
currency !  If  the  Government  debt  had  been  twice  this 
amount,  would  the  uncovered  circulation  have  been 
doubled? or,  forsooth,  if  the debt had  not  existed,  would 
there have been no issues except those covered by gold? 
Moreover,  a Government debt and particularly  a perma- 
nent debt, cannot afford a guarantee or a basis for the issue 
of notes.  If  every Government debt could be used to create 
an equivalent sum of  money,  the conclusion  would  inevit- 
ably follow "  that the way to create money is for a govern- 
ment  to borrow  it,"  and we  should have far outdistanced 
all the Laws and Chamberlains in creation. 
To this it may be replied, from a practical standpoint, that 
however  unfortunate these mistakes  may  be,  they are not 
dangerous on a small scale and that in  the present  instance 
the total uncovered issue was not fixed at 14 millions solely 
because  this was the amount of  the Government  debt,  but 
also because  the  requirements  of  the  English  public  had 
been estimated at this figure. 
This answer,  however,  only suggests another and more 
serious criticism of  the existing system.  If  we grant that the 
needs of  society were limited to 14 millions in  1844, we are 
led to inquire why this limit has been preserved  intact when 
the needs of  society and, above all,  the actual  population, 
have increased so greatly ? 
It  is difficult  to  find  an answer to this criticism, all  the 
more because the principle of  a fixed  issue is in  itself open 
to attack, for  as has already been  pointed  out,'  at certain 
times a larger  issue  is justified,  whilst  at others the  limit 
fixed would itself be too high.2 
' See especially  Cauwhs, op.  and  loc.  cit., pp.  317-318. 
'  In  Holland  an  attempt  has bcrn  made  to avoid  the  disadvantages of a 
fixed issue  by  leaving  the  amount  of  the  paper  circul.~tion  to bc  fixed  from 
time  to time  by  royal  decree.-Pierson,  p.  498. 304  HIS'I'OKY  OF TIIE  BANI<  OF ENGLAND. 
For  all  these reasons  the attempt has been  made to dis- 
cover a system which combines the currency principle with 
a  greater degree of  elasticity.  Such a  system  has been 
adopted by the German Empire and we  must therefore con- 
sider how the German plan differs from  the English. 
Comparisoit  between  the  Note  Issue  in  England  and 
 it^  Germany.  The law of  1875, which created the  Imperial 
Bank, and the more recent  law of  1899, subjected the issue 
of  bank  notes in  Germany to the following rules: 
The amount of  the uncovered  circulation, as in  the case 
of  England,  is  fixed  beforehand-it  is  at  present 
~f;22,500,m.~  Out of  this total only E4,438,550 is contri- 
buted by  banks of  issue other than the  Imperial Bank. 
Xloreover the law  of  1875,  like the English law  of  1844, 
tends towards centralisation,  and both  aim at  the suppres- 
sion  of  the  plural system of  issue. 
The banks of issue in  Germany, apart from  the Imperial 
Bank, originally numbered 33, but are now  reduced  to 6,' 
and their position  has been made so much worse by the law 
of  18g9Qhat  it  is a question  whether these  banks and in 
particular the Bank of  Frankfurt, will  not choose to give up 
their rights of  issue. 
So far  the  two  systems, the  English  and the  German, 
only show points of  resemblance ; the great distinction from 
the point of  view of  the note issue4  is that the Imperial Bank 
may  exceed the limit fixed  for  uncovered  issues by paying 
a tax of  5  per cent.  Since this tax  is added to the  rate of 
Ih*fore  1899  the  amount  had  been  first  +&rz,5do,ooo and  then 
;G14,811,45o. 
'  l'hi.  Banks  of  Frankfurt,  of  Saxony,  of  .Bavaria,  of  Wurtrmbnrg, of 
I3adrn  and of  Southern  Germany. 
'  In order  to  protect  the reserve of  the Rcichsbank,  thy  law of  1899 for- 
bids  other  banks  of  issue  (I) to discount below  the  rate of  the  Reichsbanlc 
whrn this rate is 4  per  cent. or higher,  (2) to discount  more than  f  per  cent. 
bc.low  thv  rate of  the Rrichsbank  in  other cases. 
'1'hc.r~  arc: nl:tny  other differences  between  the two banks; for  instance, 
tlir.  ~iirtallic  rcsrrve  of  thr  lsanlc  of  (icrnlany must  equal  at least  one-third 
uf  the amount  of  notrs  in  circulation,  while  the remaining  two-thirds must 
ron3i.t  of  bills  of  eschangc  not  having  more  than  three  months  to  run; 
again, the  Gern~an  systrnm  has  a  highly-developed  fiscal  side,  which  would 
probably  be  objrctionnblr  to  English  ideas  and  which  has  been  made  still 
Illorr  prominent  bv  the Inw  of  1899.  Rut  wr  arr not  concernrd  with  all 
thi.,  for n compari.;on  bc,!\v~.~.n  thr.  Ilnnk of  Enfl1:rncl  a~ld  lhc.  otht.r  Europran 
b;inlts  doc-  not  fall  \vithin  our  pro\,incr. 
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discount,  which  would  be already high  in  times of crisis, 
there is no danger that the Bank will  use  its power  rashly 
and thus indirectly encourage specu1ation.l 
SECTION  11. 
The banking department is a bank like other banks with 
this difference, that it is obliged to publish a weekly return 
of its transactions. 
This  balance  sheet,  like  that  of  other  banks,  shows 
liabilities and assets.  The examination  of  these  in  turn 
will occupy the two parts of our second section. 
The  liabilities  fall  under  five  heads :  (I) Proprietors' 
Capital ;  (2) Rest; (3) Public Deposits; (4) Other Deposits; 
(5) Seven-day and other bills. 
The assets fall under four heads only : (I)  Government 
Securities; (2) Other  Securities; (3)  Notes; (4)  Gold  and 
Silver Coin. 
PART  I.  - 
THE  LIABII-ITIES  OF  THE  BANKING  DEPARTMENT. 
Nos.  I  and 2.-Proprietors'  Cafiital and  Rest. 
The capital of  the  Bank of  England is &14,553,000;  it 
is larger than that of  the Bank of  France or that of  the Bank 
of  Germany, although the latter  has lately  (18gg)  been  in- 
creased by one-half  and raised  from 6 to  g  millions.  But 
-and  this distinguishes it from  other systems-the  capital 
of  the  Bank  is  all  sunk in  Government  debt  and  hence 
constitutes a guarantee capital. 
The rest or  reserve fund  was  only formed, as we  have 
seen,  in  1722.  The directors have agreed never to let  this 
fund fall below 3 millions  and on  September  16, 1903, it 
was .€3,753,869. 
The principal object of  the capital is to afford security to 
'  The  Bank  of  Germany  has however  recently  been  accused  of misusing 
supplmmentary  issues,  which  rrarhrd  a  total  of  ~6,800,ooo  in  1899.  See 
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the depositors and these enjoy complete safety at the Bank 
of  England.  The capital,  combined with  the rest,  repre- 
sents nearly 40 per cent. of  the total deposits and more than 
45 per cent. of  the private deposits.'  But the magnitude of 
the capital has its disadvantages, since, according to Clare,' 
its earnings, in spite of  the fact that the total profits are 14 
millions,  only amount to  10 per cent.,  i.e., a  dividend  of 
A2  18s. on  shares at A34z.  The other important English 
and Scotch banks pay dividends varying from 33 to 4%  per 
cent. 
No. 3.-Public  Defo~its.~ 
These form the largest account in  the Bank's books and 
"  the largest probably that any bank has ever  possessed."' 
The daily receipts from the Customs and Excise are paid in 
at the branches of  the  Bank of  England, and, moreover, 
the payments made by the Treasury for the  Army,  Navy 
and Civil Service, are effected by cheques on the Bank ; the 
latter also undertakes the administration of  the Public Debt, 
but for this it receives a special ~ayment.~ 
The balance kept by  the Treasury at the Bank amounts 
on an average to about 3 millions.  In addition to this sum, 
the  Public  Deposits  include  the balances  credited  to  the 
Secretary of  State for India and to the National Debt Com- 
missioners.  At  the  beginning  of  the  year  the  Public 
Deposits  shrink on  account  of  the dividends paid  on  the 
National  Debt, but  from  the middle  of  January  until  the 
end of  March  the sums paid  in  exceed  by 6 or 7  millions 
those paid out.  This is due to the fact that the greater part 
of  the direct  taxes (income tax,  house duty and land  tax) 
are collected during the first quarter.  At the same time the 
The  average  of  the  total  deposits for  the  last ten  years  is E48,61o,0oo9 
and the  average of  the private deposits A39,48z,ooo.-See  Jacl;son,  Table  1. 
a  See Clare,  p.  25,  and  Raffalovich,  p.  364:  For  everything  relating  to 
the liabilities  of  the  banking  department, we  have  found  Clare  and  his  COm- 
mentator  invaluable. 
'  Clare,  pp.  25-28. 
The  total  value  of  this account has increased  from  A~,Z~I,OOO  in  1844 
to  A9,285,000 in  19oo.-Palgrave,  p.  13. 
'  See  below,  Appendix,  the  section  specially devoted  to  this  question. 
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made by the Government are deferred till the end 
of  March,  which  marks  the  close  of  the  financial  year. 
During  the first days of  April the Public Deposits fall again 
by about 4 millions and the balance returns to what  it was 
in  January.'  The result  of  this  payment  of  taxes  is  an 
appreciable  decrease  in  the circulation  of  notes and coin, 
amounting to 3 millions for gold and 14  millions for notes. 
The reserve of  the Bank reaches its maximum at the end of 
March. 
The transfer to  the Bank of  a  considerable  sum, drawn 
mainly  from  the  resources  of  the  joint-stock  and private 
banks, narrows the margin  between  the official rate of  dis- 
count and the market rate.  The difference between  the two 
is  sometimes  reduced  from  AI 3s.  per  cent.  to  10s. 
per cent.  This is  the time when  the Bank discounts least. 
After  some unimportant  fluctuations,  the  Public Deposits 
reach  their  minimum  about November.  Preparation  then 
has  to  be  made  for  the payments  falling due in  January 
and if the Exchequer has but a small balance, advances are 
made  to  it on  bills2 which  it  repays  out  of  the  January 
revenues. 
No.  4.-Other  De9osits. 
The Bank's  liabilities to private  individuals,  which  fall 
under this head,  correspond  closely enough to the current 
accounts of  other banks. 
The balance  of  the sums standing to  the  credit  of  the 
Bank's customers serves as a kind of  measure of the supply 
of available capital.  If  the  total  rises above  the  average 
there is an excess of  such capital and vice versa. 
The Bank  of  England is in  fact the  bankers'  bank,  the 
cpntral reservoir  which  contains  not  only the  balances  of 
For  the  fluctuations  in  the  public  deposits at  the  Bank  of  England  see 
Clare, Table  111. 
'  These  bills  used  to  be  known  as drficirncy  bills,  but  have  since  bren 
'eplacrd  by  drficiency  advances.  See  in  the  Appendix  on  the  Relations 
between  the  Bank of  England and the Treasury,  the section  dealing  with  the 
floating debt. 
Clare,  pp. 28-31.  The total of  these  private deposits has increased  from 
A8.069,ooo in 1844 to ~40,602,ooo  In  1900 (Palgrave, p.  12). i.e., an  increase 
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the great merchants and the big lin~ited  companies, but also 
those of numerous  country  banks  and of  all the  London 
bankers belonging to the Clearing  House.  Each of  the  18 
clearing  banks has an account  at the  Bank and differences 
are paid by means of  transfers in  its books.  These transfers 
sometimes  amount  on  Settlement  days  to  a  total  of  50 
millions. 
Besides this, the  London  bankers keep at  the  Bank  the 
reserves  which  they  hold  in  case  of  emergency.  "  The 
Bank  has therefore the responsibility of  looking after what 
is  really  the  ultimate  banking  reserve  of  the  whole 
country,"'  and should difficulties arise it is to it that appeal 
will be made.  This state of  things necessarily carries with it 
serious dangers.% 
Up to 1877 the Bank specified in its Returns what propor- 
tion  of  the  deposits  belonged  to  bankers.  At  this  date 
there was a balance of  13 millions credited to customers who 
were  not bankers, and one of  .&g,5oo,ooo to bankers.'  One 
of the most desirable reforms in  the Bank's  administration 
is the resumption of  this statement.' 
In normal times the total of  the private deposits fluctuates 
regularly enough,'but  during a crisis it has been frequently 
observed that this total increases appreciably.  This is partly 
because the  banks  feel  it  necessary  to  strengthen  their 
reserves and partly because the public are eager to be rid of 
all doubtful  investments and to entrust their money to the 
institution  which  they  believe, and not  without  reason,  to 
be  the safest in  the world, i.e.,  to the  Bank of  England. 
One other point remains to be considered  with refererice 
to the current account of  the bankers." 
When there is a drain of  gold, which normally  occurs in 
the autumn, the only defence which  the Bank can  make is 
to raise the discount rate so as to attract capital to England. 
Clare, p. 30. 
As  regards  this  point,  see  brlow  the  chapter  on  the  Reserve,  p.  323. 
The reserve of  the Bank  atid the reserve  of  the  bunkers. 
'  See Palgrave, pp.  12, 13.  In  1876 the current account of  the bankers  was 
EI  1,851,000 out of  a total  of  L23,493,ooo ; the proportion  was  thus greater. 
On this point  compare  the  last chapter  of  the  present  volurne. 
'  Table  It'. 
Clare,  pp.  37-40;  Raffalovich,  p.  367. 
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Foreign bankers are thus induced  to buy bills on  London, 
a proceeding which  reacts on  the exchanges. 
The success of this policy depends on  the support given 
to the Bank of England by the outside market.  If  the latter 
is well supplied, it  will not  follow the Bank's lead; hence it 
is possible to judge  from the state of  the current accounts 
whether this policy will be successful or not. 
The Bank  has  also an  indirect  method  of  clearing  the 
market of  its surplus capital :  it sells Consols for "  money," 
and buys them  back  for the  "account."  The purchasers 
pay in cheques on their bankers and the balance to the credit 
of  the latter is decreased. 
It has been suggested, says M. Raffalovich, that the Bank 
should secure command of  the situation  by paying interest 
on  deposits.  Since  a  large  proportion  of  the  money 
deposited  with  private  banks  is placed  there  for  security, 
there  is no doubt that  in  view  of  the prestige of  the Bank 
of  England, a very  low  rate of interest would serve to attract 
considerable  sums  and  uhen  once  it  had  adopted  this 
policy, a slight increase in  the rate paid  would be sufficient 
to deplete  the  market.  There are,  however,  very  serious 
objections to this course; for one thing it would be contrary 
to the Bank's traditional policy, which  is to sacrifice profit 
to absolute security; and besides, by  entering into cornpeti- 
tion  with  other  bankers,  the  central  institution  would 
certainly incur enmity and it ~ould  lose the profit which it 
makes from  the balances of  the current accounts on  which 
no  interest  is paid.  Finally  by  increasing  the total of  its 
deposits,  the  Rank  would  find  it  difficult  to  maintain  the 
proportion  between  its reserve and its  liabilities,  which  is 
now  50 per cent.' 
The liabilities of  the  banking department  conclude with 
the heading  No.  5, Seveit-day  and  other  bills, as regards 
which  no comment is  needed. 
The average  for  the last  ten  years : from  1881 to  1891 the  average  was 
only 42  per cent.  The maximum  was  reached  in  1894, when  the  proportion 
was 63  per  cent. ; since  then  the  tendency  has been  towards  a decline.  See 
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PART  11. 
THE  ASSETS  OF  THE BANKING  DEPARTB~ENT. 
We have said that the assets of  the banking department 
fall under four  heads : 
(I)  Government  Securities;  (2)  Other  Securities;  (3) 
Notes; (4) Gold and Silver Coin. 
In actual fact, however,  the first two groups, Government 
securities and other securities, represent  the Bank's invest- 
ments, while the two last groups, notes and gold and silver 
coin, form the stock of  money  best  known  as the reserve. 
Hence instead of  discussing each  group separately, it  will 
be convenient to combine them under two heads, which will 
supply matter for the following chapters. 
Chapter I.  The investments of  the Bank.  The Bank of 
England and the rate of  discount. 
Chapter 11.  The reserve. 
CHAPTER  I. 
THE INVESTMENTS  OF THE BANI<. 
THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE DISCOUNT 
RATE. 
(a) Government  Securities.  I heir  natute ; (b)  Other Securities.  Hankey's 
theory  as to the proper  nature of  these.  Uncertainty  as to  their  actual 
character. 
'Khe  average Bank Rate.  Its fluctuations.  Average since 1844 and variations. 
Periodic  fluctuations.  The Autumnal  Drain.  The  Bank  Rate and the 
Market  Rate.  The  Bank  Rate before  1844.  Competition  between  the 
Bank and the market between  1844 and 1878.  Since 1878 the Bank Rate 
in  London  has always been  above  the  Market  Rate.  Position  different 
in  the Provinces.  Frequent fluctuations in  the Bank Rate.  Comparison 
with  the  chief  European  Banks.  Bad  effect  of  the  fluctuations  in  the 
discount  rate upon  trade.  Explanation  of  the fluctuations of  the English 
Bank  Rate.  Spccial  character  of  the  London  Market.  Artificial  char- 
acter of  the Act  of  1844.  Lack  of  fluidity  in  the  securities  held  by  the 
Bank  of  England. 
THE  Government securities are those securities which  yield 
an income guaranteed by the State (Consols, Treasury bills, 
etc.).  Little  importance  is  attached  to  variations  in  the 
amount of  the Government  securities.  At  the end of  the 
quarter the total increases because the Government borrows 
on  the security of  bills, which  it  redeems in the course of  a 
few weeks. 
When the Bank does not renew the Treasury bills which 
it holds the result is a tightness on the money market. 
(b)-OTHER  SECURITIES. 
Thomas  Hankey, at one time  Governor  of  the Bank  of 
England,  In  his book on  The Principles of  Banking,'  dis- 
cusses the nature of  the securities which ought to be  held 
by a bank.  He distinguishes short loans and bills  of  ex- 
change,  which  are based on  commercial  transactions,  and 
' p.  26,  et  seq.  Hankey  was a director of  the Bank of  England  for more 
than  fifty  years; the  full  title of  his book  is,  The Principles  of  Banking,  its 
Utility and  Economy,  with Remarks on the  Workin$ and  Management  of  the 
Botalz  of  Ettgland.  e st edition,  1867 ;  4th edition, rev~sed  by  C. Wigram, 1887. 312  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
are readily and naturally converted  into money, from other 
securities, such  as mortgages, and business securities of  a 
similar character, which, although they offer suitable open- 
ings for an investor, are not  the  kind of  securities which a 
bank should hold, because they cannot be easily realised. 
The Bank  of  England  follows  Hankey's  advice  closely 
enough.  Its  securities  consist  of  Indian  stock,  railway 
debenture stock, discounted commercial bills, and advances 
on  security. 
We can  only  speak  on  supposition, however,  for  since 
1875 the  details  of  the Bank's  investments have  not  been 
published.  Before this date a return was supplied to Parlia- 
ment, which distinguished the discounts, the loans, and the 
other assets.  The discontinuance of  this return  is much to 
be regretted. 
Moreover,  the  discounts  have  decreased  considerably 
owing to  the competition  of  the outside  market.  Paper is 
only brought to the Bank  under exceptional circumstances, 
when the market is  ill-supplied with  money and it is feared 
that the official rate may be raised. 
Even  before  1875, however,  the  total  of  the  bills  dis- 
counted was exceedingly  variable;'  it was  very  high  when 
the market was stringent, as in  1836, 1847, 1857, and from 
1864-1867,  it sank very low when the pressure was removed.' 
Since this very difficult question  of  the Bank of England 
and the discount rate has been touched upon, it will be advis- 
able to study it fully once for all, and, indeed,  the matter is 
as much and perhaps more in  place here than elsewhere. 
This  important  questionS can  be  best  discussed  under 
three  heads,  viz. :--I.,  Theaverage  rate  of  the  Bank  of 
England and its periodical fluctuations.  II., A comparison 
Compare Palgra\.e,  p.  14. 
a  Thus discounted  bills  madr  up  more  than  half  (56  per  cent.)  of  thc 
securities held  by  the Bank  in  1847, and they  were  46 per  cent.  in  1857, and 
42  per  cent.  from  1864  to  18b6, but  they  only  made  up  28 per  cent.  of  the 
total securities in  1844, and only  23  per  cent. in  1875. 
a  The very  difficult  question  of  the English Bank rate cannot be  examined 
without  a  preliminary  study of  Mr.  Palgrave's  recent  book,  Bank  Rate  and 
the  Money  Market  (1903).  Mr.  Palgrave  has  written  no  less  than  three 
INVESTMENTS AND  RATE  OF  DISCOUNT.  ;IS 
between the Bank rate and the market  rate.  III.,  A  com- 
parison  between the discount rates of  the Bank of  England 
and those of the Banks of France and Germany.  The great 
fluctuations in  the Bank  of  England rate;  the  results and 
the explanation of this phenomenon. 
1.-The  Average Discount Rate of  the Bank of  England.- 
Its  Periodical  Fluctuations.-The  Autumnal  Drai~t. 
The average  rate  of  the  Bank  is  relatively  low  in  com- 
parison  with  the usual  rates of  the  Continental  banks;  it 
exceeds that of  the Bank of  France on1y.I 
It  has been  pointed  out  that  the rate,  after displaying a 
tendency  to  increase  between  1854 and 1866, has shown a 
constant tendency to fall since this period. 
The period  1844-1900, if  divided  into six groups, corre- 
sponds to the following average rates :-2 
"  The average for  the whole period  1845-1900 is £3  I 2s." 
The rate  of  discount is  subject to periodical  fluctuations 
in the  course  of  each  year;  it is  generally  higher  in  the 
winter half  as compared with  the summer half.  In autumn 
and early winter money is  needed to meet  the expenses of 
the home harvest, the cost of  holidays and travelling,  and, 
works on  this subject,  in  1874,  1880,  and  1892 ; his  last  book  revises  and 
completes  the earlier ones,  which  were  in  themselves standard works on  this 
question.  M.  Paul  Loubet's  essay on  La Banque  de  France  et  l'E+compte 
may also  be consulted  with  pleasure as  well  as profit;  this book,  like  Mr. 
Palgrave's,  contains a  mass of  comparative  statistics.  Mr.  F.  E.  Steele has 
also published an essay on the subject, entitled,  On the Changes in the  Bank 
Rate;  First  their  Causes, and  Secondly  their  Effect.  This study  originally 
came out in  the journal  of  the  Institute  of  Bankers. 
This may  be  seen  from  the  table  given  by  M.  Paul  Loubet  (p.  103) 
of the average  discount rate in  the principal  European  capitals from  1885  to 
IW.  Between  1883  and  ]go2  the average  rate  was 25  per.  cent.  for  the 
Bank  of Ftance,  3f  per cent.  for  the  Bank  of  England, and  34  per  cent. 
for the Bank  of  Germany. 
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the range of  fluctuation during the same year has on  three 
occasions amounted to 54,  6 and  per cent.' 
Nowhere else, except on  one occasion  in  Germany,  have 
the  fluctuations during a single year  reached 4  and 5  per 
cent., as a  rule  they  have  not  been  more than  I  or  2  per 
cent. 
(b) What  are the results of this fact?  These constant and 
large  fluctuations  have  very  injurious  effects  on  trade." 
This may  be  better  understood  by  considering the  great 
advantages of  a moderate and a relatively stable rate. 
With  respect  to  the  moderation  of the  rate  in  the  first 
place,  anyone who  discounts  paper  at a  bank,  that is  in 
fact,  every  trader,  naturally  wishes  to  borrow  at  as low 
a  rate  as  possible,  since  otherwise  he  cannot  as a  rule 
find  such a use for the capital lent  him  as will  repay him 
for  the  expenses  of  the  transaction  and one of  the  main 
objects of  the banking system will have disappeared. 
With  respect to the stability of  the rate,  it may  be  said 
that a certain fixity is an essential.  This enables the trader 
to reckon beforehand, at least approximately,  the amounts 
that he will have to pay  his banker;  the stability is thus a 
guarantee of  the safety of his transactions. 
The  English  commercial  world  does  not  enjoy  these 
advantages and guarantees4  to the extent which it has a right 
to expect.  It  remains  to  discover  the explanation  of  this 
fact. 
(c) Explanatiort  of  the Fluctuatior~s  irt.  the Bank Rate of 
Discourtt.  These  fluctuations are  due  to  several  causes. 
We shall  deal  first  with  those  about  which  everyone  is 
agreed and then  pass on  to  those which are only partially 
accepted. 
' See  the  years  18j8,  1873 a04 1866  respectively. 
'  Palgrave,  Table 38,  p.  127. 
'  Con~pare  Steele, 'pp.  19 and  20.  For the  eflect  of  the  variations  in  the 
diwount rate on the Stock Exchange see Steele, pp.  20-2;.  For  the  important 
qurstion  of  the  relations  between  the  discount  rate  and  prices  see  Gitlen's 
second essay  in  his Essays in Finance (second series),  pp. 37-89. 
'  Thrse advantagrs are so great that  Professor Foxwrll  has observed that, 
"  'The  true  test  of  sound  ccononiic,  as distinguished  trom  merely  solvent 
banking,  is  the  moderation  of  the  average. rate  of  discount."-Economic 
lournnl,  March,  1892, p.  154. 
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I .-The  Peculiar  Characte,r of  the London Market. 
The  London  market  is  distinguished  from  the  other 
European  markets by its importance.  Nearly all the trade 
(,f  the world is connected  with  London,  and  it  has justly 
been  said  that  London  is  the  "  clearing  house  for  the 
inte~national  exchanges."'  Unfortunately, this privileged 
position  has  its  disadvantages;  it  subjects  the  London 
market to the risks of  sudden and large demands. 
The London market  is also distinguished  from the other 
European  markets  by  the  fact,  to  which,  indeed,  much 
of  its  importance  is  due:  that  London  is  the  or~ly 
free  market  for gold  in the world.  In  France  the  Bank 
charges a  premium,  varying  from  2&  to  6  per  mille,  on 
gold  for export  purposes;  in  Germany,  according  to  the 
witty remai k of  Mr. F. H. Jackson,= there exists the equally 
formidable deterrent of  the  Imfierial  displeasure.  In Eng- 
land  there  is  nothing  of  this  kind,  the  trade  in  gold  is 
absolutely free;  perhaps it is this which  makes 1,ondon  the 
financial capital of  the norld, but  in  return,  it  leaves only 
one  means of  resisting a denland for gold,-that  is an  in- 
crease in  the value of  the capital lent, or in  other words, a 
rise in  the rate of  discount.  England thus subjects herself 
to  fluctuations in  the discount  rates,  hut  she does  it only 
because she finds that the  advantages of  possessing a free 
market  for  gold  fully counter-balance  the  disadvantages, 
and at any rate she acts H  it11 her eyes open.3 
2.-The  Artificial  Natzue  of  the Act  of  ISM. 
IIas the system established by  the legislation of  1844 any 
influence on  the discount rate?  Some have  answered  this 
in  the affirmative. 
' Edmond ThCry,  Europe et  &tats Unis  d'ilmdriqtre, p.  I  I  I.  London  has 
also been  called  the  Rome of  financr for  civilised countr~es. 
Jackson, op. cit..  p.  6. 
'Professor Foxwell  justly  quotes in  this connection  Mr.  Pownall's  obser- 
vation,  ''  Our  money  rnatb~l  IS  sensilive  becuuse me  choose  that  it  shall  be 
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Mr.  Palgrave,'  for  instance,  observes  in  the first  place 
that the division of  the Bank of  England into two parts also 
"  divides  the  resources  of  the  Bank  artificially  into  two 
parts,  and  causes  the  demand  to  fall on  the  smaller  of 
them."  In  England the demands are naturally  very  large 
and may be  sudden.  The division  into  two  departments, 
which has the advantage of  "  directing immediate attention 
to the amount of  free  resources which  the Bank has at its 
disposal,  nevertheless  tends to render  the  amount actually 
available to meet any sudden demand smaller than it would 
be if this artificial arrangement were not followed." 
hloreover, the Bank is obliged by the Act of  1844 to buy 
standard  gold  to any amount at a  fixed  price,  whether  it 
needs it or not, and hence it is forced to replenish its reserves 
at the  will  of  the  importers  and  not  at the  wish  of  its 
directors.  Hence  there is  at times a useless  accumulation 
of  gold,  which  sometimes leads to a  low  Bank  rate,  and 
sometimes, when  the accumulations produce a tightness on 
the  market,  to the opposite result,  neither of  these move- 
ments in  the rate having any connection  with the needs of 
trade.' 
3.-Lack  of Fluidity in the Compositiott of  the Sectrtities 
held hy  the Bank of  England. 
It has been remarked that the exact nature of the securities 
held by the Bank is not known, but all the evidence goes to 
make  it probable  that short loans only acquire importance 
under  exceptional  conditions  and that  the  number of  dis- 
counted bills is very  limited.  In an ordinary way,  indeed, 
the Bank of  England does not compete with the other banks 
of  discount.  It does not discount at the marlcet rate except 
for its own customers and as this is generally lower than the 
13anlc  rate  (the  aberage difference  during the  last  twenty 
years has been  3  per cent. per annum), evidently it call hold 
only a very small number of  commercial bills. 
' Pnlgrnvi.,  pp.  198,  199. 
' I'nlgrave,  p.  199. 
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On the other hand, as Mr. Jackson1 points out, apparently 
lVith regret  that  things are  not  the same in  England,  the 
Banks  of  France  and  of  Germany  usually  hold  a  large 
number of  bills of  exchange.  These Banks also are habitual 
purchasers of commercial  securities-the  Bank  of  France 
because  it is obliged to be so by its constitution; the Bank 
of Germany because it  must hold bills to the value of  two- 
thirds of  its issues. 
If  we  examlne,  as  Mr.  Palgrave2 does,  some  recent 
balance  sheets,  we  find  that  the  Bank  of  France  held 
securities  at  Paris  and  the  branches  to  the  value  of 
Egq,ooo,ooo  (I  ,37g,ooo,ooo  francs),  of  which  .&I  ,ooo,ooo 
was in bills for short periods and E24,ooo,ooo in short loans. 
At  the  Bank  of  Germany,  out  of  securities  worth 
L64,000,000,  nearly  ,&.'jo,ooo,ooo  was in  bills,  ,&2,1oo,ooo 
of  these being English paper, while ,@,ooo,ooo  was in the 
form of  short loans.3 
The large  quantity  of  specie  held  in  reserve,  combined 
with  the  readily  available  and  fluid  character  of  the 
securities,  enables  the  Continental  banks  to  control  the 
market  and always  to  have  an  easy  command  of  ready 
money. 
The Bank of  England cannot secure this control of  the 
market except when circun~stances  force the latter to apply 
to it for  discount, hence if in ordinary times the Bank wishes 
to obtain  money quickly, it can only do so by selling Con- 
sols, '  and it  does  not  hold  any considerable  quantity  of 
securities which  by  maturing rapidly  will  provide  it  with 
cash without forcing it to disturb the home market.  Con- 
sequently the Bank has to determine its discount  rate very 
carefully  and  must  often  vary  it  in  order  to  protect  its 
reserve. 
a  pp.  206  and  207. 
'  The average of bills discounted during the  last ten years  was 27  millions 
(675 m~llions  of  francs) for  France  and 35 millions  for  the  Bank of Germany. 
For  further  details on  the  total  discounts  of the  Banks  of  France  and  Ger- 
nl3ny  brttveen  1883  and  lgor compare Jackson. Table  I. 
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It may be added, and the remark is worth making at the 
risk  of  its  appearing  irrelevant,  that  this  characteristic 
feature of  the  Bank of  England securities is analogous to 
a characteristic which  may  be observed  in  English finance 
as n whole. 
\.Vliilst other countries hold numerous bills  of  exchange 
on  England,  and  an  appreciable  number  of  English 
Treasury  bills,  the  English  public,  which  possesses  an 
enormous  quantity  of  Continental  securities,  State loans, 
railway  shares,  industrial  securities,  etc.-the  English 
public, I repeat, holds very  little foreign commercial paper 
slid seems to consider it of  small importance. 
No doubt the possession of  foreign shares is a good thing, 
it serves at need to pay a debt abroad and thus to avoid a 
drain of  English bullion.  But it is no less true, on the other 
hand, that supposing a rise  in  the  value of  money  on  the 
European market or some danger of  political trouble, a very 
c.onsiclerahle  drain  of  English  bullion  may  be  produced 
tlirough the bills of exchange and the Treasury bills which 
are held abroad.  Some writers, in particular hlr. Palgrave,' 
think  that the situation  is made  more  serious by  the  fact 
that the ilnports increase more rapidly than thk exports and 
that  the  amount  of  "  international  securities " held  in 
England tends  to  decrease,  suggesting that "  the ccluntry 
may have been  living above its income."' 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE  RESERVE. 
Nature  of  the  rcservc.  What  is  mcant  by  the  term.  'I'he  rescrve  as  the 
keyslone  of  English  credit.  Thc  bank  rcservc  and  the  rescrve  of  the 
banlivrs.  Aniount d the  rrsc*rvc.  Its  norrilal  fluctuations.  l'hc  reserve 
in  ti~nc  of  crisis.  Question  whctlicr  the  suspension of  the  limit  of  issue 
was  forcsc-rn by  P(*P~  In  1844.  Obscurity of  the  debatcs  in  Parliament. 
A  1cttc.r  of  I'ccl.  Mr.  Lowe's  schcmc  for  reform  (1873). 
THE  Reserve, as we  have said, consists almost  entirely of 
notes,  which are  retained  in  the banking department, and 
only to a very small extent of  gold and silver coin. 
The Reserve forms the essential point, the "  vital "  point, 
as Clare calls it, of  the Uank  Return.  "  On the mainten- 
ance of  a sufficient store of  actual cash to satisfy the claims 
of  depositors  depends the  very existence  of  the  Bank, for 
the whole  of  the  Deposits are practically debts payable  in 
gold on demand and the Bank must either fulfil its obliga- 
tion to repay when called upon, or close its doors."' 
IVe shall study this delicate subject under five heads : 
I. -The  nature of  the Reserve. 
2.--In  what way is the Reserve the keystone of  all English 
credit ? 
3.-The  Reserve of  the Bank and the bankers'  reserve. 
4.-The  amount of  the Reserve;  its fluctuations. 
5.---The Reserve during a crisis.-Did  the author of  the 
Act  of 1844 foresee the suspension,  at such  times,  of  the 
limit fixed for the uncovered issue?  Mr. Lowe's scheme for 
reform. 
Mr. Clare's remarks  on this subject are exceedingly well 
judged  and  should  be  read  carefully  by  everyone  who 
wishes to obtain a clear understanding of  the matter. 
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It is sometimes thought, he observes,' "  that the Reserve 
secures the note-holder  as well as the depositor and that an 
export of gold is bad for the country, because it must impair 
the ability of  the Bank to cash  its notes on presentation." 
This is a misconception.  The convertibility of  the note has 
nothing to do with  the banking department.  The Reserve 
is solely a banking reserve. 
This misconception  is due to a  confusion  between "  the 
banking department's  cash  reserve against deposits,"  and 
"  the issue department's  stock of  gold appropriated  to  the 
service of  the note."  It may be connected with the fact that 
the Reserve is commonly spoken of  as gold, while in reality 
the principal stock of  gold is deposited in the Issue Depart- 
ment as security for the notes. 
"  It is  obvious,  too,  on  examining  the  Return,  that  a 
withdrawal of  bullion  must diminish  the stock in the issue 
department."  Why should it  also affect  the  cash  at the 
banking department 3 
This is readily understood if we consider the method used 
to withdraw gold from the Bank. 
"  The usual  course is  to  obtain  credit  with  a  London 
banker  by  discounting  bills  or  selling  securities,  etc.,  to 
make  use  of  this  credit  by  asking  for  Bank  of  England 
Notes, and to convert the notes into gold at the Issue Depart- 
ment.  The gold,  it  is true,  is  actually  paid  out by  the 
Issue Department, but the notes,  which  give power  to de- 
mand that gold, are bound to come out of  the Reserve of  the 
Banking Department."  This explains why a withdrawal of 
gold may weaken both the stock in the issue department and 
also the Reserve properly so called. 
The issue department works automatically in  giving out 
gold  in  exchange for  notes.  The result  of a  drain  is  to 
weaken  the Reserve  and hence  the position  of  the  Bank. 
The importance of variations in the Reserve depends on the 
fact  that  in  England  gold  is  the  only  metal  which  is 
unlimited legal tender;  silver is only legal tender for sums 
not exceeding forty shillings. 
Under  ordinary  circumstances  payments  are  made  by 
cheque, but the very basis of  credit  is "  the principle that 
debts are payable in gold."'  Yet the liabilities of  bankers 
to their depositors exceed by hundreds of  millions the stock 
of gold actually in  the country and this involves an obvious 
danger. 
The total of  the deposits, which  Mr. Newmarch estimated 
in  1851 at 250 millions, amounted in  191  to ~888,1oo,ooo; 
it is  thus seven or eight times larger than  the whole stock 
of  gold in the country.'  Besides this, the Bank of  England 
Reserve in 1901 was only ~24,046,000,  i.e.,  2.71 per cent. of 
the total liabilities of  the banks.'  This 2.71 per cent. is thus 
all  that  the banks have  to  depend  upon  to  meet  possible 
demands. 
The terrible  responsibility  which  rests  on  the  Bank  of 
England is evident, as is also the manner in which the Bank 
is the keystone of  the whole system of  English credit.  In 
fact, as Mr. Clare remarks, "  if  the Reserve were lost, this 
' nation of shopkeepers ' would have to put its shutters up." 
111.-THE  RESERVE  OF  THE  BANK  AND  THE  BANKERS' 
RESERVE. 
In  the United States a deposit  bank is  obliged to keep 
25  per cent. of  its deposits in  cash.  In  England, on  the 
contrary,  the  banker  is  under  no  restriction  whatever, 
Clare, p. 48. 
'  The  exact  value  of  the  English  coined  money  is  not  known;  Mr. 
Goschen  and  others  have  estimated  it  at  73  millions,  but  it  was  shown  in 
the  Economist  for  January  3rd,  1892,  that  this estimate  is  too  small.  Ac- 
cording to this journal,  the  coin  in  circulation amounts  to 86 millions, while 
the  authorities of  the  Mint  go still  further  and reckon  it  at  loo millions. 
a  Fornlerly  the  proportion  was  still  smaller ; in  1872  the  Reserve  was 
only f;lz,loo,ooo as against 584 millions  of  deposits,  i.e.. the  proportion  was 
2.06  per  cent.-Palgrave,  p.  104.  Mr.  Pownall  declared  (Economic Journal, 
Vol.  II., p.  532) that :  If the system did not exist, the  man who suggested 
its  introduction  would  be  branded  madman."  See  the  whole  article,  The 
Ins~ifficienc~  of  our Cash Rescrves and of  our  Central Stock of  Gold, pp.  530- 
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although, as we  have seen, the total  liabilities of  the banks 
exceed the total metallic stock of  the country.  It is true that 
people  sometimes speak of  the bankers'  reserve.  But  the 
word is not here used in its exact sense; there is no reference 
here to a special fund set aside for use in emergencies, but 
merely  to the till-money,  the cash required by the bankers 
for  their  ordinary  business.  "  The reserve,  properly  so 
called, of  a Provincial Banker consists of  readily convertible 
securities, such as Consols, etc., of  money payable ' at call ' 
with the London brokers, of  a credit balance in  the books of 
his London  Agent, and in  some cases of  a balance at the 
Uank of  England as well.  The same is true of  the London 
banker.  IIis actual reserve consists, not  of  a store of  cash 
locked up in his strong-room, but of  money at call, a balance 
at the Bank, and a bundle of  securities."' 
These reserves are sufficient  in  ordinary times,  but they 
are not coin and the banks have undertaken to pay  in coina 
very  large  sums.  Thus  they  all  depend,  directly  or 
indirectly, on the Bank of  England, and not one of  them is 
prepared  to  meet  an unusual dernand out  of  his  own re- 
sources.  This state  of  things  is,  it  cannot  be  too often 
repeated,  very  serious,  and may  some day cause  an un- 
pleasant  surprise. 
It nlay  be  well  to  refer  at this point,  when  opportunity 
offers,  to a question which has aroused endless discussion : 
The  question  of  the  bankers'  de.posits  at  the  Bank  of 
E~rgland. 
IVhat is  the  value of  these deposits?  Since  1876  no 
special information on this point has been given in the Uank 
Returns-a  most regrettable fact-but  we know that in  1876 
they amounted to  I 13  millions out of  a total of  23 millions. 
Mr. Foxwells notes that between  1844 and 1877 there were 
61 occasions when the Bank Reserve was "  not suflicient to 
meet the London bankers'  balances."  Even in  1876, when 
the  Reserve  was  40  per  cent.  above  the  average,  the 
bankers' deposits amounted to 75 per cent. of  this  reserve. 
Clare, pp.  49-50. 
'  This  fact,  says  Mr.  Pownall,  is  only  clcorly  rcaliscd  in  time  of  crisis 
(P  536). 
1.0~.  cit., p.  150.  For  furthcr  details colu1):u.c Palg~.:~vr,  pp.  23,  27. 
Hence it has several times been suggested'  that the Bank of 
England should keep unemployed the whole or a part of the 
bankers'  deposits.  The Bank  itselfa has always protested 
against such a theory and it has been pointed out 
that since these banks themselves only exist by using their 
customers' deposits, they cannot expect to impose a different 
upon the Bank of  England. 
hloreover  the Bank has never hitherto acknowledged that 
it  felt  bound  to  keep  a  metallic  reserve  for  the  whole 
country; it  contents itself  with  a  consideration of  its  own 
liabilities.  But  this  latent responsibility  is  shown  in  the 
extreme care and promptitude with  which  it  defends itself 
against the  dangers of a  foreign  drain.  The position  in- 
volves a conflict of interests.  On the one hand, the share- 
holders  would  like  to  see  the  unemployed  capital,  upon 
which they make no  profit, reduced  to a'minimum ;  on the 
other  hand,  the public,  remembering  that  the  Bank  pays 
no interest on its deposits,  is of  opinion  that it might well 
keep a larger reserve. 
Private bankers who belong to the Clearing House have 
often been advised to form an association and to keep their 
own reserve. 
Peel himself considered:' that the joint-stock  banks ought 
to be obliged to share in the expenses necessary to keep up 
a  gold reserve  and this opinion  has in  more  recent  times 
received the support of  Mr. Goschen4 and Mr. Lidderdale.' 
' This theory  was first put  forward in  the  Econontist  for  November  18th, 
I 872. 
a  See  Hanltey, preface  to the second cdition of  his Principles  of  Ranking. 
and Jackson, pp.  11 and  12. 
With  regard  to  the  proportion  of  the  bankers'  deposits  that  the  Bank  of 
England  ought  to keep  intact,  see  the  correspondence  between  Mr.  H.  H. 
Gibbs and  Profcssor  Bonamy  Price,  which  has been  published  at the  end  of 
Price's Chapters  on Practical  Political  Economy.  This correspondence  deals 
with  a  number  of  questions  of  interest.  Mr.  Gibbs  was  a  director  of  the 
I3anlr  of  England  for  more  than  tifty  years;  he  was  raised  to  the  pccrage 
with  the  title of  1-ord Aldenham. 
'  See  his  speech  on  December  3rd,  1847,  Parliamentary  Debates,  Vol. 
xcv., p.  669. 
' "  It  is  a  false  and  dangerous  system,"  says  Lord  Goschen, "  to  rely 
sinlply  upon the aid  the  Bank  of Ettgland  can give  in a  crisis.  I  hold  that 
the  great  banking  institufions are  bound  to take  their  sltare." 
1  '6  I fc3cl," said  hlr. I.iddcrdalc,  in  a spccch at thc Mansion  House, "  that 
the  one  thing  needful  is the  concern,  in  tllrir vurious degrees,  of  all  banks, 
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But the bankers have always refused to do anything of  the 
kind, being convinced that in case of  need  the Government 
would  always  intervene  to  save  the  Bank  of  England.' 
Indeed, apart from considerations of  general interest, which 
would  necessarily  have  immense weight  since the Bank  is 
the keystone of  the national credit, it is thought with reason 
that  the  Government  would  be  forced  to  interfere,  for the 
Treasury  is the Bank's  greatest customer and any misfor- 
tune which  affected  the  Rank  would  completely  upset  the 
business of  the State. 
Between  1895  and 1900 the average amount of  the Reserve 
was  &f;z5,791,ooo; during  this  same  period  the  Reserve 
varied from 23 to 28  millions.  This is a great improvement, 
mainly  due to  the  lesson  learnt  from  the  crisis of  1890. 
Between  1880 and 1890 the  average Reserve  was  only  13 
millions and the actual amount varied from  19  to 9 millions. 
If  wc eompare the amount of  the Reserve with that of  the 
liabilities,  we  find  here  also a  satisfactory  increase : the 
Reserve,  which  was  formerly  only  46  per  cent.  on  the 
average, of  the total  liabilities,  is  now  equal  to more than 
50 per cent, of  the liabilities. 
Normal  Fluctuations  in  the  Reserve. 
The Reserve increases during the first quarter and reaches 
its  maximum  at  the  end  of  March;  it  then  falls,  but 
increases again at the end of  June.= 
The influences  which  affect the Reserve  are both  home 
and foreign. 
'  Clare, p.  53.  In  1866 the  directors  of  the  Bank  nrotested  vigorously 
against the idea, which  was afterwards  supported  by  Bagehot  (p.  170), that 
the  private  banks  had  a  right  to  count  on  assistance  from  the  Bank  of 
England  during a  crisis.  Twenty-six  years  later  the  fact  that the bankers 
relied  on the Bank  was so obvious  that Lord  Goschen,  in  his speech  before 
the  London  Chamber  of  Commerce  on  December  znd,  1891,  did  not  even 
trouble  to discuss it.  He condemns, however, as likely  to encourage specula- 
tion, the feeling that, at the worst,  a  letter from the Treasury will supply an 
easy remedy. 
'  Thus the average reserve  for March was E14,364,000 between  1845 and 
IF,  as compared  with  A12,747,000  for  May. 
An increase of trade,  the payment of  wages, the fear of a 
crisis, cause a withdrawal  of gold or notes from the  Banli. 
There is also a home drain in  May and in  the autumn'  for 
the  half-yearly  payrrients  in  Scotland and an  influx of  3 
of sovereigns in  March  after the collection  of  the 
income tax. 
The normal  and expected fluctuations in  the Reserve do 
not affect the discount rate when they merely involve a with- 
drawal of gold for home uses;  but the case is quite different 
when it becomes a question of abnormal movements or of  a 
foreign drain. 
When credit  is good  experience  shows that money  will 
only  be used  for current needs; the gold and notes drawn 
from the  Bank will  be  returned  to  it as soon as they  have 
fulfilled their  purpose, but "  when credit is bad . . .  there 
is  no  knowing  how  much additional currency  the country 
may  suddenly ask for, nor  how long it may keep  it.  If  it 
asks for too much there will he a panic."'  The chief defect 
in  the constitution of  the Bank is that it is unfitted to meet 
a sudden and excessive demand.  "  The Reserve may melt 
away before  the measures taken to relieve it have had time 
to act." 
In fact, the importation of  gold from abroad, which is the 
only way to increase the currency,  is still a  tardy remedy, 
notwithstanding  the  improvements  in  methods  of  com- 
munication. 
On the other hand, a rise in  the discount rate under such 
circumstances does not produce a decrease in  the demands, 
since the people who have immediate liabilities to meet will 
pay  whatever they are asked. 
'  The  average  rcservc  for Octobcr  was  ,411,904,000  between  1845  and 
1gm. 
Clare, p.  58;  this is also J. S.  Mill's  opinion.  Mill  is very  doubtful  in 
Pronouncing  judgment  on  the  Act  of  1844;  as he  says himself,  he  is  far 
from believing  that in  a  problem  so new  and difficult  we can  learn  nothing 
from  discussion  and  experience.  No  doubt  Mill  rcalises  perfectly  well  the 
dangers  of  the  Banking  Principle,  but  at  the  same  time  he  declares 
(Principles,  Bk.  Ill., Chap. xxiv.,  $4) that,  whatever may be the advantages 
of the  Act  of  1844, they  are purchased  at the cost  of  forbidding  a  certain 
extension  of  credit  in  time  of  crisis,  when  a  temporary  deficiency  needs  to 
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Hence  in  such  a case  the  Reserve  is in  danger  of  dis- 
appearing  and it  is  usual-the  thing has happened  three 
times, in  1847, in  1857 and in 1866-for  the Government to 
take the responsibility of authorising the Bank to break the 
law. 
We  shall presently see, when we study the crises through 
which the Bank of  England has passed, the way in  which 
these  permissions have been  given  and  what  their  effects 
have been. 
For the present,  to conclude this chapter,  I  wish briefly 
to discuss a question which has never been definitely cleared 
up.  I  wish  to  consider  whether  these  authorisations  to 
exceed the legal limit were foreseen by Peel in framing the 
Act of  1844. 
The question is  worth discussing, since, if  these repeated 
transgressions of  the  legal  limit for  the  uncovered  issues 
were foreseen  by  Peel,  he did actually  provide a  kind  of 
second reserve for times of  crisis-that  second reserve about 
which so much was said in  1891. 
Besides  this,  the  question  possesses  historical  interest 
and hence deserves examination in a work like the present. 
Unfortunately the answer is not  easy to find. 
First  as regards the text of  the law.  The Act  of  1844, 
after fixing the amount up to which the  Bank might  issue 
notes against securities at 14 millions, adds that an authori- 
sation  from  the  Government  will  be  required  for  any 
additional issue. 
Unfortunately,  this clause refers to the succession to the 
rights of  issue of  a provincial  bank.  The law itself,  then, 
throws no light on our question.  S. J. Loyd, Torrens and 
the other promoters of  the Act are also silent on this point; 
it may be  that  they did  not  realise  the possibility  of any 
such event. 
Peel, who  in his speeches in  1844 was purposely  vague, 
said in his answer to Baring,' "  The Bank would supply the 
void,  with  the consent of  the  Privy Council,  by  an  issue 
beyond the Lrq,ooo,ooo."  But the context shows that these 
words also refer to the possible inheritance of  the rights of 
issue of  provincial banks. 
' During  the  sitting  of May  20th.-VOI.  IV., p.  384,  of  the  S)eeches. 
On the other hand, in his speech on December 31-4 1847, 
Peel  congratulated  the  Government  on  their  action  in 
authorising the suspension of the Act of  1844~  and Parker' 
quotes a letter from Peel to Cotton which shows that as early 
as June 4th,  1844,  Peel  acknowledged  the  possibility  of 
suspending the Act in question. 
The wording of this letter, written by Peel to the Governor 
of  the  Bank,  and in  particular  the concluding  sentence, 
leaves no room for doubt in the matter.s 
But whatever Peel may have thought in the first instance, 
it is clear that at the present day thepossibility of  suspend- 
ing the Act in  case of a crisis is  a  recognised part of  the 
English legal regulation of  the issue of  Bank notes, and Mr. 
(afterwards Lord) Goschen made it clear that the commercial 
world relied absolutely on a measure of  this kind. 
As a  rule  the  mere  suspension  of  the  Act  has  proved 
sufficient to calm  the severity of  the crisis.  This has been 
laid to  the credit of  English legislation; but in  reality it is 
the best proof  of  a weakness in the system that the uneasi- 
ness caused  by  the  Act of  1844 should  be allayed  by  the 
mere announcement that the restriction imposed by the said 
Act can be ignored. 
Only one official 'proposal  for reform in the matter before 
us has been  brought  forward.  This was the scheme sug- 
gested in  1873 by  Mr. Lowe, that Liberal Chancellor of  the 
Exchequer whose cutting freedom of  speech often did more 
'  Parl.  Debates, Vol.  XCV., p. 668. 
Vol.  III., p.  139. 
'  The  letter  runs  as  follows : "  My  confidence  is  unshaken,  that  we 
are  taking  all  the  precautions  which  legislation  can  prudently  take against 
the recurrence of a monetary  crisis.  It  may rckcur in spite of  our precautions, 
and  if it does, and if  it  be  necessary  to assume  a  grave responsibility  for the 
Purpose  of  meeting  it,  I  daresay men  will  be  found  willing  to  assume  such 
a responsibility." 
And  Pcel  concludes : I'  I  would  rather  trust  to  this  than  impair  the  efi- 
cacy  and  probable  success of  those  measures by  which  one hopes  to  control 
Qvil tendrncir.~  in  thcir beginning, and to diniiniah th~  risk  that  cxt~aordinary 
lnpasures may be  nrcrs.;ar>. " 
'  For  Mr.  Goschen's  project  and  the reforn~  nioven~ent  which  followed  the 
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harm to his own party than to his opponents, and who, under 
the  title  of  Lord  Sherbrooke,  "  was extinguished  in  the 
House of  Lords like a rocket in a fish-pond."' 
Mr.  Robert  Lowe'  proposed that the  Bank  of  England 
should be allowed to exceed the authorised limit of  its issues 
under  three conditions:  (I) That the rate of  discount  was 
not  less than  12 per cent. ; (2)  That the foreign  exchanges 
were favourable to England; (3) That the situation was one 
of  internal panic. 
The Bill  was  not  well  received  and soon  passed  into 
oblivion.  Its failure was deserved.  It is,  indeed,  difficult 
to  imagine a  case  in  which  Mr.  Lowe's  three  conditions 
would be satisfied and if they were satisfied, it would mean 
that the country was already suffering from those disadvant- 
ages which it is the object of  a good system of  banking to 
prevent. 
' Augustin  Filon,  Profils Anglais. 
The text  of  this  Bill  is given by  Palgravc, p.  93. 
PART  111. 
PEEL'S  ACT  IN  TIMES  OF CRISIS.  - 
CHAPTER  I. 
THE  CRISIS  OF  1847. 
Causes  of  the crisis :  Failure of  the harvests made necessary a  large importa- 
tion  of  grain  and  hence  a  large  exportation  of  specie.  Extensive 
speculation.  The railway  mania.  The crisis  of  1847 and  the  Bank  of 
England.  Unfortunate effect of  the  Act of  1844; useless  pressure on the 
Money  Market;  luckily  the  object  of  its  promoters  not  attained  as 
regards  the restriction  of  the  interior  circulation  in  exact  proportion  to 
the export of  bullion.  Unwise  policy  of  the  Bank :  its reserves  r'educcd 
to  E2,558,000.  The crisis,  allayed  for  a  time,  renewed  with  violence. 
Large nunibcr of  failures.  Bank refuses  to make  advances on  Govern- 
ment  securities.  Panic  produced  by  this  policy,  hoarding  of  notes  and 
coin,  increase  in  failures.  Bank  forced  to  choose  between  co~nplrte 
Refusal to  Discount  and  Suspension  of  Act  of  1844.  Suspension  of  Act 
of  1844.  End  of  the crisis.  Delay  of  Government  to suspend  Act  until 
situation  di-sperate.  Letter  from  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  to 
Governor of  the  Rank.  Conditions  under  which  the susperision grantd. 
Magical  effect  of  the  suspension.  The knowledge  that  notes  could  be 
obtained  removed  the  dcsire  to  have  them.  End  of  the  crisis.  Great 
services  of  the  Bank  to  the  public  during  the  crisis.  Results  of  the 
crisis.  Parliamentary  Debates.  Specch of  Sir Robert  Peel;. his opinion 
of  the effects of  the Act ;  degree in  which its objcct attained ;  modifications 
to  be  made  in  the  Act; the joint-stock  banks  and  the metallic  rcsrrvr. 
The Inquiry  of  1848.  Report of  the  Committee  of  the  House  of Com- 
mons.  Remarkable Report  of  the  Lords'  Committee. 
(a)-CAUSES  OF  THE  CRISIS. 
THE  crisis of  1847 was due to bad  harvests and in  particular 
to the failure of  the potato crops in Ireland,'  which made it 
necessary  to  purchase  foreign  grain  in  large  quantities. 
The importations of  grain increased as follows :-' 
Ydars  ...  186.  1846.  1847. 
Wheat  3,777,410 cwts.  6,207,894 cwts.  11  PSI  7,305 CwtS. 
Wheat Meal aii  ~1;";  945,864  ,,  3,190,429  8,  6,329,058  v, 
Maize  ...  ...  241,667  ,,  3,024,883  9,  751464,194  11 
' The  crisis  produced  in  Ireland  by  the  failure  of  the  potato  crops  in 
1845  and  1847 recalls  the  famines of  the  darkest  ages  of  humanity.,  The 
Peasants  literally died of hunger in such large numbers that in some districts 
it  was  impossible  to provide  coffins.  Famine  and  emigration  combined  re- 
duced  the population  of the country from 8 to 6 millions.  More than 700,000 
Irjsh  emigrated  to  the  United  States alone.  A  touching description  of  this 
crisis  will  be  found  in  a  most  interesting  and  fairly  impartial  book  by  an 
'rjsh  Member of  Parliament,  Mr.  Justin  MacCarthy : A  History of  OUT  Own 
Times. from the uccrssiopr  of  Queen  Victoria to  the  Gctteral  Election  of  1880, 
vO1.  I., pp.  2~-304.  a  Levi, p.  310. 332  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
Since  the  price  of  corn  had  risen  to  a  corresponding 
extent, it is not surprising that these importations produced 
a great demand for gold  and were the immediate causa of 
the crisis of  1847.' 
Combined  with  this immediate cause were  others  more 
deeply  rooted  and  dating  further  back-to  wit,  specula- 
tion,  and in  particular,  speculation  in  railways.  It must 
be admitted too,  that the effects of  the export of  gold  were 
intensified by  the over-rigid  provisions  of  the  Act of  1844 
and by the imprudent conduct of  the Bank of  England.2 
The Railway Mania. Some brief  remarks must be made 
with  respect  to  the  "  railway  mania"  w.hich  spread  per- 
sistently  throughout  Great  Britain.  The  sums annually 
invested  in  railway  enterprises  increased  in  the following 
proportions :-' 
Yearly average from 1826 to 1829  ...  f;817,ooo  ..  1830 to 1833  ...  2,157,000  ....  1834 to 1837  ...  10,880,000 
1838 to 1841  3,614,000  ....  ...  ..  1842to1813  ...  4,586,000 
Total for the year 1844  .........  f;17,870,000  ......  I845  ......... 60,824,000  .........  P  ,,  ..  1847  13z,og6,000 
The  other  European  countries  followed  England's 
example as regards excessive construction.'  The movement 
'  The crisis,  which  was  so disastrous  for  England  and  other  European 
countries, brought  unusual  prosperity  to the  United  States.  The American 
exports in  1847 exceeded by  40 per  cent.  those of  the preceding  year, and by 
34,317,249  dollars the imports for 1847.  It was 29 years before such favour- 
able conditions occurred  again.  See Conant,  p.  487. 
'  For these two causes see D.  Morier Evans, The Commprcial  Crisis  1847- 
1848, pp.  1-52 and :,3-108  resprcti\'eIy. 
*  See  Porter  (G.),  The  Progress  oj  the  Notion  in  its  Social  and  Com- 
mercial  Relations,  p.  327.  Porter  was  Ricardo's  brother-in-law. 
According  to Tooke (Vol.  IV., p.  314) the expenses of  labour and material 
alone, reached the following sums :- 
1841 ............ d1,176,000  1844 ............ f;4,88o,ooo 
1842  ............ d2,384,000  1845 ............A I 1,280,000 
1843 ............ d3*548,000  1846 ............  E29,188,ooo 
1947 (first  six months)  A20,560,000 
' "  In  1845  Belgium  had  alrcady  343  miles  of  railways  at  a  cost  of 
Es,~~~,(Kw,;  France  552  miles,  at  a  cost  of  E10,232,om, with  projcct~  and 
nutho1 ity  for  I ,9nn  miles  more,  involving  an  expenditure  of  .&.3o,ooo,mo 
additional;  (iprmany  had  2,c11,o  mile% of  railway,  made  at  a  cost  of 
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lasted in England throughout the first part of 1847, and then 
stopped after a specially intense outburst.  There 
were thus two equally objectionable features about the  rail- 
mania :  (I) It  involved a  sudden  absorption  of  the 
savings of  the nation in enterprises of  a single kind.  (2)  It 
ended in  a  still more sudden stoppage in  the  development 
of  the  undertakings  in  which  this capital  was  invested. 
These characteristics were  rendered still more objectionable 
by a burst of  speculation in  railway shares. 
At the same time it must be acknowledged that the railway 
mania was the least  harmful of  the  causes of  the crisis of 
1847, since the  evil was in  some degree only  a temporary 
one and the extension of  the  railway system laid a founda- 
tion for future prosperity.' 
(b)-THE  CRISIS  OF  1847  AND  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
The Act of  1844 was  intended by  its authors to restrict 
the interior note circulation in exact proportion to the export 
of bullion.  If  this end had been attained the results would 
have been even more disastrous than they actually were ;'  all 
that the Act did produce was a useless pressure on the money 
market and a sudden contraction  in the discounts at a time 
when it was too late to arrest speculation.  The policy of  the 
Bank of  England was, on the whole, most  unwise.' 
The  harvests  in  1842,  1843  and  1844  had  been  very 
plentiful and the improvement  in means of  communication 
A15,5oo,ooo,  and 2,300 miles more were authorised ;  and the United States of 
America  had  completed  3,688 'niiles,  at an expenditure of  ~17,702,000,  and 
in  construction  5,624  miles,  involving  an  expenditure  of  ~26,995,ooo."- 
Levi, pp.  303-304.  See also Conant, p.  4P8. 
For  a  statement of  this point  of  vlew  see  Sir Robert  Peel's  speech  in 
Porl.  Debates,  3rd series,  Vol.  XCV.,  pp.  666-667. 
a  How  little the end  at which  Lord Overstone and his supporters aimed 
was actually attained is shown by  the following figures : On August  29,  1846, 
the notes in the hands of  the public amounted to ,420,426,000  and the bullion 
to ,&16,366,ooo.  On  January 30  in  the  following  ycar  the  bullion  had  dc- 
creased  to  d~z,goz,ooo,  whilst  the  notcs  amounted  to  L20,4b),ocm.  By 
April  10  the  bullion  had  dwindled  to &9,867,000,  the  amount of the  notes 
relllaining practically  the same, viz., ,42o,aq3,m.  This state of  things much 
Perplexed  F.  T.  Baring, ex-Chancellor of  the Exchequer, who had  bclicved  in 
the "  nlechanical " action  of the Act  of  IS++  See  Baring's  speech,  Parl. 
Debates. VOI. XCV., p.  615. 
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now  made  superfluous an  accumulation  of  commodities 
such as had formerly been  necessary,  hence money flowed 
into the Bank of  England and the discount rate was lowered 
to  I$ per cent.  and after some fluctuations,  remained at 3 
per cent. from August,  1846, till January, 1847. 
The failure of  the  potato crop in  1845, followed by  the 
still  more  disastrous  crop of  1846,  made  it  necessary,  as 
we  have  seen, to  export large quantities  of  bullion for the 
purchase of  foreign corn.  Notwithstanding the continuous 
drain the  Bank maintained  the same rate of  discount from 
the middle of  September, 184.6, until the following January; 
it  was  not  until  its  stock  of  bullion,  already  reduced 
to  k15,163,ooo  in  December,  1846,  had  fallen  to 
&13,94o,ooo,  that  it  raised  the  rate  to  3)  per  cent.  on 
January  16th.  This proved  absurdly  inadequate,  for  the 
bullion continued to disappear,  and it was decided to raise 
the rate gradually until on April  10th it reached 5 per cent. 
At  this  date  the  bullion  in  the  Bank  was  reduced  to 
£9,367,000,  whilst the Reserve had fallen from E8,86g,ooo 
to &z,558,ooo during the period we  have just  described. 
In  face of  such  a situation  the  market  was  seized with 
panic  and  severe measures  had  to  be  taken  to  stop the 
demand for notes.  The directors decided to keep the  dis 
count rate at 5 per cent., but only to discount short paper, 
and to limit the number of  bills discounted,  however good 
they might be.  This policy caused the discount rate of  the 
private banks to rise to 10 or 12 per cent., which rise natur- 
ally stopped the drain  of  bullion, and a sum of  £~oo,ooo, 
which  had been  shipped to go to America, was  hastily re- 
landed. 
Tlie crisis was appeased for the time;  the bullion at the 
Bank  increased  to  &1o,526,ooo  and  the  Reserve  to 
,&,625,ooo.  Unfortunately  the  improvement  was  only 
temporary. 
The high prices of  grain had induced many merchants to 
speculate on  its  importation.  But  the  large quantities  of 
goods imported, joined  to  the prospects of  a good harvest 
both  for  corn  and  potatoes,  led  to  an  enormous  fall  in 
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cereals,1 which  fall was disastrous to  the  speculators.  A 
series  of failures  occurred  between  August  and  October, 
involving total  liabilities  of  ~;I~,OOO,OOO,'  and  upset  the 
market once again. 
The firm of  Saunderson & Co.,  one of  the principal  bill- 
braking establishments, which was in close connection with 
the  most  important corn  dealers,  stopped  payment  in  the 
middle of  September.  Nearly all the firms engaged in trade 
with the Mauritius followed suit.  These disasters were com- 
bined  with  other  important  failures  in  connection  with 
East India trade,  in which credit was generally allowed for 
very  long  periods  on  account  of  the  distance.  Finally, 
the collapse was made absolute by the results of  the insane 
speculation in railways to which we  have referred above. 
The directors of  the Bank of  England recognised that the 
time had come for heroic measures; in  fact, the bullion had 
declined to &8,365,000 and the banking  reserve had fallen 
once  more  to  A;3,40g,ooo.  On October  znd,  1847, it was 
therefore announced that the discount rate would be  raised 
to 53 per cent. and that for the time, no advance would be 
made on  public  stock or on  Exchequer  bills.  This last 
measure  caused  a  panic  on  the  Stock  Ex~hange,~  and 
led  to a  fall  in  Consols4 and to the accumulation of notes 
and coin  in  private  strong boxes.'  Moreover  the banks, 
which had hitherto held their owns in the midst of  so many 
other failures,  now  began  to give way.  On October  13th 
Knapp & Co. of  Abingdon, stopped payment.  On October 
The price of  wheat,  which  at the end of  May  had been 131s., had fallen 
to 49s.  6d. 
'  Amongst  the  firms  which  went  bankrupt  the  following  may  be  men- 
tioned :  Leslie, Alexander  & Co., with  liabilities  of  E50,ooo; King,  Melvillc 
CO., with liabilities of ~200,ow  ;  Coventry & Sheppard,  also with liabilities 
of ,&200,000;  Robinson  & Co., whose  senior partner was one of  the directors 
of the  Bank of  England, etc., etc. 
'  For  the  effect  of  this announcement  see  the  Economist  for  October  g, 
184{. 
Consols  wcrc at 84j, on  October  5th  they  fcll  to  773.  Exchequer  Bills 
also fell 35  per  cent. 
'  Samuel Gurney,  in  his evidence before the Conimittee, estimated  at  4 or 
5  millions the value  of  thc  notes hoarded on account of  the  terror people felt 
of being  lcft  without any. 
Before Octobcr  13  only  one bank,  Messrs.  Cockburns  &  Co., of  White- 
hall, had  failed.-See  Dictionary  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  I., p.  460. 336  HISTORY  OF THE BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
18th the Royal  Bank  of  Liverpool  failed,  and before the 
23rd of October large numbers of  banks in  Liverpool, Man- 
chester, Newcastle  and the  West of England had followed 
its example. 
The Bank  of  England had  to  choose  between  the utter 
ruin  of  English  trade by an  absolute  refusal  to  discount, 
and the violation of  the Act of  1844.' 
The Government persisted in hoping that the crisis would 
pass  like  that  in  April  and  waited  until  things  were 
desperate2 before  they  suspended  the  Act.3  It  was  not 
until  October  23rd,  when  the  banking  reserve  was 
£1,176,000,  that  the  Government  decided  to  inform  the 
Bank  unofficially  that  they  would  propose a  Bill  of  In- 
demnity to Parliament should notes be issued  in  excess of 
the limit fixed by the Act of  1844, provided that the discount 
charged was not less than 8 per cent.  The official letter was 
actually  sent to the Governor of  the Bank two  days later; 
it  authorised an  increase  in  the discounts and loans at a 
minimum  rate of  8 per cent.  According to the terms of the 
letter these transactions were to be  kept within  reasonable 
limits  and a  Bill  of  Indemnity was promised  should this 
policy  lead  to  an infringement  of  the law.  In order that 
the  Rank  might  not  gain  by  the  situation  and  so  be 
tempted to prolong it, the letter added that all profits result- 
ing from the additional issues were to go to the Treasury. 
The  publication  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer's 
letter had a magical effect.  The certainty that money  could 
be got took away all desire to have it.*  The Bank   re pared 
Compare Tooke's evidence  before the  House of  Lords'  Committee.  See 
Extra'its des Enqcr6tes  Anglaises, p.  151. 
'  It  was  not  unlikely  that  the  Bank  would  have  to  suspend  payment, 
althougl~  it  had  6  111illions in  the  Issuc  Department.-Dict.  of  Pol.  Econ , 
p. 461. 
'  The Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  Sir  Charles  Wood,  afterwards  Lord 
Halifax, refused  several  times  to agree to  such  a measure. 
'  During  the  debate  on  November  30,  Sir  Charles  Wood  repeated  the 
following  words,  characteristic  of  those who demanded  the  suspension  of  the 
Act  of  1844: "  Let  us have  notes . . .  We don't  mean, indeed,  to take the 
notes,  because  we  shall  not  want  them; only  tell  us that  we  can  get  them, 
and this will  at once restore confidence."  See Parl.  Debates,  Vol.  XCV., P. 
399. 
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j-po,~  of  additional notes, but there was no need  to use 
them.  Notes which had been hoarded under the impression 
that  the  limit  fixed by the Act  of  1844 would  shortly  be 
reached  and that the  Bank  would  be  unable  to  assist  the 
commercial  world,  were  brought out  in  a mass from  their 
hiding-places;'  the  same thing happened  with  regard  to 
gold, so that both the bullion  and the reserve of  the Bank 
rapidly increased to adequate amounts. 
Aid  Given by the Bank of  England  during the  Crisis. 
The mistakes made in the management of  the Bank must 
not make us forget the immense services which it rendered. 
Between  September  15th and  November  15th  the  Bank 
assisted different important financial and trading establish- 
ments  and through them  the whole of  English commerce, 
in the following ways :-2 
" I.-It  advanced  j-150,ooo  to  a  large  firm  in  London 
.  . .  on security of  debentures of  the Governor and Company 
of  the Copper hliners of  England,"  and prevented a failure 
with liabilities of  several millions. 
"  2.-It  advanced  £5o,ooo  to  a  country banker  on  the 
security of  real property." 
"  3.-It  advanced A 120,000  to  the  Governor and  Com- 
pany of  the Copper Miners, which prevented them stopping 
payment." 
"  4.-It  advanced ~300,000  to the Royal Bank of  Liver- 
pool."  Unfortunately,  this  sum,  large  though  it  was, 
proved insufficient  to save the  Royal Bank. 
"  5.-It  advanced  A~oo,ooo  to another joint-stock  bank 
in  the country." 
"  6.-It  advanced £130,000  on  real  property  to a  large 
mercantile house in London." 
I I  7.-It  advanced Aso,ooo to another mercantile house." 
'  See Wood's  speech,  loc. cit. 
'  See  Macleod,  Theory  of  Credit, p.  1031,  and  Theory  and  Practice  of 
Banking, Vol,  II., p.  168.  l'hcse  two  works  are  alniost  identical : towards 
the end of  his life Macleod deceivcd himself  into a belief  that he was working 
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"  8.-It  advanced kso,ooo on bills of  exchange to a joint- 
stock bank of  issue, which soon after stopped payment." 
9.-It  saved  a  bank  in  Liverpool  from  failing  by  not 
insisting on the immediate payment of  d~oo,ooo  which was 
due to it, 
"  10.-It  assisted another very large joint-stock  bank  in 
the country  by  an advance of  &8oo,ooo beyond  its usual 
discount limit." 
I I .-It  advanced £300,000  to two Scotch banks. 
Besides these advances it made many others in  addition, 
both in London and in the provinces, but it would be tedious 
to specify them.  We  must, however, note the well-deserved 
tribute paid to the Bank by the Chancellor of  the Exchequer 
during  the  debate  in  the  Commons  on  November  30th. 
"  The Bank of  England,"  said Sir Charles Wood,' "  was 
pressed directly for assistance from all parts of  the country, 
and indirectly through the London bankers, who were called 
upon  to  support  their  country correspondents.  . . . Two 
bill-brokers  had stopped, and the operations of  two others 
were nearly paralysed.  The whole demand for discount was 
thrown upon the hands of  the Bank of  England.  Notwith- 
standing this . . .  the  Bank never refused  a  bill  which  it 
would  have discounted at another time, but still, the large 
mass of bills which,  under ordinary circumstances, are dis- 
counted by bill-brokers,  could not be negotiated." 
(d)-RESULTS  OF THE  CRISIS  OF 1847. 
There was a General Election in the autumn of  1847, and 
when  Parliament meta the first proceeding of  the Ministry 
was to propose the appointment of  a Committee of  Inquiry 
"  into the causes of  the recent commercial distress, and how 
far it has been affected by the Laws for regulating the Issue 
of  Bank Notes payable on Demand." 
The Parliamentary  debate  on  this  motion  lasted  three 
Parl.  Debates,  lac.  cit..  p.  398. 
The p's  Speech  (Parl. Debates. Vol. XCV.. pp.  11-14)  dealt at some 
length  wit  the  Bank  of  England and  stated  that  happily  the  authorisation 
granted to  the  Bank had not  led to an infringement of  the  law. 
days.  The principal speakers were Messrs. Wilson, hiloles- 
worth,  Ellice,  Newdegate,  Baring,  the  Chancellor of  the 
Exchequer and Sir Robert Peel.  We  have already referred 
to the speeches of Baring and Sir Charles Wood, and now 
propose  to give a rather more detailed  analysis  of  that of 
Sir Robert  Peel,  partly  because  the speaker was  mainly 
responsible for the Act  of  1844, which had claimed to be a 
preventive  against crises,  but  also because  his  speech  is 
in itself worth recording.' 
Peel, after denying the statement that th'e Act of  1844 had 
been  passed  without  sufficient  preliminary  inq~iry,~  pro- 
ceeded to consider the triple object of  the law in question." 
"  Its first object was .  .  .  to prevent, by early and gradual, 
severe and sudden contraction, and the panic and confusion 
inseparable from it."  In this object Peel admitted that the 
Act  had failed, for the Bank  had  not  been  forced  to  take 
early precautions to  prevent the withdrawakof  its treasure. 
He remarked, however, that : "  If  the Bank had possessed 
the resolution to meet the coming danger by a contraction of 
its issues, by raising the rate of  discount, . . .  if  they had 
been  firm and determined in  the adoption of  those precau- 
tions, the necessity for extrinsic interference might have been 
prevented,  it  might  not  then  have been  necessary  for the 
Government to authorise a violation  of  the Act of  1844."' 
But, besides this first object which had not been attained, 
the Bill  had "  two other objects of  equal  importance : (I) 
'  to maintain and guarantee the convertibility of  the paper 
currency ';  (2) '  to prevent  the difficulties which arise at all 
times from undue speculation being aggravated by the abuse 
of  paper credit in the form of  promissory  notes.' " 
In these two objects Peel believed that the Bill had com- 
pletely succeeded.  There had been no shadow of  doubt cast 
on the convertibility of  the paper currency and the power of 
making  unlimited  issues  had  been  wisely  checked  with 
respect  both  to  the  Bank  of  England and to the country 
banks. 
See Peel's  speech  in Parl.  Debates,  lac. cit., pp. 650-672. 
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After this discussion of  the objects of  the Act of  1844, Sir 
Robert  Peel  described  the  history  of  the  crisis of  1847, 
beginning  by an  inquiry  into  its causes.'  He explicitly 
approved the policy of  the Government both in sending the 
letter and in their choice of  the moment for sending it.  He 
approved  the  policy  in  principle,  because  "  when  there 
occurs a state of  panic-a  state which cannot be foreseen or 
provided  against by law-which  cannot be  reasoned  with, 
the Government  must assume a power  to prevent  the con- 
sequences which may occur."  = 
Finally,  in  reference to the advisability of  making some 
modification in the Act of  1844, Peel declared himself "  in 
favour  of  the maintenance  of  the  great principles  of  that 
measure."  He believed3  that the joint-stock  banks ought to 
be required "  to bear some share of  the expense of  keeping 
in reserve a stock of  gold."  As to the Bank of  England, if 
the identical restrictions now  imposed were removed, others 
would  have  to  take  their  place.  "  Some  restrictions  you 
must  impose,  for  after  the  experience  of  1826,  1836  and 
1839, I, for one, am not content  to leave the regulation of 
the monetary  concerns of  this country to the  uncontrolled 
discretion of  the Bank.  In  1844 the general conviction was 
that it ought not to be so left; and I, for one, know no better 
mode  of  imposing restriction  than that which  was devised 
by the Act of  1844.'' 
After Sir Robert Peel's speech the proposal  to appoint a 
Committee of  Inquiry was agreed to. 
This inquiry is of  interest from many points of  view  and 
supplies  valuable  information,  without  which  the  causes 
and the  history  of  the crisis of  1847 could  not  be  under- 
stood. '  One of  its most interesting features is perhaps that 
it shows plainly  that the supporters of  Peel's  Act  were  in 
See what has becn said above on this point. 
p.  668. 
9.  669. 
'  See  the  Extraits  des  Enqufites Anglaises  by  MM. Coullet  and Juglar ; 
nll  refcrcnces  are to this edition. 
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no  way  discouraged  by  the  crisis which  was  just  over,- 
they  upheld  the  law  more zealously  than  the author of  it 
himself. 
Consider, in the first place, the evidence of  the Governor 
and  the  Deputy-Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England,  Mr. 
Morris and Mr. Prescott.'  They declared their full approval 
of the Act of  1844.  The Act had attained its main  object, 
which was to ensure the convertibility of  the notes; further 
than this, it had made the crisis less severe, although it had 
perhaps hastened  its arrival.  It must be  recognised, they 
said, that the commercial distress was inevitable and that it 
was  independent  of  the Act  of  1844.  But the great merit 
of the Act  in  their opinion  was that owing to  it the Bank 
possessed a stock of  bullion amounting to ,&8,ooo,ooo, when 
the pressure  came, whereas  if  the Bank  had  been  free  it 
would have adopted the policy of  dangerous liberality which 
had done so much harm on previous occasions. 
Hence  the  Governors  of  the Bank  naturally  deprecated 
any  modification  of  the  Act  of  1844 and  the  same  con- 
clusion was reached by Mr. G. W. Norman'  and Mr. S. J. 
Loyd.'  The brief and strongly worded Report of  the Com- 
mittee of  the House of Commons came to the same decision.' 
The Report  of  the House of Lords, however,  embodied 
different conclusions.  Its purport can  be  judged  by  the 
following quotation  from  M.  Courcelle-Seneuil  :--6 
"  Those who  had  believed  that  the  Act  of  1844 would 
prevent the periodical recurrence of  over-excitement followed 
by a commercial crisis must have been  sadly disappointed 
by the events of  1846 and 1847.'  Those who hoped that the 
'  See  EnquLte  de  la  Chambre  des  Lords,  pp.  1-81,  and  Enqukte  de  la 
Chambre des  Communes,  pp.  5-81. 
a  p.  218,  Enquete  des Lords. 
'  For the evidence  of  these two  see  Enqukte  des  Lords, pp.  119195. 
'  A  French version of  this report is given  in  the Extraits de I'Enqukte  de 
la  Chambre des  Comntunes,  pp.  1-4. 
'  Trait6  thbon'que  et  Pratique  des  Operations de  Banque,  p.  324. 
It is only  fair to point  out that the  authors of  the law of  1844 never 
imagined  such  absurditirs.  I.oyd,  for  instance,  in  a  pamphlet  entitled 
Thoughts  on  the  Separation  of  the  Departments  of  the  Bank  of  England, 
\~&IIL~.  1s  .2jiir>t~i!  ir.  the  T~acts,  pp.  249-283,  states definitely  (pp.  240-241) 342  HIS'TORY  OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
Act  would  discourage rash  speculation  could  hardly have 
been less disappointed, for, according to the evidence of  the 
Governor of  the Bank  of  England,  speculation  had  never 
been  so rife as from 1846 to 1847.  Those who thought that 
the Act would secure the market from violent fluctuations in 
the value of money, were undeceived when they found that 
the  difference between  the  maximum  and minimum  rates 
of  discount, which had varied from 21  to 2% per cent. during 
the disastrous years of  1837 and 1839, rose  to a  per cent. 
in  1847.  Those  who  thought  that  in  future  the  bank- 
ruptcies would be  less frequent and less serious were con- 
clusively answered when the Governor of  the Bank described 
how in London alone thirty-three important firms had failed, 
with a total liability of  E8,12g,ooo, etc." 
Two suggesiions "  had been  made before the Committee 
of  the House of Lords; the one advised the absolute repeal 
of  the Act of  1844, the other proposed that the Act should be 
maintained, but accompanied by a wider relaxing  power." 
The Report decided in favour of  the latter suggestion.' 
that the  reform  will  not  prevent  crises  from  occurring,  but  he  adds,  "We 
can prevent  an additional  stimulus being  given  to a  rise  of  prices  and undue 
speculations  by  the  influence  of  an  ill-regulated  currency."  It must  be 
aclrnowledged  after  an interval  of  sixty  years  that  even  this  limited  object 
has not been  completely attained. 
'  Compare also  the  last  chapter of  this  volume. 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE  CRISIS  OF  1857. 
Sudden  outbreak  of  the  crisis  of  1857 : a  contrast  to  the  preceding  one. 
Cautious policy of the  Bank during the Crimean War.  Condition of  the 
market  during  1856 and  more  than  half  1857.  The crisis  of  1857 in 
America.  The three causes of  the American  crisis.  Their  influence  felt 
also  in  Europe.  (a) The great discoveries  of  gold,  (b)  The extension  of 
railways, (c) The development of  banking and the abuse of  credit facilities. 
Extraordinary   umber  of  failures  in  America.  The ruin  of  American 
banlts led  to that of  a number of English  banks.  The Bank  of  England 
the  only  source of  discount  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Reduction  of  the 
Bank  Reserve  on  November  12, to  ,&384,114.  Assistance  given  by  the 
Banlc  to  commerce  in  anticipation  of  the  suspension  of  the  Act.  The 
suspension  of  the  Act.  Letter of  the Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer:  text 
of  this  letter.  Bank  issues  E2,ooo,ooo  notes  in  excess  of  the  statutory 
limit,  the  maximum  put  into  circulation  only  &928,ooo.  Comparison 
between  the crisis of  1857 and the crises of  1847 and 1866 with  reference 
to  the  suspension  of  the  Act  of  1844.  A Bill  of  Indemnity  had  to be 
passed.  The Inquiry of  1858 and the  causes of  the  crisis of  1857 : (I) 
Unprecedented extension  of  International Trade, (2) Excessive importatia3n 
of  precious  metals.  (3) Remarkable development  of  banks of  credit. 
THE crisis of  1857 differs in  several  respects  from  that of 
1847.  It was not the result of  a bad harvest, but was in the 
main  the  after  effect  of  a  crisis produced  in  America  by 
unbounded  speculation.  The  distinctive  feature  of  this 
crisis in  1857 was that, although the panic accompanying it 
was less intense than that of  ten  years earlier,  the pressure 
on the money market was more severe and more prolonged ; 
it was also the only crisis in which the Bank of  England was 
obliged to violate the Act of 1844 by exceeding the statutory 
limit. 
The crisis began with great suddenness.  There were,  no 
doubt, signs of  stringency on the money market even before 
1857.  Bad  harvests and a  decline in  foreign  investments 
had caused pressure on the  European  markets as early as 
1853.  But the Crimean War had increased people's timidity 
and had  thus made the business  world  more prudent  and 
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of  the Bank of  England deserved all praise;'  its policy  was 
analogous to that followed quite recently  during the South 
African War.  It raised its rate of  discount  unhesitatingly 
in spite of  the violence and bitterness of  the protests raised. 
The rate was very high throughout  1855 and even reached 
7  per cent.= and when  the war came to an end without pro- 
ducing  the  anticipated  disaster,  people  were  forced  to 
acknowledge that the Bank of  England deserved well of  the 
country. 
In spite of  everything the market continued very uneasy 
during 1856; the discount rate was high  and the situation 
continued somewhat strained until  September,  1857, with- 
out, however, arousing any suspicion of  what was to follow. 
According to the evidence of  the Governor of  the Bank, S. 
Neave,'"things  were  then  pretty  stationary,"  but  the 
harvests  promised well  and except for "  certain  more far- 
seeing persons,"'  the public were well content with the con- 
dition of  affairs. 
The Bank felt so confident that on August 17th, when the 
stock of  bullion  amounted to Aro,ooo,ooo and the Reserve 
of  notes  was  A6,296,ooo,  negotiations  were  opened  with 
the East India  Company to export a  million  in  specie to 
the East.  A week later the crisis had burst out in  America. 
The American  crisis was the result of  a series of  events 
which,  indeed, had  also affected Europe.  These were : (I) 
The great discoveries of  gold; (2)  The extension  of  rail- 
ways; (3) The development of  banking and of  speculation. 
See Weguelin's  evidence, Extraits  des  Enquttes,  1857, p.  101. 
'  It  fell  as low  as 34  per  cent.  only  for  a  very  short  time  during  the 
summer. 
'  See p. xv. of  the  Report. 
'  'These  far-seeing  persons  had  observed  that  the  great  stimulus  given 
to business by  the  war  expenditure  could  only  be  temporary  and  that  never- 
:helr%zs,  merchants were  continui~~g  their  purchases  in  anticipation  of  a  con- 
tinu:rnc-e of  the high prices. 
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I.-The  Great  Discoveries  of  Gold. 
Towards the middle of the 19th century the discovery of a 
large number of gold mines caused an economic revolution, 
which recalled that due to the discovery of  the treasures of 
Peru  and  Mexico  four  centuries  earlier.  The  average 
annual production  between  1493 and  1850 had  been  esti- 
mated at A I ,SOO,OW;  between  185  I and 1860 it increased to 
a  yearly  average  of  ~26,600,000.1 President  Buchanana 
calculated  that  the  production  of  the  United  States alone 
during the eight years 185-1857,  was A8o,ooo,ooo. 
Prices did not  increase proportionately to the increase in 
metallic  money,  but "  enterprises of  all  kinds  received  a 
stimulus unheard of  in the history of  the world."" 
2.-The  Extension  of  Railways. 
In  1856, 3,642  miles of  railway  were constructed  in  the 
United States, and the construction from  1849 to  1857 had 
been  21,000  miles.  This total,  which  amounted  to seven- 
ninths  of  the  railway  system  in  the  whole  country,  had 
absorbed  capital  to  the  amount of  ~14o,ooo,ooo,  mainly 
foreign.  The steady increase of  immigration, added to the 
normal growth of  the population and the immense progress 
made  in  districts  which  had  hitherto  been  undeveloped, 
intoxicated  the nation.  As Von  Holstb remarks : "  It was 
more and more lost sight of, that even in the age of  steam, 
time  must  remain  an essential  factor  in  every  process of 
development,"  and  the  American  people  were  led  "  to 
mould  the  reality in  their minds  in  accordance  with  what 
imagination pictured to them." 
'  According  to  Conant,  p.  493,  Professor  Soetbeer  estimates  the  total 
production  of  gold  between  1493 and  1850  as  173,258,ooo,ooo marks,  and 
between  1851 and  1885 at  17,81o,ooo,ooo  marks.  Between  1885 and  1895 the 
production  was  A275,ooo,ooo,  according  to  the  Encyclopcedia  Brilannica 
(Supplement  Vol.  XIX.,  p.  18),  and  between  1895  and  1899 it  apparently 
increased by  two-fifths. 
Conant, p.  493. 
'  Conant, loc. cit. 
'  The Constitutimal History  of  the United States.  Lalor's  English trans- 
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England  and  the  Continent  had  witnessed  a  similar 
extension in their railway systems.  In England alone more 
than 4,000 miles had been constructed since 1850, the exist- 
ing lines being thus doubled.' 
And  in  Europe, as in  America,  speculation  in  railways 
had  been  encouraged by  the payment of  dividends out  of 
capital. 
3.-The  Development  of  Banking  and  the  Abuse  of 
Credit. 
The number of  banks in  America increased very rapidly ; 
in 1847 therewere 715, in  1857 there were 1,416.  Andwhat 
was worse, the discounts  increased  in  like  proportion  and 
rose  from  310,382,945  dollars  to  684,456,887-more  than 
double the previous amount.  The circulation increased in an 
analogous manner  from  105,s  19,766 dollars to  2 14,778,822 
dollars.  M. Juglar2 remarks that this was not actually due 
to over-issue,  since owing  to  the  strictness of  the  regula- 
tions,  the issues did not  often exceed the  metallic reserve; 
but  the  bankers  got  over  this  difficulty  by  attracting 
deposits by high interest and lending them on similar terms 
to reckless speculators. 
M. Juglars enumerates the evils of  the position as follows : 
the  increase  of  banks  having  an  insufficient  capital;  too 
many deposits; an excess of  currency doubled by an exag- 
gerated extension of  discounting. 
Nevertheless  foreign  capital  steadily  flowed  into  the 
United States.  "  Conditions were ripe both in  Europe and 
America for a crash when the impulse came on August aqth, 
1857, from the failure of  the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust 
Co.,  of  Cincinnati and New  York,  with  reported  liabilities 
of 7,000,000 dollars.  A panic followed on  the  New  York 
Stock  Exchange,  stocks  fell,  money  was  hoarded  to  be 
For further details see James Ford Rhodes,  History  of  the United States 
from  the  Compromise  of  1850,  Vol.  III.,  p.  53.  The author  gives  a  full 
analysis of  this  crisis  in  America  as  well  as  some  details  with  regard  to 
Europe. 
'  p.  268.  a  p.  269. 
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loaned  only  at  extravagant  rates,  deposits began  to  dis- 
appear from the banks, and late in  September a run began 
on  the  banks  of  Philadelphia.  They were  compelled  to 
suspend specie payments on September 26th."' 
During  the  beginning  of  October  the  Illinois  Central 
Railway, the New  York and Erie and the Michigan Central 
all failed,  as well  as 150 banks in  Pennsylvania,  Virginia 
and Maryland.  At  the  same time  the  New  York  banks 
shared  the fate of  those at  Philadelphia.  They  had  con- 
tracted their discounts very suddenly, reducing  them  from 
122,000,000 dollars to 97,200,000 between  August 8th  and 
October 17th.  Rut this contraction, says D. Rlorier Evans,= 
"  by  causing much damage to  the country  banks and the 
commercial interest, had awakened a feeling of  jealousy  in 
addition to the general alarm, and on  the 13th (of  October) 
a preconcerted  run  took  place.  The stoppage of  eighteen 
banlts was the immediate consequence of  the pressure.  The 
remaining  establishments  put  themselves  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the law." 
Out of  the sixty-three banks in  New York only one man- 
aged to avoid suspending its payments  and the importance 
of  this crisis of  1857 in  America  may be  realised from  the 
fact that there were  5,123 failures in  the United States and 
('anada,  with  liabilities amounting  to  291,801,000 dollars.' 
Money  was  already  dear  in  England  and  complaints 
were being  raised a~ainst  the  13ank, when  the news of  the 
failure of the Ohio Life Insurance Co. caused intense alarm 
on  account  of the  ,&8o,ooo,ooo which  were  reported  to  be 
invested in  American stock.  The operations of  a syndicate 
Conant, p. 496. 
The  History  of the Commercial  Crisis,  1858-59,  p.  34. 
a  Sumncr,  A  History  of  American  Currency, p.  1q4, says  that  the  con- 
stitution of the  State of  New York  forbade the  suspcsnslon of  specie  payments 
directly  or  indirectly,  but  on  this  occasion  the  judges  of  the  Supreme Court 
met  and agreed  not  to grant  any injunction  unlcss  the  Uanlr  appeared  to be 
really  insolvent or  guilty  of  fraud. 
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of  bears, i.e., speculators for a fall, increased the anxiety,' 
although the high  rate of  interest in  New  York  attracted 
considerable  sums.  The Bank  of  France lost  25,oo~ow 
francs in one week and the bullion in the Bank of  England 
fell to 48,991,m  on October  19th. 
On November  7th  the firm of  Dennistoun stopped pay- 
ment,  with  liabilities of  nearly  2  millions.  The Western 
Bank closed its doors on the 9th of  November,  the City of 
Glasgow  Bank soon did likewise and a  number  of  failures 
occurred.  The Bank of  England had to send more than a 
million  to Scotland, besides meeting important demands for 
gold in  Ireland.  It was the only source of  discount during 
a crisis which  paralysed  everyone's  courage;  in  a  single 
day  its discounts amounted  to  Ez,373,ooo.  The conse- 
quence was that on Wednesday, November  ~~th,  its entire 
reserve,  including  what was held  at the branch  establish- 
ments,  only amounted  to  E1,462,153, of  which  4957,710 
was in notes  and the next evening the reserve in the bank- 
ing  department  had  fallen  to  ,&384,914,  consisting  of 
,,$68,035  in notes, 4274,953 in gold  and 442,106 in silver.' 
The Bank could not have gone on for another day under 
the regime of  the Act of  1844' and its stoppage would have 
meant the entire collapse of  the London market. 
Nevertheless,  as we  have seen, it  had continued  its dis- 
counts  when  everyone  else  had  contracted  theirs.  This 
policy evidently implied a feeling of  certainty that the  Act 
would  be  suspended;  this  was  actually  done at the last 
moment,  by a letter from  the Chancellor of  the Exchequer 
to  the  Governors  of  the  Bank-  letter  modelled  on  the 
' Gilbart, Vol.  II., p. 302.  In  Stock  Exchange parlance bears are specu- 
lators for a  fall, bulls speculators for a  rise. 
Macleod, Theory  of  Credit, p.  1056. 
a  See  the  statement  made  by  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  before  the 
Committee  of  Inquiry.  Question  132 : Supposing  that  the letter  from  the 
Chancellor had not been  issued on that day, would  the Bank on the morning 
of  the  13th  (November)  have been  in  a  condition  to continue  its discounts? 
"  No,  certainly  not."  See  Extmits  drs  Enquttes  Anglaises.  Enqutte  de 
1858, p.  18.  Compare p.  30. 
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one  of  October  25th,  1847, whose  contents we 
have described.' 
As in  1847, the public alarm was at once abated, but this 
time  the  demands  for  discount  continued  to  be  very 
numerous  for more  than  a  fortnight.  The  Bank  issued 
k2,ooo,ooo of notes  in  excess  of the  statutory  limit;  the 
maximum  of additional  notes  actually  in  circulation  did 
not  however  exceed  kg28,m (on  November  loth),  the 
remainder were added to the reser~e.~ 
1 The text of  the letter of  November  12, 1857, is  as follows :- 
"  Gentlemen,  Downing  Street,  12 November,  1857. 
'l  Her Majesty's  Government  havc  observed  with  great  concern  thc 
conscqucnces  which  havc  cnsucd  froni  the  reccnt  failure  of  certain 
joint-stock  banks  in  England  and  Scotland,  as  well  as of  certain  large 
niercantile  firms,  chiefly connrctcd  with  the  American  trade.  The discrcdit 
and distrust which  havc resultcd  from  these cvcnts, and  the withdrawal  of  a 
large aniount of  the paper  circulation  authorised by  the existing  Bank  Acts, 
appear to Her Majesty's  Govcrnnient to render it neccssary  for them to itiform 
the directors of  the  Bank  of  England  that  if  they  should  be  unable  ill  the 
present  ernrrgcncy  to  meet  the  demands  for  discounts  and  advances  upon 
approved  securities  without  excecding  the  limits  of  their  circulation  prc- 
scribed  by  the  Act  of  1844,  the  Govcrnment  will  bc  prcpared  to propose  to 
Parliament, upon  its meeting,  a  Bill  of  Indcninity for  any excess so issued. 
"  In order to prevent this temporary  relaxation of  the law being extended 
beyond  the actual necessities  of  thr  occasion,  Her Majesty's  Covcrnment arc 
of  opinion  that the Bank terms of  discount should not  be  reduced  below  their 
present  rate. 
"  Her Majesty's  Govcrnnient reserve  for  future consideration  the appro- 
priation  of  any profits  which  may arise up011 issucs in excess of  the statutory 
amount. 
"  Her Majesty's  Government  are fully  impressed  with  the importance of 
maintaining  thc  letter  of  the law, cvcn  in  a  time  of  considerable  mercantile 
difficulty;  but thcy bclicvc  that, for the rcmoval of  apprrhrnsions which  havc 
checkrd the course of  monetary  transactions,  such  a  measure as is now  con- 
tclnplated  has  become  necessary,  and  thcy  rely  upon  thc  discretion  and 
prudence  of the directors for  confining  its operation  within  the strict limits 
of the exigencies of  the case. 
'"We  have, etc.,  (Signed) "  PALMLRS.TON. 
"  G.  C.  I.EWIS." 
Wc quote this  Ivttcr  front  the  rrport  of  thr  Co~ii~iiittec  of  1857,  Report 
fro)ii the Sc4crt  Corirrnittec  on the  Bank  Acts, p.  xi.  (Frcknrh  vvrsion  by  M. 
Kmile  Jouveaux,  scc p.  xix.  of  the  Extraits  drs  EtrquCtes  sur  lu  Idgislulioir 
des  haaquc.~,  1857  ct  1858). 
I -  I'he  following were  the amounts by  which  the statutory limit  was  1.x- 
cccded  from  November  13th  to  30th.  Report,  p.  xli.  Coliipare  Happort 
Commission d'Enqulte,  p.  xxi. 
NOV. 13  .........  f;186,ooo  Nov.  23  .........  f;397*- 
,,  14  .........  622,000  ..  24  .........  317s000 
.........  16  860,000  ,,  25  81,000  ..  ......... 
,,  17  .........  836,000  ..  26  .........  2439- 
18  852,000  ..  27  .........  3qz,000  ..  .........  ..  19  .........  896,000  ..  28  .........  184,cmo 
.........  20  gg8,tmoo  ,,  30  15,ooo  ..  ......... 
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Although  the  amount by  which  the  statutory lirnit was 
escceded  in  1857, was  comparatively  small,  the  mere  fact 
that  the  limit  was  exceeded  was  unprecedented  and  lias 
rcmaincd  unique  in  the  history of  the  Bank  down  to  the 
present day.  It is true that the Bank had been authorised in 
1847  to exceed  the  limit  fixed by  the  Act  of  1844 and, as 
ttch shall see, it  received  a  like authorisation  in  1866, but 
neither in 1847 nor in  1866 did it make use of  the permission 
given ; hence  there was  no  need  either in  1847  or  in 1866 
for  Parliament  to  ratify  the  authorisation  granted  by  the 
Government.  In  1857  the case was different.  The inter- 
vention of  I'arliament  tias a necessity on  this occasion.  It 
will  he  remembered,  indeed,  that  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchcquer does not actually authorise the  Bank  to violate 
the Act  of  1844, this would be beyond his powers;  all that 
he can do is to inform the directors that  if  they  find them- 
selves obliged,  in the  interests of  commerce, to exceed  the 
statutory limit,  the  Government  is prepared  to  propose  a 
Bill  of  Indemnity  to  Parliament.  In  1847 and 1866 the 
Chancellor's  letter  proved  sufficient  to allay anxiety,  the 
statutory limit was not esceeded, and there was no need  for 
a  I3ill  of  Inden~nity. In  1857, when  Parliament  met,  the 
Covcrnmcnt brought in and passed an  Act sanctioning the 
additional  issues  which  had  been  made,  and temporarily 
suspc.nding, (until February  st,  1858), the  Act of  1844, on 
condition  that the  directors did  not  reduce the rate of  dis- 
count below  lo per cent.  On Ilecember 24th  honever  the 
I3anli 1otverc.d its mte to 8 per cent.  This proceeding auto- 
~natically  svt tllc Act of  1844 in  force again.  It  had actually 
becv-t  suspnded for  forty-three  days, from  November  13th 
ro Ilccembt~r  qth,  hut in  theory  and legally the suspension 
had only lasted twelve days, since the Act  of  Indemnity (21 
Vict., c. i.)  was not passed until December 12th.' 
' l'hc  text of  illis Act  is  givcn by  I':~lg~.:tvc,  PI).  91-93. 
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COMPARISON  BETWEEN  THE  CRISES  OF  1847  AND  1857 
WITH  REGARD  TO  THEIR  SEVERITY. 
As  regards this point  it is  probable  that  the panic  was 
less violent in  1857 than in 1847, but that, on the other hand, 
the real suffering  was more widespread.  This view is borne 
out  by  the  fact  that  the  total  of  loans,  discounts  and 
advances upon  stock made  by  the  Bank  of  England  was 
£12,645,000  between  November  12th and  December  1st.l 
It is  noticeable, too, that great care was taken not to reduce 
the rate of discount too quickly ; it was maintained at 5 per 
cent. until the stock of bullion had risen to £15,w,w. 
THE  INQUIRY  OF  1858  AND  THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  CRISIS 
OF  1857. 
According to the wise English custom, the crisis of  1857 
was  followed  by  an inquiry.  It is  imposs~ble  to  give an 
analysis of  it here,a but we  may, at any rate, summarise its 
conclusions as to the causes of  the crisis. 
As classified by the Select Committee,'  the chief causes of 
the crisis of  1857 were three : (I)  An unprecedented extension 
of  foreign  trade.  (2) An excessive importation of  gold and 
silver.  (3)  A  remarkable  development  of  banks  and  of 
credit. 
(I) With  regard  to  the  first  cause,  it  was  shown  that, 
owing especially to the reform of  the tariff, the imports had 
increased  from  71 to  124 millions  and  that  the  exports, 
which  until  1848 had  never  exceeded  .@o,I  ~o,ooo,  had 
reached £1  12,155,000  In  1857. 
(2)  With regard to the increase of  bullion,  it  was stated 
that £107,5oo,ooo of  gold was added to the European stock, 
whilst A26,800,ooo was exported, leaving a total increase of 
A80,70o,ooo.  There was naturally a corresponding increase 
in  the circulating  medium,  the  paper  currency  not  repre- 
sented  by  bullion  being  ~31,600,000  and  the  gold  coins 
amounting to 50  millions. 
i.evi,  p:  404. 
'  For  thls  subject  scc  Extraits  des  Enquetcs  by  Coullrt  and  Juglar. 
Report,  p. v. (Erlrails, especially p.  xii.); scc also D.  M. Evans, op.  cit., 
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(3) The increased facilities for credit were a natural result 
of  the extension  of  trade and of the increase  in  currency. 
The deposits  at  the  joint-stock  banks  in  London  alone, 
which  had  amounted  to  cf;8,800,ooo  in  1847,  were 
£43,100,724  in  1857, and there was a proportional increase 
in  the other deposits,  both at the  private  and  the  country 
banks.  The result was a great extension of  credit facilities. 
Mr. Fowler makes some apt remarks on this point : 
I'  It is not,"  he says, "  very easy to define how far credit 
may extend safely, but it is very clear that during the years 
1855 and  1856 the  extension  of  credit  was enormous and 
dangerous.  It has been  sometimes asserted,  though  there 
is no way  of  testing the  truth of  the assertion, that during 
the years  in  question  there  were  as many  bills offered for 
discount in  Lombard Street as there are now (1890)) though 
the  real  volume of  trade  has  vastly  increased  since  1857, 
the  total  of  imports  and  of  exports  being  unitedly 
~311,764,oooin  1856, and A748,944,m in 1890.  In those 
times  it was a common  thing for banks  in  manufacturing 
districts to send great masses of  bills to London  for re-dis- 
count. . . .The amount of  this business in  1856 and  1857 
was enormous, and even after the panic of  that year, when 
many  bills  came  to  an  end  by  failures of  traders and of 
bankers,  the amount of re-discount  by  banks continued  to 
be  very  large.  But,  at  this  moment,  that  business  has 
almost come to an end." 
' IJict.  of  I'olitical  Ecotlotr~y,  Vol.  I., p.  462. 
CHAPTER  111. 
THE  CRISIS  OF  1866. 
l<conomic results of  the Civil  War in the U.S.A.  Influx of  gold into Europe. 
Disturbance of  the cotton trade.  Immediate causes of  the crisis of  1866, 
(I) The rage for limited companies,  (I) The practice of  financing, (3)  Bad 
customs adopted by  certain banks with  regard to deposits.  The crisis  of 
1866.  The crisis of  1864 and the crisis of  1866.  A retarded liquidation. 
The failure of  Overend  and  Gurney.  Black  Friday.  Remarks  on  the 
firm  of  Overend  and  Gurney  and  the  causes  of  its  collapse.  Unpre- 
cedented  panic resulting from the failure of  this firm.  Advances amount- 
ing to four millions made by  the Bank in a  single day (Friday, May  11). 
Suspension  of  the  Act  of  1844.  End  of  the crisis.  Part  played  by  the 
Bank.  The AL~  suspended on the evening of  Friday, May  I I.  Announce- 
ment  of  suspension allayed  panic,  fresh outbreak  a  few days later,  flow 
of  deposits  to  the  Bank,  no  additional  issue  required.  Great  services 
rendered by  the Bank, Advances  amounting  to L~l,zzg,ooo  made in five 
days.  Rrsults of  the  crisis of  1866.  Excitement  aroused  by  the  crisis 
outside  England.  Lord  Clarendon's  circular.  Heavy  losses  at home. 
Some good  effects of  the crisis. 
(a)-ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  THE WAR  OF  SECESSION. 
THE  years which followed the outbreak of  the Civil War in 
America were years of  financial difficulty in Europe as well 
as in  America.  'These  difficulties were in  part  due  to  the 
war  and in  part to causes distinct from but  intensified by 
it.  The influx of  gold into Europe and the disturbance of 
the cotton trade must be ranked among the  most important 
of the direct consequences of  the war. 
Influx of gold into Europe.  The system of  inconvertible 
paper  currency  established  in  the  United  States in  1861 
caused gold to flow  into Europe in considerable quantities. 
An  American  author to whom  frequent reference has been 
made in  the course of  this work, Mr. Conant,'  estimates the 
gold exported from  America at 21,532,891 dollars in  1862; 
56,642,200 dollars in  1863 ;  89,484,865 dollars in  1864; and 
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This influx of  currency only raised prices slightly, hardly 
10  per cent., but it stimulated business considerably.' 
Disturbance  of  the Cotton Trade.  The blockade  of  the 
ports  in  the Southern States forced  England  to seek  her 
cotton  supply elsewhere.  The quantity  imported  in  1855 
was  collected  with  some  difficulty  from  all  parts  of  the 
world, but the price of  cotton was tripled.  Moreover, though 
successful in obtaining supplies from India, Egypt, China 
and Brazil,  England could not at once pay in merchandise 
for  these  unexpected  imports;  payment  had  to  be  made 
in cash, and as regards India in particular, in silver.'  Hence 
the cotton crisis upset  both  the industrial  centres and the 
money market. 
(b)-CAUSES  OF  THE  CRISIS  OF  1866. 
The disorganisation of  the cotton trade, the confusion due 
to the export of  gold, the fall in the rate of  interest and the 
accumulation of  capital resulting from the extension in  the 
use of  machinery, very soon gave a feverish and speculative 
character to the English money  market,  recalling the con- 
ditions prevailing in  1825 and 1847. 
The speculative  tendency  showed  itself  especially  in  a 
craze  for  limited  liability  companies  and in  the  practice 
of  financing. 
I.-The  Mania  for  Limited  Liability  Companies. 
Companies of  this kind were originally only created under 
special charters; their promotion did not become easy until 
after the amendment of  the Company Law in  1862.' 
At  the outset the hope of  unlimited profit combined with 
limited risk aroused much enthusiasm.  In a short time three 
Stanley  Jevons : Investigations  in  Currency and  Finatice, p.  56. 
'  Between  1862  and  1866  the  net  imports  of  silver  into  India  were 
5?,094,337  tens of  rupees (the ten of  rupees was about equal to LI),  whilst  the 
bills  on  India  sold by  the  English  Government  were  only 29,409,469 tens  of 
rupees (Conant,  p.  501, note). 
France  felt  the  indirect  eRects  of  this  disturbance,  since  its  silver  pieces 
which  were at  a premium,  vanished  as if  by  magic. 
'  For  this  Act,  25  and  26  Vict.,  C.  139,  see  Lyon-Cacn  and  Renault, 
Trait4 des  Societds  Commerciales, p.  478, et seq. 
hundred  limited  companies were  founded  with  a  nominal 
capital  of £504,000,000.  In  1863 alone the shares issued, 
wliich in  France amounted to £32,000,000,  had reached the 
sum of  L145,000,000  in  England, and during the first four 
months of  1864 securities to the value of  ~f;75,4m,ooo  were 
upon  the  English market.'  It has been  estimated 
that 90 per cent. of these limited companies founded between 
1862  and  1865 ultimately  failed.  The abuses  committed 
even made people forget for the time the advantages of the 
limited company system, and one distinguished writer2 goes 
so far as to speak of  the "  pestilential principle " of  limited 
liability 
I I .-The  Practice  of  Finattcing. 
Owing to the escessive number issued, the shares became 
unsaleahle.  Since credit  was  lacking,  people  resorted  to 
fitlancing and to finance hills.  These terms  demand  some 
explanation .' 
Suppose that a  railway contractor  wanted  Ljo,~  ;  he 
applied to a company, offering as security shares in the line 
lie was constructing.  The company agreed to lend him the 
amount, not in cash, but by an accepta~ice  made out in  his 
favour; this acceptance the contractor could then discount, 
and thus obtain  the money  required.  In  this  way  profit 
was made by the loan of  a signature only.  The transaction 
was not analogous to the discount of  a bill of  exchange, for 
there were  no goods delivered and sold and requiring only 
an interval before being consumed; hence the distaste which 
bankers felt to accepting and circulating such paper. 
It must, however, be acknowledged that the new  method 
"  was  legitimate  within  the  limits  of  the  strength of  the 
guarauteeing con1p:tnies and the prospects of  ilie new enter- 
prises."  By its  means enterprises which  niiglit  prove  of 
great  value  could  be  sct  going  without  delay.  Unfor- 
' Juglar, p.  378. 
'  Mr.  James Sterling. 
On  tlic  subjrct  of  fin:~nring  srr Jugl;lr,  1'.  $40,  and  Ixvi, p.  462.  The 
s.v.*tr.ni rv.~s  it1dct.d not  unl;~iorv~i  in  Fr:tncc ;  in  I;crt, this  ~.ountry  rv;ts  ul~rad 
of lCngla~ld  in this  rcbpcct,  tli;c~iltr  vhietly to  thc 3oci<fi  dc CrCdit  Mobilier. 356  HISTORY  OF THE BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
tunately  the  system was  employed "  without  wisdom  and 
sometimes without honesty,"'  and it soon brought about a 
terrible crash. 
Amongst the firms which turned their attention to financ- 
ing one  of  the best  known  was that of  Messrs.  Overend, 
Gurney & Co., of  which we shall have more to say later. 
Combined with the limited companies and the practice of 
financing, bad habits in  relation to deposits began  to make 
their  appearance.  Hitherto  respectable  banks  had  only 
paid interest on their deposit accounts, which the depositors 
could only withdraw  after due notice and  in  a lump sum, 
but had not allowed interest on current or drawing accounts, 
on  which  English depositors draw cheques and which can 
thus be withdrawn at will.  The new  banks, especially the 
Colonial banks, neglected these wise practices and began to 
pay interest even on drawing accounts, at first at low  rates, 
but afterwards at fairly high rates. 
This policy had the effect of  attracting large supplies of 
capital ; the  deposits at  joint-stock  banks  increased  from 
~.43,ooo,ooo  in  1860 to A;gr ,ooo,ooo  in  1864,  and the deposits 
at  private  and  country  banks  increased  by  20 millions' 
during the same period.  But the system ended in  the ruin 
both  of  the depositors and of  the banker. 
I.-The  Crisis  of  1864 and  the  Crisis  of  1866. 
There were  two crises in  1864:  the first ending  in the 
liquidation  of  the smaller  tradesmen,  the  second affecting 
the large capitalist.  In  both cases the  liquidation  on  the 
Continent was completed in  1864;  its effects were felt even 
in  Brazil and Australia. 
In  England  events  took  a  somewhat  different  course. 
This country,  like  the  rest  of  Europe,  suffered  great un- 
easiness.  The foreign exchanges turned against it towards 
' See Conant, p.  502. 
'  A  large  proportion of  these  deposits,  about  a  quarter  in  fact,  consisted 
of  acceptances  (see Juglar, p.  385). 
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the end of  1863  and during  I&+  the  Bank  of  England 
was twice obliged to raise its rate of  discount to g per cent. 
For  the time  the collapse  was  successfully averted.  Un- 
fortunately  it  was  only  delayed  a  couple  of  years  and 
England  gained  nothing  by  waiting.  The crisis of  1866 
was, in  fact, the most serious that has been  experienced in 
modern times. 
The proof, as M. Juglar' observes, that the crisis of  1866 
was  not  independent,  but  was  the  violent and  inevitable 
completion of that of  1864, though somewhat delayed, is that 
other countries had no share in it.  Their crash had occurred 
in 1864. 
11.-The  Failure of  Overend & Gurney.-Black  Friday. 
The year  1866 opened  with gloomy  prospects.  Abroad 
everything pointed to a European war; at home a commer- 
cial crisis soon  appeared imminent.  The first warning of 
it was given in  February by  the failure of  the Joint-Stock 
Discount Company, and this was followed by  the stoppage 
of  Barned's  Bank  at  Liverpool,  with  liabilities  of 
.43,5~,000.* 
The situation  obviously  grew  worse  from  day  to  day; 
the rate of  discount at the  Bank  of  England,  which  had 
fallen to 6 per cent., was raised early in May to 7, 8, g  and 
finally, on May  I I th, to  10  per cent.  Towards evening  of 
May 10th the news spread of  the greatest failure which  had 
hitherto occurred in  England, that of  Overend, Gurney and 
Co.  The firm of  Overend & Gurney was one of  the most 
respected in  the City.  It enjoyed a European  reputation; 
one of  the partners,  S. Gurney,  had  played  an  important 
part in the crisis of  1847 and the subsequent inquiry, and in 
addition  it held deposits to the amount of  8 millions.  Un- 
fortunately, after 1860 this firm  had become  involved in  a 
series of risky speculations and was actually insolvent with- 
out  anyone  suspecting  it.  An  opportunity  was  taken  in 
August,  1865,  to  reconstruct  it as a  limited  liability  com- 
'  P. 387. 
a  Gilbart,  o).  cft.,  Vol.  II.,  p. 308. nj8  MISTORY  OF  THE  BANI<  OF  ENGLAND. 
pany, with a capital of j n~illio~ls  in ~oo,tmo  kjo  shares, of 
which  k15 \\-ere paid  up.  h.joo,ooo  was  paid  for  the 
goodwill  of  the  old  firm, whose  position  we  have  seen. 
?'he  shares  of  the  new  conlpany  were  at first  sold  at  a 
premiunl of Are. Some months later Overend. Gurnev and 
Company failed under the following circumstances : 
An action  was pending before the law courts against the 
Mid-IVales  Railway  to  recover  the  value  of  securities 
amounting to k'6o,ooo which had been accepted by the com- 
pany, and which were held  by Overend & Gurne> and two 
other firms.  Judgment  was  delivered  on  May  9th  to  the 
effect  that the railway company  had  no authority to accept 
the securities.  This decision, combined with rumours about 
Overend & Gurney  which  had  been  current for some little 
time, caused a  run  upon  the firm.  The directors  tried  to 
avert disaster by asking for help from the Bank of  England 
to  the  amount of kf~loo,ooo;  but  the security  offered  was 
insufficient, the loan was refused,' and the firm of  Overend, 
Gurney  8:  Company  stopped  payment  with  liabilities  of 
£f;18,727,917.~ 
The next day (Friday,  May  11th) will  long be known  in 
the annals of  the City as " Black Frida~."~  The prevailing 
excitement  is  indescribable ; Lombard  Street  was  impass- 
able.  it  seemed that  demands for accommodaton  must  in- 
crease to an extraordinary extent,  and  doubt  was  thrown 
upon  the position of  the most  respected houses. 
"  It  might  have  been  thought,"  exclaims  iiolowski,' 
"  that the ships carrying England and her fortune had sud- 
denly sprung a terrible leak and that  the wrecked  persons 
Not  without  rogret,  for  the  Banlr  recognkcd  the  danger. 
'  Thp  liquidation  of  the  firm  of  Ovcsrcnd  8-  Gurn~y  lasted  27  years  and 
cost A188,953. The final report of  the liquidators was prrscnted  on  November 
18,  1893.  For  furthcr details sec the  Baukers'  Magazine for  Dcccmbcr,  1893. 
*  Thc same name had  been  given  to  Friday,  Decetnbrr  6, 1745, whim thr 
advance  of  the  Pretender  struck  terror  into  the  London  commercial  world. 
Sre above, p.  150. 
See  the  beginning  of  an  article  by  Wolowski  which  appearrd  in  the 
Revue  des  ,Deux  Mondes  (August  15,  1866),  undrr  the  tide  of  Le  Noir 
Vendredi.  rhis  article  was  rrprintt-d with  othrrs  by  the  s:llne  author  in  3 
book  bcarin  the  qomca.hat  inadequate  title of  'a  Ranqtre  d'Angltlerre el  I~S 
~a,tyues  d'kosle.' 
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were clutching madly at the spars and fragments in %arch 
of a means of  safety." 
On  this  one  day  alone  the  Bank  of  England  made 
advances to the value of nearly 4 millions;  and its reserve, 
which had been ~5,727,ooo  in the morning, was reduced to 
about 3 millions.' 
111.-Suspension  of  the Act of  1844.-End  of  the Crisis.- 
Part  Played  by the Bank  of  England. 
On  the  evening of  this same  Friday  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer  described  the  situation  to  the  House  of 
Commons  and stated that  the Government had  written  to 
the  Bank  promising  to  introduce a  Bill  of  Indemnity  in 
case it was obliged to exceed the statutory limit of  its issues.' 
The news of  the suspension of  the Act of  1844 was received 
with  applause  from  both  sides  of  the  House  and  was 
enthusiastically  welcomed by  the con~mercial  world.  The 
anxiety of  the latter was so intense3 that, as the authorisa- 
tion  for the  additional  issues  was  not  announced  before 
midnight, a deputation of  bankers waited on the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer at the House itself.  It is  said that one of 
the representatives of  the joint-stock banks remarked to the 
representative  of  the  Bank  of  England, "  I  can  draw  a 
couple of cheques to-morrow  morning which will  shut you 
up at once."4 
The suspension of  the Act of  1844  had such an effect that 
the next day the crisis seemed to be at an end.  The pressure 
on the banks ceased temporarily, and, as in  1847, the Bank 
of England was not obliged to exceed the legal limits of  its 
issues.  The demand  for  discounts  continued  to  be con- 
siderable, but it was met by  the deposits which flowed into 
These figures are taken from  the letter of  the Governor of the  Bank, L. 
Holland,  to Glsdstane, who was then  Chancellor of  the  Exchequer. 
'  The  letter  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  wa5  modelled  on  the 
similar  letters  sent  in  1847  and  1857.  The  text  of  this  letter  is  given  by 
Wolowski, pp.  102-103. 
'  On  this same  Friday  (May  11) the  great  railway  contractors,  Morton, 
Peto & Betts, whose  liabilities  amounted to 4 millions, suspended  payment. 
'  Gillart, op. rit., Vol.  II., p.  319. 360  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
the Bank1 as soon as it was known that a sufficiency of  notes 
would be issued.  Unfortunately during the following week 
a number of  failures took place ;  these alarmed the depositors 
of  the  other  banks  and  produced  fresh  disasters.  The 
London  Bank was obliged to stop payment  with  liabilities 
of  A4,333,877,  after paying  50  per  cent.  of  its  deposits. 
The Consolidated Bank tried to assist it but collapsed in  its 
turn.  The Agra and Masterman's  Bank, which then occu- 
pied a most important position in the East, failed also, with 
liabilities of  E15,582,002.  These bat.ks all possessed suffi- 
cient assets,  but  they  had  not  time  to convert  them  into 
cash. 
The important part played by the Bank of  England at this 
time is evident from a statement made by  Mr. Gladstone in 
the House of  Commons on May 17th.' 
According to this statement,  the advances made  by  the 
Bank of  England on Government securities on Friday, the 
day of  the panic,  amounted to Agzg,ooo, on the following 
day to A747,000, and during the three succeeding days they 
made  up the  total  of  L2,874,000.  With  regard  to  com- 
merce in  general, "  the best measure that can  be  given  of 
the manner in which the Bank has exercised its functions is 
shown in this :  that it has made advances upon bills and has 
discounted bills to the extent of  A9,350,000, making a total 
of  advances and discounts in  five days of  A12,225,ooo." 
The crisis was not  appeased in  a single day.  The dis- 
'count rate of  10  per cent. was maintained  by the Bank from 
May  11th until August 6th, for the distrust of  English  in- 
vestments  was  so great that even this high  rate  failed  to 
attract capital from countries where, as in  France, the rate 
continued to be less than 4 per cent. 
This distrust on  the part of  the foreigner, which at one 
time it was feared would persirt, made people imagine that 
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London  was going to lose its predominance  in  the world's 
money market.  Sir Stafford Northcote is supposed to have 
remarked that there was "  a run upon England." ' 
The circular issued at this time by the Earl of  Clarendon,' 
in  which  it  was  stated  that  "Her  Majesty's  Government 
have no reason to apprehend that there is any general want 
of soundness in the ordinary trade of  this country which can 
give reasonable ground for  anxiety or  alarm either  in  this 
country or abroad,"  only served to increase the distrust felt 
by foreignew3 
At  home there  was  no  lack  of  confidence so far as the 
Bank of  England was concerned;  its metallic reserve, which 
had never fallen below AI  1,800,000, rose to ~19,200,000  in 
December, 1866.  But the losses in commerce and of  savings 
were enormous.  It was estimated that the various failures 
involved liabilities amounting to  50   million^,^ and it  may 
be  supposed that the losses which  were not  published  and 
which  therefore  cannot  be  calculated  exactly,  must  have 
been  very greateS Railway shares were  much  depreciated 
and Consols fell to 85. 
The crisis of  1866 had,  however, some good results. 
The  weaker  banks  and  the  doubtful  companies  dis- 
appeared  in  the  struggle,  but  the  well-established  banks 
emerged from it yet further strengthened and extended their 
good influence over a wider area.  The practices of  financing 
and of giving accommodation bills were replaced by sounder 
commercial methods,  and finally,  as a  result  of  all  this, 
there was no fresh crisis for twenty-three  years. 
Wolowski,  p.  133. 
a  Levi, p. 471. 
a  Sidney Buxton, Finance and  Politics, Vol.  II., p.  21. 
Macleod,  Theory  of  Credit, p.  1063. 
Certain  banks  doing  business  with  the  East  published  the  extent  of 
their losses.  The  Bank of  Hindustan,  China and Japan, for  instance, stated 
its profits  at ,423,485  and  its losses at  ,487,796,  to which  must  be  added  a 
further expected  loss of  ~70,000  ; The Asiatic  Bank lost ,4142,000, whilst  its 
profits  were ,461,491, etc.-Macleod,  op. cit. and loc. cit. 
The deposits  at the  Bank,  which  were  134 millions  on May  loth, had 
increased to 16 millions by the  17th. 
a  In answer to a question  bp Captain Grindley. CRYSIS  OF  18cp.  363 
CHAPTER  IV. 
THE CRISIS OF  1890,  OR THE BARING CRISIS. 
'l'l~e Bank  between  1866  and  18yo.  Causes  of  the  crisis.  Formation  of 
nunirrous  limited  companies.  Extensive  speculation,  especially  in  thl* 
.4rg~ntine  Republic.  ?'he  Argentine  Land  Banks and the ccdulas.  The 
I%anlc rate of  discount.  Reprehensible  policy  of  the joint-stock  banks. 
Iticidcnts of  the crisis.  Failure of  the Barings.  Intervention of  thc Bank. 
'I'hh  guarantee fund.  Firm and successful policy  of  the Governor, 1.idd1.r- 
dale.  Importation  of  foreign  gc~ld.  Assistance  givcn  by  the  Bank  of 
l'rance.  Fate of  the firm  of  Baring.  Comparison  between  the crisis  of 
18qo and the preceding crises.  lniportant differences.  The Hank Reserve 
during the various crises.  l'he  crisis of  18(y stopprd in  time,  the others 
\vrl-r not.  'l'he  public knew nothing of  the crisis of  1830 until it was over. 
THE  crisis of  1866 was followed by a long interval of  quiet 
prosperity.  The theory which held that crises recurred every 
ten years received a striking refutation.  Even the failure in 
1878 of  two important banks, the City of  Glasgow and the 
West of  England,  which,  considering the  circumstances, 
might well have caused a panic, only raised a slight alarm. 
Twenty-four  years  passed  before  another  crisis  occurred, 
that of  1890, better known as the Baring crisis.' 
In 1890 there was, indeed, an economic crisis which might 
have  proved  very  serious,  and which  involved  the  failure 
of  the house of  Raring Brothers.  The unexpected collapse 
of  this celebrated firm made such an impression on the public 
~llind  that at first the cause was mistaken  for the effect and 
it was thought that the crisis only occurred because Baring 
Brothers  had  got  into  difficulties,  whereas  in  actual  fact 
their difficulties were due to the general situation, which was 
such that a crisis was bound to come sooner or later.  More- 
' For this chapter  I  have made frequent use  of  an article on  the crisis of 
~Xcp  which  appeared ih  the  Economic lournu1 for  March,  1891.  1 have  also 
u\cd  an article published  in  the  Jourtral  of  llte  Irrsfilute  of  Butrkers  for 
Ja~~u:~ry,  1891,  and  Palgrave's  1)ictionary.  \'ol.  l., rsprcially  pp.  462-460. 
Kc;~drrs  Inay  al.;o  consult an article by  M.  Raffalovich,  I.es  Afursht's  Firtctlr- 
iieers  ,*ti  188,0,  in  the ]uttrtr~tl dcs  &rottornistrs  for Jnnr~nry,  IS~I. 
over  many  other  firms  besides  Baring  ljrotliers  had 
incurred  liabilities .which to  a  greater  or  less  degree  es- 
ceeded the limits of  prudence. 
It  is,  besides,  easy  to  show  that  this  crisis,  like  all 
the  preceding  ones,  was  the  result  of  a  series  of  earlier 
mistakes. 
(a)--THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  CRISIS. 
Both  1888 and 1889 had been  years of  extensive specula- 
tion.  This was  probably  due to  the  recent  conversion of 
Consols,  which  made  the public  look  out for  investments 
with higher profits than 29  per cent.  At  any rate  a  great 
many companies of  a more or less speculative character were 
formed, such as American mining companies and brewery 
companies,  whilst  many  commercial  and  banking  firms 
were reconstructed as  joint-stock  companies.  "  The Returns 
of  the  Registrar  of  Joint-Stock  Companies  show  that 
the  total  amount  of  capital  registered  during  1888 was 
£353,781,594,  and in  1889, L241,277,460."' 
Many of  the  newly-registered  companies  were  founded 
for  enterprises  abroad,  especially  in  the  Argentine 
Republic,  a  country  which  was  particularly  attractive  to 
English savings.  The money  lent to the  South ilnlerican 
Republic  during  1888  and  1889  was  ~36,102,766  and 
£29,223,341,  according to a table given in  the Statist.' 
The  Stock  Exchange  was  deeply  interested  in  certain 
institutio~is  for  the  mortgage of  land  in  South  America, 
which  recall  in  a  surprising  manner  the  projects  of  Dr. 
I-Iugh  Chamberlain  two  centuries  before.  "  The British 
public also became interested to a very serious extent in  the 
land mortgage bonds of  certain Argentine banks known as 
~Cdulas,  in  connection  with which  it  has since been  ascer- 
tained that grave irregularities . . .  have occurred.  These 
~Pdulas  were introduced  in  Europe by  one or  two respcrt- 
able  1,ondon  houses  \vithout  any regular  prospectus,  and 
jt~rir.  Ittsl. of  Bankers,  loc.  rit., p.  I. 
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were  bought  by  investors  who  trusted  the  firms  in 
question."' 
Towards the end of  1889 prudent people began to feel that 
the  financial  situation  in  Argentina,  combined  with  the 
enormous  amount of  English capital  involved  in  specula- 
tions of  all kinds and the rash conduct of  some of  the most 
important  firms,  would  prove  a  source  of  dahger  to 
England.2  There was a fall in the best securities. 
The Bank  of  England shared  these  anxieties  and the 
directors,  seeing  that  Consols  were  falling  and  that  the 
reserve  of  the  Bank  declined  also,  wisely  determined  to 
raise their rate of  discount to 6 per cent. 
They maintained this comparatively high rate for  seven 
weeks with a praiseworthy resolution, considering the strong 
opposition  of  the  City  bankers  whose  proceedings  were 
thereby hindered.  Unfortunately the joint-stock  banks did 
not support the Bank of  England in  its prudent policy and 
the market rate of  discount never rose above 44 per cent.; in 
addition, the well-known arguments on the futility of  amass- 
ing a reserve to meet a crisis  which  would  most  probably 
never  occur,  were  heard and read  on  every  side.  Hence 
towards the end of  February the Bank had to reduce its rate 
to 5  per cent.,  although it had not  succeeded in attracting 
an effective stock of  gold. 
The Economic  ]ourna13  criticises very  severely  the  be- 
haviour  of  the joint-stock  banks on this occasion.  "  It is 
a great pity,"  it  remarks, "  that the joint-stock  banks did 
not take a  wiser view of  the situation, for  if they  had, and 
if the Bank had been allowed to strengthen itself in the early 
part of  1890, it would  probably  have been  unnecessary  to 
The Econ.  lournal, Vol.  I., p.  192. 
a  I  may  refer  here  to  a  personal  recollection.  A  Greek  financier  from 
London,  now  dead,  M.  K-,  spent  the  winter  1889-1890 in  my  native 
country of  Corfu.  He often discussed the new customs of  the Stock Exchange 
with  one of  my  relatives  and  complained  that  the  English  public  were  in- 
volving  themselves  in  absurd  speculation.  "  The  evil,"  he  remarked,  "  is 
worse  than  people  think,  many  important  English  firms  are  entangled,  and 
even  the  Barings  have turned out of  the  straight path." 
apply to foreign countries . . .  when  the crisis occurred in 
the autumn.  The banks have got thoroughly into the habit 
of  regarding  the  amount of  the  reserve  of  the  Bank  of 
England as of no importance,  although it is the sole fund 
in existence to enable them to meet their liabilities if  called 
ufon.  They fully believe that,  if  the worst  comes to  the 
worst,  the Bank will not be allowed to fail,  as an ordinary 
bank would fail if  the whole of  its cash were gone,'  and the 
experience of  more than one commercial crisis  has shown 
that  this calculation is  a  safe  one,  and  has consequently 
encouraged the banks to adhere to their present dangerous 
practice." 
The autumn  of  1890 began  badly.  The lisual  incon- 
veniences of  the autumnal drain were intensifid t y various 
issues of  new shares  and by a revolution  in tEc  cc  untry so 
closely  connected  with  English  trade  at-,.!  finance,  the 
Argentine Republic. 
The Bank rate fell  in  a  short time  to  4 per cent.,  then 
quickly  rose  to  5  per  cent.,  and on  November  7th,  after 
an  unexpected  demand  for  gold for  Spain,'  it was  raised 
to 6 per cent.  The next day the firm of  Baring Brothers 
collapsed. 
The  causes  of  the  failure  of  this  famous  and  much 
respected  house,  which  was  at one  time  called  the  sixth 
European Power, date back some way to the loss due to the 
attempt  to  issue  the  shares of  the  Buenos  Ayres  Water 
Works Company, which it had undertaken ;  Messrs. Baring 
had been obliged to keep the shares which they had "  under- 
written."  Other misfortunes were soon added to this;  the 
firm had several  undertakings on  its hands at once, and it 
has been justly  observed :9  "  The chief  of  the firm appears 
Compare  the  passage  often quoted  from  Lord  Goschen's  speech. 
'  .&f;go,ooo of  .old  were  exported,making  part  of  a  much  larger  sum 
required  for  a  Sprnish  loan. 
'  Econ. lournal, p.  192. 366  HlSTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
to have thought that their command of  money was so great 
that  there  was  no  need  for  the  ordinary calculations  and 
precautions." 
Although people began  to suspect danger from so many 
uncertain  undertakings, yet the firm of  Baring appeared so 
firmly established,  its branches were so extensive, and  the 
services it  had  rendered  to  trade and to  the  State were  so 
great,'  that  these  first  suspicions  did  not  develop  into 
alarm.a 
It  was  not  until  Saturday,  November  Sth,  that  two  or 
three prominent persons were told the true state of  the case, 
and on  the  following  Monday  an  eminent  banker  and  a 
member of  the Treasury Committee of  the Bank of  England 
were instructed to inquire into the affairs of  Messrs.  Baring. 
Nothing  definite was known  by  the  general  public,  but 
a  feeling of  anxiety-increased  by  the  numerous sales of 
Consols,  the  price  of  which  had  already  fallen  to  933- 
began to prevail in  the City; and the next day, when it was 
Iieard on  the one  hand  that A3,5oo,ooo  of  gold was  to be 
imp~rted,~  and on  the other that the sale of  Consols  was 
continuing, everyone  felt  that  they  wcre  confronted  by  a 
danger of  the first magnitude.  This feeling of  vague alarm 
grew  more  intense  in  the  course of  Wednesday, on which 
day A750,000 of  Consols were sold at once, and it became a 
panic  on  Friday,'  when  the  position  of Barings  at lengtii 
became knoun and people heard that there  was a meeting 
at the Bank of  England of  the representatives of  the lcading 
banks and co~nmercial  firms. 
'I'hht  same  evening,  in  view  of  the  public  interests  at 
stake, and of  the fact that it was impossible fur the  Barings 
to meet their liabilities-although  they ncre actually solvent 
--tllc  nleetirig  decided  to  come  to  their  help,  and  conse- 
' It Inay  bt:  rccollrcttd that  it lvns a Sir  1;ranci~ 13;tring who \vrotc in  1707 
olir of  the  bcst studios  that wf*  possess on tllc  Dank  of  ISngIand. 
a  ]our.  Inst. of  Hanlzers, p. 2. 
a  E4,500,0on  \\.err ;~ctu;t'ly  importcd. 
On this day  Consols fell  to 934. 
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quently it  was  agreed  that  the  Bank  of  England  should 
provide for their obligations, and should be secured  from 
risk of ultimate  loss by  a guarantee fund which  was to be 
maintained for three years. ' 
This fund, which at first amounted to 5 or 6 millions,  rose 
to  10 millions  the  next  day-when  the announcement  of 
what  had  happened  calmed  the  public  and  arrested  the 
panic. 
The fact  that  the  settlement  of  Messrs.  Barings'  diffi- 
culties was known almost  as soon as the existence of  these 
difficulties, caused  great  satisfaction  in  the  City.  Con- 
gratulations were heard on all sides and everyone sung the 
praises  of  the  Bank of  England  and of  its Governor,  Mr. 
Lidderdale,  who  had  displayed  so  much  resolution  and 
courage.' 
These praises were  indeed fully deserved;  the  firm atti- 
tude of  the Governor of  the  Bank in  1890 offers a curious 
contrast to the shifting policy of  his predecessors in similitr 
circumstances.  Mr. Lidderdale's plan  may be sunlmariscd 
as follows : 
(I) Creation of a guarantee fund to last for three years. 
(2)  Importation of  gold from abroad and maintenance of 
the Bank rate at the high but not exaggerated level of  6 per 
cent.' 
Gold  was imported  chiefly from  France.  This was  the 
second occasion during the 19th century on which the assist- 
ance  of  the  Bank of  France enabled  the  Bank of  England 
to escape from a dificult position; and it must be  acknow- 
ledged to  the credit of  the  Bank of  France that in  1890,  as 
' The  text  of the  guarantee  is  given  in  the  Journal  of  tlle  Zitslitvlc  of 
lfc~~tbers,  p.  5. 
l'hc  fund  rose  as high  as 18  millions;  many  people,  wllcti  once  nil 
danger  was over,  thought  it  good  form  to share  in  a  mcasurc  taltcn  for ttlc 
public  intcrcst. 
On  Drcrtrtbrr 30 a dcputalion  fro111 thc  Slock  Exchat~ge  ofiicially  pr<.- 
srntcd  an  address  of  thanks  to  the  Bank  of  England.  For  tho  text  of  this 
addrrss and the rcply  madc  by  the Govcrnor I.iddrrdalc,  scc  the lour. ltrst.  of 
Rankers, pp.  9-10. 
'  111  .;pit?  of  this  thc* advnnccs  tnadr  incl.cascd  froni  A;zj,~oo,ooo  to 
.&f'3zlooo,ooo in  a single  wcck.-Picrson,  p.  473. 368  HISTORY  OF  THE BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
in  1839, it gave evidence of  a friendly feeling towards the 
Eank of  England which cannot be too much praised.' 
(3)  No suspension of  the Act of  1844.  The situation was 
such that a letter from the Treasury would have intensified 
rather than allayed the panic. 
However  praiseworthy  Mr. Lidderdale's  policy,  as thus 
described, may be,  we must nevertheless point out that the 
creation of  a guarantee fund is a quite exceptional proceed- 
ing, which could not, whatever may be said of  it, pass into 
general use,  since  there is  theoretically  no  reason  why  it 
should not be applied to every case, for all securities and all 
investments may be  regarded  as virtually  good and hence 
ultimately may be sold for a satisfactory price. 
What was the fate of  the firm of  Baring Brothers? 
The  liabilities  of  the  house  amounted  to  ~21,ooo,ooo. 
Those who had been  charged with  the investigation  of  its 
affairs estimated  that, taking the value of  the private pro- 
perty  of  the partners as E~,ooo,ooo,  the assets of  the firm, 
calculated at the very low prices of  Friday,  November  7th, 
exceeded the liabilities by 3 millions.  After the events which 
we  have just  described, Baring Brothers was reconstructed 
as a joint-stock company under the name of  Baring Brothers 
& Co.,  Limited, with a capital of  one million.  Mr  T. C. 
Baring,  who  had  retired  from  business in  1883, disinter- 
estedly placed  his entire fortune at the disposal of  the new 
company, of which he consented to become a  director.  In 
1894 the guarantors were relieved from all further responsi- 
bility  and  all  subsequent  payments  devolved  upon  the 
company  of  Baring  Brothers &  Co.,  which  has  quickly 
restored the name of  Baring to its former eminence. 
(c)-COMPARISON  BETWEEN  THE CRISIS  OF  1890 AND THE 
PRECEDING  CRISES. 
The comparison  is  all in  favour  of  the  crisis of  1890, 
which  differs  greatly  from  its  predecessors.  "  In  former 
times alarm was diffused over the whole kingdom,  London 
l  For  the manner in  which  the remittance of the gold was accomplished see 
The  Political  Science  Quarterly,  March,  1894:  p.  23.  This review  is  edited 
by  the  Faculty of  Political  Science of  Columb~a  College,  Boston. 
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was  drained  of  its  reserves  to  fill  up the  wants;  of  the 
country,'  and the irnprudencies of  banks, having caused or 
aggravated alarms, there  was a  general  uneasiness  in  the 
banking world and a consequent ...  indisposition to grant 
assistance to the trading world.  But on this last occasion 
there was no  general alarm in  the country.  Banks outside 
London  were  hardly  sensible  of  the  crisis,  and even  in 
London  there  was  no  panic except  in  Capel  Court.  No 
bank failed in  town or country, and no suspicion of  danger 
to  banks seems to  have existed  amongst their customers. 
Some great issuing houses lost their position and narrowly 
escaped suspension.  Enormous losses fell on the public, but 
not  on  banks  except  indirectly.  It  was  not  a  panic 
causing  general  alarm  amongst  the  public,  but  a  crisis 
of  a special kind,  which  might easily  have been  extended 
so as to have caused such a panic as never yet has occurred 
in  any country.  The danger was  prodigious,  but  it  was 
averted. 
"  In former crises the danger was not averted and things 
were allowed to drift, so that great houses and banks failed, 
and general alarm ensued."  In 1890 on the contrary, "  it 
may fairly be said that, for all practical  purposes,  nothing 
was known of  the crisis in  the country at large until all was 
~ver."~ 
'  This  will  be  better  realised  from  a  comparison  of  the  Bank  reserve  in 
1890 and during the earlier crises. 
1857-October  3  ......  A6,014,000  1866-May  25  ......  ;E830,000 
10  4,606,000  ......  June  I  4151000  ......  ......  17  ......  4,024,000  8  2,167,000 
24  ......  3,217,000  22  ......  4,067,000  ......  31  ......  394859000  July  6  3,335,000 
November  7  ......  a,~  15,ooo  26  ......  1,498,ooo  ......  14  ......  9579°'30  AU~US~  3  2,412,000  ......  21  ......  1,448,000  17  3,611,000  ......  28  ......  l9918,-  31  5,833,~  ......  ......  December  2,268,000  1890--October 16  10,275,000  ......  12  ......  3,900,000  30  10,600,000 
19  ......  5*757~"  November  13  ...... 10,024,000  ......  26  7,426,000  20  13,378,000  ...... 
1866-April  13  ......  6,3179000  27  ...... 15,309,000 
27  ......  5,8449000  December  I I  ...... 15,904,000 
May  11  ......  P,gjO,OOO  18  ...... rg,f97,~)0  ......  18  ......  73w“30  2j  14,105,000 
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PART  IV. 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS  WITH  REGARD  TO  THE ACT 
OF  I~~~.-PRESENT  POSITION  OF THE QUESTION.- 
SCHEMES  FOR  REFORM. 
CHAPTER  I. 
SCIiEMES FOR  RE1;ORM  AND MR.  GOSCHEN'S 
PROPOSAL. 
Opposition  to  Act  of  1844  rr-awakened  by  the  crisis  of  1890.  Numerous 
schemes for  reform.  Proposal  of  Mr.  Goschen,  thrn  Chancrllor  of  thc! 
Exchrqurr.  Analysis of  Mr.  Goschen's  speccht~s. Criticism of  existing 
system, (I) Insuficien~~  of  central stock of  gold, (2) Absence of  elasticity 
in time of  crisis.  Plan for  rcfor~n. Drawbacks to and advantages of  hlr. 
(ioschen's plan,  (I) l'he  plan  too  complicated,  (2) No conditions  specifird 
subject to which  the second  reserve  to  be  available.  Advantages  of  the 
schmie.  Incrrase of  the  central  stock  of  gold  through  the introduction 
of a  new  and  convenient  form  of  p.7per  currency, and  without  resorting 
to  the  international  gold  market.  Fate  and  results  of  Mr.  (;oschen's 
scheme.  Doubtful  welcome givcn to his proposals.  1,ittltr justification  lor 
opposition  to  ;GI  notes.  The situation  in  1825  and  at  present.  Mr. 
Goschen's  proposals never  drafted in  tho form of  a Bill, but  had the good 
effect of  increasing  the central stock of  gold 
THE  crisis of  18(p  re-awakened the opposition  to the Act  of 
1844. 
During  the  year  1891 numerous  pamphlets  drcw  the 
attention of  the public to the necd for a reform of  the charter, 
and advocated the most varied remedies.' 
' Amongst  the most  important  of  the work5 and  articles which  apprared 
about this time and at the beginning of  1892, the following nlay be notrd :- 
Stanley  Cobb,  Banks'  Cash Reserves,  especially  Chaps.  vi.  and  vii. ; and 
bfetallic  Reserves  and  the  Meetiltg  of  Pnrliantent. 
Gardiner  (Charles),  President  of  the  Institute  of  D;inl<rrs in  Scotland, 
Mr. Goschen's Schcme  for  Rcfortlt  of  the Bank  Arts. 
Mavor  (James),  The  Call  for  Currency  Rcform  and  Mr.  Gosrke,t's  Rc- 
sponse. 
Bosanquet  (B. Tindal), Our Banking  Systein. 
Moxon  (T.  R.), Our Bnn1:ing System and  its  ~ffrct  upon Comtnerce. 
(iillctt (W.),  A  letter  to llre  Chancellor  of  the Exrhcqucr. 
111 some of  thc  worlis ~nentionrd  above the discussion  of  the Act  of  1844 
is  cornbilled  with  that of  the bi~netallist  controversy,  which  was then raging. 
We  thought at one time of giving an analysis here of  the 
chief proposals  made at  this time  and had  even  prepared 
such a study, but this preparation determined us to abandon 
the  idea.  In  the  first  place,  the  great majority  of  these 
schemes are now,  after ten  years'  interval, completely  for- 
gotten,  and  some  have  been  abandoned  even  by  their 
In the second place, in the critical portion  of  their 
work,  which .is  generally  the only one of  any value,  most 
of  the  reforms  emphasise  certain  disadvantages  in  the 
English  banking  system,  such  as the  insufficiency of  the 
metallic  reserve,  the  great fluctuations in  the  rate  of  dis- 
count,  the necessity for suspending the Act of  1844 in  time 
of crisis and other points with which we  have already sufi- 
ciently dealt.  Finally, and above all, among the chorus of 
reformers one voice  was heard  more clearly and effectively 
than  the others, that of  Mr. Goschen, who was then  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Exchequer  and the general  attention  and all 
the discussions soon centred round his proposals. 
Hence the best method of  studying the reform movement 
in  1891 is to examine the speeches delivered and the  letters 
written by Mr. (afterwards Lord) Gosthen.'  This statesman 
has indeed summarised with moderation  and abi!ity  all the 
serious criticisms which  can be brought against the Act  of 
1844, and, in addition, has put forward practical suggestions 
for a reform, which afford a solid basis for discussi~n.~ 
hlr. Goschen  began  his  speech on  December 2nd  before 
' See (I) the speech at Leeds on January 28,  1891, On the insufficiency  of 
our  cash reserves  and  of  our  central  stock  of  gold;  (2) a  speech  bcforc  the 
laondon Chamber  of  Conlmercc on  December  2,  On the  Metallic  Reserve. 
'l'he  latter speech has  been  published  as a  pamphlet,  together  with  a  Letter 
to  the  Goaernor  of  the  Bank  of  Englat~d,  dated  December  3,  1891,  and a 
Letter  to hlr. Saititrt.1 hfoi~tagtr.  M.P., now  Lord  Swaythling,  dated  Januarv 
20,  18g2 
Mr. Goschcn's  proposals  for~ucd  the  subject of  an cxccllent study by  Pro- 
fessor  Foxwell,  the  econonlist  to  whom  we  owe  the  very  complete  biblio- 
graphy on  the question of  the "  Right to the whole produce of  labour."  See 
Afr.  Coschoa's  Currency  Proposals  in  the  Economic  journal,  March,  1802. 
Franqois  also has examined  Mr.  Goschen's  proposals  in  the lournal  des  3.  conomistes  .  for January, 1892. 
'  It must be  acknowlrdgrd that,  in  addition  to Lord  Goschen's  scheme, 
certain other proposals  were  made which  would  have repaid  discussion,  e.g., 
those of  Mcssrh.  Stanlcy Cobb, I'ownall,  and (;airdincr.  \Vf: hnvc. bc,(-n unablr 
to  csalninc.  them  owing  to  lark  of  timc  and  space.  Scr,  however,  with 
rc.fcrcnce  to thcsc  schemes,  Yoxwcll,  pp.  iq8-1qg,  and  Goschen,  Speech  on 
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the  London  Chamber of  Commerce by repeating what  he 
had  already  said  at the  commencement  of  his speech  at 
Leeds,  viz., that no form of  regulation could prevent panics 
and failures  resulting from  imprudence  and over-specula- 
tion,  but  that  legislation  might  perhaps do  something  to 
prevent the spread of  these panics. 
He  then  proceeded  to  criticise  the  system  existing  in 
England and attacked  it  mainly on two grounds :  (I)  The 
insufficiency of  the central stock of  gold and (2) The want 
of  elasticity in times of  crisis which characterised the system 
imposed upon the Bank. 
I.-INSUFFICIENCY  OF  THE  CENTRAL  STOCK  OF  GOLD. 
At the time of Mr. Goschen's speech the average amount 
of  the  metallic  reserve  in  England  was  from  21  to  22 
millions, as compared with 95  millions (gold and silver) in 
France, and 40 millions (gold and silver) in  Germany.  The 
United  States held  in  the  Treasury  and in  the National 
Banks, a metallic reserve (gold and silver) of  142 millions. 
The inferiority of  England in this respect was dangerous 
owing to the difficulty of  rapidly  attracting  gold.  Gold 
could always be obtained, but  time was  necessary.  This 
fact had not been  sufficiently foreseen  and was what  made 
the situation dangerous,  especially  "  in  these  days when 
combinations are so easy, . . .  when syndicates are so com- 
mon "  that an attack on the English stock of  bullion would 
be a most simple matter. 
11.-WANT  OF  ELASTICITY  IN  TIME OF  CRISIS. 
The method  used  for the suspension  of  the charter was 
inadequate.  In  actual  fact,  the  situation  had  to  be  very 
serious and  many  disasters  must  already  have  occurred, 
before  the Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  could  decide  to 
write his letter.  "  There are certain  authorities who hold 
that the very uncertainty as to whether the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer's  letter  will  or will  not  be  given  is in  itself a 
preventive to over- speculation ."  But experience has,  un- 
fortunately,  proved  the contrary,  and it  may  be  said that 
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l6 in the City, gentlemen calculate with pretty considerable 
certainty that the Chancellor of the Exchequer's  letter will 
be forthcoming ii the alarm is great enough and the panic 
is great enough." 
After these  remarks,  Mr.  Goschen  declared  that  it  was 
not his intention  to criticise the Act of  1844,'  that he only 
desired to modify as little as possible a law which had, "  on 
the whole,"  worked "  extremely well."  But after a lapse of 
fifty years circumstances  had  changed enormously; "  the 
Bank  of  England has not  that command  over  the money 
market which it used to have,"  and for changed conditions 
fresh legislation was necessary. 
We have  seen  that  Mr.  Goschen  had  two  objects-to 
increase  the central  stock  of  gold,  and  to  give  greater 
elasticity to the issues in time of  crisis.  These two reforms 
had  already been  indicated by  others, but the  originality 
of  Mr.  Goschen's  plan  consisted  in  his combining  them, 
thanks chiefly to the issue of  £1  notes. 
The details of  this scheme are very clearly summarised in 
the letter written  by  the proposer himself  to the Governor 
of  the Bank of  England. 
"  The Bank  of  England,"  wrote  Mr.  Goschen,  "  is at 
present  authorised  to  issue  ~16,450,000  on  securities. 
Beyond that all notes must be  represented by gold.  The 
average amount  of  gold  in  the  issue department  for  the 
years 188190  may be taken as . . . A21,550,ooo, which,  if 
added  to the  E16,45o,ooo--the  authorised amount  of  the 
fiduciary issue-would  give a  total of  ,,$38,ooo,ooo,  repre- 
senting the average total issue under the provisions of  the 
Act  of  1844.  I  would  disturb  nothing  up to  this point 
beyond authorising the issue of  £1  notes  under precisely 
"  I  have  been  and  am  a  Bank  Charter  Act  man."  See  p.  8  of  the 
Speech  on  December  2nd.  Mr.  Goschen's  respect  for  Robert  Peel's Act  is 
shared  by  all the  reformers;  time has, in  fact, raised  the empirical  measure 
passed  in  1844 into an institution,  which  shares in  the  veneration  enjoyed  by 
every  national institution  in  England. the same conditions as those under tvhich  notes of  higher 
denominations are issued at present.  But beyond this limit 
of  k38,ooo,m, I  would authorise the issue of  notes under 
the conditions which  1 have sketched-namely,  kt'4  011  gold 
to AI  on securities.'' 
These proposals may be explained more vividly by means 
of an example.  Suppose that the stock of  gold in  the issue 
department stands at £21,55o,ooo.  Suppose that "  an addi- 
tional sum of  ,&25,000,000 were  issued in  the proportion  of 
on gold to ,41  on securities,  the addition to the stock of 
gold  would  be  ~2o,ooo,ooo,  bringing  the  total  up  to 
L4~,550,000,  and the position would be as follows :- 
Total Nofrs- 
.........  Oldaverage  &~,OOO,OOO  .........  Additional  issue  25,000,000 
"  This total would be  issued  against gold and securities 
respectively, in the following proportions :- 
Total stock 0/6wld-- 
......  Under the old provisions  ,42  1,550,000 
AJd  four-fifths  of  A25,ooo.ooo  ...  under the new provisions  zo,ooo,wo  --- 
............  Notes issued against gold  ,&t1,550.ao0 
Notis issued aKa  itrsl srcrrrifir  S-  .........  Previoy amount  A16,+50,0~  ...  Add one-fifth of ,€25,w,ooo  s,ooo,ooo  --- 
......  Total notes issued ngainst securities  I ,4  jo,"  -- 
...  Total notes as above  E63,ooo,ooo 
"  The contrast  between  the new  and  the  old  situation 
would be this : 
"\ire should have A4r,55o,m  of  gold at the Rank instead 
of f  I ,550,ooo, and the increase in the fiduciary issue would 
bc onlJ. &5,(xm,(ao;  and that increase would be  due to the 
introduction  ,,f  A1 nutes, vhich if once acclimatized, tvould 
be  far less  likely  to  be  presented  for  payment  than  4.5 
notes."' 
Mr.  Goschen conlpletes his scheme as follows:  " If  the 
addition to the stock of gold through the issue of  £1  notes 
should  bring  the  total  stock  up  to  A3o,ooo,ooo,  a  pint 
which  would  be reached by the issue of  ~1o,ooo,m  under 
the  new  conditions,  I  should  be  prepared  to  give certain 
additional  powers of  issue  in times  of  emergency.  ...  I 
would authorise the Bank to strengthen  the reserve in  the 
banking department by the issue of  additional notes against 
securities,  on  paying  to  the  Government  a  high  rate  of 
interest, to be  fixed by  law.  ...  The rate of  interest must 
be  neither  so high as to make  the  pern~ission inoperative, 
nor so low as to encourage people to speculate up to it. 
"  This additional authority to the Bank is intended to take 
the  place  of  and  prevent  the  necessity  for  the  Treasury 
letter, by which the Bank Charter Act has been several times 
suspended." 
Mr.  Goschen's  plan,  like all  human  proposals,  has  its 
advantages and its disadvantages.  We will  first consider 
the  latter, which  will  enable  us  the  better  to explain  the 
former. 
Disadvantages  of  the  Scheme. 
The  scheme  has  two  main  disadvantages:  on  the  one 
hand,  it is unnecessarily complicated and on  the other hand 
it leaves undetermined a point of  fundamental importnnce- 
it  does  not  specify the conditions under  which  the  second 
reserve is to be available. 
Mr.  Goschen  adds  that  "  if  contrary  to  my  expectation,  the  additional 
issue under  the  new  tcrrns  should  reach i;t;go,ooo,ooo, I  should  be  prepared to 
require  nny  furtlirr  icsut.s  beyond  that  zuln  to  be  covered  in  full  by  gold. 
Such  a provision  nould nl1.c.t  thc objection  that  an  indefinite  anlaunt  of  gold 
"light  be  lost  to  the  country  under  my  plan." 376  HISTORY  OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
These  disadvantages  were  pointed  out  and clearly  ex- 
pounded by Mr. Foxwell.' 
r .-The  scheme is too complicated. 
"  Why, for instance, should he stipulate that there must 
be no fiduciary  issue of  AI notes until  A38 million  notes 
are  issued  upon  the  old  footing?"  Especially  as this 
limitation  might  lead  to  confusion  in  the working  of  the 
issue. 
"  Again, why  are the  new  powers of  relief  issue  not  to 
be available until the stock of gold in the Issue Department 
amounts to d3o  millions ?  This again seems an unnecessary 
precaution,  and . . .  might  prevent  the  operation  of  the 
new powers exactly when  it  was most  required.  It would, 
for instance,  have  made  the  scheme  inoperative  in  1857, 
even  if  25  millions of  AI notes had then been  in  circula- 
tion." 
Why,  in  fact, not  allow  the issue of  AI notes,  as the 
Economist"  suggests,  on  the  present  basis?  And  why 
make any distinction between  the issue of  the two kinds of 
notes ? 
"  It  would  seem,"  observes  Mr.  Fo~well,~  "  that  Mr. 
Goschen has been led to complicate his proposals by an un- 
necessary tenderness for Peel's Act and a desire to represent 
his scheme as an addition to that Act rather than a modifi- 
cation of  it.  But surely the  Act of  1844 is  from  its  very 
nature one which no statesman need  hesitate to amend.  Its 
empirical basis shows that it was drafted to meet the special 
requirements  of  its own  day,  and cannot consequently  be 
perfectly  adapted to the  greatly  altered  conditions  of  the 
present time." 
2.-The  conditions  under  which  the  second  reserve  is 
available are not sufficiently  specified. 
By  not  specifying  these  conditions,  Mr.  Goschen  has 
omitted to specify the exact nature of  the second  reserve. 
"  Is it  to be  strictly a  panic  reserve,  only available  at 
times of absolute crisis,"  at times  such  as formerly  have 
made it necessary to suspend the Act of  18441 "  Or is it to 
I  p.  152.  '  No.  23, January, 1892.  'P.  153, 
SCHEMES  FOR  REFORhl.  077 
be generally available to prevent injurious monetary strains? 
In  other words,  is  the  rate fixed  for access  to  the  reserve 
to be a comparatively low  rate, fixed by the point at which 
the difficulty of obtaining accommodation becomes a serious 
obstacle  to the  ordinary  business of  the  country;  or is it 
to be  a  high  rate,  and are we  aiming merely  at relieving 
strains  which  threaten  the  entire  collapse  of  the  credit 
system ?" 
Mr. Goschen said that  the discount rate must neither be 
so high as to  prevent  the use of  the second reserve  nor  so 
low  as to encourage  speculation.  But  what  is  this  rate? 
"Are we to follow the lines of  Mr. Lowe's proposal in  1873,' 
fixing the minimum rate at 10 per cent. or even higher; or 
shall we follow the example of  Germany, where relief begins 
at a 5 per cent. rate ?" 
This question is unsettled,  and this want of  definiteness 
makes  it  impossible  to  understand  and consequently  im- 
possible  to judge,  the exact bearing of  the scheme in  this 
respect. 
Advantages  of  M7.  Goschen's  Plan. 
Apart  from  these disadvantages,  which  could  be  easily 
remedied,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  Mr.  Goschen's 
scheme has obvious merits. "  It would undoubtedly increase 
the central stock of  gold, while at the same time providing 
us with  a  new  and convenient form of  currency, and this 
by  a  costless operation  which  would  not  make any fresh 
demands on the international  gold market,  or in  any way 
unfavourably  affect  pri~es."~  This latter  combination,  it 
should be noted,  is one deserving of  high praise, and one 
which is not a feature of  the other projects.  It is true that, 
in  so far as the issue was fiduciary,  gold would  doubtless 
leave the country, but the quantity thus lost would not  be 
large and would be fully compensated for by the increased 
power  given to the Bank from  the centralisation of  a sum 
four  times  as great as that  exported.  As  Mr.  Goschen 
remarked, "~4o,om,ooo  at the centre "  was to be preferred 
to "lf;5o,ooo,ooo in the pocket of  the people." 
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!Is  rt.gards  the  issue of  notes  the  new  position  of  tlie 
Bank  wozld obviously be much stronger than  the old one. 
"  The ,41 notes would  be  much  less likely to be  presented 
for conversion  than  the  larger ones, and therefore  the cir- 
culation  as a whole would  require  a smaller proportionate 
reserve; but the actual percentage of  bullion  held against it 
would  be  increased.  With  the  issue  department  thus 
strengthened, it  becomes safe to make its reserve available 
in  certain  emergencies  for  the  purposes  of  the  banking 
department." 
It  must be confessed that  Mr.  Goschen's  plan  was  not 
very  favourably  received  by  the  public.  The  theorists, 
probably owing to the complicated and rather vague nature 
of  the proposed reform,  expressed  very doubtful opinions, 
and  the  judgment  of  the  commercial  world  was  almost 
hostile.' 
In particular, the introduction of  Ar  notes aroused much 
opposition.  This opposition  was  ill-judged : these  small 
notes,  which  have  worked  excellently  in  Scotland and  in 
America,  are convenient and very cheap, and are presented 
for  payment  niuch  less often  than  notes  of  higher  value. 
Their one  disadvantage,  as  was  pointed  out  by  G. IV. 
Norman  more than sixty years ago,= is  the risk of  forgery, 
but Mr.  Goschen  showed  conclusively3 that  this could  be 
avoided.  Hence  the  only argument  that can  be  brought 
against LI notes  (an  argument very  frequently  used),  is 
based  on  the  memory  of  the  crisis of  1825;  but  it  really 
shows a  complete  ignorance of  the causes of  this crisis to 
try to compare the new  notes as suggested with those  then 
existing.  'There can be no analogy between A.1  notes issued 
' See the outcome of a meeting held  at Salters' Hall  on January 21,  1892, 
to  express  the  opinion  of  the  City.  Compare  the  Economist,  lor.  cit.,  and 
Stanley Cobb, Metallic  Reserves. 
0p.  cit., p. 67.  M. Hsnri  Germain  made an  interesting  statement  with 
regard  to  not..< of  low  v;llues  before  the  AcadPnlie  des  Scrrnres  Moralrs  rt 
Politlques at  n ~nwting  on July 9, 1892. 
'  Speech on  Decenlber  2, pp. 22-23. 
by  the  Bank of England  and tliose  issued  by  any chance 
grocer or cheese-monger. 
The example of the crisis of  182j is, in  fact, the one and 
constant objection brought  fornard by  those who  reject all 
idea of  modifying the Act of  1844;  1 was more than a little 
surprised  to find it used even  by a director of  the Bank of 
England.'  But it cannot be too often insisted upon  that the 
crisis of  1825 Uas  not due to the absence of  a limit to the 
fiduciary issue of the  Bank of  England, but to the  absurd 
system  of  country banking  and  in  particular,  to  the  fact 
that the Bank of  England had not  yet learnt that the paper 
circulation ought to be regulated by  the foreign  exchanges 
and the price of  bullion. 
Whatever may be thought of  the merits of  the discussion 
and  in  spite of  the  many  advantages of  Mr.  Goschen's 
proposals, they were never embodied in a Bill. 
It is, however,  some consolation to know that the efforts 
of  this statesman were not entirely wasted and that to make 
up for  the elasticity  ~hich  was  still lacking  in  the  Act  of 
1844, the central stock of  gold was much increased. 
From R21,820,~~  in 1890, it rose to k24,3i7,000 in  1891, 
R25,524,ooo in  1892, k34,414,ooo in  1894, A38,951,ooo in 
1895, and reached  a  maximum  of  A4;44,319,0oo in  1896. 
Since then the stock has slightly decreased, but has always 
been  maintained  at a  sufficiently  respectable  levelz and in 
1902 was still R35,644,000. 
At this same date the stock of  gold at the Bank of France 
was  If;101,932,m  and  that  at  the  Bank  of  Germany 
L36,273,000.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  these  t\vo 
Banks  have a much  larger quantity of  notes in  circulation 
than the  Hank of  England and if we  consider the situation 
during the last decade, we  find  that the proportion of  gold 
to  notes  in  England was  128 per  cent.,  in France 54  per 
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cent. and in Germany 56 per cent.'  If  the silver reserve is 
also taken  into account, though from an international point 
of  view  this  is  not  comparable  in  importance to  the  gold 
reserve, the rnetal1i.c stock at the Bank  of  France amounted 
to 86  per cent. of  the  notes  in  circulation  and  that at the 
Bank of  Germany to 81 per cent. only. 
In  this  respect  clearly,  the  position  of  the  Bank  of 
England,  though  inferior  in  some  other  ways,  remains 
superior  to that of  either  the Bank of  France or the  Bank 
of  Germany. 
'  From 1892 to 1902 the average of  notes  in circulation  was-in  England, 
;Ez7,24g,ooo.;  in  France,  ~150,278,000;  and  in  Germany,  A55,372,m,  as 
compared  w~th  stocks of  gold of  &,03n,0o0,  A81,187,000,  and A30,803,m, 
respectively.  See Jackson, Table  I. 
CHAPTER  11. 
GENERAL  REMARKS ON  THE PRESENT 
POSITION OF THE  BANK  OF 
ENGLAND. 
Change in  public opinion as regards the Act of  1844.  Opinion of  the English 
economists.  The Foreign  economists.  Opinions  and observations of  M. 
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu.  Desirable reforms.  Danger of  a sudden  withdrawal 
of  large quantities of gold.  Reforms suggested  in  the administration of 
the Bank.  Report of  the Lords'  Committee of  1848. 
THE  Act  has  for  a  long  time  been  the  object  of  violent 
attack. 
Courcelle-Seneuil has given a  forcible summary of  most 
of  the criticisms of  it. 
"  The Bank of  England,"  he says,' "  cannot regulate the 
circulation ; it could only do so if  it had a monopoly of  the 
business  of  discounting  and could  stop any  tendency  to 
speculation  in  trade by the refusal of  credit.  But  it is pre- 
cisely at these times that trade has no  need of  the  Bank of 
England;  it  can  obtain  credit  more  cheaply  elsewhere. 
People only apply to the  Bank when  the ordinary sources 
of  credit begin  to be exhausted;  is this a suitable moment 
to refuse discount?  When the  reactionary  movement  has 
actually begun, ought the Bank to fill  the cup to overflow- 
ing and hasten the disaster, as in  1825  ? 
"  The Bill of  1844 was based  on  several  errors of  fact. 
It supposed  that  banks  could  increase  their  circulation  at 
will,  which  is inexact ; that commerce always requires the 
same  quantity  of money,  uhich  is  inexact;  and,  finally, 
that  a  metallic currency  is  safer  and less  variable  than  a 
paper  currency,  which  is  equally  inexact.  Thus the  Bill 
was  framed in  opposition  to  the natural  laws which  guide 
' 0).  cit., p.  323-324.  Comparc  the analogous judgment  expressed  by  M. 
Courtois on thc Act of  1844.  p.  235,  note,  and pp.  251-252 of  the Histoire dcs 
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the real movements of  commerce, and as soon as it mas put 
to the test of  experience the  inadequacy and danger of  its 
effects became  evident." 
.4lthough  these criticisms are  apparently unanswerable, 
nothing further has been  heard  in  England, since 1892, of 
modifying the Act of  1844. 
I  even  noticed,  at a  meeting of  the  Political  Economy 
Club on  the  12th of  June last,  at which  the question  Itas 
discussed,  a marked disinclination  to  make changes which 
seemed useless and might be dangerous.  As far as I could 
judge,  the  quieta non movere was apparently the motto-of 
English economists as far as the Bank of  England was con- 
cerned, a state of  mind which  would  be  of  merely  relative 
importance uere it confined  to  England.  For the  English 
public, naturally conservative, only demands changes mhen 
disturbed by a violent crisis, and the Old Lady of  'I'hread- 
needle  Street,  who  is  the  Panglosse  of  the  English 
commercial  world,  has  adopted by  turns with  equal  con- 
viction, the most contradictory opinions. 
'This  superstitious adherence, thiq  fabooism,  is the more 
childish  vh~n  applied  to  Robert  Peel's  Act,  considering 
the fundamentally empirical  character of  this measure  and 
the  fact  that  its  authors  themselves  looked  upon  it  as 
temporary. 
Rut,  14 hat  is  more important,  a  tendency  to respect  the 
old  charter  of  1844 is  observable  even  outside  England. 
LITliether  it be that its success, at first partial, but since 1867 
practically  complete,  has  disarmed  some  of  its  critics; 
\\ hether  it be that theoretical  discussions are some~hat  out 
of  fashion,  and that nouadays people are inclined to admit 
the  possible existence of  several equally  good  systems as 
regards  banlis  of  is5ue:  or  nhether  it  be  for  some  other 
reason, the fact remains that the N  riters 1% ho have discussed 
the subject during the last ten  years have concerned  them- 
selves less  to criticise the  A4ct  of  1844 than  to  explain  it. 
It might be supposed that after careful consideration it  has 
been  found less bad in  reality  than  in  appearance. 
l'l~is  is,  in  thv  t;i:li~i, the  conclusion  reached  by  hl. 
\\yilfrcdu-Pareto and  b!.  Jlr.  I'icrson.  'I'he  latter agrees 
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with  Bagehot  that  the  indifferent  rules which  the  .4ct  of 
1844 imposed upon  the directors of  the Bank  were  at any 
rate  preferable  to  those  which  the  directors  might  have 
framed for themselves.' 
Even  the  Socittk  d'tconomie  politique  in  Paris,  which 
has  always  been  fascinated  by  the  idea  of  freedom, 
was  apparently  not  much  affected  by  the  numerous  dis- 
advantages  which  M.  Sayous,  following  Mr.  Pownall, 
pointed  out  in  the working  of the London  money  rnarket 
during a crisis, disadvantages which  in  the main  he attri- 
buted  to  the organisation of  the Bank of  England. 
And finally,  M. Leroy  Beaulieu, an economist who com- 
bines immense learning with  a sound, practical  sense, and 
(u hat  is  nowadays  growing  more and more  rare)  a  wide 
business  experience,  defends  the  Act  with  ability  and 
moderation as follo\vs :-a 
"  From  1S7o to  the  present day  England and the  Banli 
of  England-\\hich  have become the centre of  the trade and 
finance of  the world,  which  have in  a  measure  to  regulate 
all the exchanges and all the business affairs of  the universe, 
and  which  act  almost  as  the  ultimate  repository  of  the 
world's reserve-have  succeeded in  playing their part with- 
out a  suspension  of  the  Act  of  1844,  and  this  during a 
quarter of  a century characterised by the activity of  business 
and  by  financial  and commercial  crises.  The Hank  has 
always  been  able,  in  fact, to  supply  gold  to  those  ~ho 
demanded it, not only to  settle extraordinary purchases of 
cereals and comnlodities, but for foreign  loans and invest- 
ments.  All that it has done has been to charge more highly 
for this gold at certain times. 
"  Under the  influence of  general conditions and also of 
the Act  of  1844, the position  of  the Bank of  England has 
become much  more definite.  Strictly speaking, it does not 
supply credit  facilities.  Its functiorl is  to  be  the  general 
repository for the cash  reserve  of  British  trade and finance 
and even  ultimately of the trade and finance of  the world. 
'  0j.  cit.,  p.  461. 
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In  particular  it is  the Bank's  business to procure gold for 
international  settlements,  and yet  it  only  keeps a  limited 
supply. . . . 
"  Thus the ' Banking Principle ' is  entirely  abandoned. 
The Bank of  England, carrying out Ricardo's  wish,  if  not 
his  actual  scheme,  is  the  keeper  of  the  gold  reserve  of 
Great  Britain, while  at the same time it provides the gold 
needed  for  international  payments. . . . 
9 I 
hI.  Leroy  Beaulieu  remarks  that the loans on  securities 
made by  the Bank of England are even  more limited  than 
those of  the Bank of  France-which  latter also is tending to 
become  the  repository  of  commercial  cash-and  observes 
that the Bank of England is thus returning to the system of 
banking which prevailed in ancient times and in the Middle 
Ages. 
I' Credit,"  he goes on,' "  is actually obtained in England 
from the private bankers, from the joint-stock  banks, which 
are  hardly  ever  banks of  issue,  and also  from  the  bill- 
brokers, who may  be called the  ' beaters ' or purveyors of 
the  large  companies.  . . .  These  large  joint-stock  com- 
panies only keep as much  reserve  in  notes  and coin as is 
required  for  their  current  needs; they  deposit  the rest  at 
the  Bank of  England, which  thus holds the reserve  for all 
the banks in the country. 
"  Delicate  though this system appears, it  has  given .rise 
to no danger since  1871. 
"  hlethods of  attracting gold have multiplied during the 
last twenty-five  years.  International  securities, negotiable 
on a.large number of  different markets, the use of  the tele- 
graph  for  assignments  and  transfers  of  money  and  of 
railways  and  steam-boats  for  its  actual  transport,  have 
produced a  new  state of  things,  in  which  a comparatively 
small reserve can be increased with  much greater ease, and 
consequently tends to be exhausted much less rapidly than 
formerly.  . . . 
"  New  habits are tending to reduce not only the quantity 
of  gold but also the quantity of  notes available.  . . . 
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"  The Bank  of England  is not  perfection,  but  the  tool 
does its work well on the whole. 
"  The English banking system, artificial though it be,  is 
less so than the French system.  Since the privileged Bank 
practically  undertakes none of  the business connected with 
credit, there is more equality betwen the other banks. 
"  Should  the  Act  of  IS*  be  repealed?'  It would  be 
better to modify it in respect to the regulation of  note issue ; 
the tendency  for  the notes not  to exceed  the cash  reserve 
increases daily and may be looked upon as permanent.  . . . 
To repeal the portion  of  the  Act dealing with  this matter 
would  be  attended  by  no  inconvenience,  but also  by  no 
particular  gain, and any legislative change in  a matter of 
this sort which is not obviously useful, may have moral dis- 
advantages." 
The matter could not  be better  expressed, and we  have 
thought it  of  interest  to give these full  extracts from  M. 
Leroy-Beaulieu's  work,  not only as supplying an apprecia- 
tion of  the Act of  1844, but as giving an excellent summary 
of  the  working  of  the  English  banking  system.  At  the 
same time, while recognising that much current criticism is 
unduly violent, we must avoid falling into the exaggerated 
optimism  of  thinking  that,  in  reference  to  the  Bank  of 
England, all is for the best in the best possible world, and 
that  there  remains  nothing  for  the  future  to  fear  or to 
improve. 
In  the  first  place,  the  fact  that  important  financial 
institutions,  and even  important  foreign  countries,  have 
considerable  gold  deposits  at  London,  has  given  rise  to 
the fear of a possible sudden withdrawal of  a quantity of 
gold.  It is difficult to say whether any such danger actually 
exists.  Mr.  Jackson  had tried  to prove  that a withdrawal 
of this kind is  neither possible nor probable : '  in  any case, 
p.  606. 
'  For  in  the  first  place  the  foreign  institution  must  already  have  the 
money  in  question  in  England.  This money  cannot  be  idle,  it  must  have 
been  employed  or  invested  in  one  way  or  another.  But  long  before  the 
securities  into  which  it  has been  converted,  were  sold,  or  the  money  with- 
drawn  from  the  market,  the  effect  of  the  withdrawal  on  the  prices  of  the 
securities  or  of  the  money  would  be  such  that  the  foreign  institution  would 
abandon  its scheme on account of the loss involved ie carrying it out.  In  any 
case,  there  would  be  time  to  attract  gold  from  abroad  into  England.  Op. 
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he considers that the attempt would be criminal and would 
hardly prove  successful.  But  Mr.  Palgrave1 shows much 
anxiety  as regards this matter,  and various other  people 
whose opinion I have asked, have seemed to be afraid that, 
in this age of  trusts and gigantic combines,  the danger is 
more serious than ever.  'They  believe that it is of  the utmost 
importance  to  strengthen  the  reserve  and to  give greater 
elasticity  to  the note  issue  in  order to  meet  the  difficulty 
should it arise. 
Leaving on  one side a  problem  which  experience  alone 
can solve--and  hitherto no such attempt has ever been made 
-we  must pass on to consider whether the present  organi- 
sation  of  the  Bank  of  England  does  not  possess  other 
drawbacks. 
Some such drawbacks are already familiar to the reader, 
since we  have dealt  at length with  the artificial  nature of 
&he  Act of  1844.  By separating the Bank into two depart- 
ments it  tends to increase the fluctuations in  the discount 
rate.  The same result follows from the clause obliging the 
Bank to buy all the gold offered to it.  This latter provision 
indeed, leads to unforeseen accumulations of  bullion and to 
abnormal  reductions  in  the  Bank  rate.  We have  also 
pointed out how  much it is to be  regretted  that a separate 
statement  of  the  bankers'  current  accounts  is no  longer 
published, and have referred to the justice of  the arguments 
in  favour  of  making  these  bankers  responsible  for  the 
expense  of  maintaining  some  portion  of  the  reserve. 
Finally, in  the course of  our study we  have made no secret 
of  our lack of  sympathy with  the "  strait jacket " imposed 
upon the note issue by Peel's Acts3 No doubt, so far as the 
metallic  reserve  tends to exceed  the notes in  circulation, a 
reform such as we demand would have merely a speculative 
interest, but, after all, it is not  certain, but only probable, 
that the present policy will be persisted  in,  and there is no 
Op.  cit.,  p.  2x5. 
3 The bad  efieets  of  the  Act  in  this respect  are  due  to the  fact  that  it 
hinders  the  extension  of  the  circulation  at the  very  times  when  it  would  be 
most valuable,  and this is so true that  the mere suspension of  the 4ct of  1844 
has been  sufficient on several occasions to  allay  public anxiety. 
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guarantee  that a crisis analogous to that of  1866  will never 
occur again.  In 1890 this was only averted by the prudence 
and courage of Mr. Lidderdale. 
In addition to these drawbacks which  have already been 
examined, others have been pointed out from an administra- 
tive point of  view.  The administration of  the Bank is, it is 
alleged, somewhat costly, and its management might  with 
advantage be more permanent. ' 
The management of  the Bank of  England is  entrusted to 
a  body  of  directors  chosen  from  amongst  the  principal 
bankers and financiers of  the City.  This body, whose com- 
position  varies  but  slightly from  year  to year,  has at its 
head a Governor who is appointed for two years only.  This 
system  has been  criticised, as we  have said, for its lack of 
continuitya and  it  has  sometimes  been  suggested  that  a 
permanent  Governor would be in a better position  to man- 
age the affairs of  the Bank 
This idea  has  been  frequently  put  forward,  and even 
Bagehot  thought  that  the  appointment  of  a  permanent 
Deputy-Governor "  would  give the  decisions of  the Bank 
that foresight, that quickness and that consistency in which 
those decisions are undeniably now defi~ient."~  It is more 
curious to find  the same view  expressed  in  the Report  of 
the Committee of  Inquiry of  the House of  Lords in  1848.' 
"  The objections,"  so the Report runs, "  which  have been 
often urged against the Bank, . .  are a Want of  Permanence 
and of  Consistency  derived  from  its system  of  periodical 
Elections  of  Governors  and  Deputy-Governers-the  evil 
Consequences of  filling these high and important Offices . . 
by  a  mere  Rotation  of  Seniority-and  the intimate  Con- 
nection  subsisting between  the Directors and the Commer- 
cial World of  London, which may cast on them  a Degree 
of  Pressure difficult  at Times to be  resisted.  It appears 
further to be apparent from the Evidence that the immediate 
'  For  the latter point see Palgrave, pp.  57-60 
'  Thus it  is  risky  if  one  governor  authorises  advances  upon  Consols  in 
times of  difficulty,  while  another governor  adopts  a  different  policy. 
Bagehot, Lombard Street, p.  a39 (edition  1906). 
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pecuniary  Interest  of  the  Proprietors . . . may  at Times 
supersede or control larger and higher Considerations.  This 
ought not to be.  . . . 
9 , 
We have  felt  obliged  as impartial  historians,  to  state 
these  criticisms,  which  condemn  somewhat  severely  the 
lack of  continuity in the management of  the Bank resulting 
from the system of  appointment by election.  It is difficult 
for a foreigner to decide what exact degree of  truth there is 
in these accusations.  But it  is evident that  the  mere fact 
that they are thus reproduced after an interval of  nearly sixty 
years by  competent  persons and well-known  writers  gives 
them a certain weight. 
APPENDIX. 
HISTORY OF  THE RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE BANK  OF 
ENGLAND  AND  THE TREASURY. 
THE  RELATIONS  OF CHARTERED BANKS  OF 
ISSUE  TO NATIONAL  FINANCE. 
Relations of  chartered banks of  issue and the Public Finances.  Various ways 
in  which  such banks pay for their privileges.  Advantages  gained  by  the 
English Government from the privileges  granted to the  Bank.  Summary 
of  these  advantages :  Business  connected  with  the  Treasury  and  the 
public  money,  the  administration of  the  national  debt.  Management  of 
the  revenues : (a) The management  of  the  revenues  before  the  Act  of 
1834, (b)  The Act  of  1834,  (c) Modifications  made  in  the  Act  of  1834. 
Present  position.  Management  of  the expenditure.  The Act of  1848. 
The  Paymaster  General.  Simple  and  practical  management  of  the 
accounts.  The administration of  the  national debt.  The Bank  and the 
administration  of  the  permanent  debt.  The  Act  of  1751.  The  Act  of 
1834.  Deficiency  bills and deficiency advances.  The Bank  undertakes 
not  only  the  payment  of  interest,  but  also  the  administration  of  the 
national  debt.  The  Bank  and  the  administration  of  the  floating  debt 
(issue,  circulation,  redemption  of  exchequer  bills  and  bonds  and  of 
treasury  bills).  The Act  of  1709 and  those  of  1834  and  1866.  The 
exchequer  bills  and bonds  and the  treasury bills.  Indemnity  paid  to the 
Bank  in  return  for  the  administration  of  the  permanent  and  floating 
debts. 
A CHARTERED bank of  issue as a general rule must pay the 
State  for  the  privilege  accorded  to  it.  This  payment 
assumes various forms :  a loan, a tax, a share in the profits, 
the undertaking  of  certain  duties connected with  the cash 
account of  the Treasury, most  generally the administration 
of the floating or permanent debt.' 
We have  already  observed  that  a  loan,'  often  a  loan 
without  interest, is the usual return made for  the privilege 
of issuing notes and that the negotiation  of  a loan was the 
primary cause explaining the establishment of  the principal 
European banks of  issue,  and in  particular of the Bank of 
England. 
'  Leroy-Beaulieu, Science  des Finances,  pp.  106-107. 
'  See above,  p.  80.  Compare du  Hays du  Gassart  Des  prdts  consentis 
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A tax on the circulation is another form of  payment : it 
corresponds in  theory to a stamp duty on commercial bills, 
the application  of  which  to  bank  notes  has  certain  draw- 
backs and from which  the bank is  usually exempted, either 
entirely,  as in  France,  or  in  return  for  a  definitely  fixed 
yearly  payment,  as in  England.  Sometimes a compound 
system  is  adopted,  the  note  circulation  is exempt  from 
taxation up to a fixed total issue, but if  this total is exceeded 
a tax, and frequently a very heavy tax, has to be paid.  This 
is the system in Germany and  Belgium. 
A  share in  the profits  may  take two  forms:  it may be 
either a  share in  the  normal  profits,  or a  share in  extra- 
ordinary profits  resulting,  for instance,  from an abnormal 
increase in the discount rate. 
Finally,  the  State  may  secure  an  indirect  return  by 
entrusting the bank  of  issue with  certain duties connected 
with financial administration or the Treasury. 
These profits are relatively  small  when  compared  with 
those  which  some otner European States obtain in  return 
for the concession of  similar privileges,' and this is a matter 
on  which  English  legislation  is  deserving of  the highest 
praise.  If  a  monopoly  of  issue  is  granted,  it  should  be 
because the Government considers this system to be for the 
public welfare, and especially because it involves least risk. 
The public  interest is  the only justification  nowadays for 
a  monopoly  of  this  kind;  hence  the  State  ought  to 
endeavour to  lessen the drawbacks which  inevitably attend 
any monopoly, instead of  increasing them by appropriating 
'  In  France  these  profits  amounted  to  8,785,269  francs  in  1900,  and  to 
6,977,345 in 1901, i.r., respectively  18  and 20 per cent. of the net proceeds. 
In  Germany  for  the  same  years  these  profits  were  25,859,799  and 
1~~770,445  marks, i.e.,  76 and 49 per cent. of  the  net proceeds. 
In  Belgium  they were  6,615,336 and 4,969,590 francs,  i.e., 63  and 51  per 
cent.  of  the  net proceeds. 
Hence  both  France  and  England  may be  classed among  the  States which 
do not make undue profits  out of  the concession of  a  monopoly of  issue. 
~rofits  which  must  ultimately  be  paid  by  the  public,  for 
whose benefit the monopoly was established. 
In actual fact the advantages which  the Treasury derives 
from the Bank of England are the following :- 
(a) It is  exempt from  paying  interest on its debt to  the 
Bank so long as the charter of  the latter is  continued. 
(b)  It receives an annual payment of  £180,000. 
(c) Should the Bank be authorised to exceed the statutory 
limit of  its issues,  it  is usually  stipulated that its discount 
rate should be raised  and that the profits resulting from the 
additional  issue,  deducting  the amount  required  to  cover 
expenses and risks, should go to the Treasury. 
(d) Certain  duties  connected  with  public  finance  are 
entrusted  to the  Bank,  such  as the administration of  the 
national debt, for which however payment is made. 
Enough has already been  said with  regard  to  the first 
three  points;  it  is  only  necessary  to  recollect  that  the 
annuity of  ~180,000  is  partly paid in return  for exemption 
from the stamp tax, and that the arrangement by which the 
State shares in any profits made from supplementary issues 
was  not  inspired by a desire  for  gain, but  was  made  lest 
the Bank, tempted by high profits, shou!d  acquiesce in use- 
less and dangerous issues. 
Thus the only profit made by the State from  the conces- 
sion  of the  Bank  charter is,  so far,  the  non-payment  ~f 
interest on a capital of  about  AII,~,~.~  This,  at the 
existing rate of 24  per cent.,  is equivalent to an annual sum 
of A275,m, and it may be remarked, by the way, that this 
portion  of the law  of  1844 has been  severely criticised  by 
many English writers. 
We now come to the last point, which is the only one that 
is really interesting and characteristic.  It relates to the con- 
nection between the Bank and the Treasury and the way in 
which the Bank assists and even replaces the latter. 
We are here faced by  one of  those gradual processes of 
evolution  which  are  so  characteristic  of  English  nature, 
as in  fact,  they  are characteristic  of  Nature  in  general. 
\Ye can see an organism-the  ancient Exchequer-gradu- 
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ally and without any sudden break, eliminated and replaced 
almost  entirely  by  another-the  Bank.  This somewhat 
peculiar process has played as important a part in the history 
of  the Bank of  England as the Act of  1844 itself; the two 
together  have  completely  modified  the  character  of  the 
institution.  Considering the importance of  this process and 
the  difficulty  of  describing it  piecemeal  each  time  in  the 
course of  the years  that a stage in  its  evolution  has been 
reached,  we  have  decided  to  deal  with  it  separately  by 
making it the subject of  this Appendix.  We hope in  this 
way, if we cannot avoid the risk of  confusing the question of 
the issues of  the Bank with that of  its duties in regard to the 
Treasury, at any rate to escape the  introduction of  further 
complications into a book  to  which  it  has already proved 
difficult enough to give some degree of  unity. 
The question of  the relations between  the Bank  and the 
Treasury  when  thus  limited  and  defined,  divides  itself 
naturally into two parts : 
(a) The  duties  connected  with  the  Treasury  and  the 
public money. 
(b) The duties connected  with  the national debt. 
We propose to describe these duties in succession and to 
complete our study by a few short comments.' 
As  might  be  expected,  there is  no  book  in  English  on  this important 
question.  Two  Italian  works  may however  be  consulted  with  advantage: 
Martinuzzi  (Pietro),  La  banca  d'  Inghtlterra  nei  riguardi  del  servizio  del 
tesoro;  and  C. Perazzi,  Memorie  intorno  alla  contabilita  dello  stato  in 
Inghiltera,  a  supplement  to  the  Sella  scheme.  Sella,  the  famous  Italian 
financier,  wished,  like  many  of  his  countrymen,  to  introduce  the  English 
system  into  Italy.  Several  analogous  attempts have been  made in  France: 
under  the  July  monarchy  projects  with  this  object  were  brought  forward 
by  Benolt  Feuld  and  Mauguin,  while  under  the  third  Republic  complete 
schemes were drawn up by  MM. Hem6 de Saisy, in  1873, and C.  Dreyfus, in 
1885;  a  superintendent  of  direct  taxes  even  wrote  a  work  embodying  a 
scheme in no less  than  113 articles.  See Rkformr des Services de  Tresorcrie, 
by  R. Lemercier  de Jauvelle. 
With  regard  to  the  question  as raised  in  France  and  Germany  see  an 
essay by  M.  Dartiguenave, Relal~ons  de  la  Uanque de  France avec le  Trdsor, 
and a publication  of  the  Inspector-General  of  Finance, Mission en Allemagne. 
Organisation  et fonctionnement  de  la  Banque  de  1'Empire  allemand. 
Finally, with regard to Belgium, where  (in 1850) a system very  similar to 
the English one was introduced, see  Noel,  Banques  d'4mission.  etc.,  pp.  546- 
567.  For  the  Belgian  Law of  1900,  which  was later  than  Noel's  book,  see 
Dartiguenave, pp.  179-180. 
It is customary in  England to entrust the administration 
of the various receipts to special commissioners, who under- 
take all the business of  assessing the different taxes;  when 
this is done the taxes are paid to local receivers, who hand 
them over to the Receivers-General, by whom they are paid 
into the Bank of  England;  whereas formerly they used to 
be paid into the Exchequer, which  was until  1834 the State 
Treasury. 
(a)-The  Management of  the Revenue before the Act of 
I 834. 
When, owing to the Act of  Restriction,'  Bank notes were 
accepted at par in payment of  taxes, the Bank had to send 
a representative to the Exchequer to examine and take away 
the notes which were paid in there. 
Shortly afterwards, by a series of  Acts passed in  George 
111.'~  reign,'  it was enacted that the Bank's  representatives 
must take the notes direct from the various receivers, of  the 
Customs, of  the Excise, of  the Stamp Duties, etc., and enter 
them to the credit of  those receivers as though the payments 
had been  made straight to  the Bank in  coin.  In addition, 
it gradually grew into a custom for the Bank to take charge 
through its representatives at the Exchequer, not only of  the 
revenues fixed by special laws, but of  all the sums paid to 
the Government from whatever source.  The general use of 
paper  money  had  made  this  plan  necessary;  the  notes 
presented at the Exchequer  had to be verified  in order that 
the latter might safely  take the responsibility  of  accepting 
them in payment of  the taxes. 
' For what follows see also in  Boucard  and JBze, kldments de  Science  de 
Finances  et  de  Lkgislation  FinanciPre  franfaise,  the  part  dealing  with  the 
Exchequer account at the Banks of  England  and Ireland,  p.  1185. 
See above, Vol.  I., p.  187. 
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The payments were actually made at the Exchequer, but 
the Bank took an increasingly important share in  the man- 
agement of  these payments. 
Besides this, since 1725 the Bank had held on deposit and 
been answerable for certain funds which, although belong- 
ing to private individuals, are yet under  the control  of  the 
Court of  Chancery, such as the securities belonging to the 
suitors of  this Court.  In  1786, as soon as the Commission 
for the reduction  of  the national debt, or in  other words the 
Sinking Fund, was constituted, the Bank had to take charge 
of  the sums resulting from  the annuity which  was granted 
with a view to the redemption.  In 1802 the money produced 
by  the  redemption  or  purchase  of  the  land  taxes  was 
entrusted to the Bank, and in  1828 it  likewise  took charge 
of  the funds belonging  to  the  Savings Bank,  and  subse- 
quently of  many other funds of  a similar kind. 
To all  this was  added  the  business  connected  with  the 
national  debt,  which  the  Bank  had  long carried  on, and 
the extra work due to the Act of  1827 (7 and 8 George IV., 
c.  53),  in  consequence of  which  the Receiver-General  had 
to pay  the receipts from  the  Excise  into the  Bank,  where 
they were entered as a special account called "  The account 
of  the public money of  the Receiver-General of  the Excise."' 
The gradual  transfer  of  all  this  business  to  the  Bank 
suggested to  the Government the advisability of  reorganis- 
ing the old  Court of  the Exchequer  and prepared the way 
for the Act of 1834. 
(b)-The  Act of  1834 (4 William IV., c. 15). 
This Act  reorganised the Exchequer and established the 
office of  the Comptroller-General  of  the receipt and issue of 
his  Majesty's  Exchequer,  to  which  were  transferred  the 
'  The  Act  of  1841 (4 and  5  Vict.,  c.  20)  concerning  the  Excise  made 
practically  no  alteration in  the  method of  dealing  with  the  receipts  or  in  the 
administration  of  the  tax. 
In  1847  (10-11 Vict.,  c. 42)  the  duties  on  horses,  carriages,  etc.,  were 
transferred from the  Co~nniissio~iers  of  Stamps  nnd  Taxes to those  of  Excise 
and  \\,ere administered like the  latter; and in  1849 (12-13 Vict.,  c.  I) the two 
Boards  of  Excisc  were  amalgamated  into the  single  Board of  Commissioners 
of  lnland  Revenue.  The receipts  forming  the  Inland  Revenue  are  entered 
by  the  Bank  to  the  account  of  the  Receiver-Gencral  of  the  Inland  Revenue 
and are transferred thence day by  day to the general account of the  Exchcquer. 
powers  belonging to the different offices abo1ished.l  The 
 omm missioners  of  the  Treasury  were  to  "  establish  and 
direct "  what books, etc.,  should be used in  the Exchequer, 
and "  the forms thereof, as  well as the forms of  all warrants 
. . .  and other documents "  in use. 
An important change was made by this Act of  May aznd, 
1834, in providing that, after the I ~th  of  June following, all 
Exchequer bills,  notes,  security for money, etc, which had 
hitherto been  entrusted to the four  tellers,  should be paid 
in to the Bank of  England, where they were credited to the 
"  account of  his Majesty's Exchequer."  At the same time, 
and this was still more important, all public moneys which 
had hitherto been  payable at the Exchequer were  in future 
to be paid to the Bank and entered by it to the credit of  the 
Exchequer.  At the end of  each day the Bank was to send 
to  the Comptroller-General  a  summary of  all  the amounts 
paid in and entered to the Government account. 
All  sums thus entered  to the account  of  the Exchequer 
were to be regarded  as constituting a fund for the payment 
of  the various expenses arising out of  the public  service. 
The Comptroller-General  \vas empowered  by  the  Commis- 
sioners  of  the  Treasury  to  authorise  the  Bank  to  open 
accounts with the officials. 
A  circular issued by the Commissioners of  the Treasury, 
dated September 26th,  1834, formed the supplement to this 
law.  This document repeated what we have just  said, viz., 
that all public receipts,  from whatever source, must be sent 
as soon as received  to the  respective  Receivers-General  in 
London, who must pay the money each day to the Bank of 
England.  The Bank must at once enter these sums to  the 
credit  of  the  accounts  of  the  receivers  and  also  of  the 
account of  the Exchequer.  In  this way  the latter account 
ultimately  includes the whole of  the revenue of  the United 
Kingdom. 
' Those of  the  Auditor of thc Exchequer, of  the  Tellers  of  the  Exchequer 
and  of the  Clerk  of  the  Prlls.  'i'hc  officials  holding  these  posts received  un- 
duly  largc  salaries  and  the  posts  themselves,  which  had  become  mere  sine- 
currs,  werc of  no use except as a  provision  for the  relatives of  ministers  (Sir 
Willian~  Anwn, 1'lae  Law and  Custot~r  of  the  Constitution,  Vol.  II., pp.  330- 
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Such is  the outline of the Act of  1834.  This Act  was 
the outcome of  a series of  events,  such as the granting of 
the status of legal tender to Bank of  England notes in  1833, 
the persistent increase in the taxes, which rendered necessary 
a more complicated system of  control, and so on. 
It must be  noted  in  particular,  that when  the  Act  was 
passed many of  its provisions were already in force and that 
in the main  it only co-ordinated  and united  into  a  single 
Act various earlier measures. 
(c)-Modifications  made in the Act of  1834.-Present 
Position of  the Matter. 
The Act of 1834 was modified by that of  1866 (29-30 Vict., 
c. 39), which  in  the first place established the office  of  the 
Comptroller  and  Auditor-General  of  his  Majesty's  Ex- 
chequer, which official took the place of  the old Comptroller- 
General  and of the Commissioners for auditing the  public 
accounts.  It also provided  that the Commissioners of  the 
Customs1 and of the Inland Revenue and the Postmaster- 
General should pay in to the Bank their respective receipts, 
and that the Bank should enter them to the account of  the 
Exchequer.  These payments were to be notified daily to the 
Comptroller-General. 
All  the money  thus credited  to the Exchequer must  be 
regarded as a general fund  out of  which  the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General can order transfers to enable accounts 
to be opened with the various offic.als, whose business it is 
to make payments  in  connection  with  the public offices. 
Four times a year the Treasury draws up a scheme of  the 
receipts forming the "  consolidated fund "'  for the following 
For  the Customs see also Statute 1876,  c.  36. 
'  What  is  the  exact  explanation  of  the  term  "  Consolidated  Fund "? 
Since 1786 the  English  Budget  has been divided  into  two parts,  the  one  con- 
sisting  of  what  may  be  called  the  permanent  grants,  the  due  payment  of 
which  is authorised by  Parliament  from  time  to  time, but  which  are entirely 
in the hands of the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  as regards  all details of  time 
and method of  collection ; this  first  section  of  the  Budget  forms  the  "  Con- 
solidated Fund."  The other part consists, on the contrary, of  payments voted 
annually and thus remaining under the direct periodical control of  Parliament ; 
this  section  is known  as the  Annual  Supply.  See  Alphzus  Todd,  Parlia- 
naentary Government  of  England, Vol.  I.,  pp.  733-737. 
quarter and the expenses to be paid out of  these funds during 
the same period.  If  the receipts are insufficient to cover the 
expenses,  the Comptroller and Auditor-General notifies  the 
amount of  the deficit  to the  Bank, which  is authorised to 
make  advances up to  the sum indicated at the  request of 
the Treasury.  The principal and interest of  these advances 
are paid out of the receipts forming the consolidated funds 
for the next quarter. 
The  administration  of  the  expenditure  was  definitely 
organised  in  1848, but as early  as 1817 certain  payments 
were undertaken by the Bank of  England. 
The Act of  1848' (11 and 12 Vict.,  c.  55) abolished the 
various officials  hitherto entrusted with  the paying out of 
money, and substituted a single official, his Majesty's Pay- 
master-General. 
As regards the Bank,  it  was  decided  that  the different 
sums entered to the accounts of  the officials thus suppressed 
should be transferred to the recently opened account of  the 
Paymaster-General.  In order to ensure complete control, it 
is provided that the person  making a payment  to the Bank 
must first be authorised to do so by the Paymaster-General. 
All  the accounts  held by the Bank in  the  name of  the 
Paymaster-General  must be regarded, as has been already 
stated with regard to the Exchequer account, as a general 
fund to be used in the payment of  current expenses. 
The Paymaster-General  has also to  send  to  the  Com- 
missioners of  the Treasury a weekly  statement of  the con- 
dition  of  his account with  the  Bank, and each  manth  he 
must submit detailed accounts to them. 
In  order  that  its  dealings with  the  Paymaster-General 
may  be  as clear  as possible,  the Bank  keeps two  supply 
accounts, in which it enters all sums which have to be placed 
to the credit of  the Paymaster. 
The first of  these is called the Exchequer credit account, 
This law was  supplemented by  a  circular  issued  by  the  Commissioners 
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and  represents all  the  credits  granted  to  the  Paymaster- 
General  out of  the account  of  the Comptroller-General  of 
the  Exchequer.  The  second  is  called  the  Paymaster- 
General's  cash account  and in  this  are entered  all  other 
sums credited to the Paymaster-General  by the Bank. 
No cheque or order for payment can be drawn on these 
accounts;  such payments are managed  by  daily  transfers 
of  sums  to  two  so-called  "  working  accounts,"  viz.,  the 
11 drawing  account,"  or the current  account  for  cheques, 
and the  "bills  account,"  or  the  current account  for  bills. 
This transfer of sums to the "  working accounts " is  made 
through orders from the Paymaster-General.  The amount 
of  such transfers must not exceed that of  the payments for 
the day. 
The control of  expenditure is as important as that of  the 
receipts.  The  Comptroller-General  exercises  a  checking 
control : by  comparing  the  accounts  of  the  Paymaster- 
General  stating the  various transfers  that he orders,  with 
the daily returns  made by the  Bank  of  its own  transfers, 
the  progress of  the expenditure can be continually super- 
vised.  Subsequent  control  is carried on by verification  of 
the warrants, cheques and bills which have run out and by 
the  examination  of  the various returns.  In  addition,  it 
should be noted that a clear distinction is made between the 
supplying of  the  funds to be  used  in  the  payment of  the 
various public expenses and the actual employment of  these 
funds. 
(b)-THE  MANAGEMENT  OF  THE  NATIONAL  DEBT. 
A  national debt consists of  two portions,  the permanent 
and the floating debt. We  will consider these in  turn. 
I.-The  Bank of  England  and the Administration of  the 
Permanent Debt . 
Before  the  English  debt  was  consolidated  in  1751, the 
interest was paid by the Exchequer;  at that date the Bank 
first  undertook  the administration of  the  national debt.' 
After the  reorganisation  of  the Exchequer1 the payment 
of the  expenses connected with  the debt were managed by 
the Commissioners  for the  reduction  of  the national  debt. 
The interest is paid out of  the consolidated fund.  When it 
happened  that  this account  was  not  large  enough  for  the 
purpose,  the  difference  was  met  by  the  issue  of  special 
Exchequer  bills  called  deficiency  bills.  In  1866  an 
but  simpler  plan  was  adopted  and  deficiency 
were  substituted for  these  bills,  which  advances 
must be refunded in  the following quarter. 
The Bank is not only entrusted with the payment of  the 
interest on the debt, it also acts as intermediary between the 
Treasury and  the  public with  respect  to  the  business  of 
actual administration of  the national debt.  Thus it receives 
payments direct from the subscribers and enters their names 
in the "  journal " and opens special accounts to their credit 
in the "  Grand Livre "  of  the national debt.  Subsequently 
it manages the various formalities of  transfer which may be 
required through stock-brokers and bill-brokers.  To these 
different  transactions,  M.  Noela  remarks,  it  devotes  an 
enormous area containing about 1,700,ooo registers, which 
are kept up to date by more than 400 clerks. 
What is paid for  all these services?  Since 1892~  the Bank 
has  received  from  the  Government  as indemnity  for  the 
expenses  of  administering the  national  debt:  (I)  A325 a 
year on every million pounds up to &oo,ooo,ooo;  (2)  Aroo 
a year only for every million in excess of  this sum.  Thus 
the total  indemnity amounts to about ,&160,ooo.  Formerly 
For  further  details as to the  administration  of  the  debt  before  1834 see 
Lawson, p.  184, and  Martinuzzi,  p.  130. 
a  09.  cit., p.  39. 
a  B~forc  this  date  the  Bank  was  paid  a  much  larger  sum.  At  first  the 
indemnity  was  A340  per  million  up  to  A6oo,ooo,ooo; beyond  this  amount 
the  commission  was  only  A300.  Afterwards  it  was  lowered  on  a  similar 
plan to f;gm  and A150 respectively.-Bulletin  de statistique et de LCgislation 
comparde,  1892, Vol.  XXXII. 
The Act  of  1892  provided  for  a fresh  reduction  of  the  indemnity  paid  for 
the  administration  of  the  national  debt,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  this  Act 
increased the  commission  which  the  Bank received for the  issue  of  Treasury 
bills.  See below, p.  401. 
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it came to not less than ,&2oo,ooo, and even, in still earlier 
times, ,&25o,ooo. 
In France  the  English  system  was  formerly  imitated. 
The Bank of  France was entrusted with the payment of  the 
interest on  the  national debt and with the management  of 
the  business  connected  with  its  redemption;  for  this  it 
received a commission of  14  per  cent.  It  was considered 
with  reason  that  this commission  was too high,  and, after 
largely reducing it  and converting  it into a fixed rent,  the 
management  of  the  national  debt  was  finally  restored  to 
the Government.' 
11.-The  Bank  of  England  and  the  Administration  of  the 
Floating Debt  (Issue, Circulation and  Redemption of 
Exchequer Bills and Bonds and of  Treasury Bills). 
One of  the  most  important of  the services  rendered  by 
the Bank of  England to the Government has been  the cir- 
culation of  Exchequer bills.' 
An account of the manner in which this used to be done 
is  given  in  the evidence  of Abraham  Newland,  the chief 
cashier of  the  Bank of  England, before  the Committee of 
Secrecy on March  28th,  1797.' 
When the Exchequer was re-constituted in 1834, a Comp- 
troller-General was appointed, as  we  have seen, and the duty 
of preparing,  issuing and numbering  the  Exchequer bills 
devolved on him.  But the Act of  1866, which consolidated 
'  Dartiguenave, pp.  157-158. In 1897 M.  Guillemet proposed  to hand over 
this business to the Bank once more,  but this time without payment.  It was 
rightly 'thought  that such a  heavy charge could  not be imposed on the Bank 
without  indemnity  and that if,  on the other hand, it  was necessary  to pay 
an indemnity,  it  would  be  better  to  leave  the  matter  in  the hands  of  the 
Government,  which  had  organised  it economicall  enough.  We may note, 
however,  that  in  consequence  of  an Act of  1897 Lrt. 8 and g),  the Bank of 
France has to cash gratuitously  for the benefit of  the Treasury, both in  Paris 
and in the provinces, the bearer coupons of  the French Rentes and the bills of 
the  French  Treasury.  The Bank of  France also  helps  gratuitously  in  the 
issue  of  treasury bills. 
'  The  Bank  undertook  this circulation  in  1709 (see  above,  p.  122).  It 
will  be remembered that the first  Exchequer  Bills  were issued by  Montague 
in  1696. 
'  Compare Lawson,  p.  167.  With  regard  to the somewhat original  per- 
sonality of Newland  see Stephens'  notice at the end of  his  Bibliography,  pp. 
167-173. 
and amended all the earlier laws on this matter, provided 
that  in  future  all  Exchequer  bills  and bonds  should  be 
prepared and paid at the Bank. 
The  Act  of  1866  distinguishes  exchequer  bills  and 
exchequer  bonds.  The difference  between  the  two  is  the 
following:  the  Exchequer  bonds,  which  were  first  intro- 
duced by Gladstone in  1853, are issued for a definite period 
of time,  generally for  three years,  and bear  interest  at a 
fixed rate, whilst the interest on the Exchequer bills, which 
is determined and published every quarter by the Treasury, 
varies according  to  the  rate of  interest  prevailing  on  the 
market at the time. 
In  addition  to  Exchequer  bills  and  Exchequer  bonds, 
there are  also Treasury  bills,  issued  for  the  first  time  in 
1877.  These new  bills  only differ from  Exchequer biNs- 
which  they  are  gradually  tending  to  replace  entirely-in 
that they are issued for a maximum period of  twelve months, 
and generallj for a much shorter time. 
The business of  the Bank is the same with regard to all 
these  different  securities.  Consequently  it  receives  a 
uniform payment : for the issue, circulation and redemption 
of the various bills and bonds it is paid at the rate of  A2001 
for every million pounds in bills or bonds in existence on the 
first  of  December in each year, on which day the payment 
in question is calculated. 
'  This sum was increased  from iC;~oo  to &zoo  by  the Act  of  1892, which 
reduced  the  indemnity  received  by  the  Bank  for the  administration  of the 
national debt. 
In France, since the Act  passed  in -1897 (art. 8),  the Bank  shares in  the 
business of  issuing Treasury  bills,  but this service is  unpaid.  This arrangc- 
ment, moreover,  does  not  seem  to  be  a  very  useful  one;  the expenses  of 
issue  are  not  diminished  thereby,  because  the  Bank  only  serves  as  inter- 
mediary  and  in  actual  fact  the  bills  can  easily  be  floated  without  its 
assistance.  In  1901, when  bills  to  the  value  of  589,342,266 francs  were 
issued  by  the Treasury, the Bank  of  France only  received  13,647,000  francs 
in  subscriptions (Dartiguenave,  p.  152). CONCLUSION.  403 
CONCLUSION. 
THE  history of  the Bank of  England, the relation  of  which 
has  occupied  these  two  volumes,  has  been  admirably 
summarised in  a  few  lines,  which  we  ask leave  to  quote 
here.' 
"  The Bank of  England, which is now-the most celebrated 
bank in  the world,  did  not  make its first appearance,  like 
a  second  hlinerva,  invincible  and completely armed.  Its 
birth  was  heralded, by  longcontinued misfortunes  and its 
history  is  marked  by  romantic  incidents  and  dramatic 
adventures, intimately  connected  with  the political  history 
of  England.  In this  respect the development of  the Bank 
is in  no way different from the evolution and completion of 
all other social and political institutions in England.  Their 
foundations have been  laid piece by piece at the dictates of 
practical  needs, instead of  being planned as a whole accord- 
ing to abstract principles.  And on  these foundations  the 
buildings  themselves  have been  practically  raised,  curious 
in  form,  no doubt, and irregular,  but remarkable in  their 
solidity, imposing in their appearance and excellent in their 
practical  working." 
The  accuracy and insight of  these observations are easily 
demonstrated  by  the account  of  the  circumstances  under 
which the Bank was founded and a recollection  of  the slight 
degree  of  resemblance  which,  from  the  outset,  existed 
between it and other modern national banks. 
In  the first place,  the  Rank  of England, founded by a 
Scotchman,  Paterson,  under  the  patronage  of  a  foreign 
prince,  William  III.,  had  no  monopoly  of  issue.  Its 
'  These lines, whose force and vividness is much weakened  by  translation, 
are  quoted  from  an  article published  in  the  Grcek  papcr,  NL'a  Zlimc'ra  (No. 
for  September  8/21,  igor), at the  time  of  the  publication  of  the  first edition 
of  a  portion  of  the  prcssent work.  Thc article  was  written  by  an  cminent 
authority,  whose  identity  \\.ill  be  easily  r~cognised  by  many  in  spite  of  his 
anonymity. 
original charter merely  allowed  it  to circulate notes up to 
the value of its capital, which capital  was  lent in  a lump 
suin to the Government.  Not  only then  had the Bank  no 
monopoly,  but  the  holders  of  its  notes  had  none  of  the 
modern  guarantees of  conversion,  such,  in  particular,  as 
the  existence  of  a  metallic  reserve  representing  a  fixed 
proportion of  the issue. 
The first  notes  issued  were  much  more  analogous  to 
treasury bills than to the  present bank  notes.  They were 
not legal tender, but, on the other hand, they bore interest 
which  made them  circulate  more  easily,  though  it  led  to 
fluctuations in their value. 
Gradually the Bank secured a monopoly of  issue, at first 
limited to London and its neighbourhood, then extended in 
1844 to the whole of  England;  by  degrees, too,  its notes 
acquired  their  modern  form;  they  were  not  made  legal 
tender until 1833. 
Compared with that of  the Bank of  France, the existence 
of  the  Bank  of  England  has  been  remarkably  agitated. 
Hated by some, passionately supported by others, develop- 
ing in a country still hardly ripe for public freedom, whose 
inhabitants  were  thrown  by  the  thirst  for  gain  into  the 
maddest of  speculations,  the "  Old Lady of  Threadneedle 
Street " passed  a  stormy  youth,  literally  crammed  with 
romantic  adventures  and  dramatic  experiences.  Her 
maturity was hardly more peaceful and it is only  in  recent 
years that she has known  tranquillity. 
From  1694 to  1870 twenty-five  years  have  never  passed 
without some serious danger threatening the Bank of  Eng- 
land.  Twice over (in  1696 and  1797) the Bank was forced 
to suspend cash payments-on  the first occasion  owing to 
the confusion in the metallic currency, on the second owing 
to that  in  the paper currency.  At other times  there  were 
4  6  runs,"  often produced by political troubles or commercial 
crises resulting from  insane  speculation,  which  shook  the 
institution  to its very  foundations.  It will  be  remembered 
that it was at the conclusion of  one of  these crises,  a crisis 
which  lasted for  three  years,  and during which  the  Bank 
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that  the  Act of  1844 was  passed-that  Act  which  largely 
modified  the character of  the Bank, deprived it  of  its dis- 
cretionary powers in  the matter of  issue and reduced  it, by 
the formation of  an issue department working automatically, 
to the position of  a great banking house, with the Govern- 
ment  for its principal  customer  and  the  other  banks for 
practically its only other customers. 
What explanation  can  be  given,  considering  that  their 
positions  are  now  very  similar,  of  the  widely  differihg 
histories of  the Banks of  France and of  England ? 
In the first place it will be said that the contrast is  owing 
to the dates of  their respective foundations.  The Bank  of 
France had the benefit of  the experience gained in the past. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  last  century  the  principles  of 
political economy were beginning to be recognised, Govern- 
ments were  better  instructed  and hence  less  likely  to  be 
attracted by the deceptive dreams of  a Hugh Chamberlain 
or of  a Law.' 
No doubt ; but, unfortunately, this explanation, however 
true it may be  with regard to the periods when  the Banks 
were  founded,  will  not  serve  to account  for the events of 
the  19th century,  during  which  the  Bank  of  France  was 
able to withstand the most serious revolutions and the most 
cruel national disasters, whilst from  1819  to  1870 the Bank 
of  England came  to  the  verge  of  bankruptcy  every  ten 
years.  Another explanation must be sought, and I believe 
that it  will  be found rather  in  the different  characteristics 
of the two nations than in the different organisations of  the 
two Banks. 
The French nation is prudent and economical, the English 
nation is enterprising and speculative;  the one grows rich 
through saving, the other through business.  What is true 
of  the  individuals  is  true  also  of  the  commercial  com- 
munities.  When interest goes down the English commercial 
world,  unable  to reduce  its mode of  life,  deserts  its usual 
business in  favour  of  more profitable,  but,  on  that  very 
'  Besides  this,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  Caisse  d'tscompte, 
founded  in  1776,  collapsed  during  the  financial  troubles  of  the  Revolution, 
and  that  the  Banque  GL'n6rolc  founded  by  Law  in  1716,  only  survived  for 
four  years. 
account, more risky undertakings.  If the decline in the rate 
of interest is great and seems likely to continue, John Bull, 
who according to that  old  saying which  we  have already 
quoted, "  can stand many things, but he cannot stand 2 per 
cent.,"  rushes into speculation.  But  in  England, as else- 
where, speculation leads to disaster and ultimately to crises, 
the brunt of  which  must in the end be borne by the central 
bank.  This has been the history of  all the great crises which 
have occurred during the century that is  just  completed. 
These crises might, it would seem, have been  averted by 
the  accumulation of  a very large stock of  specie.  For, as 
Lord Goschen has remarked, the thing needed above every- 
thing in a crisis is cash.  But to amass money and to forego 
its use in ordinary times involves a heavy expense; and the 
occasional  risks  of  a  crisis  have  been  found  preferable. 
Even nowadays the tendency to prefer the pursuit of  a gain 
which, while  involving  some risks,  is yet  immediate, to  a 
troublesome  prudence,  has not altogether  disappeared.  It 
is true that such a tendency is no longer to be traced in the 
administration of  the Bank  of  England, but when  it  was 
proposed  with  entire  justice,  that  the  joint-stock  banks 
should share  in  the  formation  of  a  metallic  reserve,  the 
prompt reply  was,  that however  wise  such a policy  might 
be, it must mean a decrease in  the shareholders' dividends, 
and  this  answer  was  sufficient  to  put  a  stop  to  further 
discussion. 
Another  characteristic  feature  is  that  in  England  no 
attempt is made to prevent or even to regulate the export of 
gold.  This exposes  the country to  obvious dangers,  but, 
on the other hand, it has made London, the only free market 
for gold,  into  the  financial  cap~tal  of  the  world.  The 
English consider that this advantage fully makes up for the 
risks to which they are exposed, whilst the other European 
nations envy without daring to imitace them. 
In conclusion, it may be said that to write the history of 
the Bank of  England is, in some degree, to attempt to write 
the commercial and finarlcial history of  the English nation. 
For a foreigner this is not the least of  the difficulties involved 406  HISTORY  OF THE BANK  OF  ENGLAND. 
in  the  undertaking;  as we  observed  at  the  outset,l  this 
necessity  of  following  the  history  of  England,  besides 
demanding studies of  a sufficiently complicated kind, adds 
many confusions to the narrative of  the events which con- 
cern the Bank of  England.  Under these circumstances,  to 
give  to  our  account  that  quality  of  unity  so  essentially 
desirable,  demanded  historical  qualifications  which  we  do 
not possess, whilst the second volume has needed a practical 
knowledge of  business which also we  do not  possess.  For 
want  of  this it  has been  difficult to  arrive at definite con- 
clusions  and  we  have  been  obliged  to  give  somewhat 
hesitating answers to  the questions which we  felt bound to 
raise.2 
This is a fact which  we  did not  realise at the outset, but 
only later on, when  we  had already thrown  ourselves into 
the task with  an eagerness which so often goes with  inex- 
perience,  and  when  the  work  was  already  far  advanced. 
The kindly reader will think more of  the trouble taken than 
of  the  result  obtained,  and  will  perhaps consider  that,  in 
spite of  its defects, this work has at least the merit of  having 
prepared  the  ground  and made  the way  easy  for  studies 
which shall be really worthy of  the great institution whose 
history it has been our horlour to write. 
See above, pp. 10-12. 
We  are  somewhat  comforted  by  finding  similar  hesitation  persisting 
among many  persons  whose  theoretical  training  and  practical  knowledge  of 
business were all that could be  desired.  Often during the past  four years  we 
have  asked  English  economists  and  bankers  for  their  opinions  on  Robert 
Peel's Act  and  on  the  reforms  in  it  which  had  been  proposed.  It  has been 
but  seldom  that  we  have  received  a  decisive  answer.  One  of  those  ques- 
tioned,  bdder  than  the  rest,  ultitnately  confessed  that  he thought  the  Act  of 
1844 "  a  bit clumsy "-a  truth  which  we had  already  partly  suspected. 
On the  other  hand,  1 have  frequently  heard  foreigners solve  the  problem 
without  any  hesitation.  Unfortunately  I  have  also  noticed  that  this  excess 
of  certainty  has not always  procecdcd  from  an  excess of  knowledge. 
SUPPLEMENT  I. 
MEMORANDUM  ON  BANKING  SUBMITTED  TO  THE 
CABINET  BY  SIR  ROBERT  PEEL. 
Reprinted from "  Sir Robert  Peel  from  his private papers," by  Charles Stuart 
Parker.  3  vols., 1891-99.  By permission of  the  Publisher, Mr.  John 
blurray. 
THE  chief  legislative  measure of  1844 was the  well-known  Act 
which after more than half  a century still governs our currency 
and banking. 
In  1819 Sir  Robert  Peel  had passed  a  Bill  establishing  the 
principle  that all bank notes should  be  payable  on  demand  in 
gold.  But five-and-twenty years' experience had proved  that in 
commercial  crises legal  obligation to pay did  not ensure actual 
payment in gold.  County banks had failed to cash their notes, 
and  even  the  Bank  of  England "  had  heen  exposed  to great 
danger"  in  1825,  and again  in  1839.  On  this  account the 
House  of  Commons  had  appointed  in  1840,  and  in  1841, 
Committees which had taken important evidence, but as yet with 
no result.  Sir Robert Peel now  took the work  in  hand.  In a 
paper submitted to the Cabinet he shows that there are "  three 
courses open for consideration,"  and presents "  a general  out- 
line of the arguments for and against each of  them." 
CABINET  MEMORANDUM  (EXTRACT). 
I.-Maintenance  of  the  leading  principles  of  the  present 
system. 
For  this  course  it  may  be  contended  that  we  may  safely 
calculate upon the success of  a  proposal  to  that effect.  Many 
interests and many prejudices would be in favour of  it; sufficient 
probably  to command a large Parliamentary  majority. 
Against the course it would  be  argued that the  system is a 
dangerous one ; that  the Bank  of  England  has very imperfect 
control over the issues of  paper : that the nominal convertibility 
pf  paper into gold, where there is unlimited  competition  as to 
Issue, does not ensure the value and practical convertibility of  the 
Paper;  that the Bank has more than once been exposed to great 
danger in  respect  to the  exhaustion  of  its  treasures,  and  for 
the  purpose of  averting it has been  compelled  to make sudden 
and  violent  contractions of  the  currency;  that the effect  even 
of such contractions has not immediately told upon  other issuers 
of paper;  that they have occasionally increased their circulation SUPPLEMENT  I. 
at the time when the Bank was taking measures for the reduc- 
tion  of  its own,  and  by  such  counteraction  of  the views  and 
measures of  the  Bank  have aggravated  the  ultimate  pressure 
upon the country. 
It will  be  strongly contended  in argument that it is discredit- 
able  for the Executive Government,  with  the experience of  the 
past before  it, to rely upon mere numerical majorities, upon the 
prejudices and interests of  their  supporters,  and  sanction  and 
advise for another ten years the continuance of  a  system which 
they cannot in argument defend. 
11.-The  next course is the opposite extreme, the prohibition 
for the future of  all issues of  paper payable to bearer on demand, 
by the Bank of  England and every other bank whatever. 
That course proceeds  upon  the assumption that the issue of 
money  is  a prerogative of  Sovereignty ; that paper convertible 
into gold at the standard price at the will of  the holder partakes 
of  all the properties of  coin, is equally the measure of  value, and 
the common instrument of  exchange;  that it  is the duty of  the 
Sovereign to protect the holders of  such paper from the injurious 
consequences of  its discredit;  and that any profit which may be 
derived from the issue of  such paper justly  belongs to the State. 
The effect  of  the adoption of  this course would  be  to make a 
complete  separation between the  various departments of  bank- 
ing and the department for  the  issue  of  money.  By  money  I 
mean coin, and notes payable to bearer, convertible on  demand 
into coin. 
A  Board would be constituted independent of  the Government 
but responsible to Parliament,  charged with the issue of  paper, 
convertible into gold, to be a legal tender.  There would be no 
necessary interference  with  banks,  excepting  so far as regards 
the power of  issue.  Government paper would be supplied by the 
public department of issue to the Bank of England and to other 
banks,  and they would  use  this paper  in  purely banking  trans- 
actions, in  the  same way  In  which they use their own paper. 
In  favour  of  this  plan  it  would  be  contended  that it is  in 
conformity with  strict principle;  that it deals  impartially  with 
all  interests,  and is  capable of  application  to  all  parts of  the 
United Kingdom ;  that it shows no favour to any one powerful 
corporation like the Bank of  England;  that, if  it interferes with 
private interests,  it  interferes with all  in  an equal degree,  and 
on the broad  intelligible  principle of  interference for the public 
good.  If compensation to such private interests be due, it may 
be  raade  more  equitably and more  easily  under  this plan  than 
under  any other, by  giving to the existing  issuers of  paper an 
advantage  over  others  in  respect  to the  terms  on  which  an 
amount of  Government paper equal  to the  average amount of 
their past issues should be  supplied to them. 
If  we were about to establish in a  new state of  society a new 
system  of  currency,  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  contest 
the principles on  which  this plan  is founded  or the 
equity of  the practical application  of  them. 
The chief  arguments against the plan are the risk of  applying 
at once to three constituent parts of  a  great Empire, in each of 
which  there  is  a  different  system  of  currency,  any  unbending 
uniform rule;  the  impolicy of  disregarding altogether  the  feel- 
ings and habits that long prescription  has interwoven with  the 
modes of  transacting business, and of rejecting the use of  every 
instrument which is ready  made to your hand ; the presumption 
of concluding in  a  matter of  so much  uncertainty  as this that 
you can infallibly command the public confidence for a perfectly 
novel and exclusive paper currency,  and the tremendous hazard 
you incur in  the event of  failure.  It will be contended, and not 
without reason, that howeyer  safe for commercial purposes such 
a system of  currency may be, yet that a papcr circulation resting 
altogether on  Government security-a  purely Government  paper 
--is  much  more  likely  in  times  of political  danger  to be  dis- 
trusted and discredited than that paper for which it would be the 
substitute. 
Of  this  second  method  of  solving  the  difficulties  of  the 
question  it  may,  I think,  be  justly  observed that many persons 
who,  if they  were  responsible for the conduct of  public affairs, 
would  shrink  from the proposal  of  it  as a  practical  measure, 
will make abundant  use of  it in  argument, in contrast with  any 
other measure,  for the  purpose  of  showing its superior merit, 
on  account  of  its  conformity  with  strict  principle,  and  the 
impartiality of  its application  to all interests which it may affect. 
111.-The  third and  remaining course is an intermediate  one 
between complete acquiescence in the present system and radical 
subversion of  it.  It would  consist in  enactments of  which  the 
follow in^ is an outline :- 
~rohibYit  for the  future  the establishment  in  any part of  the 
United Kingdom of  any new bank of  issue. 
Separate the department of  issue of the Bank of  England from 
every other de~artment. 
~ke~  a  separate account  of  the  profits  of  issue.  Let  it be 
understood  that  the whole  of  these  profits  shall  be  accounted 
for to the Government;  that they  shall be  applied  in  the  first 
instance to the substitution generally of  Bank of  England paper, 
by  holding  out  inducements  to  existing  banks  of  issue  to 
transact  their  banking  business  with  this  paper  in  preference 
to their own. 
Require constant publicity  of  all accounts connected with  the 
department of issue; the quantity of  bullion, the amount of notes, 
the amount of securities. 
Permit the continuance of  existing banks, either permanently 
or for a definite period of  years; but claim the right, if  they are SUPPLEMENT  I. 
banks  of  issue,  of  subjecting  them  equally  with  the  Bank  of 
England to strict regulations as to the exercise of  their privilege 
of  issue. 
Insist upon  publicity  of  their transactions  in  such a  form as 
shall enable the public to judge of  the confidence which may be 
placed  in them. 
Deal in  the first instance with  England only,  excepting in so 
far as relates tp prohibiting new banks of  issue. 
Assume  that  the probable  effect  of  regulations of  this kind 
will be to encourage existing banks of  issue in England to make 
voluntary arrangements for the substitution of  Bank of  England 
paper for their own;  and that the ultimate  effect will be such a 
degree  of  control by  the Bank over the general  issues  of  the 
country  as to enable  it  to  regulate  the  currency  by  gradual 
contraction and gradual expansion according to the state of  the 
exchange. 
The argument in favour of this plan it that it violates no exist- 
ing  right ;  that  it  takes  precautions  against  future  abuses ; 
that  it ensures by  gradual means  the  establishment  of  a  safe 
system of  currency. - 
It is impossible not to foresee that it will be encountered by  a 
formidable combination.  It will be resisted  by those who are for 
the  rigid  application  of  sound  principle  without  reference  to 
times  or circumstarices,  and  who  think  that  all  paper  issues 
should  proceed  directly  and exclusively  from the  Government; 
by  those of  the opposite  opinion, who  think there ought to be 
unlimited competition as to issue, provided  there be the security 
of  the immediate convertibility  into gold; by those who charge 
the  Bank  of  England with  being  the  chief  cause  of  the  past 
derangements of  the currency and consider that on that account 
it  is  entitled  to no favour;  by  the country  bankers and those 
whom the country banks can influence. 
The  Cabinet  must weigh  deliberately  the  several  considera- 
tions which  present themselves.  My  advice is  that they should 
determine to propose the course which they  may conscientiously 
believe to reconcile in the greatest degree the qualities of  being 
consistent  with sound principle  and  suited  to the present  con- 
dition  of  society,  and  should  encounter  the  risk  which  it  is 
impossible  not  to  foresee  must  attend  any  proposal  for 
guarding  against eventual  dangers at the expense of  personal 
interests and in disregard of  private feelings. 
The Cabinet adopted, as Peel  intended,  the third  course,  in 
1844 for  England  and  Wales,  and  in  1845 for  Scotland  and 
Ireland.  There was no serious opposition.  His own speech in 
introducing  his Bill  has  been  well  called  "  the  Parliamentary 
foundation of  all sound thinking upon the subject, and the most 
authoritative  exposition  of  the  true  principles  of  the  national 
currency. " 
SUPPLEMENT  11. 
THE  BANK  CHARTER ACT,  1844. 
7 & 8 VICTORIA,  CAP.  XXXII. 
An  Act  to regulate the Issue of  Bank Notes, and  for giving to the  Governor 
and Company of  the Bank of  England certain Privileges for a limited 
Period.  [~gth  July 1844.1 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . I.-That  from and after 
the Thirty-first Day of  August One thousand eight hundred and 
forty-four  the Issue of  Promissory Notes of  the  Governor  and 
Company of  the Bank of  England, payable on Demand,  shall be 
separated and thenceforth kept wholly distinct  from the General 
Banking Business of  the said Governor and Company; and the 
Business of  and relating to such Issue shall be  thenceforth :on- 
ducted and carried  on by  the said  Governor  and Company in a 
separate Department to be called "  The Issue Department of  the 
Bank of  England,"  subject to the Rules and Regulations herein- 
after contained ; anc!  it shall be lawful for the Court of  Directors 
of  the said  Governor  and  Company,  if  they  shall think  fit,  to 
appoint a Committee or Committees of  Directors for the Conduct 
and  Management  of  such  Issue  Department of  the  Bank  of 
England, and from Time to Time to remove the Members, and 
define, alter, and regulate the Constitution and Powers of such 
Committee,  as they  shall  think  fit,  subject  to any  Byelaws, 
Rules,  or Regulations which  may  be  made  for  that  Purpose: 
Provided  nevertheless,  that  the  said  Issue  Department  shall 
always be kept separate and distinct from the Banking Depart- 
ment of  the said Governor and Company. 
11.-There  shall  be  transferred,  appropriated,  and  set apart 
by  the said Governor and Company to the Issue Department of 
the Bank of  England Securities to the Value of  Fourteen million 
Pounds, whereof  the Debt due by the Public to the said Governor 
and Company shall be and be deemed a  Part;  and  there shall 
also at the same Time be transferred, appropriated, and set apart 
by  the  said  Governor  and  Company  to the said  Issue Depart- 
ment so much of the Gold Coin and Gold and Silver Bullion then 
held  by  the Bank of England  as shall  not be  required  by  the 
Banking  Department  thereof;  and  thereupon  there  shall  be 
delivered  out of the said Issue Department  into the said  Bank- 
ing  Department of  the  Bank  of  England  such  an Amount  of SUPPLEMENT  11.  SUPPLEMENT  11. 
Bank of  England Notes as, together with  the Bank of  England 
Notes then in circulation, shall be equal to the aggregate Amount 
of  the Securities, Coin,  and Bullion  so transferred  to  the  said 
Issue  Department  of  the  Bank  of  England;  and  the  whole 
Amount of Bank of England Notes then in circulation, including 
those  delivered  to  the  Banking  Department  of  the  Bank  of 
England as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be issued on the Credit 
of  such  Secu'rities,  Coin,  and  Bullion  so appropriated  and  set 
apart to the  said  Issue  Department;  and  from  thenceforth  it 
shall  not  he  lawful  for  the  said  Governor  and  Company  to 
increase the Amount of Securities for the Time being in the said 
Issue Department, save as  herein-after is mentioned, but it shall 
be  lawful for the said  Governor and Company  to diminish the 
Amount  of  such  Securities, and again to increase the same to 
any Sum not exceeding in the whole the Sum of  Fourteen million 
Pounds, and so from Time to Time as they shall see Occasion; 
and from and after such Transfer and Appropriation  to the said 
Issue Department as aforesaid  it shall not be lawful for the said 
Governor and Company to issue Bank of  England Notes,  either 
into the Banking Department of  the Bank of  England, or to any 
Persons or Person whatsoever, save in exchange for other Bank 
of England Notes, or for Gold Coin or for Gold or Silver Bullion 
received  or purchased  for the  said Issue  Department under the 
Provisions of  this  Act,  or in  exchange for Securities acquired 
and taken  in  the  said  Issue  Department  under  the Provisions 
herein contained : Provided always, that it shall be lawful for the 
said  Governor and  Company  in  their  Banking  Department  to 
issue all such Bank of  England Notes as they shall at any Time 
receive  from  the  said  Issue  Department  or otherwise,  in  the 
same Manner in all respects as such Issue would be lawful to any 
other Person or Persons. 
111.-It  shall not be lawful for the Bank of  England to retain 
in  the Issue  Department of  the said  Bank at any One Time an 
Amount of  Silver,,Bullion exceeding One Fourth Part of  the Gold 
Coin and Bullion  at such Time held  by  the Bank  of  England in 
the Issue Department. 
1V.-All  Persons shall be entitled  to demand from  the  Issue 
Department  of  the Bank of  England Bank of  England Notes in 
exchange for Gold Bullion, at the Rate of  Three Pounds Seven- 
teen  Shillings  and  Ninepence  per  Ounce  of  Standard  Gold: 
Provided always, that the said Governor and Company  shall in 
all  Cases he entitled  to require  such Gold  Bullion  to be melted 
and  assayed  by  Persons  approved  by  the  said  Governor  and 
Company,  at the  Expense of  the  Parties  tendering  such  Gold 
Bullion. 
V.-Provided  always,  That if  any  Banker who on the Sixth 
Day of  May  One thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty-four  was 
issuing his own Bank  Notes  shall cease to issue his own Bank 
Notes, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council, at any Time 
after the Cessation  of  such  Issue,  upon  the  Application  of  the 
said  Governor and Company, to authorize and empower the said 
Governor and Company to increase  the Amount of  Securities in 
the said  Issue Department beyond  the  total  Sum or Value of 
Fourteen million Pounds, and thereupon to issue additional Bank 
of  England Notes  to an Amount  not exceeding such  increased 
Amount of  Securities specified in such Order in  Council, and so 
from  Time  to  Time;  Provided  always,  that  such  increased 
Amount of  Securities specified in  such Order in  Council shall in 
no Case exceed  the Proportion  of  Two Thirds the  Amount  of 
Bank Notes which the Banker so ceasing to issue may have been 
authorized to issue under  the Provision of  this Act;  and every 
such Order in  Council shall be published  in  the next succeeding 
London  Gazette. 
V1.-An  Account  of the Amount of  Bank of  England  Notes 
issued by  the Issue Department of  the Bank of England, and of 
Gold  Coin and  of  Gold  and Silver Bullion  respectively,  and of 
Securities in the said Issue Department, and also an Account of 
the  Capital  Stock,  and  the  Deposits,  and of  the  Money  and 
Securities belonging  to the said Governor and Company in  the 
Banking Department of the Bank  of  England, on some Day in 
every Week to be  fixed by  the Commissioners of  Stamps and 
Taxes, shall be  transmitted  by  the said Governor and Company 
weekly to the said Commissioners in the Form prescribed . . . . 
and shall be  published  by  the  said  Commissioners  in  the next 
succeeding  London  Gazette  in  which  the  same  may  be  con- 
veniently inserted. 
VI1.-The  Bank of England shall be released  and discharged 
from the Payment of  any Stamp Duty, or Composition in respect 
of  Stamp Duty, upon  or in  respect  of  their  Promissory  Notes 
payable to Bearer on Demand, and all  such  Notes shall thence- 
forth be  and continue  free and wholly  exempt from all Liability 
to any Stamp Duty whatsoever. 
V1II.-Requiring  the Bank to allow  to the  public E180,ooo 
per annum, repealed by 37 and 38 Victoria, cap. 96. 
1X.-In  case, under  the Provisions  herein-before  contained, 
the  Securities held  in  the  said  Issue Department of  the  Rank 
of  England  shall  at any  Time be  increased  beyond  the total 
Amount of  Fourteen million Pounds, then and in each and every 
Year  in  which  the  same  shall  happen,  and  so  long  as such 
!ncrease  shall continue,  the said  Governor and Company  shall, 
In  addition to the said  annual Sum of  One hundred  and eighty 
thousand Pounds,  make a further  Payment or Allowance to the 
Public, equal  in  Amount  to  the net  Profit  derived  in  the  said 
Issue Department during the current Year from such additional 
Securities,  after  deducting  the Amount  of  the  ICxpenscs  orc:t- 
shed  by  the  additional  Issue  during the same  Period,  ~\hich SUPPLEMENT  11.  SUPPLEMENT  11.  415 
Expenses shall include the Amount of any and every Composi- 
tion or Payment to be made by  the said Governor and Company 
to  any  Banker in consideration  of  the  Discontinuance  at any 
Time hereafter of  the  Issue  of  Bank  Notes  by  such  Banker; 
.  .  .  .  . 
X.--No  Person  other than a  Banker  on the Sixth  Day 
of  May One thousand eight hundred and forty-four was lawfully 
issuing his own Bank Notes shall make or issue Bank Notes in 
any Part of the United Kingdom. 
XI.-It  shall not be  lawful  for any Banker  to draw,  accept, 
make, or issue in  England  or Wales, any Bill of  Exchange or 
Promissory  Note or  Engagement  for  the  Payment of  Money 
payable to Bearer on Demand, or to borrow, owe, or take up,  in 
England or Wales, any Sums or Sum of  Money on the Bills  or 
Notes of  such Banker payable to Bearer on Demand, save and 
except that  it  shall be  lawful for any Banker who  was on  the 
Sixth  Day of May  One thousand  eight hundred and forty-four 
carrying on the Business of  a Banker in England or Wales, and 
was then  lawfully issuing, in England or Wales, his own Bank 
Notes, under the Authority  of a  Licence to that  Effect, to con- 
tinue to issue such Notes to the Extent and under the Conditions 
herein-after  mentioned,  but not  further or otherwise;  and the 
Right of  any Company or Partnership to continue to issue such 
Notes shall not be  in  any Manner prejudiced  or affected by any 
Change which  may  hereafter take place  in  the  personal  Com- 
position of  such Company or Partnership, either by the Transfer 
of  any Shares or Share therein, or by  the Admission of  any new 
Partner or Member thereto,  or by the Retirement of  any present 
Partner or Mernher  therefrom:  Provided  always, that  it shall 
not be lawful for any Company or Partnership now consisting of 
only Six  or less than  Six Persons to issue Bank  Notes at any 
Time after the  Number of Partners therein  shall exceed Six in 
the whole. 
XI1.-If  any Banker in any Part of  the United  Kingdom who 
after the passing of  this Act shall be entitled to issue Bank Notes 
shall become bankrupt, or shall cease to carry on the Business of 
a  Banker, or shall discontinue the  Issue of  Bank  Notes, either 
by  Agreement with  the Governor and Company of  the Bank of 
England or otherwise, it shall cot be lawful  for such Banker at 
any Time thereafter to issue any such Notes. 
XII1.-Every  Banker claiming under  this  Act  to continue to 
issue Bank Notes in  England  or U'ales  shsll,  .  .  .  .  give 
Notice  in  Writing to the  Commissioners of  Stamps and  Taxes 
at their Head Office in  London of  such Claim,  .  .  .  .  then 
the said  Commissioners  shall proceed  to ascertain  the average 
Amount of  the Bank Notes of  such Ranker which were in circula- 
tion  during  the  said  Period  of  Twelve  Weeks preceding  the 
Twenty-seventh  Day  of  April  last;  .  .  .  .  and it shall  be 
lawful for every such Banker to continue to issue his own Bank 
Notes after the passing of this Act : Provided nevertheless, that 
such  Banker  shall  not  at any  Time after  the Tenth  Day  of 
October  One  thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty-four  have  in 
upon the Average of  a  Period of  Four Weeks, to be 
ascertained  as herein-after  mentioned,  a  greater  Amount  of 
Notes than the Amount  so certified. 
X1V.-Provided  always, and be it enacted, that if  it shall be 
made to appear to the Commissioners of  Stamps and Taxes that 
any Two or more Banks have,  by  written  Contract  or Agree- 
ment  .  .  .  .  become united within the Twelve Weeks next 
preceding  such  Twenty-seventh  Day  of  April  as aforesaid,  it 
&all  be  lawful  for  the  said  Commissioners  to  ascertain  the 
average Amount of  the Notes of  each such Bank in  the Manner 
herein-before directed, and to certify the average Amount of  the 
Notes of  the Two or more Banks so united as the Amount which 
the united  Bank  shall thereafter be authorized  to issue, subject 
to the Regulations of  this Act. 
XV.-The  Commissioners of  Stamps and Taxes shall, at the 
Time of  certifying to any Banker such Particulars as they  are 
herein-before  required  to certify,  also  publish  a  Duplicate  of 
their Certificate thereof  in the next succeeding London Gazette. 
XV1.-In  case  it  shall  be  made  to appear to the  Commis- 
sioners of  Stamps and Taxes, at any Time hereafter, that any 
two or more  Banks  .  .  .  .  have,  by  written  Contract or 
Agreement  .  .  .  .  become  united  subsequently  to  the 
passing of  this Act, it shall be lawful to the said Commissioners, 
upon the Application of  such united Bank, to certify,  in  manner 
herein-before mentioned, the aggregate of  the Amounts of  Bank 
Notes which such separate Banks were previously  authorized to 
issue,  and  so from Time to Time;  and every  such  Certificate 
shall be published  in  manner herein-before  directed;  and  from 
and  after such  Publication the  Amount therein  stated shall  be 
and be deemed to be the Limit  of  the Amount  of  Bank  Notes 
which  such  united  Bank  may  have  in  circulation:  Provided 
always, that it shall not be lawful for any such united  Bank to 
issue  Bank  Notes  at any  Time after  the Number  of  Partners 
therein shall exceed Six in  the whole. 
Sections  17, 18,  19.  20,  21,  22 state the administrative con- 
ditions which  must  be fulfilled  by  all private  banks  continuing 
to issue notes.  Sections 23, 24, 25, 26 state the conditions under 
which the right to issue notes may be taken over by the Bank. 
XXVI1.-The  Bank of  England  shall  have  and enjoy  such 
exclusive Privilege of  Banking as  is given by this Act, upon such 
Terms and  Conditions, and  subject  to the Termination  thereof 
at such Time and in  such Manner, as is by  this Act provided and 
specified;  .  .  .  .  subject nevertheless to Redemption upon SUPPLEMENT  11. 
the Terms  and Conditions  following;  (that  is to say,) at any 
Time upon  Twelve  Months  Notice  to be  given  after the  First 
Day of August  One thousand eight hundred and  fifty-five,  and 
upon  Repayment by  Parliament to the said Governor and Com- 
pany  or their  Successors of the  Sum  of  Eleven  million  fifteen 
thousand  and one hundred  Pounds,  being  the  Debt  now  due 
from the Public to the said Governor and Company, without any 
Deduction,  Discount,  or  Abatement  whatsoever,  .  .  .  . 
then  and in  such  Case,  and  not  till  then,  the  said  exclusive 
Privileges  of  Banking  granted  by  this  Act  shall  cease  and 
determine at the Expiration  of  such  Notice of  Twelve  Months; 
and any Vote or Resolution of  the House of Commons, signified 
under the Hand of  the Speaker of  the  said House in  Writing, 
and  delivered  at the  public  Office  of  the  said  Governor  and 
Company,  shall  be  deemed  and  adjudged  to  be  a  sufficient 
Notice. 
SUPPLEMENT  111. 
PLAN  FOR 
THE ESTABLISHMENT  OF A  NATIONAL  BANK. 
By  DAVID  RICARDO,  M.P.  1824. 
THE  Bank of  England performs two operations of  banking which 
are quite distinct and have no  necessary  connection  with  each 
other:  it issues a paper currency as a substitute for a metallic 
one, and it advances money in the way of  loan to merchants and 
others. 
That  these  two  operations  of  banking  have  no  necessary 
connection  will  appear obvious  from this-that  they  might  be 
carried on by  two separate bodies without  the slightest  loss of 
advantage, either to the country or to the merchants who receive 
accommodation from such loans. 
Suppose the privilege of  issuing paper money were taken away 
from the Bank and were in future to be exercised  by the State 
only, subject to the same regulation to which  the Bank is now 
liable  of  paying  its notes  on demand  in  specie,  in  what way 
would the national wealth be in the least impaired?  We  should 
then, as now, carry on all the traffic and commerce of  the country 
with  the  cheap  medium,  paper  money,  instead  of  the  dear 
medium,  metallic  money;  and  all  the advantages  which  now 
flow  from making this part of  the national capital productive in 
the form of  raw material, food, clothing, machinery and imple- 
ments,  instead  of  retaining  it  useless  in  the form  of  metallic 
money, would be equally secured. 
The  public,  or the Government  on  behalf  of  the  public,  is 
indebted to the Bank in a sum of money  larger than the whole 
amount of  Bank  notes in  circulation ;  for the Government  not 
only owes the Bank fifteen millions,  its original capital, which is 
lent  at 3  per cent.  interest, but also many  more millions which 
are  advanced  on  Exchequer  bills,  on  half-pay  and  pension 
annuities,  and on other securities.  It is evident, therefore,  that 
if  the  Government  itself  were  to  be  the  sole  issuer  of  paper 
money  instead of  borrowing  it of  the Bank, the only d~fference 
would be with respect to the interest:  the Bank would no longer 
receive  interest and  the Government would  no  longer  pay  it; 
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same position  in which  they now  stand.  It is evident  too that 
there would be just  as much  money in  circulation, for it could 
make no difference in that respect whether the sixteen  millions 
of  paper  money  now  circulating  in  London  were  issued  by 
Government or by a banking corporation.  The merchants could 
suffer no inconvenience from any want of  facility  in getting the 
usual advances made to them  in  the way of  discount or in any 
other  manner;  for, first,  the amount  of  these  advances must 
essentially depend upon the amount of  money in circulation, and 
that  would  be just  the same as before;  and  secondly,  of  the 
amount in  circulation  the Bank would  have precisely  the same 
proportion, neither less nor more, to lend to the merchants. 
If  it  be  true,  as I  think  I  have  clearly  proved,  that  the 
advances made by the Bank to the Government exceed the whole 
amount of  the notes of  the Bank in circulation, it is evident that 
part of  its advances to Government, as well as the whole  of  its 
loans to other persons, must be made from other funds possessed 
or at the disposal of  the Bank,  and which  it would continue to 
possess after Government had discharged its debt to it, and after 
all its notes were withdrawn  from circulation.  Let it not then 
be  said that the Bank charter, as far as regards the issuing of 
paper money, ought to be renewed for this reason, that if  it be 
not the merchants will  suffer inconvenience from being deprived 
of  the usual facilities of  borrowing, as I trust I have shown that 
their means of  borrowing would be just  as ample as before. 
It may however be said that, if  the Bank were deprived of  that 
part of  its business  which  consists in  issuing  paper  money,  it 
would  have  no  motive  to continue  a  joint-stock  company  and 
would  agree on  a  dissolution  of  its partnership.  I  believe  no 
such  thing;  it would  still have profitable  means of  employing 
its own funds.  But suppose  I am wrong and that the company 
were  dissolved,  what  inconvenience  would  commerce  sustain 
from it?  If the ioint stock of  the comDanv be manaced by a few 
directors chosen'by the general body 'of  proprietor;,  or if  it be 
divided  amonpst the ~ro~rietors  themselves and each  share be 
managed by  ;he  indiv'idusl to whom  it belongs,  will  that make 
any difference  in its real amount or in the efficacy with which it 
may be employed for commercial purposes?  It is probable that 
in  no case would  it be managed  by  the individual  proprietors, 
but that it would be collected in  a mass or masses and managed 
with much  more economy  and skill than it is now  managed by 
the Bank.  A great deal too much stress has always been laid on 
the benefits  which  commerce derives  from  the  accommodation 
afforded  to merchants  by  the Bank.  I  believe  it to be  quite 
insignificant compared with that which is afforded by the private 
funds of  individuals.  We know that at the present moment the 
advances by  the Bank  to merchants on discount are of  a  very 
trifling amount,  and we have  abundant evidence  to prove  that 
at no time have they been great.  The whole fund at the disposal 
of the Bank for the last thirty years is well known.  It consisted 
of  its own capital and savings,  of  the amount of  deposits left 
with it by  Government and by  individuals who employed it as a 
banker.  From  this  aggregate  fund  must  be  deducted  the 
amount  af  cash and  bullion  in  the  coffers  of  the  Bank,  the 
amount  of  advances  to the  holders  of  receipts  for  the  loans 
contracted for during each year, and the amount of  advances to 
Government in every way.  After making these deductions, the 
remainder only could have been  devoted  to commercial objects, 
and if  it were ascertained, would, I am sure, be comparatively of 
a  small amount. 
From papers  laid  before  Parliament in  1797,  in  which  the 
Bank  gave a  number  as unit  and a  scale of  its  discounts  for 
different years, it was calculated by sorne ingenious individual, 
after comparing this scale with other documents also laid before 
Parliament,  that the amount of  money  advanced in the way of 
discount to the merchants for a period of  three years and a  half 
previous  to  1797,  varied  from  two  millions  to  ~~,~00,000. 
These are trifling  amounts in such a country as this, and must 
bear a small proportion to the sum lent by individuals for similar 
purposes.  In  1797 the  advances to Government  alone by  the 
Bank,  exclusive  of  its capital  which  was also lent to Govern- 
ment, were more than three times the amount of  the advances 
to the whole body of  merchants. 
A  Committee of  the House of  Commons was appointed  last 
session of  Parliament to inquire into the law of  pledges and into 
the relation of  consigners of  goods from  abroad to consignees. 
This Committee called  before it Mr.  Richardson, of  the house 
of Richardson,  Overend  & Co., eminent discount brokers  in the 
City.  This gentleman was asked :- 
"  9.-Are  you not in the habit occasionally  of  discounting to 
a large extent bills of  brokers and other persons given upon the 
security of goods deposited in their hands? 
"  A.-Very  large. 
"  9.-Have  you not carried on the business of  a  bill  broker 
and money  agent to a  very large extent, much beyond  that of 
any other individual in this town? 
"  4  6  A.-I  should think very much beyond. 
9.-To  the extent of some millions- annually? 
66 A.-A  great many ; about twenty millions annually, some- 
times more." 
The evide~ce  of  Mr. Richardson satisfactorily proves, I think, 
the extent of  transactions of this kind in which the Bank has no 
kind  of  concern.  Can anyone doubt that if  the  Bank  were  to 
break  up  its  establishment  and  divide  its  funds  among  the 
individual  proprietors, the  business  of  Mr.  Richardson and of 
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On the one hand  they  would  have  more  applications  made  to 
them for money on discount, on the other many who would have 
money to dispose of would apply to them to obtain employment 
for  it.  The  same  amount  of  money  and  no  more  would  be 
employed in this branch of  business, and if not employed by the 
Bank or by  the  individual  proprietors if  they  had the manage- 
ment of  their own funds, it would inevitably find its way, either 
by  a  direct  or  circuitous  channel,  to  Mr.  Richardson  or to 
some other money  agent, to be employed by  him  in  promoting 
the commerce and upholding the trade of the country, for in no 
other way could these funds be made so productive to the parties 
to whom they would belong. 
If  the  view  which  I have taken of  this subject  be  a  correct 
one, it appears that the commerce of  the country would  not be 
in  the  least  impeded by  depriving the Bank of  England of  the 
power  of  issuing  paper  money,  provided  an  amount  of  such 
money equal to the Bank circulation was issued by  Government, 
and that the  sole effect ,of  depriving  the Bank of  this privilege 
would  be to transfer the profit  which accrues from  the  interest 
of  the money so issued from the Bank to Government. 
There remains,  however,  one  other  objection  to  which  the 
reader's  attention is requested. 
It is said that Government could not be safely entrusted with 
the power of  issuing paper money ;  that it would  most certainly 
abuse it;  and that on any occasion when it was pressed for money 
to carry on a war it would cease to pay coin on demand for its 
notes,  and  from  that  moment  the  currency  would  become  a 
forced  Government  paper.  There would,  I  confess,  be  great 
danger of  this if  Government-that  is to say, the Ministers-were 
themselves  to be  entrusted  with  the  power  of  issuing  paper 
money.  But I propose to place  this trust in  the hands of  Com- 
missioners  not  removable from their official  situation  but by  a 
vote of  one or both  Houses  of  Parliament.  I propose  also to 
prevent  all  intercourse  between  these  Commissioners  and 
Ministers  by  forbidding  every  species  of  money  transaction 
between  them.  The Commissioners should  never,  on any pre- 
tence, lend money to Government, nor be  in  the slightest degree 
under its control or influence.  Over Commissioners  so entirely 
independent of  them the Ministers would  have much  less power 
than  they  now  possess  over  the  Bank directors.  Experience 
shows how little this latter body have been able to withstand the 
cajolings  of  Ministers,  and  how  frequently  they  have  been 
induced  to  increase  their  advances  on  Exchequer  bills  and 
Treasury bills at the very  moment  they were themselves declar- 
ing  that  it  would  be  attended  with  the  greatest  risk  to the 
stability of  their establishment  and to the public  interest.  From 
a perusal of  the correspondence between the Government and the 
Rank previous to the stoppage of  Bank payments in  1797, it will 
be  seen  that the Bank attributes the  necessity  of  that measure 
(erroneously in this instance, I think) to the frequent and urgent 
demands for an increase of advances on the part of  Government. 
I  ask  then  whether  the  country would  not  possess  a  greater 
Security against all such influence over the minds of  the issuers 
of  paper as would induce them to swerve from the  strict line  of 
their  duty, if  the paper money  of  the country  were  issued  by 
Commissioners on the plan  I have proposed,  rather  than by the 
Bank  of  England  as at present  constituted  If  Government 
wanted  money  it should be obliged  to raise it  in  the legitimate 
way, by  taxing the people,  by  the issue and sale of  Exchequer 
bills, by funded loans, or by borrowing from any of  the numerous 
banks which might exist in the country; but in  no case should it 
be allowed to borrow from those who have the power of  creating 
money. 
If  the  funds  of  the  Commissioners  became  so ample  as to 
leave  them  a  surplus which  might be  advantageously disposed 
of,  let them  go into the market and purchase publicly  Govern- 
ment  securities  with  it.  If  on  the contrary  it should  become 
necessary  for them to contract their issues without diminishing 
their stock of gold, let them sell their securities in the same way 
in  the open market.  By this regulation a trifling sacrifice would 
be  made, amounting  to the turn of  the 'market  which  may  be 
supposed  to be gained by  those whose business it is to employ 
their  capital  and  skill  in  dealing in  these  securities,  but  in  a 
question of  this importance such a sacrifice is not worth consider- 
ing.  It must be  recollected that from the great competition  in 
this particular business,  the turn of  the market is reduced  to a 
very  small fraction, and  that the amount  of  such transactions 
could never be great, as  the circulation would be kept at its just 
level  by  allowing  for a  small  contraction  or extension  of  the 
treasure in coin and bullion  in the coffers of  the Commissioners. 
It would be only when, from the increasing wealth and prosperity 
of  the country,  the  country  required  a  permanently  increased 
amount of  circulation that it would be expedient to invest money 
in  the purchase of  securities paying interest, and only in a  con- 
trary case that a part of  such securities would  be required to be 
sold.  Thus then we see that the most complete security could 
be obtained against the influence which, on a first and superficial 
view,  it might  be  supposed  Government would  have over the 
issues  of  a  National  Bank,  and  that  by  organising  such  an 
establishment, all  the  interest  which  is  now  annually  paid  by 
Government  to the Bank would become  a part of  the national 
resources. 
I  would propose,  then,  some such plan  as the following  for 
the establishment of  a National  Bank :- 
I.  Five Commissioners  shall  be  appointed  in  whom  the full 
Power  of  issuing all the  paper  money  of  the  country shall  be 
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2.  On the expiration  of the charter of  the Bank  of  England 
in  1833 the  Commissioners  shall issue fifteen  millions  of  paper 
money,  the amount of the capital of  the Bank  lent to Govern- 
ment,  with  which  that  debt  shall  be  discharged.  From  that 
time the annual interest of 3 per cent. shall cease and determine. 
3.  On the  same day  ten  millions  of  paper  money  shall  be 
employed  by  the  Commissioners  in  the  following  manner :- 
With such parts of that sum as they may think expedient they 
shall purchase gold bullion of  the bank or of  other persons, and 
with  the  remainder,  within  six  months  of  the  day  above- 
mentioned,  they shall redeem  a part of  the Government debt to 
the Bank on Exchequer bills.  The Exchequer  bills so redeemed 
shall thereafter  remaln at the disposal of  the Commissioners. 
4.  The Bank shall be obliged with as little delay as convenient 
after the  expiration of  its charter,  to  redeem  all  its notes  in 
circulation by  the payment of them  in the new notes issued by 
Government.  It shall not pay them in goid, but shall be obliged 
to keep always a  reserve of  the new notes equal in amount to its 
own notes which may remain  in circulation. 
5.  The notes of  the Bank of  England shall be current for six 
months  after the expiration  of  the Bank  charter,  after  which 
they  shall no longer be received  by  Government  in  payment  of 
the revenue. 
7.  Within six months after the expiration of  the Bank charter 
the notes of  the country banks shall cease to circulate,  and the 
different banks which  shall have issued  them  shall be under the 
same obligation as the Bank of  England to pay them in Govern- 
ment notes.  They shall have the privilege of  paying their notes 
in gold coin if  they prefer so to do. 
8.  For the greater security of  the holders of  Government notes 
residing in  the country  there  shall be  agents in  the  different 
towns, who shall be obliged on demand to verify the genuineness 
of the notes by  affixing  their  signatures to them,  after  which 
such notes shall be exchangeable only in the district where they 
are so signed. 
9.  Notes issued in one district, or bearing the signature of an 
agent in one district, shall not be payable in any other; but on 
the deposit  of  any  number of notes in  the office of  the district 
where they were  originally issued  or where  they  were  signed, 
agreeably to the last regulation,  a bill  may be  obtained  on any 
other district payable in the notes of  that district. 
10.  Notes issued in the country shall not be payable in coin in 
the country ;  but for such notes a bill may be obtained on London 
which will be paid in coin or in London notes at the option of  the 
party presenting the bill  in London. 
I r.  P  ~lyone  depositing  coin  or London  notes  in  the London 
may obtain a bill payable in the notes of  any other district, 
to be  named  at the  time  of  obtaining  the bill.  And  anyone 
depositing  coin in the London office may obtain London notes to 
an equal amount. 
12.  The Commissioners in London shall be obliged to buy any 
quantity of  gold of standard fineness and exceeding one hundred 
ounces in weight  that may be  offered them, at a  price not less 
than ;63  17s. 6d. per ounce. 
13.  From the moment of  the  establishment of  the  National 
Bank the Commissioners shali be obliged to pay their notes and 
bills on demand in gold coin. 
14.  Notes  of  one pound shall be issued  at the first establish- 
ment  of  the  National  Bank,  and  shall  be  given  to  anyone 
requiring them in exchange for notes of  a larger amount if  the 
person presenting them prefers such notes to coin.  This regula- 
tion  to continue  in  force  only  for one year as far as regards 
London, hut to be a permanent one in all the country districts. 
15.  It must be well  understood  that in country  districts  the 
agents will  neither be liable to give notes for coin nor coin for 
notes. 
16.  The Commissioners shall act as the general banker  to all 
the  public  departments  in  the  same  manner  as the  Bank  of 
England  now acts, but they shall be  precluded  from filling  the 
same office either to any corporation or to any individual what- 
ever. 
On the subject of  the first regulation  I have already spoken. 
The Commissioners should be,  I  think,  five  in  number.  They 
should  have  an adequate salary  for  the  business  which  they 
would  have  to  perform  and  superintend.  They  should  be 
appoicted by  Government but not removable by  Government. 
The second  regulation  refers  to the mode in  which  the new 
paper  circulation  should  be  substituted  for  the  old.  By  the 
provision here made twenty-five  millions of  paper money  will  be 
issued.  That sum will not be  too large for the circulation of  the 
whole country, but if  it should be, the excess may be exchanged 
for gold coin, or the Commissioners may  sell  a portion of  their 
Exchequer  bills and thus diminish  the amount of the paper cir- 
culation.  There are other modes by  which  the  substitution of 
the new notes for the old might be made if  the Bank of  England 
co-operated  with the Commissioners, but the one here proposed 
would  be  effectual.  It might  be  desirable  that  Government 
should purchase from the Bank at a  fair valuation the whole of 
1ts buildings  if  the  Bank were willing  to part with them,  and 
also take all its clerks and servants into pay.  It would be  but 
Just to the clerks and servants of  the Bank to provide  employ- 
ment  and  support for them, and would  be  useful  to the public 
to have the services of  so many tried and experienced officers to 
conduct  their  affairs.  It is a  part of  my  plan,  too,  that  the 
Payment  to the Bank for the management of  the National  Debt 
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that this department of  the public business  should be put under 
the superintendence and control of  the Commissioners. 
The third regulation provides for a proper deposit of  gold coin 
and bullion, without which the new establishment could not act. 
In fact,  there would be  fourteen  millions  instead of  ten at the 
disposal of  the Commissioners.  It has been  seen by one of  the 
subsequent  regulations  that  the  Commissioners  would  act  as 
banker to the public departments, and as it is found by  experi- 
ence that on the average  these departments have four millions 
in  their  banker's  hands,  the Commissioners  would  have these 
four millions in addition to the ten millions.  If  five millions were 
devoted to the purchase of  coin and bullion,  nine millions would 
be invested in floating securities.  If  eight millions were invested 
in gold, six millions would remain for the purchase of  Exchequer 
bills.  Whatever debt remained due to the Bank after this second 
payment made by  the Commissioners  must be  provided  for  by 
loan,  or made  the subject of  a  special  agreement between  the 
Government and the Bank of England. 
The fourth and fifth  regulations provide  for the substitution 
of  the new paper money  for the old, and protect the bank from 
the payment in specie of  the notes which it may have outstand- 
ing.  This cannot  be  attended  with  any  inconvenience  to the 
holders of  those notes, because the Bank is bound  to give them 
Government notes which  are exchangeable on demand for gold 
coin. 
The  seventh  regulation  provides  for the  substitution  of  the 
new  notes for the old country bank notes.  The country banks 
could have  no difficulty  in  providing  themselves  with  the new 
notes for  that purpose.  All  their  transactions  finally  settle  in 
London, and their circulation is raised  upon securities deposited 
there.  By  disposing  of  these  securities  they  would  furnish 
themselves with  the requisite  quantity of  money  to provide  for 
the payment  of  their notes,  consequently the country would at 
no time be  in want of  an adequate circulation.  The circulation 
of  the country banks is estimated at about ten millions. 
The eighth  regulation  provides  against  fraud  and  forgery. 
In the first instance paper  money  cannot be  issued  from each 
district but must all be sent from London.  It is just,  therefore, 
that some public agent should, in as many places as convenient, 
be  prepared  to verify  the  genuineness  of  the  notes.  After  a 
time the circulation of  each district would be carried on by notes 
issued  in  that  district  in  forms  sent  for  that  purpose  from 
London. 
The  ninth  regulation  provides  every  possible  facility  for 
making remittances and payments to any district in the country. 
If  a  man at York wishes to make a  payment  of  Ex,ooo to a 
person at Canterbury, by the payment of  ;GI,-  in  notes issued 
at York  to  the agent  in  that town  he  may  receive  a  bill  for 
EI,OOO  payable  at Canterbury  in  the  notes  of  that  district. 
The  tenth regulation  provides for the payment  of  the  notes 
of every  district  in  coin  in  London.  If  a  man  in  York  wants  LI,OOO  in  coin  Government  should  not  be  at the expense  of 
sending it to him, he ought to be at that expense himself.  This 
is a sacrifice which  must be made for the use  of  paper money, 
and if  the inhabitants of the country are not contented to submit 
to it, they may use gold instead of paper;  they must, neverthe- 
less, be at the expense of  procuring it. 
The  eleventh  regulation  as well  as the  ninth  provides  for 
making  remittances and payments to all parts of  the country. 
The  twelfth  regulation  provides  against  the  amount  of  the 
paper  currency being too much  limited  in  quantity by  obliging 
the Commissioners to issue it at all  times in  exchange for gold 
at the price of  A3 17s. 6d.  per ounce.  Regulating their issues 
by  the  price  of  gold  the  Commissioners  could  never  err.  It 
might  be  expedient  to  oblige  them  to  sell  gold  bullion  at 
Ag 17s.  gd.,  in  which  case  the coin  would probably  never  be 
exported, because that can never be obtained under A3  17s. 108d. 
per ounce.  Under such a  system the only variations  that could 
take place in the price of  gold would be  between  the prices  of 
A3 17s. 6d.  and  f7s. gd., and by watching the market price 
and increasing  their issues of  paper when  the price  inclined  to 
A3  17s. 6d. or under, and limiting them or withdrawing a  small 
portion  when the  price inclined  to A3 17s. gd.  or more,  there 
would  not probably  be a  dozen transactions in  the year by  the 
Commissioners  in  the purchase  and sale of  gold, and  if  there 
were  they  would  always  be  advantageous  and  leave  a  small 
profit to the establishment.  As it is, however, desirable to be on 
the safe side in  managing  the  important  business  of  a  paper 
money  in a  great country, it would be proper to make a  liberal 
provision of  gold, as suggested in a  former regulation,  in case 
it  should  be  thought expedient  occasionally  to correct  the ex- 
changes with foreign countries by the exportaticn of  gold as  well 
as  by the reduction of  the amount of  paper. 
The thirteenth  regulation  obliges  the  Commissioners  to pay 
their notes on demand in gold  coin. 
The fourteenth  regulation provides for a  supply of  one pound 
notes for the country circulation.  On the first  establishmznt of 
the National Bank, but not afterwards, these are to be issued in 
London,  to be  subsequently countersigned  in  the country.  As 
check on the country  agents every description  of  note  might 
e  sent to  them  from  London,  numbered  and  signed.  After 
eceiving them, the agent  should countersign them  before  they 
were  issued  to  the  public,  and  he  should  be  held  strictly 
responsible for the whole amount sent to him in the same manner 
as the  distributors  of  stamps  are  responsible  for  the  whole 
amount  of  stamps sent  to them.  It is hardly  necessary  to SUPPLEMENT  111.  SUPPLEMENT  111.  427 
observe that the country agents ought to be in constant corre- 
spondence with  the  London  district  for the purpose  of  giving 
information of  all their proceedings.  Suppose a country agent 
has given  zoo  notes of ,GI  for a  note of LIOO,  he  must give 
information  of  that fact, sending at the same  time the larger 
note for which he has given them.  His account in London would 
be  credited  and  debited  accordingly.  If  he  receive  Lroo in 
notes and give a  bill  on another district  he must give advice, 
both to the London district and to the district on which  the bill 
is  given,  sending up the note as in the former instance.  His 
account will be credited for this 6x00,  and the agent of  the other 
district will be charged with it.  It is not requisite to go farther 
into details;  I may already have said too much, but my object 
has been  to show that the  security  for the detection  of  fraud 
is nearly perfect, as vouchers for every transaction would all be 
originally issued  in  London,  and must be  returned  to London, 
or be in the possession of  the country agent. 
The fifteenth  regulation  is  only  explanatory  of  some  of  the 
former regulations. 
The sixteenth  regulation directs that the Commissioners shall 
act as  banker to the public departments and to the public depart- 
ments only. 
If  the plan now proposed should be adopted the countr  would 
probably,  on  the most  moderate  computation,  save  AYo,mo 
per annum.  Suppose the circulation  of paper money  to amount 
to twenty-five  millions  and  the  Government  deposits  to  four 
millions,  these together make twenty-nine millions.  On all this 
sum interest would be  saved with the exception of  six millions 
perhaps,  which  .it  might  be  thought  necessary  to  retain  as 
deposits in  gold coin and bullion and which  would consequently 
be unproductive.  Reckoning interest then at 3 per cent. only on 
twenty-three millions,  the public would  be gainers of  ,G6go,ooo. 
To this  must  be  added  A248,ooo  which  is now  paid  for the 
management  of  the  public  debt,  making  together  A938,ooo. 
Now  supposing  the  expenses  to amount  to  A188,ooo,  there 
would  remain  for  the  public  an  annual  saving  or  gain  of 
&750,000. 
It wrll  be remarked  that the plan provides against any party 
but the Commissioners in  London  making an original  issue of 
notes.  Agents in other districts in  the country, connected with 
the  Commissioners,  may  give  one  description  of  notes  for 
another;  they may  give bills for notes or notes for bills  drawn 
on them, but in the first  instance, every one of  these notes must 
be  issued  by  the Commissioners in  London,  and consequently 
the whole  is strictly under  their  cognizance.  If  from any cir- 
cumstances  the  circulation  in  any  particular  district  should 
become  redundant, provision  is made for  the transfer of  such 
redundancy to London, and if it should be deficient a fresh supply 
is obtained  from London.  If  the circulation  of  London  should 
be redundant it will  show itself by the increased  price of  bullion 
and the fall in the foreign exchanges, precisely as a  redundancy 
is now shown, and the remedy  is also the same as that now  in 
operation,  viz. : a  reduction  of  circulation,  which  is  brought 
by  a  reduction  of  the paper  circulation.  That reduction 
may  take place in  two ways-either  by  the  sale of  Exchequer 
bills in the market and the cancelling of  the paper money which 
is  obtained  for them,  or by  giving  gold  in  exchange for the 
paper,  cancelling  the paper  as before  and exporting the gold. 
The exporting the gold will not be done by the Commissioners; 
that  will  be  effected  by  the  commercial  operation  of  the 
merchants,  who  never  fail  to  find  gold  the  most  profitable 
remittance when  the paper  money  is redundant  and excessive. 
If, on the  contrary,  the circulation  of  London  were  too  low, 
there  would  be  two ways of  increasing it-by  the purchase  of 
Government  securities  in  the market  and  the creation of  new 
paper  money  for  the purpose,  or by  the importation and pur- 
chase by the Commissioners of  gold bullion,  for the purchase of 
which  new  paper  money  would  be  created.  The importation 
would  take place through commercial operations, as gold never 
fails  to be  a  profitable  article of  import when  the amount of 
currency is deficient. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
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